Tuesday
Jul282009
Iran: Will the Supreme Leader Give Up Ahmadinejad?
Tuesday, July 28, 2009 at 10:43
The Latest from Iran (28 July): The Regime Crumbles
The Latest from Iran (28 July): The Government Crumbles
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Perhaps the most striking headline in yesterday's press was that of The New York Times, "Ahmadinejad Seen as Increasingly Vulnerable". Unfortunately for the paper, the distinction was not that this indicated information or insight, but that it showed reporters who were either naive or coming very late to the political party.
This weekend's events were not the start of the President's slide from power. That process had started as early as 15 June, when the mass demonstrations pointed to at least a significant minority in Iran who were unprepared to give Ahmadinejad any legitimacy. The significance of last week's developments --- the growing unease with detentions, the increase in clerical fatwas calling for Government reform, and then the row over the First Vice President --- was that illegitimacy was now complemented by a sense amongst "conservatives" of Ahmadinejad's negligence or ineptitude.
So the big question after the President's attempt, possibly his last, to regain authority --- the firing of four Ministers, reduced to one when Ahmadinejad realised he could no longer govern without Parliamentary consent --- is not about Mahmoud. Instead, it is about the Supreme Leader: what does Ayatollah Khamenei now do with a terminally wounded political leader?
To this point, the post-election path can be marked by the Supreme Leader's firm refusal to give up Ahmadinejad. Khamenei could have refrained from making the unprecedented move on Election Night of setting aside the official process and declaring a victor; he did not. A week after the election, speaking at Friday prayers, he could have traded some support for the President for a more conciliatory position towards the opposition; he did not. Khamenei could have stepped aside to allow a true recount by the Guardian Council of the Presidential vote; instead, he declared in advance that there would be no change in the outcome.
The symbolism of the battle over the First Vice President, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, was that the Supreme Leader, at least in this case, said to the President, "Enough." Whether this was because of Rahim-Mashai's politically dubious views on relations with Israel, "conservative" unease with the choice, the whiff of nepotism, or the concern that Ahmadinejad was publicly being too "independent" is unclear. The extent of Khamenei's slap-down is not, however. When the President refused to budge after he received the Supreme Leader's letter, Khamenei's advisors ensured that the order to remove Rahim-Mashai became very public.
There is a difference, however, between smiting your President in one high-profile case and giving him up completely. And, beyond superficial New York Times headlines, what distinguishes these last 72 hours is that the Supreme Leader has said nothing, made no more letters public, offered no clue even during Ahmadinejad's botched attempt to remove Ministers with whom he had argued.
And that silence is understandable. Because even if Khamenei does not say it, giving up Ahmadinejad means, "I was wrong." Wrong to push so hard on the Presidential election result, wrong not to extend an hand to the Green Movement, wrong to let arrests and beatings and killings spiral.
That silence cannot be maintained, however. The President's inauguration is in eight days. And by that point, Khamenei either has to disown his boy or embrace him, albeit while reminding Ahmadinejad not to stray again.
So far, the Supreme Leader has blundered, both in perception and strategy, by being too firm in his support of the President. Does he dare risk hugging Mahmoud to the point where he goes down with him?
The Latest from Iran (28 July): The Government Crumbles
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
Perhaps the most striking headline in yesterday's press was that of The New York Times, "Ahmadinejad Seen as Increasingly Vulnerable". Unfortunately for the paper, the distinction was not that this indicated information or insight, but that it showed reporters who were either naive or coming very late to the political party.
This weekend's events were not the start of the President's slide from power. That process had started as early as 15 June, when the mass demonstrations pointed to at least a significant minority in Iran who were unprepared to give Ahmadinejad any legitimacy. The significance of last week's developments --- the growing unease with detentions, the increase in clerical fatwas calling for Government reform, and then the row over the First Vice President --- was that illegitimacy was now complemented by a sense amongst "conservatives" of Ahmadinejad's negligence or ineptitude.
So the big question after the President's attempt, possibly his last, to regain authority --- the firing of four Ministers, reduced to one when Ahmadinejad realised he could no longer govern without Parliamentary consent --- is not about Mahmoud. Instead, it is about the Supreme Leader: what does Ayatollah Khamenei now do with a terminally wounded political leader?
To this point, the post-election path can be marked by the Supreme Leader's firm refusal to give up Ahmadinejad. Khamenei could have refrained from making the unprecedented move on Election Night of setting aside the official process and declaring a victor; he did not. A week after the election, speaking at Friday prayers, he could have traded some support for the President for a more conciliatory position towards the opposition; he did not. Khamenei could have stepped aside to allow a true recount by the Guardian Council of the Presidential vote; instead, he declared in advance that there would be no change in the outcome.
The symbolism of the battle over the First Vice President, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, was that the Supreme Leader, at least in this case, said to the President, "Enough." Whether this was because of Rahim-Mashai's politically dubious views on relations with Israel, "conservative" unease with the choice, the whiff of nepotism, or the concern that Ahmadinejad was publicly being too "independent" is unclear. The extent of Khamenei's slap-down is not, however. When the President refused to budge after he received the Supreme Leader's letter, Khamenei's advisors ensured that the order to remove Rahim-Mashai became very public.
There is a difference, however, between smiting your President in one high-profile case and giving him up completely. And, beyond superficial New York Times headlines, what distinguishes these last 72 hours is that the Supreme Leader has said nothing, made no more letters public, offered no clue even during Ahmadinejad's botched attempt to remove Ministers with whom he had argued.
And that silence is understandable. Because even if Khamenei does not say it, giving up Ahmadinejad means, "I was wrong." Wrong to push so hard on the Presidential election result, wrong not to extend an hand to the Green Movement, wrong to let arrests and beatings and killings spiral.
That silence cannot be maintained, however. The President's inauguration is in eight days. And by that point, Khamenei either has to disown his boy or embrace him, albeit while reminding Ahmadinejad not to stray again.
So far, the Supreme Leader has blundered, both in perception and strategy, by being too firm in his support of the President. Does he dare risk hugging Mahmoud to the point where he goes down with him?