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Sunday
Jul052009

Iran and the Clerics: Who are the "Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom"?

UPDATED Iran: Solving the Mystery of The “Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom”

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QOMA confession. After several hours, we were still not certain of the significance of yesterday's statement by the Association of Teachers and Researchers of Qom, who declared that the Government was "illegitimate". Our initial thought was that the group was just one of a number of clerical factions, in this case a "reformist" faction such as the Assocation of Combatant Clerics linked to former President Khatami. We were not sure who the members were or what relationship they had to prominent critics of the Government such as Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Sane'i, or Ayatollah Taheri.

The Association's statement was elevated, however, by today's headline treatment in The New York Times, which declared that the Association was "the most important group of religious leaders in Iran". The statement was a "significant, if so far symbolic, setback for the government". There was a general statement from Stanford academic Abbas Milani and the assertion that the association was "formed under the leadership of the revolution’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Then "an Iranian political analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity because of fear of reprisal" declared, “The significance is that even within the clergy, there are many who refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the election results as announced by the supreme leader."

The problem with The Times' declaration was that it was based on little more than the minimal information behind our initial assessment. In other words, while there are signs of a substantial debate amongst the clergy not only about the specifics of the election but about the structure and systems of the Islamic Republic (a debate we've been highlighting as important for several days), there was nothing behind the spectre of the "Association".

Internet "chatter" today has offered few details on the group. The discussion area "Anonymous Iran", which features the excellent Josh Shahryar and his "Green Brief", has reached a dead end. So an Enduring America colleague did a bit of digging and came up with the following:
I have not found anything to suggest that this is the most important clerical group in Qom. I would say with reasonable confidence that it is not. This wiki site talks about "Society of Scholars and Teachers of Qom's Hawza":

"[Ayatollah Mohammad Va'ez] Abaee-Khorasani moved to Qom again [in 1997] as the head of Mohammad Khatami's presidential campaign office. The Qom campaign led to about 70% of the people of city voting for the reformist Khatami, which was unbelievable because of the supposedly conservative leanings of the citizens of the city. The local campaign team later became the founding members of Society of Scholars and Teachers of Qom's Hawza (majma'-e mohaghgheghin va modarresin-e howze-ye elmiyye-ye ghom), the political organization of reformist clerics of the city."

A very tentative conclusion? The Association's statement should not be dismissed. While the names and influence of those behind it are unclear, it is an indication of the complex but important manoeuvres linking politics and religion in Iran. And because those issues are complex, they should not be exaggerated and simplified in misleading headlines such as the one offered by The New York Times today.

References (1)

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Reader Comments (6)

But the info is still posted on a website that is dubious to say the least. Why would an Iranian reformist group register the domain name in the UAE? Have no graphic on the site? The only content on the site be the statements? None of the other links working?

No no, not suspicious at all.

Seems like wishful thinking taking over common logic on the part of many.

July 6, 2009 | Unregistered Commenteranonymouse

"Seems like wishful thinking taking over common logic on the part of many."

I wish that I could ascribe it to such benign motives. Ugh, what a disgusting mess.

July 6, 2009 | Unregistered Commenterndk

Your suspicions were well taken; nice job. With today's PressTV article on the leader of the group, Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Mousavi-Tabrizi, we now have more information. Apparently, he added further outspoken remarks. The reform clerics do indeed seem to have drawn a line in the sand, and remarks at a Sunday conference by IRGC leaders suggests they are adamantly hostile to the reformers.

Now, here's a puzzle: two years ago the Washington Institute claimed that IRGC commander Javari was close to Rafsanjani, but he now appears to be charging forward to assert military control on behalf of Ahmadinejad.

Was the WI totally wrong? Is Rafsanjani supporting military control rather than supporting the reformers? Or is the ever-so-quiet (suddenly) Ahmadinejad in trouble?

July 6, 2009 | Unregistered CommenterWilliam deB. Mills

William, I highly doubt that Jafari and the IRGC are anything but loyal to Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. It would be interesting to see the Wash.Inst article but as far I can work out, those claims don’t really add up. I also read a report that rumored Jafari was ‘friends’ with Khatami. But Jafari, along with Qalibaf and other branch heads of IRGC, were among the signatories of the 1999 threatening letter written to Khatami. Jafari’s appointment in 2007 was at the same time that Larijani was replaced by Jalili and was seen as a calculating move by Ahm and Kham to ensure obedience and a solid and collective leadership.

As we all know Ahm is closely interconnected to the IRGC and was involved in the ‘Islamic cultural revolution’ in 1980, later worked in the Internal Security department of the IRGC and with the formulation of the elite Qods Force of the IRGC, he became one of its senior commanders. In many ways Ahm victory in 2005, reflected the rise of the New Right (Ahm with strong links to the IRGC, the Basij and cliques such as the Hojjatieh Society). His advancements have been blocked by the ‘old guard’/pragmatic conservatism (like Rafsanjani) because he threatens their political and economic power in Iran.

Even in 2005, Karroubi and Moin complained about the militarization of Iranian political space and claimed that Ahm victory was backed illegally by well-financed members of the IRGC and the Basij. The then Deputy-Commander of the IRGC, Zolqadr, said, ‘fundamentalist forces, thank god, won the election thanks to their smart plan and massive participation of the Basij.’

With Ahm maneuvering since 2005 to create political space for like-minded individuals and to dominate state institutions with them, the IRGC have done very well. In many ways the rise of the IRGC (increasing control of state media, members in legislative branch (2004+), established as major economic force), has been a cornerstone of the conservatives survival and comeback since 1997. Khamenei has also given the IRGC a strong presence in the Supreme Council for National Security so it would be at odds for Jafari to move partic against either Kham.

Hope that helps…

July 7, 2009 | Unregistered Commenterloopin

So the clerical establishmend opposes Ahmadinejad -- so what? Wouldn't that make AN a good guy?

July 10, 2009 | Unregistered Commenterhass

Loopin,
Thanks. Very useful comments.

Hass,
That's putting it in a nutshell!

I think we can dispense with the extremist view of Iran articulated by Netanyahu - there is no real evidence for it and it is so obviously self-serving. But that still leaves at least two widely different interpretations, both of which I find somewhat persuasive.

The first is that Rafsanjani runs an "oil mafia" that enriches itself by refusing to share oil profits with the rest of the country (making Iran exactly the same as every other oil exporting developing country). According to this view, Ahmadinejad really is trying to help the people by eliminating this oil mafia. One might by extension argue that the clerical establishment, traditionally the rich landowning class, is part of the old oppressive elite most visibly represented by Raf. That offers a picture of Ahmadinejad the populist reformer. Several things argue against this view: e.g., his appointment of his buddy as interior minister after the guy evidently became very rich through land investments exploiting his ties to Ahmadinejad when the latter was governor; the poor economic policies of Ah, which seem focused on handing out cash and enriching the IRGC.

The second view is that we are seeing a generational conflict in which the old clerical elite is being supplanted by an emerging military kleptocracy that is almost indistinguisable from that in Pakistan (see Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc., on Pakistan). NOTE: war threats tend to radicalize a military kleptocracy!

If we accept the second view, it becomes understandable that some of the clerics might join forces with the winners, at least as long as velayat e-faqih (political oversight by Allah's representative) is maintained - i.e., as long as a cleric continues to be supreme leader. Other clerics will have a problem with such corruption of the Republic, which stood on two legs - the second being the legitimizing process of elections. They may well also fear losing both prestige and profit to an all-powerful military. Finally, some of the clerics always thought Komeini's innnovative velayat e-faqih concept was way too forward-leaning (i.e., that clerics should stay out of politics and keep their noses clean, teaching by example more than by direct control. (For more info, see http://shadowedforest.blogspot.com/2009/07/iran-pro-democracy-clerics-vs-irgc.html.)

The first view clearly makes Ah. the good guy; in the second view makes the pro-Republican clerics at least potential allies of the masses. Whether more of the people are in favor of some sort of Shi'ite rule or outright democracy is unclear, but it does at least seem clear that Iranians have become very politicized, much more dedicated to fighting for good governance than Americans (although it is not clear how they define "good governance").

I see the people as split just like the clerics and the elite as a whole. I also see politics in Iran as just as corrupt as (and of course vastly more vicious than) in the U.S. One could do an interesting comparison between IRGC economic corruption and the bailout of Wall Street!

The point is not to label anyone as a "good guy." That is for Iranians to decide. Ah's post-electoral behavior has split the elite and opened the door for real democratic action. He's doing his best to slam that door shut (dare I call this 'creation of the imperial presidency?'). Now is the time for Americans to back off and give Iranians some space.

July 10, 2009 | Unregistered CommenterWilliam deB. Mills

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