Iran: Rebellion of the Clerics? Not So Fast

The Latest from Iran (10 July): What Next?

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One area of the Iranian post-election crisis that we've been watching carefully is the possibility of clerical opposition to the regime. On the one hand, we're wary of stories --- such as the wayward New York Times article last Sunday --- that portray a rebellion of the clerics. On the other, we do think the opposition of some ayatollahs may have some significance, especially if that intersects with other political moves against the current leadership.

Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in contrast, dismisses the notion of a clerical challenge, at least for now:

While a handful of marginal clerics and religious groups dispute the official result of Iran’s recent presidential election, the Shiite clerical establishment as a whole currently supports Iran’s top leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Although this support has been demonstrated through silence, the fact that most Shiite clerics have not intervened in the public debate over the election or the government’s use of force against protesters has been particularly effective in strengthening Khamenei’s position.

The Establishment

Iran’s clerical establishment consists of about 200,000 members, and its hierarchy includes many midlevel clerics called hojjat ol-eslam (”proof of Islam”) and around a thousand ayatollahs (”sign of God”), who are leaders recognized for their scholarship. Ranking above ayatollahs are roughly fifteen grand ayatollahs, who are revered as sources of emulation, or as religious guides, for many followers.
Khamenei was a mere hojjat ol-eslam when he was elevated to the rank of ayatollah, in a controversial move aimed at making him constitutionally fit to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, as Iran’s principal leader. Khamenei’s authority stems from the principal of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), which combines political and religious power into one supreme authority.


Dissent Only from the Margins

The ayatollahs in Qom and Isfahan who have criticized the recent presidential election are isolated, with no significant role in the clerical establishment; they lack both financial resources and religious popularity. Although these ayatollahs held key political and juridical positions during the first decades of the Islamic Republic, they were sidelined first by Khomeini and then later by Khamenei.

A small marginal group, the Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom Seminary, is the only clerical group that has explicitly referred to the presidential election as illegitimate. The association was founded in 1998, and its central council consists of eighteen midranking clerics and one ayatollah. This group plays no role in the administration of the clerical establishment, and none of its members are considered to be sources of emulation. The association was originally created to support former president Muhammad Khatami, but its support has remained symbolic rather than practical. The group’s secretary, the controversial Seyyed Hossein Moussavi Tabrizi, was involved in the execution of many of the regime’s opponents and political prisoners while he was the general prosecutor of the Revolutionary Court during the first decade of Islamic Republic,


Coopting the Clerical Establishment

Iran’s current clerical establishment has little similarity to what it was prior to 1979 Islamic Revolution. Historically, the clerical class was a semiautonomous political institution with independent financial resources from religious taxes collected directly from followers. But after the revolution, and especially since Khamenei became leader twenty years ago, the establishment became totally dependent on the government’s financial resources, social authority, networking, organization, and political status. Iran’s leader is not only the head of the judiciary, intelligence services, and the armed forces, he is also the head of Iran’s Shiite clerics.

Clerics receive hefty regular stipends from the government, and many ayatollahs have exclusive privileges for numerous profit-making transactions. The government has modernized and bureaucratized the clerical establishment by creating the Center for Seminary Management, which is under direct supervision of Khamenei and is in full control of clerical finances, the seminary’s educational system, and the political direction of the establishment. Even Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, along with other influential Shiite leaders, allegedly runs his offices within the framework of the Center.

To control clerics politically, the government created the Special Court of Clerics — an organization that works outside the judiciary branch of government and is headed by an appointee of Khamenei — to deal with dissenting clerics. This independent court does not operate within the country’s legal system; it has own set of procedures and maintains its own prisons in most Iranian cities.

Politically defiant clerics who oppose certain government decisions work outside the clerical establishment and usually have a track record of supporting Iran’s reform movement. Although several prominent reformist figures, such as former president Muhammad Khatami and former speaker of the Iranian parliament Mehdi Karrubi, are clerics, their words and actions have little or no impact on the clerical establishment and pose no threat of causing political splits.

Conclusion

The Shiite clerical establishment, which stretches across the Middle East, is highly unlikely to initiate any sort of opposition to Khamenei’s authority. Various Shiite leaders may not be happy with the Iranian government’s policies, but publicizing their differences might jeopardize the social, political, and financial advantages they now receive from Iran. For example, during his Friday sermon immediately after the Iranian election, Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Fazlallah, a prominent Shiite ayatollah in Lebanon, stated his support for the government’s official result and voiced his admiration of the Iranian people for their participation in the election. In Iraq, al-Sistani kept silent about the election result and has not reacted to the postelection crisis. Both ayatollahs have offices in Qom and benefit from the support of the Iranian government.
Inside Iran, support for Khamenei, although mostly silent, is also evident. Morteza Moqtadai, the head of Center for Seminary Management, announced that the election result was approved by “God and the Hidden Imam,” and stated that Khamenei’s words are the “Hidden Imam’s words; when he says there was no manipulation in the election, he should be heard as the ultimate arbiter.”
Khamenei — for the moment — is in a strong position. The clerical establishment’s prevailing silence, however, could eventually work against him. If the political tide begins to turn, the establishment could be rendered powerless and its support ineffective, leaving Khamenei and his followers in a vulnerable position.

Getting Iran (Loudly) Wrong: Posturing for Mr Ahmadinejad and Mr Hitchens

The Latest from Iran (10 July): What Next?

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A couple of fine examples of how to wedge events in Iran into personal and political prejudices and agendas. In Asia Times Online, Mahan Abedin charts "The Rise and Rise of Ahmadinejad" with the claim:

[He is] the most formidable leader of a faction that has incrementally broadened and deepened the scope of its reach and influence within the regime to the point where it is now completely dominant. Factional politics in the Islamic Republic - as we know it - has collapsed....All the other factions, particularly the once-powerful Islamic left, are in complete disarray. Their leaders have been exposed as losers and their supporters have been left demoralized by the entire state machinery's acquiescence in the final victory of the Islamic right.

To call this analysis "quirky", in light of Ahmadinejad's political floundering in the last three weeks would be generous. A less charitable reading would be that Abedin wants to wipe out any alternative to the President: "The biggest loser of all is former prime minister Mousavi....Another great loser is former president and arch-oligarch Rafsanjani....Many other core establishment figures, including losing presidential contender Mehdi Karroubi and former Majlis (parliament) speaker Nategh Nouri, are expected to be edged out."

Which means that, presto magico!, Ahmadinejad stands atop "a new consensus" in Iran: "While the contours of a broader political alliance have still to be worked out, there are indications that at the grassroots level at least a substantial number of Islamic left personalities and activists are willing to fall behind Ahmadinejad and accept the public hegemony of the Islamic right."

Meanwhile, swerving violently from the other direction, Christopher Hitchens in Salon finally finds the moment to vindicate his 7-year "liberation of Iraq" shout-out by linking it to the "liberation of Iran". Unfortunately, that moment is based on the wildly inaccurate New York Times story of 5 July that "the most important clerical group" in Iran had come out against the regime:

So it is very hard to overstate the significance of the statement made last Saturday by the Association of Teachers and Researchers of Qum, a much-respected source of religious rulings, which has in effect come right out with it and said that the recent farcical and prearranged plebiscite in the country was just that: a sham event. (In this, the clerics of Qum are a lot more clear-eyed than many American "experts" on Iranian public opinion, who were busy until recently writing about Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the rough-hewn man of the people.)

This shaky pretext self-justifies Hitchens in the ignorance of every internal dynamic in Iran, apart from Ayatollah Khomeini's "good" grandon Sayeed, in favour of an Iraqi platform:

Did the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and the subsequent holding of competitive elections in which many rival Iraqi Shiite parties took part, have any germinal influence on the astonishing events in Iran? Certainly when I interviewed Sayeed Khomeini in Qum some years ago, where he spoke openly about "the liberation of Iraq," he seemed to hope and believe that the example would spread. One swallow does not make a summer. But consider this: Many Iranians go as religious pilgrims to the holy sites of Najaf and Kerbala in southern Iraq. They have seen the way in which national and local elections have been held, more or less fairly and openly, with different Iraqi Shiite parties having to bid for votes (and with those parties aligned with Iran's regime doing less and less well). They have seen an often turbulent Iraqi Parliament holding genuine debates that are reported with reasonable fairness in the Iraqi media. Meanwhile, an Iranian mullah caste that classifies its own people as children who are mere wards of the state puts on a "let's pretend" election and even then tries to fix the outcome. Iranians by no means like to take their tune from Arabs—perhaps least of all from Iraqis—but watching something like the real thing next door may well have increased the appetite for the genuine article in Iran itself.

The silver lining in this cloud of promoting, posturing and preening analysis is that it's much easier to expose by going to the real "experts" in this story, the folks getting information out of Iran by any means necessary. So, farewell, "Rise and Rise of Ahmadinejad". Bye bye, Christopher. Hello, new media.

Iran and the Clerics: Who are the "Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom"?

UPDATED Iran: Solving the Mystery of The “Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom”

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A confession. After several hours, we were still not certain of the significance of yesterday's statement by the Association of Teachers and Researchers of Qom, who declared that the Government was "illegitimate". Our initial thought was that the group was just one of a number of clerical factions, in this case a "reformist" faction such as the Assocation of Combatant Clerics linked to former President Khatami. We were not sure who the members were or what relationship they had to prominent critics of the Government such as Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Sane'i, or Ayatollah Taheri.

The Association's statement was elevated, however, by today's headline treatment in The New York Times, which declared that the Association was "the most important group of religious leaders in Iran". The statement was a "significant, if so far symbolic, setback for the government". There was a general statement from Stanford academic Abbas Milani and the assertion that the association was "formed under the leadership of the revolution’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Then "an Iranian political analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity because of fear of reprisal" declared, “The significance is that even within the clergy, there are many who refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the election results as announced by the supreme leader."

The problem with The Times' declaration was that it was based on little more than the minimal information behind our initial assessment. In other words, while there are signs of a substantial debate amongst the clergy not only about the specifics of the election but about the structure and systems of the Islamic Republic (a debate we've been highlighting as important for several days), there was nothing behind the spectre of the "Association".

Internet "chatter" today has offered few details on the group. The discussion area "Anonymous Iran", which features the excellent Josh Shahryar and his "Green Brief", has reached a dead end. So an Enduring America colleague did a bit of digging and came up with the following:

I have not found anything to suggest that this is the most important clerical group in Qom. I would say with reasonable confidence that it is not. This wiki site talks about "Society of Scholars and Teachers of Qom's Hawza":

"[Ayatollah Mohammad Va'ez] Abaee-Khorasani moved to Qom again [in 1997] as the head of Mohammad Khatami's presidential campaign office. The Qom campaign led to about 70% of the people of city voting for the reformist Khatami, which was unbelievable because of the supposedly conservative leanings of the citizens of the city. The local campaign team later became the founding members of Society of Scholars and Teachers of Qom's Hawza (majma'-e mohaghgheghin va modarresin-e howze-ye elmiyye-ye ghom), the political organization of reformist clerics of the city."

A very tentative conclusion? The Association's statement should not be dismissed. While the names and influence of those behind it are unclear, it is an indication of the complex but important manoeuvres linking politics and religion in Iran. And because those issues are complex, they should not be exaggerated and simplified in misleading headlines such as the one offered by The New York Times today.