The Latest from Iran (14 July): Ripples on the Surface

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The Latest from Iran (15 July): Chess not Checkers

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2140 GMT: A Convenient Business Trip. Reports that President Ahmadinejad is going to Mashaad on Friday which means (coincidentally, I'm sure) that he will not be at the prayers led by Hashemi Rafsanjani.

2000 GMT: From Sea of Green to River of Blood. An unusual protest in Mahabad in Kurdistan, where activists turned the water red. A correspondent writes that the red river is in honour of Dr Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, who was assassinated in 1989. Some claim that President Ahmadinejad was involved in the murder.

1900 GMT: In addition to the meetings of opposition politicians with families of detainees, Mir Hossein Mousavi and his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, visited the family of the slain demonstrator Sohrab Arabi on Tuesday. (hat tip to JE re the photo)


1730 GMT: Parleman News offers an interesting overview (in Farsi) of the dynamics between Hashemi Rafsanjani's leadership of Friday prayers in Tehran and the possible attendance of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami in a march to the site.

1530 GMT: The Hunters Become the Hunted? Yesterday we reported on pro-Government newspapers, having published scathing criticism of opposition leaders, being challenged by lawsuits.

It now appears that this may be a co-ordinated strategy. Reports are coming in that Alireza Beheshti has sued Kayhan for alleging that he has had connections with "foreign" agents and Hashemi Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi has sued Iran paper, Fars news agency, and Raja News. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami have also filed lawsuits.

1400 GMT: Clerical Unease. We've just posted a separate entry on an emerging issue: do clerics dare challenge the authority of the Supreme Leader?

1100 GMT: When Culture and Politics Collide. A reader reminds us of the show of defiance by Shajarian, one of the most popular classical Iranian musicians. When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, celebrating his "victory", compared protesters to "dust", Shajarian replied that the President was also dust. He then refused to allow any broadcast of his music (except for the song "Rabbanaa") by Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.

For an introduction to Shajarian's music, I've watched his performance in the benefit concert after the Bam earthquake in 2003.

0835 GMT: A disturbing story about Iranian surveillance. There have been rumours for days that those entering the country have been subject to detailed investigation about their contacts in Iran. Now National Public Radio in the US reports, albeit via second-hand information from a "trusted colleague":

On passing through the immigration control at the airport in Tehran, [an Iranian-American] was asked by the officers if she has a Facebook account. When she said "no", the officers pulled up a laptop and searched for her name on Facebook. They found her account and noted down the names of her Facebook friends.

0740 GMT: One to Watch --- Compromise in the Cabinet? State media is already highlighting the prospect of a Cabinet reshuffle by President Ahmadinejad. Now a still speculative but clear idea is emerging of using that reshuffle for a compromise. In an interview published today, Morteza Nabavi, a "moderate right-wing conservative" and managing director of Resalat newspaper, advocates a new Administration that will "use both factions".

0625 GMT: Josh Shahryar's "Green Brief" reports: "Mehrdad Heydari, a prominent reporter in northeastern Iran, was killed in Mashhad under suspicious circumstances today by unknown individuals. Heydari had been publishing reports that were deemed anti-government in the past few weeks....Before Heydari, Hamid Maddah, a member of Mousavi’s party, died under torture in Mashhad two weeks ago."

0605 GMT: Latest on plans for the march to Friday prayers. The newssite Sharaf says it is probable that Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi will participate, but spokesmen for both men say decisions will be announced in forthcoming days through "official channels".

0600 GMT: A significant sign of Iran's post-election isolation abroad. The contract for the long-awaited Nabucco gas pipeline in Turkey was signed yesterday but Iran, one of the major producers of natural gas, was not invited.

0545 GMT: Etemade Melli claims that the number of "prohibited" speakers on a list kept by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) has grown from 100 to 1200 since the election.

0500 GMT: An unusual day yesterday. While there was no single dramatic event, a series of political and religious developments gradually put together a picture of a regime in discussions and some tensions over changes. As a pro-reformist correspondent put it, "The reform movement seems to have gained momentum and it is fighting the Ahmadinejad faction back. Considering that brute-force and coercion form an integral part of the modus operandi of this faction, I hazard to guess that this lack of suppression indicates that Ahmadinjad's group is weakened enough that it can not conjure up its millitant thugs as easily as it used to."

I'm cautious about that assessment. Detentions continue, and we still have not seen what would happen if there was a sustained attempt at a mass gathering of protest. However, the political signs were definitely of pressure for some recognition of the complaints over the election and its aftermath. And what made this even more striking was that the news of that pressure came not through the "West" or Twitter chatter but through Iran's own media.

News in the Western "mainstream" was limited to the statements of Ayatollah Montazeri criticising the regime, but our updates yesterday tracked a series of complaints from other clerics and politicians over detentions, the electoral process, and the state of the Ahmadinejad Government. Those complaints brought some rather heavy-handed (and panicked?) denunciations in the pro-Ahmadinejad press, which in turn led to threats of court action against "conservative" Iranian newspapers. Even more importantly, those complaints have brought a limited response, for example, the ruling that no person can serve both in the President's Cabinet and on the Guardian Council and on the request for Parliament to consider a new electoral law.

The issue is how far the regime bends. We are waiting to see the outcome of a series of talks being held by the National Security Commission. Reports yesterday indicated that, having spoken to opposition politicians, the NSC was now speaking to President Ahmadinejad. In Parliament, there was criticism of some of Ahmadinejad's advisors, notably his chief spokesman/Justice Minister.

And, of course, there is Friday. Supporters of the Government responded to the news that former President Hashemi Rafsanjani would lead Tehran prayers with the rumours that 1) no, he wouldn't 2) if he did, it would be the last time. Rafsanjani's supporters knocked down those stories. And the former President? He was meeting with novices in the religious school at Khorosan: "The clergy must have a relevant program for addressing the needs of society and should not be out of touch with social phenomena".

Iran: Facing the Rubicon of the Supreme Leader's Authority

The Latest from Iran (14 July): Ripples on the Surface

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Long, off-the-record discussion with some well-informed Iranian colleagues this morning. They spoke of the divisions amongst Iran's clerics over the conduct of the election and its aftermath. One indication that can be revealed is the closing statement of Ayatollah Reza Ostadi, leading Friday prayers at Qom, that he would not do so again in the near-future. Ostensibly, this was for health reasons, but the impression is that Ostadi and other ayatollahs wish to avoid public appearances until there is some resolution.

One colleague made the important point that there is a debate over whether the Iranian system of velayat-e-faqih, granting the ultimate powers to clerical leadership, extends to the holder of the office. In other words, while the general position of Supreme Leader is to be respected as the highest authority, that respect does not necessarily have to be given to an individual who does not fulfil the duties of the position, in this case, Ayatollah Khamenei.

It is that Rubicon that both Iranian politicians and clerics now face and that they hesitate at crossing. In that sense, the statements of Ayatollah Montazeri are above the waterline of the current challenge. The wider and more important issue is not a question of whether the clerics are supporting the Supreme Leader or the President but whether they dare to raise the issue of Khamenei's authority openly. The issue is whether political leaders like Rafsanjani or Mousavi push dissent to the point where the system itself is strained.

And it is because of those issues that the search for compromise has intensified in recent days. If that compromise is not possible, then it is once more back to the Rubicon.

The Latest from Iran (13 July): Challenge Renewed

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The Latest on Iran (12 July): When Is Normal Not Normal?

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2000 GMT: If Ayatollah Montazeri is suffering from dementia, with his words written by someone else (see 1400 GMT), he's hiding it well. As expected, he has issued a statement criticising the Chinese Government's treatment of Uighur Muslims and adding, "Silence from other governments, particularly Muslim governments has caused great surprise and regret."

1910 GMT: Media Twist of the Day. Kayhan newspaper,  a staunch supporter of the Ahmadinejad Government, has been summoned to court to answer charges of "disseminating lies intended to poison public opinion".

Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami have also lodged defamation charges against Iran newspaper.

1900 GMT: Catching up with news reported earlier today: about 200 faculty of the medical school of the University of Tehran have protested the arrest of political activists. Dr. Jila Marsoosi, a faculty member and the wife of detained politician Saeed Hajjarian, also a member of this faculty ddressed the crowd.

1800 GMT: Now, This is Intriguing. Part of the intrigue is in the report on Press TV's website. Habibollah Asgaroladi, a senior member of the Islamic Coalition Party, has described the formation of a new political party by Mir Hossein Mousavi as "favorable", saying, "Establishing a party to voice one's ideas and political perceptions is a wise move."

Asgaroadi and his party are "principlists", loosely defined as advancing the principles of the Isamlic Revolution and falling in between the "conservative" and "reformist" camps.

That makes his endorsement of Mousavi eyebrow-raising. But the other part of the intrigue is that the report comes via Press TV. That's right, the same State media outlet that has been anxious to downfall the political legimitacy of a Mousavi-led campaign.

Hmmm....

1405 GMT: More jitters. Deutsche Welle reports that Hossein Fadaei Ashtiani, the head of "Society Dedicated to the Islamic Revolution", has said, "One of the results of the elections was a distinction between those who are real fundamentalists and those who claim to be fundamentalists...[it has] been made clear thar some people claiming to be fundamentalists are exhibiting non-fundamentalist behavior". The article links Ashtiani's statement to other "conservative" disquiet, notably Mohsen Rezaei's declaration (which is now being publicised widely) of a six-point programme for electoral resolution.

1400 GMT: The regime is looking very jittery today. A reader sends in this information:

It seems that [Ayatollah] Montazeri [who issued a fatwa on Saturday denouncing the Government] is considered to be a real threat by Ahmadinejad et. al. The pro-Ahmadinejad news site 'Rajanews' has claimed that Montazeri is suffering from some sort of dementia. Rajanews also claims that all fatwas said to be from Montazeri are in fact written by Mohsen Kadivar. The reformist daily Parleman-news has published a statement by Montazeri's son in which categorically denies these charges by asserting that Montazeri is in great health and all Fatwas and statements are issued under his direct supervision. In fact his son concluded that Montazeri is in the process of issueing a statement regarding the plight of the Chinese muslims.

1350 GMT: It is being reported that Mohsen Hajjarian, son of detained politician Saeed Hajjarian, has been released after his arrest yesterday.

1345 GMT: We've now posted video from the funeral of Sohrab Arabi, showing hundreds of demonstrators holding up his photograph and chanting.

1130 GMT: A side story, but an important one. The Iranian Government's effusive support of China's handling of the Uighur crisis in the northwest of the country has been criticised not only by opposition groups but by high-ranking clerics such as Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi Golpaygani and Ayatollah Nasser Makerem-Shirazi, who have objected to the repression of Muslims.

1000 GMT: Unsurprisingly, there is a heated media battle within Iran, one example of which is the rumor (noted in the blog on "Friday is the Day?") that this week's leadership of Tehran prayers will be the last for former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Pro-Government publications are trying to portray the opposition as weak and divided.

The strategy is not working smoothly, however. At least one important cleric, Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi Golpaygani, has criticised State-run media for issuing statements in his name of support for the Government. He denounced the Islamic Republic News Agency as a purveyor of falsehoods.

0815 GMT: Ferehsteh Ghazi ("iranbaan"), writing for Rooz Online, claims that families of detainees are being threatened by the judiciary. They are told that, if they speak about the plight of their relatives, news will be withheld from them and the detainees "will be held longer".

0810 GMT: We're awaiting news on whether the funeral of Sohrab Arabi, the 19-year-old killed on 15 June by Basiji gunfire but whose body was only released to the family this weekend, was the occasion for public demonstrations.

0800 GMT: One exception to the item below about the absence of the "mainstream" media from the Iran story. The excellent Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times, now reporting from Beirut, recognises the potential significance of this Friday's Rafsanjani appearance at Tehran prayers. Daragahi has also picked up on the statement of the head of Ayatollah Khamenei's office of university affairs, Mohammad Mohammadian (see 0615 GMT), "We cannot order public opinion to get convinced. Certain individuals are suspicious about the election result, and we have to shed light on the realities and respond to their questions."

0703 GMT: Perhaps needless to say, the Iran story is now one for the "new" media. State-run Press TV prefers the image of legitimacy for the Government, covering the arrival of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki in Egypt for the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. (President Ahmadinejad has still not been received by a foreign leader since his summit in Moscow days after the election.)

CNN catches up with the story that the family of Shorab Arabi, killed by Basiji gunfire during the mass demonstration on 15 June, only learned of his death in recent days. Al Jazeera English and BBC English, focused on Britain's political and military difficulties in Afghanistan, have disappeared.

0700 GMT: Regime Feel-Good Story of the Day. Javan newspaper, linked to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, has been explaining that it is very good for detained politician Saeed Hajjarian to be in Evin Prison, as he can get the best medical care there rather than at home.

0615 GMT: After a quiet period since last Thursday's 18 Tir protests, there is a sense this morning --- based on movements from both sides --- that the political challenge is about to resume, with private and public protests converging.

The shift is reflected in two stories. The first, which we put together last evening, is of the linking of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani's re-appearance at Friday prayers in Tehran with a mass march to the site.

The second concerns signs from the regime that it may be looking for some limited compromises to meet the political and legal demands of the opposition. Signals come not only from Friday's call at Tehran prayers by Ayatollah Kashani for a Parliamentary review of the election process but also from a statement by the Supreme Leader's representative for universities that "the recent protests in society are not of a malicious nature", criticism at Friday prayers in Qom by Ayatollah Reza Ostadi of the system's handling of public concerns, and a declaration by the judicial commission that all protesters will be freed within 10 days. It is also worthwhile watching the reaction to Presidential Mohsen Rezaei's six-point proposal for a political settlement, which may (or may not) have emerged after discussions with members of the Iranian leadership.

Beyond these emerging manoeuvres is a fatwa from Ayatollah Montazeri, the one-time successor to Ayatollah Montazeri, calling the Supreme Leader "illegitimate", as he is working against religion, and asking the public to challenge and, if necessary, pay a heavy price to remedy the situation. We briefly reported on the fatwa on Saturday but discussion of it only took off yesterday. We are cautious about the significance, as Montazeri has been ostracised and put under house arrest for many years, but others see vital reinforcement for the opposition movement. Tehran Bureau has a useful summary in English.

With the "mainstream" media now almost silent, the political battle is being played out in the "new" media. One of the weekend flutters was over an alleged "cyber-attack" on Twitter, with the important "hashtag" #iranelection overwhelmed at times by spam messages for products and get-rich-quick schemes. EA's Mike Dunn has untangled the story, which appears to be one more of crass attempts by marketers and schemers to make money rather than deliberate political sabotage.

Iran and the Clerics: Who are the "Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom"?

UPDATED Iran: Solving the Mystery of The “Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom”

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A confession. After several hours, we were still not certain of the significance of yesterday's statement by the Association of Teachers and Researchers of Qom, who declared that the Government was "illegitimate". Our initial thought was that the group was just one of a number of clerical factions, in this case a "reformist" faction such as the Assocation of Combatant Clerics linked to former President Khatami. We were not sure who the members were or what relationship they had to prominent critics of the Government such as Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Sane'i, or Ayatollah Taheri.

The Association's statement was elevated, however, by today's headline treatment in The New York Times, which declared that the Association was "the most important group of religious leaders in Iran". The statement was a "significant, if so far symbolic, setback for the government". There was a general statement from Stanford academic Abbas Milani and the assertion that the association was "formed under the leadership of the revolution’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Then "an Iranian political analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity because of fear of reprisal" declared, “The significance is that even within the clergy, there are many who refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the election results as announced by the supreme leader."

The problem with The Times' declaration was that it was based on little more than the minimal information behind our initial assessment. In other words, while there are signs of a substantial debate amongst the clergy not only about the specifics of the election but about the structure and systems of the Islamic Republic (a debate we've been highlighting as important for several days), there was nothing behind the spectre of the "Association".

Internet "chatter" today has offered few details on the group. The discussion area "Anonymous Iran", which features the excellent Josh Shahryar and his "Green Brief", has reached a dead end. So an Enduring America colleague did a bit of digging and came up with the following:

I have not found anything to suggest that this is the most important clerical group in Qom. I would say with reasonable confidence that it is not. This wiki site talks about "Society of Scholars and Teachers of Qom's Hawza":

"[Ayatollah Mohammad Va'ez] Abaee-Khorasani moved to Qom again [in 1997] as the head of Mohammad Khatami's presidential campaign office. The Qom campaign led to about 70% of the people of city voting for the reformist Khatami, which was unbelievable because of the supposedly conservative leanings of the citizens of the city. The local campaign team later became the founding members of Society of Scholars and Teachers of Qom's Hawza (majma'-e mohaghgheghin va modarresin-e howze-ye elmiyye-ye ghom), the political organization of reformist clerics of the city."

A very tentative conclusion? The Association's statement should not be dismissed. While the names and influence of those behind it are unclear, it is an indication of the complex but important manoeuvres linking politics and religion in Iran. And because those issues are complex, they should not be exaggerated and simplified in misleading headlines such as the one offered by The New York Times today.

Iran: The Post-Election Challenge from Qom's Clerics

Iran: The “Ghaffari Tape” Criticising the Supreme Leader
The Latest from Iran (1 July): The Opposition Regroups

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In the furour over the Presidential election, the most intriguing political contest may have taken place, behind the street scenes, in Iran's religious centre, south of Tehran in the dusty city of Qom.

Within 72 hours of the 12 June vote, the clerics of Qom's seminaries had taken their place on the political stage. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to mobilise them for a public challenge to President Ahmadinejad's victory. That initial attempt failed; indeed it is a key reasons why Rafsanjani then kept a careful silence before an equally careful, "balanced" return to public life with his speech last Sunday. There would be no mass movement of the religious leadership behind any campaign. Instead, factions already aligned to particular political movements would reassert their positions. The Association of Combatant Clerics would ally itself with the efforts of former President Mohammad Khatami and, thus, Mir Hossein Mousavi; Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, prominent on the Guardian Council, would bolster Ahmadinejad's position.

As the public demonstrations against the election swell, some Western media noted the possible significance of Qom, indeed over-dramatising a possible "split" in the Iranian system; conversely, as the public challenge has been contained, notions of a clerical challenge receded. That, too, is a mistake: the debate not only over the election but over the guardianship of Iran's Islamic Revolution continues.

While there still has been no significant show of support for the President (note Press TV's slightly strained attempt this morning, via an interview with a clerical member of Parliament, to say, "No one is talking about the election anymore), opposition has emerged in scattered but sometimes dramatic ways. The criticism of Ayatollah Montazeri, the one-time successor to Ayatollah Khomeini, was to be expected; the current regime, led by Montazeri's replacement, Ayatollah Ali Khameini, still keeps the cleric under house arrest. He is not alone, however. Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani has claimed that the Iranian system is moving away from Khomeini's path and thoughts. Ayatollam Mousavi-Ardebili has criticised violence against the protestors and said recent events have weakened Iran's political and religious institutions. Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli has expressed displeasure. Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi and Ayatollah Sane’i have made gentler interventions, and Ayatollah Haeri-Shirazi has written a careful but still challenging letter to the Supreme Leader. There are reports of "secret" meetings between Ayatollahs to consider developments and longer-term prospects.

The most dramatic challenge has come in a statement by Ayatollah Hadi Ghaffari on Ayatollah Khamenei. The leaked
audio on YouTube has created a stir with Ghaffari's criticism of the Supreme Leader's post-election conduct: Khamenei has ruined the honour of clerics with his handling of the political situation. (First reports said that Ghaffari had gone as far as to insult Khamenei as a "corpse-washer".) The ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution are not being defended but destroyed.

None of this points to a Qom-led coup against President Ahmadinejad and, more importantly, Khamenei. On the other hand, these concerns are part of a much wider, more significant story of years past and years to come.

The Western caricature of Iran is that of a "theocracy" in which the "mullahs" hold power, working with secular politicians. That misconception misses the reality that a large section of Iran's clerical establishment are no friends of Ahmadinejad, whose policies and pronouncements have been seen as a challenge to the Iran envisaged by Ayatollah Khomeini. Indeed, it is not even accurate to speak on a unified clerical movement behind the Supreme Leader, whose selection in 1989 was a surprise to many --- given his relative junior status --- and has been seen as a triumph of politicians (ironically, given recent events, as part of manoeuvres by Hashemi Rafsanjani for authority) rather than a religious succession.

No surprise then that another video has supposedly resurfaced, this one of Ayatollah Montazeri considering the Iranian system of clerical authority, Velayat-e-Faqih, as he criticises Ayatollah Khameini. The text is clear: religion's true and proper place in the growth of the Islamic Republic has become "politicised" and thus corrupted.

And that is why the Presidential vote has a lasting significance, whatever happens in the near future with the demonstrations. Those ballot boxes are a symbol of the wider corruption that Montazeri claimed was undermining the Revolution. And, long after they have been put away, their symbolism --- whatever actually happened on 12 June --- remains.

As pne of our correspondents noted, after a lengthy glance at Qom last week, "This is not over."