Iran: Scott Lucas on "Sea of Green Radio"

The Latest from Iran (14 July): Ripples on the Surface

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It is a real honour to be involved with the launch of "Sea of Green Radio", a co-operative venture between Anonymous Iran and Fintan Dunne. The initiative is to bring latest news and analysis via Internet-hosted audio; already broadcasts feature Josh Shahryar, the creator of the "Green Brief".

In this chat with Fintan Dunne, I discussed he conjunction of the manoeuvres behind this Friday's prayers, with Hashemi Rafsanjani presiding and a mass march which may include Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi, with stories of possible compromise within the Iranian system.

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UPDATE 14 July, 0605 GMT: Latest on plans for the march to Friday prayers. The newssite Sharaf says it is probable that Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi will participate, but spokesmen for both men say decisions will be announced in forthcoming days through “official channels”.

UPDATE 13 July, 0845 GMT: How serious could this challenge be? Rumours are being spread, possibly by pro-Ahmadinejad sources, that this Friday's prayers will be Rafsanjani's last. Rafsanjani's son has denied this, and Ali Asghari, the repesentative of the Expediency Council in Parliament, has reaffirmed that Rafsanjani remains a prayer leader in Tehran.

UPDATE: A reader offers the following clarification and comment, "On the Mousavi Facebook it says, "Until now there is no confirmed report of the presence of Mousavi, Khatami and [Presidential candidate Mehdi] Karroubi in the prayers". I also wished that you had given more credit to Karroubi in your analysis. I think that Karroubi was very active and organized in supporting the protesters, organizing ways for families of the protesters to get in touch with the arrested and taking personally taking on the regime regarding the state of the arrested people."

We began today's updates by noting, "For the second day in a row, there were no significant open demonstrations, and statements were limited," and wondering when the opposition would make its next big move.

It's come. Four hours ago, on his Facebook page, Mir Hossein Mousavi declared, part in English, part in Farsi:

"ANOTHER BIG EVENT IS GOING TO COME....
"Venue on 26th Tir (July 17th)"
"Rafsanjani to address the people for Friday's prayers at Tehran University"
"Arise, Green Wave!"
"The day we were awaiting is finally going to come"
"With the presence of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami and Mir Hossein Mousavi"

So the perfect storm of the opposition from "without", the public challenge symbolised by the leadership of the Presidential candidate Mousavi, and the opposition from "within", the private manoeuvring of former President Rafsanjani, may be imminent. Rafsanjani, having refused to lead prayers in recent weeks and limited his pulbic appearances, re-emerges dramatically on Friday, and a vast crowd of demonstrators marches to the University of Tehran to welcome and applaud him. It turns the regime's public displays --- an ayatollah, even the Supreme Leader, setting out the appropriate line to the acclaim of followers --- against it.

This plan also has the clever beauty of complicating the regime's response. Does it dare tell Rafsanjani that he cannot speak on Friday? Do security forces dare block marchers who, after all, are only trying to worship as "good" Muslims?

This, in short, could be the largest mass gathering since 15 June, complete with the presence of Rafsanjani, Mousavi, and Khatami. Start counting dowy the days....

(hat tip to readers who made this analysis possible)

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2210 GMT: Press TV's website is featuring the six-point programme of Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei for a compromise resolution to post-election conflict (see 1510 GMT). It's one of a number of signs, which we'll discuss tomorrow, that the regime may be willing to make some concessions (albeit limited ones) to ease opposition.

2123 GMT: We have posted in a separate entry what we think may be an analysis of a major development in opposition  strategy, the combination of Hashemi Rafsanjani's leadership of Friday prayers in Tehran with a large march including Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami.

2120 GMT: Reliable websites are now agreeing that Sohrab Arabi was killed by Basiji gunfire on 15 June in Azadi Square.

1800 GMT: Some confusion over the death of Sohrab Arabi (pictured), who was reported to have died in detention in Evin Prison. According to a website, a family member has said that Arabi was among those killed in Azadi Square on 15 June, the day of the largest post-election demonstrations, when Basiji opened fire.

The report continues that Arabi's mother, unaware of her son's death, had prepared the bail money to release him from detention. She spent days outside Evin Prison, holding Sohrab's picture and asking if anyone had seen him.

1700 GMT: We've posted a separate blog entry on a disturbing, and frankly ludicrous, attempt by a Bush Administration official to claim credit, in the name of Dubya, for Iranian "regime change".

1540 GMT: Families of detainees have gathered once more in front of Evin Prison.

1522 GMT: Political Rumour of the Day. Former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, having declined in recent weeks to lead weekly prayers in Tehran, will be making the address this Friday.

1520 GMT: Yet, even as the dispute over detentions succeeds questions over the elections as the touchstone challenge to the regime, the Government presses ahead. Mohsen Hajjarian, the son of detained politician Saeed Hajjarian, has been arrested.

1510 GMT: As we thought, the issues of political activism and detentions are emerging as the key challenges to the regime. Now Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei has written an open letter. While separating legitimate protest from that spurred by foreign influence, Rezaei has emphasized the "duties of state institutions to establish in law the rights of people": "The Islamic Republic without religious freedom and democracy can not exist."

Meanwhile, Etamade Melli has maintained its pressure by publishing a summary of Mehdi Karroubi's meetings last week with the families of detainees.

1500 GMT: A day after he received Mehdi Karroubi's letter about detainees, Ayatollah Shahroudi, the head of the Iranian judiciary, has been addressed by the Iranian Association of Journalists. The association has asked Shahroudi to observe the Iranian Constitution with respect to detentions, confession, and torture. Human rights organisation have claimed that Iran leads the world in the detention of journalists.

1220 GMT: In an interview with Rooz, legal scholar Mohammad Seifzadeh and lawmaker Dariush Ghanbari announced that confessions extracted in prison lack legal validity and only serve political purposes. On the contrary of what is written and broadcasted by pro-government media organisations, Seifzadeh accused officials of defaming detainees.

Moreover, lawmaker Dariush Ghanbari, who is also the spokesperson for the Line of the Imam faction in the Majlis and Emad Hosseini, who is also member of the same faction claimed that the government was "imposing certain views on society." Rooz reports that many members of the judiciary ignored the significance of the situation when asked whether rights of detainees were violated.

1200 GMT: Another young martyr? Twitter users iranriggedelect and iranbaan report on 19 year old Sohrab Arabi, who they say died in Evin prison despite being due for release on Tuesday. Two reports on Rooz (article 1: Persian / English translation; article 2: Persian / English translation) suggest that he was involved in post-election protests, and remained in Evin even after his mother posted bail. Iranbaan also links to a video which she says shows his mother showing his picture to released detainees outside Evin in the hope that they will recognise him.

1145 GMT: CNN reports that, "A top Iranian general said government troops are "ready to sacrifice our lives" rather than back down in the face of protests over June's disputed presidential election." [link via iranrevolution]

0710 GMT: The First Post-election "Reform"? Press TV's website reports that the Expediency Council has ruled that, in future, a member of the President's Cabinet cannot also serve on the Guardian Council. Currently, Justice Minister Gholamhossein Elham, who also serves as President Ahmadinejad's primary spokesman, and Ebrahim Azizi, deputy head of the presidential office for human resources, are also on the Guardian Council.

0655 GMT: An important sign that "uneasy settling" (0615 GMT) does not mean that the situation has been resolved. A reader has confirmed, from Iranian media, yesterday's report of a statement that much of Tehran is a "crisis zone". The claim of police commander Ahmadi-Moghaddam was made in Aftab News.

Blame for the crisis was placed on people using computer software, encouraged by the BBC.

0650 GMT: Josh Shahryar's latest "Green Brief" claims, "Vast weekly protests and the heavy presence of Basiji’s have had a negative impact on Iranian bazaars; they are finding it harder and harder to stay open. As a result, commerce is slowly coming to a standstill."

0615 GMT: On the surface, there is an uneasy settling of the political situation in Iran. For the second day in a row, there were no significant open demonstrations, and statements were limited, with the most significant challenge coming in Mehdi Karroubi's letter to the head of the Iranian judiciary, Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, calling for the release of detainees (see yesterday's updates). Ayatollah Montazeri also issued a fatwa condemning the Government as "un-Islamic" for its support of violence against demonstrations. Rooz Online offers a summary (in Farsi) of the clerical debate over the political and security issues.

In short, the impression was that both sides were catching their breath before next moves. This, however, should not be mistaken for "calm". As long as the Iranian Government continues to hold hundreds of detainees without charge, including leading politicians and activists, then there will be an immediate cause for protest that could always be the platform for wider criticism of the system. On Saturday, for example, the women’s wing of Mir Hossein Mousavi’s Participation Front wrote an open letter, saying that Iranian mothers were awaiting the release of their loved ones with teary eyes and aching hearts.

That is why a lot of Internet discussion yesterday was about the alleged mistreatment of detainees and poor conditions in Evin Prison. And that is why there has been so much attention to the Basiji and the Revolutionary Guard. We were caught up in the debate over the authenticity of the leaked audio tape of Revolutionary Guard discussions on how to handle protest (although we are still unsure whether the tape is from 1999 or 2009), and much attention was paid to an article in The Wall Street Journal giving inside detail on members of the Basiji, closing with the puzzlement of one Basij over why his fiancee had left him.

There is also discussion on a possible "cyber-attack" on Twitter, with the key topic "#iranelection" being flooded with spam to obscure the latest posts on political, clerical, and security developments.

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1800 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi's letter to the head of the Iranian judiciary, Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, has been published on a Facebook page of Mohammad Khatami: "All protesting the election results agree with the original system, but its defenders have confiscated the electoral process."

1455 GMT: The mysterious of the "Basiji" audio tape (0825 and 1130 GMT): A very helpful reader has listened to four hours of the tapes and offers the following: "Each [of the four] segments is about an hour and on different aspect of protests and how to understand and neutralize it. The audio seems to be from the Revolutionary Guard who criticize the Basiji for ineffectiveness and lack of training. The 4th segment in the audio is creepy and openly talks about why ppeople are talking about a coup, psychological operations, ideology, etc."

Another reader adds, "This seems leaked audio from immediately after 1999 raids [on the 18 Tir] demonstrations. Still, given ranking figures supposedly in recordings, worth examining." The first reader, however, points us to a document, "Mechanisms for Suppression of Mobilization", which seems to correspond to aspect of the audio discussion.

(Again, our gratitude to both sources for assistance above and beyond the call of duty.)

1445 GMT: Citing a "security source", Lara Setrakian of ABC News (US) says that President Ahmadinejad's national broadcast on Tuesday was hindered by blackouts, caused by deliberate power surges from protestors' use of electrical appliances.

1430 GMT: Ayatollah Montazeri, the one-time successor to Ayatollah Khomeini, has issued another fatwa condemning the violence used against protestors. Any Government sanctioning such violence is "un-Islamic".

1230 GMT: Al Arabiya is reporting that Tehran's police chief has declared half of the city a "crisis zone".

1130 GMT: Correction. Our latest information is that the leaked audio of Basiji conversation (0825 GMT) is analysis and training in security methods.

1025 GMT: Election Past, Engagement Present. In the first clear sign that the post-election conflict is pushing the regime towards discussions with the "West" on Iran's nuclear programme and other matters of concern, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has told a news conference that Iran will present a package of "political, security, and international issues" for consideration: ""The package can be a good basis for talks with the West. The package will contain Iran's stances on political, security and international issues."

0935 GMT: The Silence is Broken. Mehdi Karroubi has issued a strong statement this morning, calling on the head of the Iranian judiciary, Ayatollah Shahroudi, to release detained protesters: "Constitutionalism and sovereignty of the people are opposed to tyranny."

0825 GMT: A lot of chatter this morning about a leaked audio, allegedly of Basiji discussing plans to raid university dormitories.

0800 GMT: More on the arrest of Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh (see yesterday's updates). The important link: Tajbakhsh was one of four US citizens detained in 2007 by the Iranian Government, the most prominent of whom was Haleh Esfiandiari. He was released after four months.

So the Iranian regime is still pursuing --- for public consumption, from their suspicions, or both --- the idea of a "velvet revolution" backed by US groups and possibly the American government.

0715 GMT: A reader tips us off to a development which we missed yesterday: according to the German news service Deutsche Welle, the 27-nation European Union has suspended all visas or visa extensions for Iranian diplomats and their families.

0630 GMT: A very quiet start to the day, with no breaking news.

The question we raised yesterday, "What next?", after the 18 Tir protests on Thursday, still hangs in the air. The only visible protests were small gatherings of the families of detainees in several locations in Tehran. Not a public word from figures such as Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani maintaining a mysterious silence. And the regime took a breather as well: beyond Ayatollah Kashani's relatively low-key address at Tehran prayers, the headline pronouncement was "a 50,000-strong special constable-like force called 'honorary police officers' to provide assistance to police support units".

There was one statement of note. Ayatollah Hashim Hashim-Zadeh Hareesi, a member of the Assembly of Experts, declared that people had started to distrust the system because of the election process. The government needed to restore people’s trust to prevent more serious problems. In itself, that statement could complement, rather than challenge, Ayatollah Kashani's request to the Iranian Parliament to review the electoral law and the Guardian Council's promise of a report on the election.

Press TV takes a look outside, "Obama ends G8 with warning to Iran". BBC English, whose coverage of Iran has almost collapsed, also devotes its limited attention to the G8 summit. CNN briefly refers to the arrest of academic Kian Tajbakhsh, primarily because he has American citizenship.

Iran: Rebellion of the Clerics? Not So Fast

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One area of the Iranian post-election crisis that we've been watching carefully is the possibility of clerical opposition to the regime. On the one hand, we're wary of stories --- such as the wayward New York Times article last Sunday --- that portray a rebellion of the clerics. On the other, we do think the opposition of some ayatollahs may have some significance, especially if that intersects with other political moves against the current leadership.

Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in contrast, dismisses the notion of a clerical challenge, at least for now:

While a handful of marginal clerics and religious groups dispute the official result of Iran’s recent presidential election, the Shiite clerical establishment as a whole currently supports Iran’s top leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Although this support has been demonstrated through silence, the fact that most Shiite clerics have not intervened in the public debate over the election or the government’s use of force against protesters has been particularly effective in strengthening Khamenei’s position.

The Establishment

Iran’s clerical establishment consists of about 200,000 members, and its hierarchy includes many midlevel clerics called hojjat ol-eslam (”proof of Islam”) and around a thousand ayatollahs (”sign of God”), who are leaders recognized for their scholarship. Ranking above ayatollahs are roughly fifteen grand ayatollahs, who are revered as sources of emulation, or as religious guides, for many followers.
Khamenei was a mere hojjat ol-eslam when he was elevated to the rank of ayatollah, in a controversial move aimed at making him constitutionally fit to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, as Iran’s principal leader. Khamenei’s authority stems from the principal of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), which combines political and religious power into one supreme authority.


Dissent Only from the Margins

The ayatollahs in Qom and Isfahan who have criticized the recent presidential election are isolated, with no significant role in the clerical establishment; they lack both financial resources and religious popularity. Although these ayatollahs held key political and juridical positions during the first decades of the Islamic Republic, they were sidelined first by Khomeini and then later by Khamenei.

A small marginal group, the Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom Seminary, is the only clerical group that has explicitly referred to the presidential election as illegitimate. The association was founded in 1998, and its central council consists of eighteen midranking clerics and one ayatollah. This group plays no role in the administration of the clerical establishment, and none of its members are considered to be sources of emulation. The association was originally created to support former president Muhammad Khatami, but its support has remained symbolic rather than practical. The group’s secretary, the controversial Seyyed Hossein Moussavi Tabrizi, was involved in the execution of many of the regime’s opponents and political prisoners while he was the general prosecutor of the Revolutionary Court during the first decade of Islamic Republic,


Coopting the Clerical Establishment

Iran’s current clerical establishment has little similarity to what it was prior to 1979 Islamic Revolution. Historically, the clerical class was a semiautonomous political institution with independent financial resources from religious taxes collected directly from followers. But after the revolution, and especially since Khamenei became leader twenty years ago, the establishment became totally dependent on the government’s financial resources, social authority, networking, organization, and political status. Iran’s leader is not only the head of the judiciary, intelligence services, and the armed forces, he is also the head of Iran’s Shiite clerics.

Clerics receive hefty regular stipends from the government, and many ayatollahs have exclusive privileges for numerous profit-making transactions. The government has modernized and bureaucratized the clerical establishment by creating the Center for Seminary Management, which is under direct supervision of Khamenei and is in full control of clerical finances, the seminary’s educational system, and the political direction of the establishment. Even Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, along with other influential Shiite leaders, allegedly runs his offices within the framework of the Center.

To control clerics politically, the government created the Special Court of Clerics — an organization that works outside the judiciary branch of government and is headed by an appointee of Khamenei — to deal with dissenting clerics. This independent court does not operate within the country’s legal system; it has own set of procedures and maintains its own prisons in most Iranian cities.

Politically defiant clerics who oppose certain government decisions work outside the clerical establishment and usually have a track record of supporting Iran’s reform movement. Although several prominent reformist figures, such as former president Muhammad Khatami and former speaker of the Iranian parliament Mehdi Karrubi, are clerics, their words and actions have little or no impact on the clerical establishment and pose no threat of causing political splits.

Conclusion

The Shiite clerical establishment, which stretches across the Middle East, is highly unlikely to initiate any sort of opposition to Khamenei’s authority. Various Shiite leaders may not be happy with the Iranian government’s policies, but publicizing their differences might jeopardize the social, political, and financial advantages they now receive from Iran. For example, during his Friday sermon immediately after the Iranian election, Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Fazlallah, a prominent Shiite ayatollah in Lebanon, stated his support for the government’s official result and voiced his admiration of the Iranian people for their participation in the election. In Iraq, al-Sistani kept silent about the election result and has not reacted to the postelection crisis. Both ayatollahs have offices in Qom and benefit from the support of the Iranian government.
Inside Iran, support for Khamenei, although mostly silent, is also evident. Morteza Moqtadai, the head of Center for Seminary Management, announced that the election result was approved by “God and the Hidden Imam,” and stated that Khamenei’s words are the “Hidden Imam’s words; when he says there was no manipulation in the election, he should be heard as the ultimate arbiter.”
Khamenei — for the moment — is in a strong position. The clerical establishment’s prevailing silence, however, could eventually work against him. If the political tide begins to turn, the establishment could be rendered powerless and its support ineffective, leaving Khamenei and his followers in a vulnerable position.