Sunday
Jul112010
Iran Special: A Response to "The Plot Against Ahmadinejad" (Verde)
Sunday, July 11, 2010 at 7:32 
Mr Verde assesses EA's Saturday "exclusive" on the planning amongst leading Iranian conservatives/principlists to limit the President's authority or even remove him from officeI thank him and offer this quick addition. I fully agree that the plotters against Ahmadinejad are "trying to protect their own interests within the regime...[rather] than offering a real change of direction". The evidence from our sources may indicate that they no longer think their interests can be protected with the President in office.
But, as Mr Verde notes, their success depends on getting the Supreme Leader to accept this point of view (and possibly setting up defences against a response by the Revolutionary Guard). That success in turn needs more than the current base of planners: Hashemi Rafsanjani and senior clerics, in their view, have to be added. Until they see this as likely, the private manoeuvres of Larijani-Rezaei-Tavakoli will not become public beyond their speeches challenging the Government:
Iran Exclusive: The Plot to Remove Ahmadinejad, Act II
As the exclusive notes, under the present circumstances the possibility that Ahmadinejad is impeached by the Parliament is unlikely. They will need the signature of 1/3 of MPs to start the process and a 2/3 vote to actually impeach him.
We all saw what happened when the Majlis voted against the pro-Ahmadinejad Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution in the contest over Islamic Azad University, in which the Parliament backed down within 48 hours. In an impeachment process, we would probably witness more than a busload of thugs in front of Majlis.
Even if the president is impeached, the Supreme Leader will have the final say in dismissing him and Khamenei has invested too much on Ahmadinejad. And even if Ahmadinejad were to be dismissed, the First VP Mohammad Reza Rahimi would become an interim president. Because the planners have as many problems with Rahimi as they do with Ahmadinejad, they would have to get rid of him before moving on the President.
All this new talk of attacking and threatening Ahmadinejad by the Larijani-Rezaei axis is probably from a position of weakness rather than strength. They feel that, as a result of changes in the past few years and especially the last 12 months, Ahmadinejad and Co. are moving to limit their power and influence. With Khamenei’s intervention in the Azad University case, they have found some space to try to push back against Ahmadinejad ----the Kahrizak Prison abuse scandal and Rahimi’s corruption case are just convenient excuses. So this could be more a rear-guard action than a strategy for attack.
The events of the past year have resulted in a logjam within the Islamic Republic. The election fraud and the post-election actions by the regime have left the Republic’s reputation in pieces. Violence on behalf of the Islamic Republic against its own citizens is not new; what is new is that this time the violence has been directed at the entire population rather than targeted at specific groups, like the leftists, MKO [Mujahedin-e-Khalq], reformists, etc.
As the Supreme Leader, Khamenei has clearly said that he supports Ahmadinejad, and within the regime he has concentrated power in the hands of a small faction that is behind the President. If he were to move against Ahmadinejad now, there were be two consequences. Firstly, the people who are behind Ahmadinejad would rebel against the decision, further damaging the Supreme Leader's reputation and influence. Secondly, Khamenei would be admitting that his decision to back Ahmadinejad wholeheartedly was wrong. This would lead to more serious questions about his judgement and his ability to remain in charge. More of the Republic’s servants would doubt Khamenei as the Leader and the legitimacy of the regime and their roles with it.
Therefore, the whole existence of the Islamic Republic could be threatened if Khamenei were to try to sacrifice Ahmadinejad. This might have been possible last summer: Khamenei could have withdrawn his support of the President then and allowed him to fall. Khamenei would have been damaged too, but he could probably have gotten away with it. But since Khamenei, for whatever reason, decided to stand by Ahmadinejad, the only way he could now get rid of him is if the regime had managed to create stability in Iran. The current situation is far from that: we are witnessing new crises on a daily basis.
Some might say that Khamenei could get rid of Ahmadinejad and install someone like Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, or Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen Rezaei. The problem is that this person would have to give in to at least some of the demands of the opposition and protestors. If that were to happen, the regime, which has been so inflexible, would suddenly have signalled to the population that ,with enough pressure, it would relent, no matter serious the issue. That could be the start of a new, and perhaps more determined, wave of opposition and protests.
Some might argue that the reformists can take over. They are too far from the centre of power at the present time. And it is increasingly looking like the reformists are facing ideological problems of their own. They seem to speak in paradoxes: both “return to the values Islamic Revolution” and “human rights”. They have not yet managed to explain how it would be possible to return to the values of the Revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini and install values like democracy, human rights, etc. The mess we are in at the present time is the result, not the abuse, of the values of the Revolution as interpreted by Khomeini. So a reformist takeover within the regime could lead to more public demands for change (and maybe even more protests) which could end up causing more damage to the Islamic Republic.
The regime in a precarious impasse with Ahmadinejad as a piece within the stalemate. If this piece is taken away in the present circumstances, it may lead to the whole structure collapsing
As far as the clerics are concerned, I think they are in a lose-lose situation. On the one hand, Ahmadinejad & Co. (with support from Khamenei) are moving to limit and weaken their power within the regime. On the other hand, the three decades of clerical rule in Iran have left them discredited. [Editor's Note: see an earlier analysis by Mr Verde, “The Escalating Crisis Within”).
Therefore any moves by Larijani-Tavakoli-Rezaei-etc against Ahamdinejad are probably more to do with them trying to protect their own interests within the regime, than a real change of direction. Otherwise, the regime could face more serious problems.
Reader Comments (14)
As I read Mr Verde's article above - I could not help but imagine a banana icecream sundae. It, and Mr Verde's writings, are both delicious!
Barry
Phew. Sounds like all factions are fighting for their 'lives' with the unintended consequence creating a bottleneck imbroglio. For me, this situation defies logic; there is cognitive dissonance at every turn ....
Thank you for this commentary. Those who wish to confuse themselves further might read M Sahimi's very good "Anniversary of a Turning Point " at Tehran Bureau now - http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/07/anniversary-of-a-turning-point.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranb...
There is nothing in this analysis I could possibly disagree with. Thanks you once again Mr Verde.
I would only add one thing. You say, "The regime in a precarious impasse with Ahmadinejad as a piece within the stalemate. If this piece is taken away in the present circumstances, it may lead to the whole structure collapsing." And that collapse would most likely be in the form of an out-and-out military takeover by the IRGC and Bassij.
dear scott,
thanks for your thoughts. i think both mousavi and karroubi (and even before them khatami) have stated many times what changes have to be done in order to maintain the system (I.R.) but foster democratization. changes in the constitution can be made in order to ensure that, for instance, the guardian council has no say whatsoever in elections. if there was no vetting by the g.c. the assembly of experts as well as the parliament would be REAL counterbalancing powers to the SL (in case of the former) and the government (in case of the latter). if the assembly of experts was REALLY democratically elected with no influence by the g.c. the SL would even be indirectly democratically legitimate.
let us not forget - the I.R.I. is only 30 years old. for political entities, this is NOTHING. especially when such an entity is unique. I am by no means a defender of the Islamic Republic, but I am not convinced yet that this state concept has failed. it will need more time, no war, no external interference in order to really know whether it works.
think of this as the end of AN & AK regime end
http://www.economist.com/node/16492611?story_id=16492611" rel="nofollow">http://www.economist.com/node/16492611?story_id...
[...] Die Verschwörung gegen Ahmadinedjad – Einspruch von Mr. Verde (empfehlenswert) [...]
Mr Verde,
Thank you for your detailed explanations, why recent Majlis moves are rather defensive than offensive. I just would like to add that AN's and the SL's reactions during the past year betray the same cluelessness. Virtually none of the country's political, economic or social problems have been solved, be it the nuclear crisis (more and much harsher sanctions), government indebtedness to the banking system (postponed) or post-electional protests (violently oppressed).
Shutting down the country as a reaction to the Bazaari strike is in the same line of provisional solutions. What will this glorious Holy Republic do after the holidays?
Arshama
Ashama
"I just would like to add that AN's and the SL's reactions during the past year betray the same cluelessness."
From a psychological point of view - I think that (for all people) when we firmly believe that our "theory of life/personal philosophy" is absolutely correct - but we are then faced with the indisputable evidence of personal failure in reality - we simply don't know what to do, as we cannot admit ( to ourselves and/or others) that our personal philosophy is incorrect. This is why people need the help of psychologists/councillors to see the error of their ways and thinking. Of course, this is NOT going to happen with people like AN and SL :)
Barry
Ramin,
The experiment has run its course, Please, no more.
Ramin,
"I am by no means a defender of the IslamicRepublic,..."
Really???????????????
Catherine,
Re. “.. that collapse would most likely be in the form of an out-and-out military takeover by the IRGC and Bassij”
Certain sections of the IRGC certainly hope this will happen. But first, I should explain the following:
Reformists being away from the center of power:
The reformists were originally pushed away from the center of power by Khamenie (this goes back to the sixth Majles and resulted in the 2009 election disputes) and they complained a lot about it. But since the post-election actions of Khamenei and parts of the military, the reformists have deliberately tried to create a distance between themselves and the current establishment. You could see that in the way they are directly criticising the role of the military in political and economic matters and also the way they are criticising (and at times mocking) Khamenei directly. There are two reasons for this: 1) they have no hope of getting anywhere close to power under the current circumstances; 2) they want to distance themselves so much from Khamenei/Ahmadinejad in order to be seen as a viable “true” alternative to them. You could see this in some of Mousavi’s statements (like naming of the current Iranian year – something which Khamenei does every year – and putting out a statement that criticized Ahmadinejad’s handling of the UN sanctions and put forward some solutions). You could see that Mousavi and other reformists leaders are trying to provide an alternative point of view (within regime boundaries) to what is currently happening in Iran.
This strategy may be aimed at this: there are serious problems within the regime (and in the country) and if events were to take a turn for the worse and the current regime leaders were unable to cope with the crises, then the reformists could take over the administration of the country (at least this is their hope). The problem with this is that there is such a large distance between the current establishment and the reformists that almost every political and military leader (including Khamenei himself) would have to either be removed from power or have their influence curbed severely for the reformists to be able to take control. This will require a lot of political skill and flexibility, something that is distinctly missing in the regime.
Reformists’ ideological problems:
Ideologically the reformists are stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand the harsh realities of today’s Iran show that the claims and intentions of the Islamic Republic are not at all compatible with the democracy, justice, fairness, mercy, etc that they claim it to be (or should be). On the other hand if they were to move too far away from the ideology of the Islamic Republic they would place themselves outside of the regime. This would mean that: 1) they would no longer be a viable alternative to the current rulers within the boundaries of the regime; 2) they would then become no different than the other non-regime opposition - like the leftists, monarchists, etc - with the difference that they, the reformist, would be associated with the Islamic Republic - and its association with mismanagement, brutality, etc; 3) they would be in danger of being wiped out as other non-regime opposition has been wiped out - some of them by the current reformists when they were in power at the time of Khomeini.
So we have the reformists being stuck with a dialog full of paradoxes.
On top of this, we have the record of the Islamic Republic’s early days. Mousavi used to speak of the early days of the IR (when he was PM) as if Iran was heaven on earth. He has now changed his position on that and says that not everything that happened then was good. Tajzadeh put out a statement recently in which he mentioned some of the transgression of the Islamic Republic’s early days (like the early and late 1980s mass executions, injustice, etc). He went as far as talking about going back to what Khomeini was saying in during his stay in Paris (in late 1978 and early 1979). Tajzadeh is a senior reformist and he would not have put out this statement without consulting with his peers. The problem here is that we have a senior reformists saying that we should go back to what Emam was promising in Paris and others are saying we should implement the constitution properly. The constitution was written after the revolution and many of the early revolutionaries believe that what eventually ended up as the IR constitution was not actually part of the draft. So do you go back to the constitution or back to what Khomeini promised in Paris? [I won’t even start about the paradoxes within the constitution which have allowed the Islamic Republic to become into the monster it is today. As example have a look at Ramin’s comment here: he is talking about setting up safe guards against the abuse of power by entities defined by the constitution - SL and GC - whose sole reason for existence is supposed to be to stop abuse of power!].
I think the post-election events have forced the reformists to revisit what they used to consider as bed rock (which is a good thing BTW). While the reformists are a better alternative to Khamenei/Ahmadinejad (who wouldn’t be?) at the present, they really need to sort out their ideology and decide where they stand: for democracy where the people’s will is implemented through the ballot box with no ifs and buts or for a dictatorship with an ill-fitting pretence of democracy? In the case of the latter, we already have that in Iran, so why would they complain about it (except that THEY would want to be in power)? Don’t forget that 8 years of Khamtami’s presidency resulted in Ahmadinejad.
IRGC (Basij is just an integrated part of the IRGC now):
The IRGC is not a well disciplined military force (for this have a look at photos of IRGC senior commanders). It has autonomous commands (it was designed that way) whose commanders are at times at loggerheads (there were persistent rumurs last year that some senior IRGC commanders were against the crackdowns and refused to allow their forces to be used). Some of the senior IRGC commanders who are charged with trying to control the problems in the country seem to have no clue (Example: Firoozabadi said in an interview that Iran did not agree to a ceasefire with Iraq in the early 1980s in order to punish Saddam. Up to now the regime stance was that it could not trust Saddam and that is had to fight on. Now Iran’s most senior military officer is saying that the war was to take revenge. Firroozabadi’s remarks mean that he is admitting that Iran was the aggressor in the latter part of the war. This could have serious effects on Iran’s claims for compensation and it could allow Iraq to make counter claims, blaming Iran for the continuation of the war). Most of the IRGC troops are conscripts who are no different from the average young man on the streets (he just has to serve there as part of his military service). So there is no reason to believe that the conscripts can be relied upon. This is why the regime is using paid thugs instead of IRGC troops (there are just not enough reliable ones around).
I guess that some of what the reformist leaders are saying is aimed at widening the rift within the IRGC ranks.
I am sure that some IRGC commanders (including Firoozabadi) think and hope that the current crisis within the regime will lead to them either being handed full control of the country or being able to take it easily (they are probably looking at how Reza Shah came to power). The problem is that they will not be able to run the country. Even if they were to take control (which is looking very doubtful) they’ll just mismanage things to a point where they too will be unable to continue.
In any case, I don’t think this eventuality is inevitable or about to happen soon. We are faced with a quagmire, no clear cut solutions.
Regards,
Verde
Mr Verde,
Your comment is very incisive, but just too long ;-)
I will try it however...
"The reformists.... really need to sort out their ideology and decide where they stand: for democracy where the people’s will is implemented through the ballot box with no ifs and buts or for a dictatorship with an ill-fitting pretence of democracy?"
As far as I know the Iranian society and her long bad memory with regards to politics and political promises, the main problem is at present, that a majority is still not convinced, if Moussavi does not opt for a dictatorship after coming to power?
I read a short nice piece on Khodnevis, pronouncing these fears of a renewed betrayal (those on the top are playing their games, and we sit watching).
Imho Moussavi must invent some mechanism, which guarantees real free elections instead of the holy mess, we have experienced the past 31 years.
This could be done by forming a committee with representatives of all existing currents within Iranian society, who subscribe to a real democracy, including the apparently non-existing seculars and supervises the legal procedures.
Obviously these are only intellectual games, because AN's latest statement about a one-party-system leaves no doubt about a speeding up putsch. Nevertheless all these efforts to grab more power are completely futile, because the IRGC has already proven its inability to manage the country's economy, and even Mr Mesbah Yazdi and his fidels cannot create miracles. When he hits the earth with his rod, there will be blood not water...
Arshama
Mousavi is incapable of inventing anything. He is also not a fighter. He left politics after Khomeini died because he did not know how to survive in the ring. Rafsanjani was the mastermind of Mousavi’s return to politics. Why Mousavi? He was the only card Rafsanjani could play in order to have his cake and eat it. Rafsanjani was sensing the dam had cracked and it would soon break and wash away Islamic Republic and that would be his end . He decided to use the Khomeini card one more time and drafted Mousavi for the job because he was easier to manage. Rafsanjani thought he could rig the election as he had done before for his own election and for Khatami. Rafsanjani, however, made a couple of miscalculations. He underestimated his opponent, the gang of Khamenei+Ahmadi+IRG. He also underestimated the size and the depth of the crack (discontent of masses) and that people might come along for the ride but only to use the occasion to show they were fed up with all of them.
No one in the right mind should hold any hope that Mousavi or any other reformists are capable of bringing democracy to Iran. Mousavi is a weak leader and at his age it is difficult to adapt. We have seen his struggle through his riddle ridden words.
Let us examine opposition leadership:
First, for democracy to set out roots culture of corruption, culture of superstition, culture of working around the law instead of within the law must be eradicated in Iran. Democracy is an attitude, it is a change of behavior in a society, it is a belief system and it is respect for the law. In the absence of such culture democracy is a pipe dream. Seeds of democracy do not sprout or will take an eternity to set out roots when the ground is not fertile. Some recent examples are Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan that is oscillating in and out of democracy. What steps Mousavi has taken to cultivate the ground and prepare the society for the change of attitude. He has had 13 months. Has there been any call to action in any of his statements in this area?
Second, trash needs to be cleaned. About two million (give or take) people of Islamic Republic need to be phased out and removed from positions they hold. How? Some by force and others through persuasion. Neither Mousavi nor any other person in the opposition has the capability to do that.
Third, people need to be persuaded that separation of religion and state is a prerequisite for equality under the law. Iranians especially those in rural areas and small towns need a charismatic and persuasive leader to help them understand that separation of religion and state does not mean separation of them from their religious beliefs. People need to be made aware that a government that has no religion means people have freedom to chose and practice their religion as they wish and not as mandated by their government. People need to be helped to grasp that if they want to pray they go to a mosque but if they seek a permit to sell their merchandize in the street corner they go to the City Hall and they would be able to get that permit without having connection to an Akhound (mullah) or bribe a basijii or a member of IRGC; all they have to do is follow the law. And that if they sensed any indiscretion in getting that permit they could blow the whistle without any repercussion. Mousavi will never advocate separation of church and state. We will never hear Karroubi talking about taking clergies off of government payrolls. These guys are from the Islamic Republic and for Islamic Republic.
Fourth, Solid plans for curing the economic malaise in the country and strong stewardship of the economy are required from a person who wants to lead Iran into a new era. A plan that would use oil and gas revenues to build Iran infrastructure and create jobs, a plan that encourages foreign investment, revive private industries, a plan that invest in health and education of people, a plan that would put every Iranian back to work so people can start building their shattered lives. Mousavi has had 13 months to ponder; which group of economists has he brought onboard to draft a plan and what kind of plan has he put forward that would tell me he is cut for the job? All we hear from him is the rerun to Khomeini era, an era of proven and documented economic disaster.
I am not interested to which God Mousavi prays or which Imam he believes in. I want to know what steps he has taken to rescue Iran and Iranians from Islamic Republic shipwreck. I see him like those who are in-charge now. I believe Iranians need a complete overhaul of the current system and not another version of Islamic Republic. With any of these Islamic Republic fellows all people will get is a different flavor of dictatorship with a different gang of Akhounds (mullahs) on government payroll.
I am not optimistic about Iran immediate future. I believe we will not see any change in Iran soon. This malignancy on Iranian society will continue to spread and I am afraid no one with the sound mind should look to reformists for cure.
Verde que te quiero verde!
You have made it quite clear for me now that an IRGC military takeover is only one - and not a very likely one for the reasons you mention - of a number of different ways the system could collaspe. I also think that even if the IRGC were to attempt a military coup, the regular Army would not go along with this, making civil war, however unlikely, an additional way the system could collapse.
I found your remarks on the reformists particularly relevant as I read this article yesterday right after your comment: The student uprising of July 9, 1999, and its powerful reverberations. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/07/anniversary-of-a-turning-point.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranb...
"The Reformists committed a grave mistake by not supporting the protesting students as strongly as they could. ... Once it became clear that the Reformists would not go all out to defend the students nor prosecute the main culprits in the attack, the protests gradually faded, dying out after five days.... The Reformists' failure to stand up to the hardliners had a devastating effect. Twenty-four Guard commanders, including then Brigadier General Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jafari, now a major general and the Guards' top commander, wrote a letter to Khatami, threatening that if he did not end the pursuit of his Reformist policies, they would be forced to take strong action."
Now wonder they are not trusted, as Arshama points out in his reply to you below.