Iran Analysis: Looking Back on the 1980s (Verde)

In recent weeks, one of the effects of the post-election crisis in Iran has been a look back at the early history of the Islamic Republic. In June, Mostafa Tajzadeh wrote an open letter asking for forgiveness for actions taken by reformists in the 1980s. This week, Mir Hossein Mousavi --- before his 1988 resignation letter as Prime Minister was published on the website of former President Abolhassan Bani Sadr --- issued an statement to disclose his version of events during the Iran-Iraq War.



Mr Verde explains the significance:

No one in the Iranian public knows anything about the decisions taken by politicians and military commanders during the Iran-Iraq War. There has never been any public scrutiny of the decisions taken. There is no independent information available about the actual events.

On the regime side, the narrative is this: “Backed by both the West and the East, Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in order to destroy the revolution, hence the war is called 'jang-e tahmili' (imposed war). The army of Islam fought heroically, hence the war being referred to as 'defa’-e moghddass' (Holy Defence). The whole world supported Saddam and eventually we were forced to accept the ceasefire, which Ayatollah Khomeini referred to as a chalice of poison.”

I am not saying this narrative is entirely false. Of course, Saddam started the war and the Iranian forces fought heroically against the odds on many occasions. My point is that the narrative is tainted by official propaganda. That is far from unexpected, but the problem is that there is no independently verifiable information, with the excuse that this is a "holy" matter, about the official thinking and decisions beyond the propaganda. Some people may be reluctant to question issues regarding the war, because it may appear that they are disrespecting the many servicemen, volunteers, and civilians who were killed during it.

However, this crisis and infighting within the Islamic Republic is producing an unexpected result. The recent revelations were spurred by the claims of Mohsen Rafighdoost, who was Minister of the Revolutionary Guard from 1982 to 1989. He makes it sound like the war was used as a tool for internal in-fighting of the regime: “Mr Hashemi [Rafsanjani, who had been put in charge of the war by Ayatollah Khomeini] told me: go and sit in your Ministry, I want to throw the ball into the court of the Government. He then gave an order that Mr Mousavi [then Prime Minister] became the head of the war effort, Mr Behzad Nabavi became the logistical deputy, and Mr [Mohhammad] Khatami became the propaganda deputy.”

Rafighdoost's implication is that Rafsanjani, knowing that the war effort was in bad shape, wanted to put Mousavi in charge so that once Iran had to accept the United Nations ceasefire resolution --- an acceptance which soon occurred --- Mousavi would be blamed for the failures. Rafighdoost also says that the government of Mousavi was hindering the war effort.

Mousavi responds that when he was put in charge, Iran was indeed in a very bad shape. He claims that in the first War Council meeting that he chaired, the regular Army and Revolutionary Guard commanders told him that Iran would certainly lose the Khuzestan Province to an Iraqi attack. He claims that the bulk of Iranian forces were massed around an unimportant height in Kordestan Province at the time, and even there they were in danger of being outflanked by the enemy.

As for management of the war, Mousavi claims that it had been handled badly since 1982.

At this stage it is impossible to know whose account to believe (maybe a combination of the two?).

A few years ago, after a public quarrel with Mohsen Rezaei, Revolutionary Guard commander in the 1980s, Rafsanjani published a secret message from Khomeini, in which the Ayatollah detailed his reasons for accepting the ceasefire. Unexpectedly Khomeini’s main reason for accepting the ceasefire was a letter from IRGC commander Rezaei. That letter said that Iran did not have any attacking capabilities for at least another five years. Even after that, it would only be possible to win the war if Tehran had hundreds of new planes and tanks and other modern weaponry such as laser-guided missiles and atomic bombs and if foreign powers were stopped from exerting influence in the region. Ayatollah Khomeini said that the Government was unable to support the war effort to this extent and everyone else except Rezaei was of the opinion that the war should be stopped.

I cannot help getting the feeling that officials are using nationally important information for their personal or factional gain, yet one effect of these disclosures is that they will further erode the Islamic Republic's historical foundations. In this crisis, the regime’s important days being tarnished: Qods [Jerusalem] Day in became “not Gaza, Not Lebanon” day, 13 Aban [in November] was a day when the regime's commemoration was so heavily guarded that it looked as if its marchers were prisoners, 16 Azar [National Students Day in December] became an occasion on which universities across the country voiced their protests, the funeral of a Grand Ayatollah Montazeri in the holy city of Qom turned into an anti-Khamenei demonstration, the religious celebration of Ashura [27 December] became a day on which the regime murdered its own citizens on the street, 22 Bahman [11 February] saw Iranian cities turned into military camps, and 14 Khordad [4 June] saw the humiliation by regime insiders of the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini on the anniversary of his death.

Now the carefully guarded regime-backed version of the Iran-Iraq War is being disputed by regime insiders.

Next chapter to come soon?

Iran Document: Karroubi Strongly Criticises Head of Guardian Council (29 July)

In a statement on his website, Mehdi Karroubi writes to Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, responding to Jannati's speech supporting the Supreme Leader and accusing the US and Saudi Arabia of offering $50 billion for "regime change" (see separate analysis on EA). Translation from the Facebook page supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi:

In the name of God,

Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Head of the Guardian Council and Friday Prayer Imam of Tehran

Greetings,

According to the news and reports published by some news agencies and news websites, recently you had an extensive political speech at Qom’s Jamkaran Mosque for the celebration of the birthday of Imam Mehdi [Shia’s "hidden" 12th Imam]. In the worst manner, you abused the pure and devoted religious gathering of Muslims who had gathered in that place only, because of their beliefs, to show respect to and ask for help from Imam Mehdi. Relying on the power and assumed immunity from liability for what you make up, you stated some imaginary unproven and divisive remarks and added the fuel of hatred and discord on the fire of difference you have started.

Among these repetitive shabby and outdated false allegations and rumours of yours against Imam Khomeini’s friends and the defenders of the people’s fundamental rights and all the noble people and freedom seekers, what was new was that you said: “I  have acquired a document that [shows] the Americans have paid $1 billion to the “heads of the conspiracy" [the Iranian opposition] via Saudi people who are currently agents of the United States in the region’s countries. These Saudis, who were speaking on behalf of the United States, told [them] if you manage to overthrow the establishment, we will pay you up to another $50 billion, but God put out this “conspiracy” with the hands of his pure believers.”

Mr. Jannati, what you call “conspiracy” was the election that, as usual, was engineered by you and the intelligence rooms guiding those like you in the Guardian Council and Interior Ministry to provide what was favoured by those who engineered this election. But despite the expectation and unlike the norm (and God is the best planner), the plan of yours and other power grabbers was not successful and the salty stew you cooked up and was hastily
fed to the nation made them angry and [this] interrupted your show election.

So you and the other designers and engineers of the election scenario, with disbelief and despite the empty claim of abiding to people’s votes, repressed people’s protest in the most extreme and most brutal way possible. And then, at the height of your fear from people’s anger, you posed victoriously and, to complete your projects, staged show trials to quiet the remnants of any objective voice, putting the silence seal on the land of dead that you had dreamed of in your mind. This method of alleging and giving out sentences has unfortunately been the method based on which, for years, many of
the pure children of this nation have been denied their rights, such as electing or being elected because their qualifications have also been rejected based on these types of reports.

However, after more than a year from what has happened [since the election], you still are having nightmares from what you have done and the response you have received, and you are constantly trying to find a pretext so that the outcome of the fantasy that you made up and the lies you
created would become smooth for you.

Mr. Jannati, in the lexicon you created following the Presidential elections you called those “conspirators” who are the majority of the Iranian nation and are considered leaders for them (I bet Mehdi Karroubi is one of them). But in the same lexicon, which fortunately was defined correctly by the nation, some have become well-known for their hypocrisy, trickery, shams, killing, abuse of religion, and deceit of faith. Undoubtedly,  no doubt if
you are not one of the obvious examples of them, you are indeed someone who made this path clear for them to achieve their goals.

If I am a conspirator because I object [to the Presidential election], then you are a partner of those who stole this nation’s vote and are disloyal to the nation because the footsteps of your foolish acts are evident in the events that have happened both before and after the election. Unfortunately, in every case you stood against the people and took side with the violent and oppressive movement.

This time for the false accusations you made against those who you call “the heads of the conspiracy”, claiming that they have received money from
Saudis to topple the system, first of all I will file charges against you to the Islamic Republic’s judiciary, although I have no hope that this will be processed. Secondly I write this letter so that you realise that I am protesting to your remarks. I ask you here to reveal any reason, document, and
evidence you have, otherwise I will unveil your growing lies and scandals publicly everywhere and by any means possible.

In conclusion, I remind you that you are at the end of the path that is called life and whatever you have done, if it has been done for the love of this world and its possessions, then you have definitely achieved it....

Mr. Jannati, history repeats itself and it is incumbent upon the politicians to learn from it. You certainly remember that after the uprising of Khordad 15 [5 June 1963] and the arrest of Imam [Khomeini] and a group of great [religious] scholars and many of the people and the butchering of the nation by the government’s soldiers and thugs in various cities, the Shah’s regime announced that they have arrested someone named “Jo Jo” at [Tehran's] Mehrabad airport who had brought two million tomans for Imam Khomeini to use for rioting against the regime.

The planners and scene-writers affiliated with the deceased Shah seemed experienced enough that, when they created a lie, they at least made it plausible for some of the people. Unfortunately you and your friends or, better said, your sources, when you create a lie, it is implausible and unacceptable. I seek refuge to God from the injustice that the government’s religious instructors and preachers have done and continue to do to the real and oppressed clergymen and the true preachers of Islam and Shia.

You also seek refuge to God and fear for your afterlife. Ask God for forgiveness and ask the great nation of Iran for mercy. There is hope that people and the almighty God may forgive your sins.

So learn a lesson, you insightful ones (from the Holy Quran)

Mehdi Karroubi

Mordad 7, 1389 6 (29 July 2010)

The Latest from Iran (29 July): 22% Support?

1935 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Activist Hoda Saber, who was mysteriously taken by unknown persons on Saturday, has called his family from Evin Prison. The reason for arrest is unknown.

International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran updates on the transfer of 15 political prisoners, including student activist Abdollah Momeni and journalist Bahman Ahmadi Amoui, to solitary confinement in Evin Prison. (We have previously reported that 10 detainees were transferred.) The 15 are protesting the “unsuitable treatment of prisoners and their families by prison authorities and Ward 350 officers on visitation days; lack of health and welfare facilities; as well as suspension of visitation privileges of several prisoners.”

NEW Iran Analysis: Twisting & Turning to Prove the Leader is Supreme (Verde)
NEW Iran: How “Ahmadinejad v. Paul the Octopus” Became a Global Showdown
Iran Analysis: The Hardliners Take on Ahmadinejad
Latest Iran Video: Ahmadinejad on Afghanistan, Sanctions, & the US (26 July)
The Latest from Iran (28 July): A Presidential Target?

1730 GMT: Sporting Moment. Kodoom reports on triumph turned into trouble....

Hossein Askari, riding for the Tabriz Petrochemical Cycling Team, won the Tour of Qinghai Lake in China.  However, according to Ali Zangiabadi, the director of the Iranian Cycling Federation, Askari will face disciplinary action in Iran after he popped the cork from a champagne bottle in his victory celebration.



1720 GMT: Academic Corner. The Educational Testing Service has announced that it is resuming registrations in Iran for TOEFL (Teaching of English as a Foreign Language) and GRE (Graduate Record Examination) tests.

The examinations, which are vital for many Iranian students who wish to study abroad, were suspended two weeks ago after tighter U.N. Security Council restrictions on financial transactions involving Iran led to ETS's banking arrangements being discontinued. Students wishing to take the tests may now register through Iran's National Organization of Educational Testing or mayn use credit/debit cards issued by banks that are not prohibited under UN or US sanctions.

1530 GMT: Solving the Oil Squeeze? Three Russian state-controlled oil companies may begin delivering gasoline to Iran in a month, the head of the Iran Commission of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce & Industry has said. Talks are being held on a “working level” and the first delivery may take place in late August or September.

1500 GMT: Karroubi Answers. Mehdi Karroubi has offered a response to Ayatollah Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council (see separate entry): "If I am an intriguer, then you are in league with those who stole the people's votes....What you called sedition was an election which was as usual engineered by you and think tanks led by you or others like you at the Ministry of Interior and Guardian Council."

1420 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Iranian activists have posted an updated letter, addressed to the Supreme Leader, requesting commutation of the death sentences of Jafar Kazemi (see 1110 GMT) and Mohammad Ali Haj Aghaei, both arrested during post-election protests and accused of "mohareb" (war against God).

Radio Zamaneh has now posted an English text of the news of Kazemi's sentence.

1410 GMT: Oil Squeeze. Reports indicate that Iran shipped around 9 million barrels of crude oil to China in June, a fall of 13.1 million barrels from last year.

1400 GMT: Water Watch. The Los Angeles Times updates on the reports that water in parts of Tehran are contaminated with high levels of toxic nitrate.

The article reports that the Ministry of Power has handed out free bottles of water to an underprivileged suburb south of the city. The Water and Sewage Waste Organization has recently dug new wells to expand the water supply. However, Minister of Health Marziyeh Vahid Dastjerdi announced that the amount of nitrate found in the drinking water in parts of Tehran exceeded the appropriate level, posing a serious threat to city-dwellers’ health.

1310 GMT: Mousavi Watch (1988 Edition). An EA correspondent checks in:

"The big news today is Enqelab Eslami, the Paris newspaper of former President Abulhassan Bani-Sadr, is allegedly re-leaking the full contents of the letter that Mousavi wrote to Ayatollah Khamenei in 1988 explaining his sudden resignation as Prime Minister. (The resignation was refused by Khomeini, who forced Mousavi to stay on.)

The contents, which I am trying to verify, are amusing: Mousavi decries his total lack of control or even information over events surrounding Iranian foreign policy and activities. For example, he states that he received word through the press that Iranian pilgrims have been apprehended in Jeddah carrying firearms or that the Speaker or Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, exchanged letters with the Prime Minister of Japan and Mousavi only got wind of it when both sides finished the exchange.

Essentially this is a strong accusation against the un-constitutional accumulation of powers by Khamenei. Enqelab Eslami first leaked the letter in 1988, prior to Khomeini's death. It now republishes iafter Mousavi's threat to reveal all, (see the letter posted on EA).

Now the ball's firmly in Mousavi's own court: he either needs to deny the veracity of the claims or confirm the letter...."

1140 GMT: Mousavi Watch. Kalemeh has a short report of Mir Hossein Mousavi's meeting this morning with members of the Assembly of Teachers and Researchers of Qom.

1110 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. An Iranian activist reports that he death sentence of political prisoner Jafar Kazemi has been upheld by an appellate court.

Kazemi, arrested last September during protests, was convicted of "mohareb" (war against God) for connections with Mujahedin-e-Khalq, a charge that he has denied. He was also in prison for nine yers during the 1980s.

Reporters Without Borders has condemned the "abuse" of detained journalist Abdolreza Tajik and other political prisoners, “It is time for United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay to press the Iranian authorities to accept a visit from the UN special rapporteur on torture, so that he can investigate the allegations of mistreatment in Iranian prisons.”

This week the Tajik family wrote Iran’s head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, that the journalist said during a prison the privisit that he had been “dishonoured” and that he demanded to see his lawyer, Mohammad Sharif, and Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Dowlatabadi.

1005 GMT: Oil Squeeze. The New York Times summarises Iran's announcement that it will increase domestic gasoline production by converting two petrochemical plants so they can produce gasoline by processing benzene.

Minister of Oil Masoud Mirkazemi's all-is-well alert was that Iran would become a net exporter of gasoline by 2015. Other scientists say, however, that gasoline from benzene will burn poorly with more impurities than regular gasoline, damaging engines.

0955 GMT: Security Escalation. Aftab News reports that 7000 bases for Basij militia are to be constructed, including 100 in Zanjan Province.

0930 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Add Australia to the list of countries ramping up restrictions on Tehran. Following the UN, US, and European Union measures, Canberra has tightened restrictions on Iranian oil and gas groups and companies for the first time and has banned trade of weapons and related material, including anything that could be used for development of nuclear, missile, chemical or biological capability.

0755 GMT: We have posted an analysis by Mr Verde, considering the significance of a speech by Ayatollah Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, "Twisting & Turning to Prove the Leader is Supreme".

0600 GMT: While we catch up with "other" news, we open today with a feature, "How 'Ahmadinejad v. Paul the Octopus' Became a Global Showdown".

The President may also want to take note of a recent poll conducted by the Iranian Student Polling Agency in which 56 percent of participants believe his popularity has declined over the past year while only 22 percent believe it has increased.

As readers know, we are cautious about any poll carried out inside Iran, but the ISPA, which surveyed 1172 people is is linked to Jahad Daneshgahi, an academic body which in turn is overseen by the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution, headed by President Ahmadinejad.

Two-thirds of the respondents in the poll believe that dissatisfaction with the government remains widespread, if largely covert. Only 18% think that the government was able to control post-election protests.

Perhaps the most striking finding, however, is this: 80% said that economic issues such as inflation, lack of affordable housing, and unemployment are their main priorities. Lack of political and social freedoms was named by only 7%, weakening Islamic values concerned 6%, and international threats such as military attacks or economic sanctions was cited by 4% percent.

Iran Analysis: Twisting & Turning to Prove the Leader is Supreme (Verde)

On Wednesday we noted a speech by Ayatollah Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, but our takeaway line was his "conspiracy theory" that the US and Saudi Arabia were paying $1 billion and putting up a bounty of another $50 billion for regime change in Tehran.

Mr Verde has gone through the speech and discovers that the bigger but untold story of Jannati's speech is even more interesting, given its connection with the Supreme Leader's "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa:

There is a lot of mention of God in the speech, with the point being that God has saved the Revolution from its enemies. Jannati says, “God gave up Imam Khomeini” and adds later, “In the same way that he protected Moses from danger, God saved Imam [Khomeini] and the Revolution." He uses the example, "The events of Tabas [the site of the failed attempt by US forces to rescue the US Embassy hostages in 1980] which was help from God, showed that God himself is the protector of the Revolution and this invisible help has been a reoccurring theme in the history of the Revolution”.

Jannati then talks about the attempted assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei in the early 1980s  and says that although al the doctors and Khamenei himself did not believe that he would live, God saved him. He says, “At the time of the passing of Imam Khomeini, God delivered the position of the leader of the revolution to the Supreme Leader [Khamenei], and he was tasked by God to protect this revolution and this regime and to continue the path of [the first Shia] Imam Ali.

Jannati then links challenges past and present to show that God will ensure the Supreme Leader will overcome “in addition to the enormous sedition of 88 [post-2009 election protests], other seditions took place during the leadership of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei too which in some cases came close to overthrowing the regime, but the same God that was the protector of the Revolution in the events of Tabas [1980] again saved the Revolution."

Interpretation

1. Note Jannati's constant references to God's protection of the regime, intervening at time to save it. This could be a sign that regime officials are being forced to rely more on this claim and less on the reassurance that the regime is popular and upheld by the people. It is worth watching for signs of this in speeches by other officials.

2. Jannati uses the title “Grand Ayatollah” for Khamenei. This is not the first time this has occurred, but it may be relevant to the “I am the Rule of the Prophet” fatwa.

3. Jannati's statement that God delivered the leadership to Khamenei supports the Supreme Leader's claim in his fatwa that his authority is like that of the Prophet.

4. Jannati's reference to the post-election protests as “enormous sedition of 88” contradicts the main regime line is that the protestors were few in number and that there never was a crisis.

5. Note Jannati's revelations that the regime was on the brink of overthrow on several occasions during the leadership of Khamenei. As far as I know, this is the first time any regime official has even talked about the possibility of the toppling of the regime, yet alone speak of "several occasions" and linking this to post-election protests.

6. Jannati's proclamation of the $1 billion "regime change" payment and the promised $50 billion is even more ridiculous than his other declarations. Up to now such claims were about millions of dollars; now it seems the rates have risen sharply.

Iran Analysis: Interpreting Khamenei's "Re-Appearing" Fatwa (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

In a development almost unnoticed outside Iran, the Supreme Leader's office has not only re-claimed the "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa but has done so with a loud defence of the decision to issue it.

The latest statement on Ayatollah Khamenei's website says that only “state orders” of the Supreme Leader must be obeyed. It blames the "media of the enemy" for creating a fuss over the fatwa, since Ayatollah Khomeini held the same views, and complains about publication of the text of the fatwa next to photographs of the SL’s meeting with military commanders. [Editor's note: is this the reason why the fatwa "disappeared" for several days? But if so, why did it not appear on Khamenei's official website in the first place, removing any ambiguity?]

Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)

The statement also claims that the issuing of this fatwa will help widen the circle of regime insiders, continuing Khamenei’s call last year for inclusion.

Observations

The statement is a very angry one which tries to blame the enemy for the fuss over the fatwa and to hide behind Khoemini as well as claiming --- without saying how --- that Khamenei wants to expand the number of people within the regime.

When the fatwa was originally issued, there were probably three objectives:

1) To provide more ammunition for sackings, disqualifications and imprisonments by regime officials
2) To attempt to counter the increasing criticism of Khamenei.
3) Perhaps most significantly, to try and stop the haemorrhage of support for Khamenei within the regime’s conservative/principalist camps.

Once the fatwa was issued, it was probably met with a torrent of criticism not just from people outside of the regime, but by regime insiders and high ranking clerics. The criticism probably not only included the fatwa itself but the claimed authority of Khamenei to issue fatwas in the first place.

That may have been the reason for the fatwa being pulled from sites, but once it was, it was interpreted as a quick retreat by Khamenei. That probably led to his advisors thinking that this was even worse than the criticism of the fatwa, because it would be seen as the Supreme Leader's acceptance that the criticism was correct.

This probably led to the re-appearance of the fatwa but this time his office seems to be trying to come out fighting. If so, I must say it is a feeble attempt at a strong stand and a fight.

Conclusion

To my knowledege, this is the first time that Khamenei’s office has been forced to issue a statement about an issue over which the Supreme Leader has been criticised. Is this a sign that even the Supreme Leader’s office now believes it needs to respond to public pressure and criticism?

Note that the original fatwa says that the principle of veiayat-e-faqih (clerical supremacy) is a branch of the rule of the Prophet and Shia Imams. Now, however, the statement says that the fatwa covers only “state orders”. This may be a retreat, as the original aim of the fatwa was to assert that the Supreme Leader's verdict is final in all circumstances.