Iran: How Should the US Treat the Green Movement? (Haghighatjoo)

insideIRAN publishes an interview with one of the most prominent US-based expatriate Iranians:

Fatemeh Haghighatjoo was a member of Iran’s Parliament from 2000 to 2004, and a prominent advocate of women’s rights and political reform. She resigned in 2004 after a crackdown on reformers and left Iran in 2005. She is now a visiting scholar at the University of Massachusetts–Boston.

Q: The Obama administration has been reluctant to express support for the opposition movement out of fear that doing so would end Iran’s cooperation in the nuclear negotiations. But now that those talks are at an impasse, what should the United States do regarding the opposition?

A: I would say the United States should carefully and delicately support the opposition movement based on United Nations conventions, because Iran is a signatory to many UN human rights conventions.

Second, the United States can help the flow of information in Iran by providing technical support for Internet and satellite access. For example, one important question is how to increase the security of domains, hide the identity of dissidents who run websites and social networking sites, and also provide a free place to move blocked websites from different servers, once the authorities shut down opposition websites. This would help the dissidents. There are many volunteers who are running the websites and they need to deal with the blockade on the Internet. The Internet and other forms of information are having a huge impact on the opposition movement. Look at the impact of BBC Persian TV during the past six months.

Q: How do you view the opposition at this stage?

A: The green movement encompasses a wide spectrum of protestors. At one side of the spectrum are protestors who are loyal to the regime and just have objections to the fraudulent election, and their ultimate goal is the removal of President Ahmadinejad. And at the other side are dissidents who fight to bring the regime down. Although the opposition is incoherent, it does have the common goals of removing Ahmadinejad, ending the violation of people’s rights, and releasing all political prisoners.

The internal leadership of the Green Movement is loyal to the foundation of the regime, so after increased demands that threaten the nature of the regime, movement leaders may be increasingly concerned about both the fundamentalists inside the government and the extremists within the movement. Former presidents Mohammed Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani have warned against radicalism. Also, there is an effort to have negotiations between opposition leaders and Supreme Leader Khamenei, even though Khamenei still talks tough and tries to convince all influential figures to condemn the protests.

The situation today is very different from past unrest. Even if the authorities arrest Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the protests will continue. There are more cracks now among the political elites than ever before. There is a rift between Khamenei and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. We also see a crack between the regime and the clergy. In every aspect of the regime, you will see that the crisis is deepening. The movement is deep and spreading. On the one hand, the regime’s strategy is the continuation of the crackdown, the arrests of activists and political leaders, to block the flow of information, and not allow any protests in the near future; and, on the other hand, the regime is trying to attract people to state-run TV by running debates at least through the end of the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in February and to recruit people for a huge pro-state rally on February 11.

It is important for the West, especially for the United States, to act correctly.

Q: Can traditional conservatives, such as Rafsanjani and Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani reform the system?

A: I do not see that they have such ability to reform the system because of the contradiction within the system. Khamenei does not tolerate any initiation for reform. They are unable to meet the people’s needs.

Q: Given the political instability inside Iran, what are the options available to the United States in dealing with Iran?

A: I understand that the United States wants to see progress on the nuclear side, while wanting to help the opposition movement, and these two things can be at cross-purposes. Inside Iran, because of the crisis and the cracks among political elites, they can’t reach ultimate decisions on international affairs. In domestic issues, the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, prefers to use his power to make decisions, and to some extent, he may be successful for now through the branches of government. However, he has not fully succeeded in gaining the support of most clergy, prominent politicians, and influential figures.

We see this lack of agreement on the nuclear issue because members of the regime keep changing their position. This, more than anything, shows the splits among the factions. Since 2005, Iran has bought time. But this time, it is different. First, they know that some countries do not like Iran’s regime, especially the current government. Khamenei fears that, in the future, the West might do something against him. But he believes that if he can acquire knowledge on building a nuclear weapon, this would give Iran the upper hand in future nuclear negotiations with the West. I guess the ultimate goal of some of Iran’s hardliners is a nuclear weapon, either to counter a likely air attack or to force toleration of the actions of a nuclear Iran.

But right now, Khamenei can’t reach an agreement on the nuclear issue because he can’t manage two crises at once, and for him the domestic issue is more important.
He understands that this movement, the opposition, could overthrow his government. He understands that the dissidents are not just about removing Ahmadinejad from power; now, the dissent is about much more than that.

Iran is in the process of transitioning to democracy. Supporting smooth transition would strengthen regional security. However, any sort of attack on Iran under any circumstance would dramatically hurt the movement. The Obama administrative and his allies, aside from maintaining negotiations with Iran regarding the nuclear program, should pay more attention to human rights issues in Iran and put more pressure on Iran’s government to release all political prisoners and stop the executions.

2009: The View from Inside Iran

In Iran Review, published in Tehran, Dr Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh considers the domestic and international landscape for Iran over the last 12 months. What struck me in particular is the careful, even coded, treatment of the post-election conflict: "What is important for an expert in Iranian affairs here is the capability to distinguish superficially changing trends from the profound and reflective developments within the establishment and the society."

The year 2009 was a very significant and decisive year for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, on the 30th birthday of the Iranian revolution (1979-2009) some kind of transformation or rebirth occurred in the scene of internal developments so that for the first time over the past three decades, domestic politics overshadowed foreign policy. In other words, the events before and after the June presidential elections caused many of the conceptual frameworks in the IRI establishment’s interactions with the internal and external environments to be revised, transformed or reconsidered. In the meantime, during the same period of time, Iran’s foreign policy faced its own ups and downs like the previous years.

Among Iran’s foreign policy priorities in 2009 mention can be made of the nuclear issue, relations with the US, relations with the EU, interactions with neighboring countries, continued hostility with Israel, regional role in the Persian Gulf and Middle East, expansion of ties with various corners of the world including Latin America, and efforts to play an effective role at international organizations through promotion of multilateral diplomacy.

The following report discusses some prominent points and significant events and interactions Iran went through and experienced in 2009.

Domestic Policy

The presidential elections began to overshadow all internal issues and developments in Iran from the early days of the spring 2009.



Nonetheless, no domestic analyst ever predicted that within a period of just two months the elections would become the hottest issue in the entire society. The kind of programs given by the candidates who had made their ways into the final stage, radio interviews and heated TV debates by the presidential hopefuls and their repercussions in the society which in turn caused street lineups by supporters of the candidates that sometimes continued until the early hours into the morning had brought a climate of excitement reminiscent of the early days of the 1979 revolution though it came as a big surprise and sounded very unusual to those who were too young to remember those days. The presence of nearly 85 percent of eligible voters in the polls demonstrated the great impact of the competition climate as well as the importance Iranian people attached to their inalienable right in the field of democracy.

However, the post-election days were not peaceful days and in fact marked the outbreak of incidents which continued towards the end of 2009 and well into the year 2010. This trend will most probably continue in the coming months.

Irrespective of all peaceful and violent protests and clashes, position-takings, commentaries, rifts, patch-ups, unifications, transformations and many other developments that have occurred in the domestic scene in Iran, the nation and the ruling establishment gained experiences which would take years to acquire under normal conditions.

In the meantime, it would be a superficial analysis to say that the IRI establishment has been shaken after the presidential elections and that its collapse is near. Likewise, it would be wrong to say that no changes have occurred in the IRI policies and approaches and that Iran is the same Iran before June 2009. If we leave behind the attractive media propaganda and spot news reporting, it would be possible to reach a deeper analysis of this trend.

Nowadays, although many state officials and experts, particularly those who have left behind the difficult years early after the revolution as well as the hardships of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) are not happy with the status quo yet they maintain that the revolution has gone through much more difficult days before. These officials and experts are convinced that despite the extremisms shown by certain individuals from the opposing camps after the presidential elections, the IRI establishment has displayed and will display high tolerance, forbearance and compatibility. They opine that all these incidents will eventually lead to a better and deeper understanding and more dynamism on behalf of the IRI system. In other words, by accepting criticisms from within, the IRI would identify and mend its vulnerable points, would have a more comprehensive and more thoughtful look at internal and international issues and take stronger strides in compliance with the conditions and requirements of the day with knowledge about the demands and potentials of the nation and civil society.

In reality, what is important for an expert in Iranian affairs here is the capability to distinguish superficially changing trends from the profound and reflective developments within the establishment and the society. As mentioned before, it is inevitable that the climate of Iran’s interactions with the internal society as well as the international community will be quite different from the past. But to expect Iran to turn into a bankrupt state engulfed with internal riots and become internationally weak is so inappropriate that even many of the current protest leaders would not agree with.

Foreign Policy

Although the scene of Iran’s international interactions was to a great extent influenced by domestic dynamism in the last months of 2009, the events and as a result Iran’s reactions fell mostly within the framework of the policies formulated by the Islamic Republic system. Some of the most important interactions and developments in key areas were as follows:

1. Nuclear Issue

On the whole, Iran received three reports from the former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency on June 5, August 28 and November 16, 2009. In all of these reports, as had been the case before, the IAEA chief adopted an ambiguous approach by saying there was no evidence to prove Iran’s intention to use nuclear energy for military purposes. At the same time he said Tehran had not suspended enrichment activities and failed to implement the Additional Protocol.

In his November report, Mohamed ElBaradei voiced concern over existence of other secret nuclear sites in Iran and took stance by adopting a harsher tone. Also in the last meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna, the draft resolution proposed by P5+1 was reviewed and in the voting which took place on November 27, a resolution was passed under the pressure of Western countries against Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities.

The Iran-IAEA dispute over the way the news about Fordo nuclear installations (near Qom) was disclosed, was among issues which helped adoption of this resolution.
Failure of Iran and P5+1 to come to an agreement on ways of supplying fuel for Iran’s nuclear research reactor, which has not been finalized so far despite negotiations and fluctuations, also overshadowed Iran’s nuclear case and its interactions with the West.

2. Ties with the United States

Although some Iranian experts still believe that there is a better chance for interaction with Barack Obama than with George Bush, what happened in 2009 raised the number of advocates of the viewpoint in the Iranian society that Obama has an iron fist in a velvet glove. Increasing the number of US troops in Afghanistan, the little difference in the policies adopted by US administrations towards the Middle East peace process, and continuation of the US policy of “everyone except for Iran” in the political and economic interactions in the northern and southern spheres of Iran were among signs that further supported this perspective among Iranian experts.

Yet, the US position vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear case and the kind of stance Washington adopted towards the post-election events have further escalated the existing tension.

The Obama administration’s persistence on suspension of Iran’s nuclear activities including uranium enrichment, giving a month-long deadline (until January 1, 2010) to Iran to accept a plan on supply of fuel for Iran’s nuclear research reactor through uranium exchange (of course based on their conditions, that is first to send uranium out of Iran and then receive the fuel in intervals, which faced Iran’s opposition) prompted Iran to propose a simultaneous exchange of fuel inside its own territory or a third country. This made the complicated relations between the two countries to become even more complicated. Here, the adoption of Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act and the Iran Sanctions Enabling Act by the US Congress on December 15 targeting Iran’s oil products further aggravated the climate.

Meanwhile, the US administration’s position vis-à-vis Iran’s post-election events – considering the fact that based on historical experience, any foreign intervention in domestic issues is considered despicable and disagreeable -  is reminiscent of the bitter era of colonialist rivalry between Russia and Britain and later the United States in Iran. This has considerably reduced the possibility of improvement in Tehran-Washington relations and paving the way for an atmosphere of fair talks on issues between the two countries.

However, the increase in the number of American experts and researchers who have admitted in their Iran analyses that no interference should be made in this process indicates that the process of having a better knowledge about Iran is a process forward that can be used in creating better opportunities for acquaintance, interaction and fair relations between governments and communities of both sides.

3. Relations with Europe

Ties between Iran and the EU in 2009 were greatly influenced by human rights issues and post-election developments besides the nuclear issue. Release of numerous statements in condemnation of death sentences carried out in Iran, as well as objection to the existing procedures in the judicial system in probing into charges of some political activists during the election protests were among Europe’s interactions with Iran which escalated after the June presidential elections and arrest of a number of local staff of certain European embassies as well as that of a number of European nationals in street riots in Iran.

Although the Swedish prime minister, whose country took over the EU chair as of July 2009, called on his partners to show self-restraint and warned that Europe should refrain from pitting Iran against other world countries, yet 27 member states of the European Union summoned their ambassadors from Iran on July 3 in protest to the detention of staff of the British embassy in Tehran. The decision was made following a meeting of the EU member states in Brussels. According to an official affiliated to the EU, participants in the meeting agreed to take gradual punitive measures against Iran.

In continuation of these developments, an EU spokesperson said on August 6 while justifying these negative position-takings that Mr. Ahmadinejad’s victory in the elections was open to question and the Iranian people were suspicious about its authenticity. The spokesperson made these statements under conditions that some ambassadors of the EU countries such as France, Britain and Sweden had taken part in the swearing-in ceremony of Mr. Ahmadinejad after his reelection.

On the whole, ties between the two sides in 2009 were full of ups and downs and in fact nothing occurred to reduce future ambiguities in these relations.

4. Iran-China Ties

Stability and growth are among characteristics of mutual relations between Iran and China, which also continued in 2009. In fact, with respect to the vague prospects for improvement of relations with the United States and the European Union, and also the kind of interaction of China and Russia with issues related to Iran, Iranian officials are unintentionally more inclined to promotion of ties with China, particularly in economic fields. The conclusion of a three billion dollar contract between Iran and China to expand Abadan refinery, a five billion dollar deal to develop phase 11 of the South Pars gas field which led to the replacement of French Total Company with the Chinese National Oil Company in this project, increase in trade exchanges between Iran and China to more than 25 billion dollars, an agreement between the two countries to construct Tehran-Isfahan railway and turning Iran to the third biggest oil exporter to China were among important developments in Tehran-Beijing ties in 2009.

5. Iran-Israel Encounter

Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu announced during his election campaign that countering Iran’s nuclear program was on top of his priorities in case of coming to power. He even announced after formation of the new government that he might launch an air strike against Iran to destroy its nuclear installations because he called Iran the biggest threat against the Zionist regime ever since its inception. On the whole, not ruling out a military strike against Iran’s nuclear installations has been one of the most important conflicts in bilateral relations.

The regime in Israel follows this policy by intertwining the Middle East peace process with Iran’s nuclear issue and all-out efforts to show that Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is a threat and in return diverts public attentions from its tension escalating policies and nuclear arsenals, which are the main source of insecurity in the Middle East. Nevertheless, this policy seems to have lost its efficiency with respect to the current realities and its propaganda dimension has outdone its executive one.

Also, the Israeli regime’s use of psychological warfare tactics to create political crises against the Islamic Republic, such as accusing Iran of building A-bomb and magnifying the political events after the June 12 elections, has prompted Israel to intensify its media attacks to undermine the establishment and reduce public loyalty and acceptability. However, experience has shown that no matter how big the differences of Iranian people may be on domestic issues, they will certainly not be inclined towards two things: Israel and the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO).

6. Relations with Neighbors

Iran’s efforts to improve ties with the neighboring countries and restore calm and tranquility towards security of its borders continued in 2009. In this respect, relations with Afghanistan, Turkey and other Central Asian and Caucasus countries continued its growing trend at different paces. However, expansion of ties with the Persian Gulf countries experienced more ups and downs.

As for Iraq, along with some fluctuations in relations, termination of presence of MKO garrisons along Iran’s borders after 24 years was among important developments in Tehran-Baghdad bilateral ties.

On the whole, the ups and downs in international relations as well as domestic dynamism in Iran in 2009 were in some cases more than what was expected at the beginning of the year. In the meantime, the international dynamism has had its special impact on the way Iran has acted. The heavy recession in world economy, the fall in oil prices, the global impacts of environmental pollutions on the climate cycles in Iran and the world, the changing global trends in the area of armaments, human rights, globalization, internet media, etc. all left their impacts on the developments in Iran.
Therefore, it can be said that irrespective of their possible consequences, the year 2009 was a year marked with profound experiences for the Iranian society and the Islamic establishment.

The Latest from Iran: If Khamenei's Other Shoe Drops (20 January)

2240 GMT: Balatarin Lives (for Real). An update and possible correction on our earlier story (1914 GMT) about the fate of Balatarin, the Iranian news portal. The site is back up, and some Iranian activists are saying that the supposed "successor" Agah Tarin was actually a regime attempt at imitation.

2000 GMT: An Iranian activist reports that journalist Nasrin Vaziri has been released after 23 days in prison.

1950 GMT: Rah-e-Sabz reports that Ali Reza Beheshti, Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief advisor, has suffered a heart attack in detention. It adds, however, that Beheshti has contacted his family and said that he is now better.

1914 GMT: Balatarin Lives. Balatarin, an Iranian website similar to the Digg or NewsVine portals, has been an important news source during the post-election crisis but was knocked off-line recently. Now a successor, Agah Tarin, has appeared.

1910 GMT: Mohsen Safai Farahani, recently sentenced to six years in prison, will be released today on bail of $700.000 $ for five days during the appeal against the verdict.

NEW Iran Analysis: “Supreme Leader Warns Rafsanjani” — The Sequels
NEW Iran: Ahmadinejad and the Labor Movement
Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader Warns Rafsanjani
Iran Special: Breaking Mousavi’s Movement — Beheshti & Abutalabi
Iran Analysis: Reality Check (Yep, We Checked, Government Still in Trouble)
The Latest from Iran (19 January): Cross-Currents

1900 GMT: The Battle Against Ahmadinejad. For all of our attention to the manoeuvres around the Supreme Leader's speech, this may be the most important news on the in-fighting in the establishment. An unnamed influential member of the hardliners who supports the Government declares that Ahmadinejad Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai "is out".

The website that prints this news, adding, "It appears as if the Government will put away Rahim-Mashai at an appropriate quiet moment"? The pro-Larijani Khabar Online.

1845 GMT: A group of economics professors have asked for the release of Professor Ali Arab Mazar of Allameh Tabatabei University, one of Mir Hossein Mousavi's top advisors, arrested after Ashura.

1840 GMT: Journalist, writer and critic Mehdi Jalil-Khani was arrested on Monday in Zanjan. He was brought blindfolded and handcuffed to the intelligence, accused of "insulting the leader".

1830 GMT: Now Poets are Banned. This entry from Pedestrian deserves to be quoted in full:

Ferdowsi is a monumental 10th century Persian poet. His Shahnameh (Book of Kings, translated into English by Dick Davis) is a national epic read and revered across Iran.

Now the wife of imprisoned journalist, Bahman Ahmadi reports that one of the charges for which he will have to serve an eight year prison sentence is, according to the judge’s verdict: “publishing an epic poem by the poet Ferdowsi on June 12th, 2009 in order to invite the public to protest and revolt.”

It is noted that Bahmad Ahmadi himself was not even allowed to read the verdict.

1455 GMT: The Coughing Protest. Rah-e-Sabz claims that a recent "political education" event at an Iran army barracks had to be cancelled when hundreds of soldiers starting coughing, apparently when the speaker criticised the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. Commanders have asked for a list of the dissident coughers.

1445 GMT: Toeing the Line. In a prolonged Press TV advertisement for the regime, Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei has blamed the post-election conflict on opposition candidates (Mousavi, Karroubi) who refused to act within the law and on foreign powers trying to unsettle the regime.

The only hint of Rezaei criticism of the Government was the invocation to distinguish between "protesters" and "rioters", both amongst security forces and Iran's state media, but he was happy to support Press TV's uplifting image of "democracy in Iran", with both sides learning to "act within the law".

Rezaei did throw out a conciliatory lifeline to the "Green movement" in the last part of the discussion by invoking the current televised debates as a reason for hope that opposition demands will be considered. Strange, however, that he would allow Press TV to push maybe the most important part of the interview --- Rezaei's letter for "unity" sent to the Supreme Leader earlier this month --- to the final minutes of the conversation.

1440 GMT: Black Comedy. University professors have published a "last will", to be retrieved after their demises: "I, Professor XXXXXX, killed by a bomb/bullet/fallen from a high floor/ suffocated with a string/fallen in a sulphuric acid bath hereby declare that 1) I was not a nuclear scientist, 2) I was never a supporter of Ahmadinejad."

Ebrahim Nabavi offers helpful proposals to Iran police chief Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam, who seems to have recently discovered the difference between BMW and SMS.

1435 GMT: Academic Purges. Six prominent professors of Allameh Tabatabei University have been relieved of their duties.

1400 GMT: The Follow-Up on Khamenei & Rafsanjani. We've posted a separate entry on varying responses to yesterday's speech by the Supreme Leader.

1148 GMT: Labour Issues. Deputy Oil Minister Seyfollah Jashn-Saz has warned, "If payments in oil sector continue like this, some employees will leave the country." Not leave the sector, leave the country.

Meanwhile, we've posted an interesting interview with an Iranian labour activist about the situation under the Ahmadinejad Government.

1140 GMT: Baghi's Detention. The wife of journalist Emadeddin Baghi, detained just after Grand Ayatollah Montazeri's death (supposedly for his interview of Montazeri), has spoken about her husband's arrest and detention.

1130 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? Well, in addition to biking and jogging (see 0900 GMT), President Ahmadinejad has met Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi. No mention of Iran's internal situation but Ahmadinejad did put out the line, "Maintenance of unity and integrity among regional countries will be the only way to thwart the conspiracies of enemies."

1125 GMT: While almost all of the Mothers of Mourning detained in recent weeks have been released, Persian2English highlights the case of one supporter who is reported to be in solitary confinement in Evin Prison.

1115 GMT: Who Killed Professor Ali-Mohammadi? Everyone (except us). The "hard-line" newspaper Kayhan reportedly has identified those responsible for the explosion which killed physicist Massoud Ali-Mohammadi last week. Iran's judiciary should go after Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi who are partners with the "black triangle" of the CIA, Mossad, and Britain's MI6.

0930 GMT: The Khamenei-Rafsanjani Dance. Press TV spins yesterday's speech by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani (and ignores the Supreme Leader's address) to portray unity: "Hashemi echoes Leader in observing law".

0900 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad handles the economic crisis by riding a bike. And jogging.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i-FAypZ2JKQ&feature=sub[/youtube]

0845 GMT: The US-based journalist and scholar Mehdi Khalaji has written a long article about his father, Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Khalaji, who was arrested last week:

By initiating a crackdown on peaceful protesters and suppressing the first generation of the Islamic Republic, the government has simultaneously discredited its Islamic legitimacy and undermined its revolutionary credentials. This regime has transformed my father from a man concerned with keeping Ayatollah Khomeini's shoulders warm into an enemy of the state. This is a revolution that eats its own children. It places its survival at risk.

0600 GMT: It's a curious but effective phrase: "Waiting for the other shoe to drop" is not just waiting, but waiting with an expectation based on nerves and fear.

So this morning we start by looking around for reactions to the Supreme Leader's speech yesterday. Our initial line, based on a very good source, was that Ayatollah Khamenei had dropped the first shoe to warn Hashemi Rafsanjani that it was time to choose sides.

However, as an EA reader helpfully intervened last night, the warning could have been intended for others in the "elite". Again, we emphasize those within the establishment --- an elite whom Khameini said could assist "sedition" with their ambiguity --- rather than the opposition. In weeks after Ashura (27 December) and before the Supreme Leader's statement, the conservative/principlist challenge to the Government neared insurgency, setting the immediate goals of taking down former Tehran prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi and Ahmadinejad's right-hand man Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

The insurgency, carried out through newspapers as well as around the Iranian Parliament, has not yet achieved either immediate goal, but it is likely that Mortazavi will have to resign as a Presidential aide, possibly serving jail time. So one reading of Khamenei's warning to the elite is that the challenge stops there.

That said, if this was a throw-down to those in the establishment beyond Rafsanjani, there's a risky slippage in the Supreme Leader's words. Critics like Ali Motahhari have not been ambiguous in their interviews; they want the removal of President Ahmadinejad or, at least, his reduction to a humiliated figurehead as he gives a public apology for the post-election failures and abuses.

If the critics don't back away from that demand, Khamenei will face a moment beyond yesterday's speech and possibly any declaration he has made since the week after the election: does he drop the other shoe and offer his unconditional backing to Ahmadinejad or does he back away and let a far from ambiguous "elite" despatch the President on a permanent holiday?

Iran Analysis: "Supreme Leader Warns Rafsanjani" --- The Sequels

A valued EA source takes us through the follow-up to the Supreme Leader's Tuesday speech, which we read initially as a warning to Hashemi Rafansanjani and then as a possible warning to other conservative/principlist critics of the Ahmadinejad Government:

1. Ali Larijani backs up Ayatollah Khamenei, but does he also strike at Government "extremists"?:

I know that the Supreme Leader does not like that a group of people under the title of defending the Supreme Leader oppress the people and become hardliners....We can not run the country by socialist economy and the economy (economy activities) should be handed over to people.

Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader Warns Rafsanjani
The Latest from Iran: If Khamenei’s Other Shoe Drops (20 January)

2. Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, a fervent Ahmadinejad suppporter in Parliament, has gone for an all-out attack: he strikes at Hashemi Rafsanjani, Green movement leaders, the reformist Association of Combatant Clergy, and even Ali Larijani:

This person (Rafsanjani)...is in the government and one of the officials because of the mercy of the leadership, Today he is the lawyer of the reformists and defends them.

We wish that Mr. Hashemi stays loyal to the leader and the revolution, but unfortunately we have to say that he --- in the recent months ---- has been managing the opposition wave. For how long, do you want to speak ambiguously and call the rioters of Ashura "people"?

Majma’ Rohannioon Mobarez (the Association of Combatant Clergys) also issued a statement in support of the opposition protests. I had told one of the members of Association of Combatant Clergy that if I was a judge, I would consider this statement as being "war against God" (mohareb)....

One of the reason why I wanted to resign (as a member of Parliament) is the behaviour and approach of the Parlimant Speaker (Ali Larijani) because we wanted the dismissal of Mr. Mohtashamipour (head of the Palestine Defence Committee), however Mr. Larijani did not pay attention.

3. Hojatoleslam Ibrahimi, of the central council of the Association of Combatant Clergy Association and a member of Parlaiment, offers conciliation. He believes that the deep friendship between the supreme leader and Hashemi Rafsanjani cannot be denied and criticises those  who are trying to cause division between them.

4. Alef Newspaper seems to echo Larijani, strongly criticising those who act inappropriately with the excuse of defending the Supreme Leader. It links an "extremism" which tried to assassinate reformist politician Saeed Hajjarian and attacked dormitories on the Tehran University with the crimes of Kahrizak Prison.

As the 40th Day memorial of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri approaches, Alef reminds readers that, even though the Supreme Leader issued a statement upon the demise of Montazeri, some extremists attacked Ayatollah house and broke the windows. Those extremists also treat other Revolution figures (e.g. Rafsanjani) the same way.

http://alef.ir/1388/content/view/62468

Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader Warns Rafsanjani

Hat-tip to a valued EA source for this story:

On the surface, the meeting was simply the greetings of a Supreme Leader to those organising the anniversary celebrations of his Islamic Republic. It was an occasion to declare that the most important aspect of any ceremony is the presence of the Iranian people, and it is important to protect them and guarantee their security.

The Latest from Iran: If Khamenei’s Other Shoe Drops (20 January)
The Latest from Iran (19 January): Cross-Currents

Not so far below the surface, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has just told other important Iranian political figures --- not those in "the opposition" but those within the establishment: Get Beside Me.

Of course Khamenei referred to the Green movement but he did so primarily to shoo it away: this was "merely a small deceived group". Behind them was the bigger threat of "the enemy [who] is trying to shaken our great national treasure, February 11 (anniversary of Iranian Revolution)".

The important passage in Khamenei's speech came after he declared, "Our real need is understanding that this is an important time for making decisions....We need to be in the arena in full force and make wise moves." He asked, or rather demanded, that all people with responsibility in the "elite" should "make their approach clear" and end their "two-sided stance". They should do so "without any ambiguity and playing of tricks"; the silence of the "elite aids the sedition."

Hashemi Rafsanjani, you have just been served a warning.

In the midst of the current battle between conservative/principlist critics and the Ahmadinejad Government, symbolised by the hostility over the alleged role of former prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi in the Kahrizak prison abuse case and the influence of close Ahmadinejad ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, Rafsanjani spoke to a group of students and university lecturers. He praised the current televised debates as an alternative to protest on the streets but said little about specific political issues.

Far too little for the Supreme Leader.

Ayatollah Khamenei's speech points to his frustration with Rafsanjani's cautious, ambiguous statements. But, going public with that frustration, it also shows the Supreme Leader's growing worry over the situation. Seven months ago, Khamenei could talk tough but still praise Rafsanjani, believing that the incipient opposition could soon be defeated. Well, the opposition is still here, Rafsanjani still hasn't chosen sides, and Khamenei must be hoping that this does not last another seven months. (Indeed, he may be thinking that, if this does last seven months, he may not be in a position to lecture Rafsanjani or the opposition any longer.)