Sunday
Jul112010
Iran Special: A Response to "The Plot Against Ahmadinejad" (Verde)
Sunday, July 11, 2010 at 7:32
Mr Verde assesses EA's Saturday "exclusive" on the planning amongst leading Iranian conservatives/principlists to limit the President's authority or even remove him from office
I thank him and offer this quick addition. I fully agree that the plotters against Ahmadinejad are "trying to protect their own interests within the regime...[rather] than offering a real change of direction". The evidence from our sources may indicate that they no longer think their interests can be protected with the President in office.
But, as Mr Verde notes, their success depends on getting the Supreme Leader to accept this point of view (and possibly setting up defences against a response by the Revolutionary Guard). That success in turn needs more than the current base of planners: Hashemi Rafsanjani and senior clerics, in their view, have to be added. Until they see this as likely, the private manoeuvres of Larijani-Rezaei-Tavakoli will not become public beyond their speeches challenging the Government:
As the exclusive notes, under the present circumstances the possibility that Ahmadinejad is impeached by the Parliament is unlikely. They will need the signature of 1/3 of MPs to start the process and a 2/3 vote to actually impeach him.
We all saw what happened when the Majlis voted against the pro-Ahmadinejad Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution in the contest over Islamic Azad University, in which the Parliament backed down within 48 hours. In an impeachment process, we would probably witness more than a busload of thugs in front of Majlis.
Even if the president is impeached, the Supreme Leader will have the final say in dismissing him and Khamenei has invested too much on Ahmadinejad. And even if Ahmadinejad were to be dismissed, the First VP Mohammad Reza Rahimi would become an interim president. Because the planners have as many problems with Rahimi as they do with Ahmadinejad, they would have to get rid of him before moving on the President.
All this new talk of attacking and threatening Ahmadinejad by the Larijani-Rezaei axis is probably from a position of weakness rather than strength. They feel that, as a result of changes in the past few years and especially the last 12 months, Ahmadinejad and Co. are moving to limit their power and influence. With Khamenei’s intervention in the Azad University case, they have found some space to try to push back against Ahmadinejad ----the Kahrizak Prison abuse scandal and Rahimi’s corruption case are just convenient excuses. So this could be more a rear-guard action than a strategy for attack.
The events of the past year have resulted in a logjam within the Islamic Republic. The election fraud and the post-election actions by the regime have left the Republic’s reputation in pieces. Violence on behalf of the Islamic Republic against its own citizens is not new; what is new is that this time the violence has been directed at the entire population rather than targeted at specific groups, like the leftists, MKO [Mujahedin-e-Khalq], reformists, etc.
As the Supreme Leader, Khamenei has clearly said that he supports Ahmadinejad, and within the regime he has concentrated power in the hands of a small faction that is behind the President. If he were to move against Ahmadinejad now, there were be two consequences. Firstly, the people who are behind Ahmadinejad would rebel against the decision, further damaging the Supreme Leader's reputation and influence. Secondly, Khamenei would be admitting that his decision to back Ahmadinejad wholeheartedly was wrong. This would lead to more serious questions about his judgement and his ability to remain in charge. More of the Republic’s servants would doubt Khamenei as the Leader and the legitimacy of the regime and their roles with it.
Therefore, the whole existence of the Islamic Republic could be threatened if Khamenei were to try to sacrifice Ahmadinejad. This might have been possible last summer: Khamenei could have withdrawn his support of the President then and allowed him to fall. Khamenei would have been damaged too, but he could probably have gotten away with it. But since Khamenei, for whatever reason, decided to stand by Ahmadinejad, the only way he could now get rid of him is if the regime had managed to create stability in Iran. The current situation is far from that: we are witnessing new crises on a daily basis.
Some might say that Khamenei could get rid of Ahmadinejad and install someone like Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, or Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen Rezaei. The problem is that this person would have to give in to at least some of the demands of the opposition and protestors. If that were to happen, the regime, which has been so inflexible, would suddenly have signalled to the population that ,with enough pressure, it would relent, no matter serious the issue. That could be the start of a new, and perhaps more determined, wave of opposition and protests.
Some might argue that the reformists can take over. They are too far from the centre of power at the present time. And it is increasingly looking like the reformists are facing ideological problems of their own. They seem to speak in paradoxes: both “return to the values Islamic Revolution” and “human rights”. They have not yet managed to explain how it would be possible to return to the values of the Revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini and install values like democracy, human rights, etc. The mess we are in at the present time is the result, not the abuse, of the values of the Revolution as interpreted by Khomeini. So a reformist takeover within the regime could lead to more public demands for change (and maybe even more protests) which could end up causing more damage to the Islamic Republic.
The regime in a precarious impasse with Ahmadinejad as a piece within the stalemate. If this piece is taken away in the present circumstances, it may lead to the whole structure collapsing
As far as the clerics are concerned, I think they are in a lose-lose situation. On the one hand, Ahmadinejad & Co. (with support from Khamenei) are moving to limit and weaken their power within the regime. On the other hand, the three decades of clerical rule in Iran have left them discredited. [Editor's Note: see an earlier analysis by Mr Verde, “The Escalating Crisis Within”).
Therefore any moves by Larijani-Tavakoli-Rezaei-etc against Ahamdinejad are probably more to do with them trying to protect their own interests within the regime, than a real change of direction. Otherwise, the regime could face more serious problems.
I thank him and offer this quick addition. I fully agree that the plotters against Ahmadinejad are "trying to protect their own interests within the regime...[rather] than offering a real change of direction". The evidence from our sources may indicate that they no longer think their interests can be protected with the President in office.
But, as Mr Verde notes, their success depends on getting the Supreme Leader to accept this point of view (and possibly setting up defences against a response by the Revolutionary Guard). That success in turn needs more than the current base of planners: Hashemi Rafsanjani and senior clerics, in their view, have to be added. Until they see this as likely, the private manoeuvres of Larijani-Rezaei-Tavakoli will not become public beyond their speeches challenging the Government:
Iran Exclusive: The Plot to Remove Ahmadinejad, Act II
As the exclusive notes, under the present circumstances the possibility that Ahmadinejad is impeached by the Parliament is unlikely. They will need the signature of 1/3 of MPs to start the process and a 2/3 vote to actually impeach him.
We all saw what happened when the Majlis voted against the pro-Ahmadinejad Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution in the contest over Islamic Azad University, in which the Parliament backed down within 48 hours. In an impeachment process, we would probably witness more than a busload of thugs in front of Majlis.
Even if the president is impeached, the Supreme Leader will have the final say in dismissing him and Khamenei has invested too much on Ahmadinejad. And even if Ahmadinejad were to be dismissed, the First VP Mohammad Reza Rahimi would become an interim president. Because the planners have as many problems with Rahimi as they do with Ahmadinejad, they would have to get rid of him before moving on the President.
All this new talk of attacking and threatening Ahmadinejad by the Larijani-Rezaei axis is probably from a position of weakness rather than strength. They feel that, as a result of changes in the past few years and especially the last 12 months, Ahmadinejad and Co. are moving to limit their power and influence. With Khamenei’s intervention in the Azad University case, they have found some space to try to push back against Ahmadinejad ----the Kahrizak Prison abuse scandal and Rahimi’s corruption case are just convenient excuses. So this could be more a rear-guard action than a strategy for attack.
The events of the past year have resulted in a logjam within the Islamic Republic. The election fraud and the post-election actions by the regime have left the Republic’s reputation in pieces. Violence on behalf of the Islamic Republic against its own citizens is not new; what is new is that this time the violence has been directed at the entire population rather than targeted at specific groups, like the leftists, MKO [Mujahedin-e-Khalq], reformists, etc.
As the Supreme Leader, Khamenei has clearly said that he supports Ahmadinejad, and within the regime he has concentrated power in the hands of a small faction that is behind the President. If he were to move against Ahmadinejad now, there were be two consequences. Firstly, the people who are behind Ahmadinejad would rebel against the decision, further damaging the Supreme Leader's reputation and influence. Secondly, Khamenei would be admitting that his decision to back Ahmadinejad wholeheartedly was wrong. This would lead to more serious questions about his judgement and his ability to remain in charge. More of the Republic’s servants would doubt Khamenei as the Leader and the legitimacy of the regime and their roles with it.
Therefore, the whole existence of the Islamic Republic could be threatened if Khamenei were to try to sacrifice Ahmadinejad. This might have been possible last summer: Khamenei could have withdrawn his support of the President then and allowed him to fall. Khamenei would have been damaged too, but he could probably have gotten away with it. But since Khamenei, for whatever reason, decided to stand by Ahmadinejad, the only way he could now get rid of him is if the regime had managed to create stability in Iran. The current situation is far from that: we are witnessing new crises on a daily basis.
Some might say that Khamenei could get rid of Ahmadinejad and install someone like Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, or Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen Rezaei. The problem is that this person would have to give in to at least some of the demands of the opposition and protestors. If that were to happen, the regime, which has been so inflexible, would suddenly have signalled to the population that ,with enough pressure, it would relent, no matter serious the issue. That could be the start of a new, and perhaps more determined, wave of opposition and protests.
Some might argue that the reformists can take over. They are too far from the centre of power at the present time. And it is increasingly looking like the reformists are facing ideological problems of their own. They seem to speak in paradoxes: both “return to the values Islamic Revolution” and “human rights”. They have not yet managed to explain how it would be possible to return to the values of the Revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini and install values like democracy, human rights, etc. The mess we are in at the present time is the result, not the abuse, of the values of the Revolution as interpreted by Khomeini. So a reformist takeover within the regime could lead to more public demands for change (and maybe even more protests) which could end up causing more damage to the Islamic Republic.
The regime in a precarious impasse with Ahmadinejad as a piece within the stalemate. If this piece is taken away in the present circumstances, it may lead to the whole structure collapsing
As far as the clerics are concerned, I think they are in a lose-lose situation. On the one hand, Ahmadinejad & Co. (with support from Khamenei) are moving to limit and weaken their power within the regime. On the other hand, the three decades of clerical rule in Iran have left them discredited. [Editor's Note: see an earlier analysis by Mr Verde, “The Escalating Crisis Within”).
Therefore any moves by Larijani-Tavakoli-Rezaei-etc against Ahamdinejad are probably more to do with them trying to protect their own interests within the regime, than a real change of direction. Otherwise, the regime could face more serious problems.