Iran Analysis: Looking Back on the 1980s (Verde)

In recent weeks, one of the effects of the post-election crisis in Iran has been a look back at the early history of the Islamic Republic. In June, Mostafa Tajzadeh wrote an open letter asking for forgiveness for actions taken by reformists in the 1980s. This week, Mir Hossein Mousavi --- before his 1988 resignation letter as Prime Minister was published on the website of former President Abolhassan Bani Sadr --- issued an statement to disclose his version of events during the Iran-Iraq War.



Mr Verde explains the significance:

No one in the Iranian public knows anything about the decisions taken by politicians and military commanders during the Iran-Iraq War. There has never been any public scrutiny of the decisions taken. There is no independent information available about the actual events.

On the regime side, the narrative is this: “Backed by both the West and the East, Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in order to destroy the revolution, hence the war is called 'jang-e tahmili' (imposed war). The army of Islam fought heroically, hence the war being referred to as 'defa’-e moghddass' (Holy Defence). The whole world supported Saddam and eventually we were forced to accept the ceasefire, which Ayatollah Khomeini referred to as a chalice of poison.”

I am not saying this narrative is entirely false. Of course, Saddam started the war and the Iranian forces fought heroically against the odds on many occasions. My point is that the narrative is tainted by official propaganda. That is far from unexpected, but the problem is that there is no independently verifiable information, with the excuse that this is a "holy" matter, about the official thinking and decisions beyond the propaganda. Some people may be reluctant to question issues regarding the war, because it may appear that they are disrespecting the many servicemen, volunteers, and civilians who were killed during it.

However, this crisis and infighting within the Islamic Republic is producing an unexpected result. The recent revelations were spurred by the claims of Mohsen Rafighdoost, who was Minister of the Revolutionary Guard from 1982 to 1989. He makes it sound like the war was used as a tool for internal in-fighting of the regime: “Mr Hashemi [Rafsanjani, who had been put in charge of the war by Ayatollah Khomeini] told me: go and sit in your Ministry, I want to throw the ball into the court of the Government. He then gave an order that Mr Mousavi [then Prime Minister] became the head of the war effort, Mr Behzad Nabavi became the logistical deputy, and Mr [Mohhammad] Khatami became the propaganda deputy.”

Rafighdoost's implication is that Rafsanjani, knowing that the war effort was in bad shape, wanted to put Mousavi in charge so that once Iran had to accept the United Nations ceasefire resolution --- an acceptance which soon occurred --- Mousavi would be blamed for the failures. Rafighdoost also says that the government of Mousavi was hindering the war effort.

Mousavi responds that when he was put in charge, Iran was indeed in a very bad shape. He claims that in the first War Council meeting that he chaired, the regular Army and Revolutionary Guard commanders told him that Iran would certainly lose the Khuzestan Province to an Iraqi attack. He claims that the bulk of Iranian forces were massed around an unimportant height in Kordestan Province at the time, and even there they were in danger of being outflanked by the enemy.

As for management of the war, Mousavi claims that it had been handled badly since 1982.

At this stage it is impossible to know whose account to believe (maybe a combination of the two?).

A few years ago, after a public quarrel with Mohsen Rezaei, Revolutionary Guard commander in the 1980s, Rafsanjani published a secret message from Khomeini, in which the Ayatollah detailed his reasons for accepting the ceasefire. Unexpectedly Khomeini’s main reason for accepting the ceasefire was a letter from IRGC commander Rezaei. That letter said that Iran did not have any attacking capabilities for at least another five years. Even after that, it would only be possible to win the war if Tehran had hundreds of new planes and tanks and other modern weaponry such as laser-guided missiles and atomic bombs and if foreign powers were stopped from exerting influence in the region. Ayatollah Khomeini said that the Government was unable to support the war effort to this extent and everyone else except Rezaei was of the opinion that the war should be stopped.

I cannot help getting the feeling that officials are using nationally important information for their personal or factional gain, yet one effect of these disclosures is that they will further erode the Islamic Republic's historical foundations. In this crisis, the regime’s important days being tarnished: Qods [Jerusalem] Day in became “not Gaza, Not Lebanon” day, 13 Aban [in November] was a day when the regime's commemoration was so heavily guarded that it looked as if its marchers were prisoners, 16 Azar [National Students Day in December] became an occasion on which universities across the country voiced their protests, the funeral of a Grand Ayatollah Montazeri in the holy city of Qom turned into an anti-Khamenei demonstration, the religious celebration of Ashura [27 December] became a day on which the regime murdered its own citizens on the street, 22 Bahman [11 February] saw Iranian cities turned into military camps, and 14 Khordad [4 June] saw the humiliation by regime insiders of the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini on the anniversary of his death.

Now the carefully guarded regime-backed version of the Iran-Iraq War is being disputed by regime insiders.

Next chapter to come soon?

Iran Special: Khamenei's "I Am the Rule of the Prophet" Fatwa --- Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

First, a summary of what Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed in his fatwa on Tuesday:

*Khamenei is claiming that he is a cleric of the highest rank who possesses all the required credentials to hold the position of “velayat-e-faqih” (Supreme Leader).

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Many Shia clerics and scholars, including the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, believed in 1989 that Khamenei did not have the required religious credentials to permit him to hold the position of Supreme Leader. Other regime officials have said that Khamenei has the credentials, but such claims were made in political speeches. This time the claim is made in the name of a religious edict and by Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that his rule is a direct succession to that of the Prophet and the Shia Imams.

During recent months, as he has been trying to cope with the fallout of the crisis within the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has repeatedly compared himself to the first Shia Imam and his opponents to the Imam’s enemies. Now he is claiming that he is not only the successor of the Imams, but of the Prophet too.

*Khamenei is claiming that he is the ruler of the Muslim of the world.

In the regime's past, political declarations claimed that the Supreme Leader is the leader of all of the world’s Muslims. This time Khamenei is claiming it himself.

The issue? Around 90% of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis. Sunni Islam does not recognize Shia Grand Ayatollahs and the Islamic Republic’s principle of religious jurisprudence. This declaration will not go down well with the Sunnis, especially as it comes from Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that obeying his orders is compulsory.

Since very early days of the Islamic Republic, the assumption has been that the order to the Supreme Leader must be obeyed. More than three decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has seen the need to remind everyone of that fact.

(Note: some religious scholars believe that, due to his limited religious credentials, Khamenei does not have the authority to issue fatwas. We will ignore these concerns for now.)

The obvious significance of this fatwa is that Khamenei is saying that his orders must be carried out without failure. This fatwa will make it easier for Khamenei to insist that his wishes are carried out by all factions of the Islamic Republic, for example, in complicated situations like the recent Islamic Azad University crisis. It will be easier to fire officials to be sacked or disqualify candidates from elections. All that will be required is reference to this fatwa.

The not-so-obvious significances?

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic the Supreme Leader is the highest authority in the country. During the time of Ayatollah Khomeini and since Khamenei came to power, it has always been assumed that the Supreme Leader’s orders must be carried out.

A dramatic demonstration of this was during the reformist-dominated Sixth Majlis (2000-2004). The Parliament was debating a new law that would have revoked the draconian press controls which had been passed by the Fifth Majlis. Khamenei wrote to the Parliament asking for the liberalized press law to be halted, and Mehdi Karroubi, who was then the Speaker, stopped the passage. He cited the order from Khamenei and said it must be obeyed.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to intervene in his capacity as Supreme Leader in many instances. The latest episode came only yesterday with the revelation that two Siatan and Baluchistan MPs, who resigned in protest of the government’s inability to provide effective security for the province, withdrew their resignation on Khamenei’s orders.

Another example: after the vote of confidence over Ahmadinejad’s cabinet last summer, then Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar revealed the Khamenei had ordered MPs to vote Yes, saying that otherwise many ministers would not have obtained the required support. In that instance, even after Khamenei’s intervention, three proposed ministers did not get the vote of confidence.

And another example: the Majlis investigation into allegations of corruption against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi were blocked by an order from Khamenei.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to act more as a senior administrator of the Islamic Republic than as a Supreme Leader who is supposed to preside over state affairs. His need yesterday to remind everyone that orders must be obeyed points to an uncertainty he might have about the effectiveness of that administration.

This could mean that Khamenei’s authority is not as solid as it was in the past. For example, last summer President Ahmadinejad refused to follow Khamenei’s order and remove his ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai from the post of First Vice President until the order was made public by the Supreme Leader’s office. From the other side of the political spectrum, despite Khamenei’s insistence that the 2009 presidential elections were fair and the elections issue is over, the reformists are refusing to back down and have at times not only disobeyed the Supreme Leader but mocked him too. Then there is the Parliament vote to block the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution decision on Islamic Azad University, asserting the President's control. That vote was in direct contravention of Khamenei’s (and, before him, Khomeini’s) statements that the Majlis should not interfere in the decisions taken by the SCCR.

Over the past year Khamenei has struggled to assert his political authority within the regime. He is being defied by senior figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami. He has been criticised by politicians like Hashemi Rafsanjani and by clerics like Ayatollah Dastgheib. He has found it hard to force them into obeying him.

The same can be said about the general public. During street demonstrations, there have chats of “Death to Dictator” and “Death to Khamenei”. The Supreme Leader has not been able to persuade all of his people to accept his decisions. He has instead been forced into using brute force and detention against his opponents. The regime’s security forces, with naked and gruesome violence, cleared the streets of demonstrators last year, and the intelligence forces have jailed many members of the opposition.

The resulting problem is that Khamenei has not been able to demonstrate that he has any real authority in Iran beyond the use of force by his security personnel. Any seemingly minor incident thus has the potential to become a spiralling crisis. Furthermore, many opposition figures who are in jail are now taking any possible opportunity to challenge his authority (Examples include recent statements by Isa Saharkhiz and Ahmad Ghabel). The regime’s authority is no longer that of its positive qualities, but that of its muscle, and that muscle may be starting to get tired.

On the conservative side there problems too. The conservative-dominated Majlis voted in the case of Islamic Azad University and the SCCR case in contravention of Khamenei’s views. That forced the Supreme Leader to give out two separate orders to Azad University and SCCR and to set up a panel to look into the case.Even the estalbishment of the panel suggests that Khamenei’s opinion is not strong enough for regime insiders to accept his decisions. Leading MP Ali Motahari has said that although he follows the Supreme Leader, he will voice his disquiet about issues too, and another conservative, Morteza Nabavi, has said that many of his colleagues are giving up.

Add to this the failure of the Ahmadinejad Government to cope with many of the problems in the country and, in some cases, its "success" in making matters worse. On 19 June 2009, Khamenei said clearly that he considers Ahmadinejad closer to him than even his decades-old friend Rafsanjani. The starting point of  the incompetence of the Ahmadinejad administration is the demonstration that the Supreme Leader is not able to choose the right people for the right job.

On the religious front, the clerics in Qom have refused to publicly back Khamenei’s post-election decisions. This has led to the Supreme Leader calling them imperceptive confidants and criticising them regularly. In contrast, after the 4 June humiliation of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the clerics were effusive with their support for Hassan's grandfather, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and praised his personal and religious qualities.

In recent months some criticism of Khamenei has been taken to a new level. Last year most of the criticism was directed at specific actions or decisions, but now some of the criticism has become personal to the point of demanding Khamenei’s removal from the post of Supreme Leader --- examples include statements by  (example: statements by Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saharkhiz, and Ghabel.) This criticism is coming not from an foreign-based opposition that has no allegiance to the Islamic Republic but from former regime insiders with substantial revolutionary credentials.

And the fatwa may not check the criticism. Many high-ranking Shia clerics will probably be upset because Khamenei is saying that, during the age of absence (of the 12th Shia Imam Mahdi), he is the rightful successor of that Imam. Doing so, he is usurping the claim of legitimacy of the Grand Ayatollahs,  that they are here to guide the faithful while the 12th Imam is hidden. And many Shia scholars do not accept the rule of the Jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih) during the age of absence. They assert that any claim of rule by an Islamic state during the period that the 12th Imam is hidden is a false pretence, since a true Islamic state can only be set up by him. Others who try to take this role are impostors.

Last year, the main talk was ofthe  illegitimacy of the Ahamdinejad as president. Now the issue seems to be shifting to the unsuitability of Khamenei for the post of Supreme Leader. This new fatwa may be an attempt at countering the challenges against the Supreme Leader himself. But one is left wondering if it will not backfire as did Khamenei’s message of condolence for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s death last year or his fatwa trying to ban Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Fiestival) in March.

But note the difference: if this declaraton backfires, the consequences will be far more dramatic.

The Latest from Iran (20 July): Khamenei "I am the Rule of the Prophet"

2135 GMT: Break Time. OK, taking a breather. But remember, we are back tomorrow morning with a very special analysis of the significance of the Supreme Leader's political and religious move with the issuance of his fatwa today.

2130 GMT: The Energy Squeeze. Najmeh Bozorgmehr of The Financial Times posts a useful summary of the problems for Tehran from foreign disinvestment from the energy sector, "Iran struggles over its gas field riches".

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2120 GMT: The Bazaar Plot. Tehran Bureau has published the English translation of the attack by Hossein Shariatmadari of Keyhan against those striking at the Tehran Bazaar:

Taxes are the right of the people and the government does not have the right to be remiss taking action against people who threaten to close the bazaar through a handful of hired mercenaries and who blackmail and spread ambiguities. In the last few days the telephones at Kayhan have not stopped ringing and many religious and committed bazaaris, meaning almost all of them, have been complaining about the failure of officials to take action against the plot of a handful of prosperous capitalists who feel no pain, and especially in the present sensitive circumstances.

2110 GMT: Sanctions Watch. An EU correspondent tips us off that President Ahmadinejad recently sent Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Ahani to Germany to lobby against sanctions.

2105 GMT: Shake-Up. An earthquake of magnitude 5.8 has been reported in southern Iran. There are no reported casualties.

So far, there is also no news of whether there were women's breasts in the area.

2100 GMT: Refugee Issues. A new project, Zanboor (Bee), has been launched to assist Iranian refugees in Turkey.

2055 GMT: Negotiations? Iranian state media is still hammering away at the propaganda line that it "rejected" an overture by the US, presumably through the alleged request of Senator John Kerry to visit Tehran (see 0615 GMT), for discussions.

Radio Farda reports, however, that the Afghanistan summit in Kabul provided the opportunity for Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki to chat with European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton.

2045 GMT: Catching Up with Khamenei. Back from a family break to check on our headline story....

In a curious development, it appears that the Supreme Leader's dramatic "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa has disappeared from much of Iranian state media. The reformist Parleman News, which we cited initially (see 1400 GMT), is still carrying the declaration, as is the Supreme Leader's new "Facebook Lite" page.

We are working on a special analysis for tomorrow.

1630 GMT: Back to the Bazaar Rumours (see 1440 GMT). Iran Focus rounds up the chatter: Sabz-e Meidan (vegetable wholesale market), shoemakers, and jewellers at Tehran Bazaar on strike with only a handful of shops open yesterday. Textile and Fabric Bazaar half closed, and few people were shopping.

Many petrol stations in Tehran were closed on Monday, with long queues in Tarasht, Sattar Khan, Behboudi and Baharestan Streets. In some cases, drivers had to wait in line for many hours.

And Rooz Online has put out an intriguing round-up of developments, including the entry of Saeed Mortazavi --- former Tehran Prosecutor General and "anti-smuggling" aide to the President --- into the Bazaar.

We are treating as unconfirmed at this point.

1453 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Saeed Torabian, member of the Tehran Bus Workers Union, has been freed on heavy bail after pressure from unionists within and outside Iran.

1444 GMT: Picture of Day. Tahavole Sabz has posted a photograph, reprinted by the Los Angeles Times, of Parvin Fahimi, the mother of Sohrab Arabi, killed by pro-government militiamen on 15 June 2009, with former detainees of Kahrizak Prison:



1440 GMT: Bazaar Rumours. And, just to make life even busier, we are getting persistent reports that --- despite claims of a resolution with an agreed 15% tax increase --- there are still closures in the Tehran Bazaar.

1435 GMT: After the Bombings. Rah-e-Sabz is reporting that people did not let the Governor and other top officials make speeches during the funerals in Zahedan for victims of last Thursday's suicide bombings.

1413 GMT: Economy Watch. Tehran MP Alireza Mahjoub has reportedly asked, "How can we manage factories with a dictatorship in place?"

1409 GMT: The Revolution Guards' Orders. It is a proving to be a day of revelations: after the Supreme Leader's fatwa comes the publication of alleged Islamic Revolution Guards Corps intelligence orders concerning the opposition.

1400 GMT: Supreme Leader "I Am the Rule of the Prophet". Ayatollah Khamenei has issued the following fatwa, published by all major Iranian media outlets:

Question: Please explain about “obedience of velayat-e-faqih”. In other words, how should we act so that we know we have belief in and have full obedience to the successor of the hidden Imam?

Answer: “Velayat-e faghih” means the rule of cleric who has the right requirements in the age of absence [of the 12th Shia Imam]. It is a branch of the rule of the saints [Shia Imams] and the same as the rule of the Prophet. As long as you obey the commands of the ruler of the Muslims [the Supreme Leader], it shows that you have full obedience to that.

1330 GMT: Don't Drink the Water. Minister of Health Marzieh Vahid Dastjerdi has declared that Tehran's drinking water should not be consumed by pregnant women and babies, adding that if the Minister of Energy says differently, he is responsible for the consequences.

1325 GMT: Academic Corner. The sudden "retirements" of professors are continuing: Rah-e-Sabz reports that 39 from Tehran, Shahid Beheshti and Khajeh Nasir universities have been moved out of their posts. The website comments that this is the "5th phase" of the retirement project, saying that 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi has given the order to "open fire".

1230 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Communications student Abbas Ahmadlou has begun serving a one-year prison sentence in Arak on charges of insulting the Supreme Leader and causing unease among public opinion.

HRANA reports that writer and translator Hojatollah Nikou'i has been arrested.

1210 GMT: Punishing the mourners. Students of Elm-o-Sanat University who attended the memorial for Kianoush Asa, slain last year in the post-election conflict, have received notices of suspension.

1208 GMT: Democracy and Security. Former President Mohammad Khatami has condemned the Zahedan bombings and said democracy is "the least expensive and most useful way to rule".

1202 GMT: Mohammad Shahryari and Abbas Ali Noura, two of the three MPs who had said they would resign after last Thursday's bombing in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, have announced they will remain in the Majlis after advice from the Supreme Leader. They said, however, that if they do not see Government action for security, they will call the Foreign Minister and Minister of Interior to account in Parliament.

1157 GMT: Economic Front. MP Hossein Eslami has claimed that 70% of Iran's imports are affected by corruption. Eslami said Iran, rather than having a massive imbalance of imports, should be exporting far more goods than it takes in. He added that workers have no labour security, which is a major reason for divorces.

1155 GMT: The Zahedan Bombing. Two more victims of last Thursday's double suicide bombing in southeastern Iran have died, bringing the toll to 29.

1145 GMT: When Internet Censorship Starts to Bite. Perhaps when even institutions inside Iran start disseminating anti-filtering software?

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports that Tabnak, affiliated Secretary of Expediency Council and 2009 Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, has posted a link to a proxy server (although that link is now "broken" when we tried to access it).

In April a pro-Ahmadinejad website had complained about the "filtering" of other sites.

1140 GMT: Parliament v. President. A pointed attack from MP Ali Motahari: the Majlis should stand firmly against "khodkamegi" (obstinacy/dictatorship) of the Government. Motahari even turned on fellow legislators, saying some caused the Government's insubordination and tendency to flout laws.

1050 GMT: Sanctions Watch. We've posted a separate entry on what appears to be a significant development with the restriction of Pakistani business with Iran.

The European Union is reportedly considering new sanctions, including bans on investment in the oil and gas sector and restrictions on shipping and finance. The draft of the measures names 41 Iranian people, 57 companies or other entities, 15 additional companies thought to be controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and three under the control of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.

Senior European diplomats will discuss the proposed sanctions on Thursday.

0820 GMT: "I'm Sorry" on a Blog Gets a Travel Ban. Adeleh Ziaei has received a ban on travel for posting “I’m Sorry” on the blog of her husband Arya Aramnejad, an artist, singer, and composer.

Aramnejad was arrested in March, and Ziaei, wrote, “I’m sorry to say that Arya was wrong to think that in his beloved country, terms such as Law, Freedom, oh! Freedom! Dignity and Justice mean anything besides merely seductive words; he was wrong that he didn’t know this is Iran, a place where anything may take place and whoever has the power can accomplish whatever he wants!”

Aramanejad has been held in solitary confinement for 50 days. His trial was on 6 July but he could not present a defense since he had no access to his judicial file.

0755 GMT: We've posted a follow-up to last Friday's dissection of war talk posing as reporting and analysis, "Dealing with the Media’s 'War, War, War' Drumbeat".

0705 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Students Iman Sedighi, Mohsen Barzgar, and Hossein Nataj were released from Mati Kola Prison in Babol on Sunday after serving half of their sentences.

0615 GMT: We begin this morning with a translation of Sunday's prepared statement by journalist Isa Saharkhiz for his appearance in Revolutionary Court: "Should the Supreme Leader Be Dismissed?"

Meanwhile, this rather silly diversion....

On Sunday, we noted the curious claim of Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the head of Parliament's National Security Commission, that "the US Congress has informed the Swiss envoy that it is ready to hold negotiations with Iran". We requested, "Mr Boroujerdi, please do get in touch with us and let us know which US Congressmen have been talking to you of this hope for discussions — because we haven’t seen any sign of this back-channel being established."

While I don't think Mr Boroujerdi is a regular EA reader, we got an answer yesterday via the Islamic Republic News Agency: "Boroujerdi said that Iran turned down a request made by U.S. Senator John Kerry to pay a visit to Tehran because the US Democrats proved inconsistent in word and action."

Hmm.... While Kerry is a former Presidential candidate and the head of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, I'm not sure he is "the US Congress". At the same time, he has pursued initiatives either on behalf of the Administration (a trip to Afghanistan) or as the point man for US diplomacy (a visit to Syria before the US re-established an Embassy in Damascus).

If Kerry did sound out the Iranians about shaking hands in Tehran, it is either a risky individual initiative or a fumbling step for "engagement", given Tehran's exposure of the approach.

Iran Document: Isa Saharkhiz in Court "Should the Supreme Leader Be Dismissed?" (18 July)

Yesterday we noted, both in our updates and in a special analysis, journalist Isa Saharkhiz's prepared statement as he appeared in Revolutionary Court after 13 months in detention. Negar Irani has translated of the first part of the statement, which is posted on the Democratic Republic of Iran website. Note in particular the last three paragraphs, where Saharkhiz refers to the Supreme Leader:

As I am sure you are aware, I Isa Saharkhiz, was arrested a year and two weeks ago, on July 3rd, 2009, as evidenced in my case file #11257/88/TD, in the town of Panjdastgah located in the village of Tirkadeh, in the city of Nour. Ministry of Intelligence officials from the Province of Mazandaran (most likely the city of Sari), under orders given by their superiors including the Minister of Intelligence at the time, Hojatoleslam Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i and his direct responsible and superior Mahmoud Ahmadinejad --- whom as stipulated under the Constitution’s articles 133, 134, 136 and 137 is fully responsible for providing direction to and overseeing all members of the Cabinet --- proceeded without any provocation to beat me, leading to severe injuries including swelling and bruising on the sides of my torso and my wrists, an injury to the tendon in my left shoulder, fractures in my ribs and the dislocation of the bones from the cartilage in the lower part of my chest.

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The head of the team from the Information Ministry at the time of my arrest even stated: “If someone attempts to be obstinate or stubborn with regards to your arrest, even if it’s your own child, I will make sure they are punished accordingly.” This statement itself was revealing of his preconditioned judgment of my character based on the views of his superiors (possibly the Minister himself).

The severe torture, beatings and blows I endured at the hands of at least six officers is a gross violation of our country’s laws and in particular a violation of our Constitution and Islam’s penal code.

Article 38 of our Constitution states: "All forms of torture for the purpose of extracting confessions or acquiring information are forbidden. Compulsion of individuals to testify, confess, or take an oath is not permissible; and any testimony, confession, or oath obtained under duress is devoid of value and credence. Violation of this article is liable to punishment in accordance with the law.”

This matter has also been emphasized in the Islamic Penal Code, Article 578, that states:” All officers and employees of the judiciary and non-judiciary branches of the government, if compelled to force a confession from a defendant through the use of physical harassment or any form of retaliation, in addition to monetary damages will be sentences to six months to three years imprisonment.”

You know better than I and the audience members here today that the Islamic Republic of Iran has made a commitment to international laws and regulations and in particular to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 11 of this same international declaration states: "Everyone charged with a penal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to the law in a public trial during which he/she has had all the guarantees necessary for his/her defense.”

After enduring such physical violence and being beaten by the officers, I informed them of the fact that my ribs had been broken, but they merely mocked me, refusing to transfer me to a hospital or medical facility. Even though I could have suffered internal bleeding, I was taken on a 400-kilometre car ride to the capital Tehran and transferred directly to Evin prison.

At Evin prison, when the initial medical examination was completed by the physician on duty, my injuries were registered as swelling and bruises to the left and right sections of my torso and wrists, including severe injuries to my rib cage. As a result of the medical examination and upon consulting with prison officials, the doctor ordered that I be transferred immediately to Ghamare Banihashem hospital that very night (located on the north side of the Northern highway, before Seyedkhandan bridge). At the same time, a number of agents were sent to the hospital and the 3rd floor was vacated in the event of my possible admittance.

Honorable audience members and members of the media,

My arrest under the circumstances described above and the offenses I was charged with, namely participating in demonstrations and encouraging people to demonstrate, took place even though I had never committed such crimes. The charges issued against me were either a form of conspiracy designed to build a case against me, or designed to specifically deal with the events that followed the Presidential elections that took place on June 12th, 2009. Otherwise it would have not been necessary to issue such charges under the pretext that the acts committed were against the national security of the nation, when the offense committed was in fact a simple crime to inform, an act that in itself is against Articles 37 and 39 of our Constitution.

Article 37 of our Constitution is related to the presumption of innocence and states: “Innocence is to be presumed, and no one is to be held guilty of a charge unless his or her guilt has been established by a competent court.”

The fact that as part of the indictment presented to the court, the first charge was dismissed and replaced with two additional charges (insulting state leaders and propaganda against the regime) speaks to the authenticity of my claims. The question we are faced with therefore is why a defendant charged with being a member of the press, with court documents and evidence that demonstrate --- assuming even that the charges are proven --- that he has been accused of being a journalist, putting pen to paper and writing publications, is also referred to as a defendant colluding against the national security of the nation. Based on the charges issued by the Ministry of Justice, how do you justify keeping me in jail for 380 days in section 209 and 350 at Evin prison and the Rajai Shar prison and Fardis prison reserved for hardcore criminals? In addition, not only did they refuse to release me from jail on bail while I awaited my court date but also deprived me of the minimum rights that should be afforded to any prisoners of conscience, including depriving me of the right to a temporary leave of absence from prison.

Honorable Head of the Court and Jury Members,

As I explained earlier, as a well-known journalist, even though I had committed no crime, I was physically tortured, beaten and transferred to Evin’s ward 209. As a result of my dire physical condition, I was subsequently taken to a hospital at 10:30 pm on July 3rd, 2009. Upon taking two X-rays from different angles and being examined by three doctors (this included the physician who was on duty at the prison that night and two additional specialists called to report to duty on an emergency basis), I was unfortunately still not admitted to the hospital, but my claim that I had fractured my rib cage and bones in my chest were nevertheless confirmed explicitly. The medical examination, howeve,r concluded that the puncturing of my lungs and left kidney by a bone and potential internal bleeding were negative.

At 1:30am on Saturday July 4th, 2009, I was taken back to solitary confinement cell #31 at Evin’s ward 209. At the time I had been prescribed a variety of pain killers (pills, capsules, ointments, and suppositories) in order to alleviate my pain. From the very beginning I emphasized that I should be examined by the Judiciary’s forensic doctor, so that the necessary legal procedures could be initiated. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Intelligence officials and those in charge of my case file did not provide me with this opportunity and even refused to follow the processes that would have afforded me the necessary medical treatment. Said differently, those in charge of my case file went out of their way to inflict pain upon me and their behaviour resulted in the fact that I experience constant pain from my injuries and fractures day and night. As you can see today, the fractures are visible on my skin and at night when I sleep I feel as though a needle is spiked through my body, a pain and suffering that I will have to endure for the rest of my life.

The question we face today is why when my friends and I, as citizens of this country, complain to the authorities, in particular to the Head of the Judiciary, the former head of the Intelligence Ministry, and the Attorney General, years go by and our complaints are not addressed by the courts, but when the order for the arrest of the likes of me is issued, my arrest and imprisonment takes place in the span of one day, and at one of the most remote locations in our country. Moreover, despite the fact that approximately one year had passed since the case was filed and the last interrogations took place and despite the fact that eight months had passed since the last investigations by the prosecutor, the court did not hear this case, in order to at least afford me, the defendant whose crimes had not been proven, a few months less imprisonment than the minimum amount defined under the law.

Honorable Head of the Court,

Does Article 34 of our Constitution not state that: “It is the indisputable right of every citizen to seek justice by recourse to competent courts. All citizens have right of access to such courts, and no one can be barred from courts to which he has a legal right of recourse”?

Why is it then that as a result of the injuries inflicted upon me by Mr. Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, and based on the evidence presented by the forensic doctor, when I approached the officials at the Judiciary (regarding the incident in which [a security agent] threw a heavy object at me and bit my ear) and even though 5 years have passed since I filed my complaint, evidence was presented and the case file was completed, the case never went to court and the accused [Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i] was never arrested? But when [Eje'i] files a complaint against me, I am tortured and beaten so shamelessly and arrested and imprisoned for an unlimited period as a prisoner of conscience? Is this not the sign of preferential treatment in Iran’s Judiciary System? Is this what we refer to as respect for the law, justice, and the Islamic Judiciary System?

Distinguished Members of the Jury and Head of the Court,

On page 17 of my case file and regulatory proceedings dated July 3rd, 2009 (the date of my arrest) by the Nour Prosecutor’s Office, the Judiciary has charged me with the following:

Based on court order for your arrest by the Intelligence Ministry, and the Revolutionary Court’s 3rd Security Branch, you have been accused of “Participating in demonstrations with the intent to create chaos, the intent to harm the regime and the security of the nation”. How do you respond?

Response: “I do not accept this charge. I did not participate in any gathering or demonstration and do not intend to do so in the future. Even in cases where there was a possibility of conflict between the people and the President, due to the official authority I was given by Mr. Karroubi’s headquarters, and acting as a non official spokesperson for Mr. Mousavi’s campaign, I gave an interview with Al-Alam (the IRIB’s Arabic TV & Radio Network) in which I announced that the previously announced gathering on Vali Asr Square for June 31st had been canceled, requesting that people do not gather in order that clashes be avoided.”

Page 115 to 120 of my case file are dedicated to the interrogations that took place on July 8th and July 10th, 2009 (approximately one week after my arrest) and include the following question I was posed during interrogation: “With regards to the charge of encouraging people to participate in demonstrations, please provide any information you deem necessary to shed light to this matter.”

My response to this question was as follows:

As I indicated to the Judge presiding over the court in Nour, I Isa Saharkhiz, did not participate in any of the people’s peaceful demonstrations. In addition, with my reformist position, I have always sought to encourage people to move towards democracy, the expansion of Human Rights rather than revolting and creating chaos. With regards to the recent events that started on June 12th, 2009 and the protests that followed by a nation that was pursuing the full realization of their lost rights, all my efforts focused on encouraging gatherings that were based on slogans of Allah O Akbar (God is great), silent gatherings carrying Green symbols, and presenting flowers to armed individuals behaving in an inhumane manner, so that God willing we could put an end to this type of behavior.

Question: “Isn’t referring to the election results as a coup, inviting people to demonstrate and creating chaos?”

Answer:

Coup d’état is a legal and political term. It is based on certain assumptions and can have both desirable and undesirable consequences. The fact that I referred to the election results as a coup, like many other prominent people in our nations (such as Seyed Mohammad Khatami) does not change the nature of the elections. The Islamic Republic’s Constitution that came about as a result of a revolution that I too had the honor to participate in, contains a number of principles including the people’s right to gather and demonstrate. Article 27 of our Constitution referring to freedom of assembly states: “Public gatherings and marches may be freely held, provided arms are not carried and that they are not detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam.” Naturally, protesting and creating chaos are two different things. In reality, chaos is created by those who stand in the way of, or create circumstances under which the basic rights of a nation and its citizens have been trampled upon, depriving them of legal gatherings and protests. If anything, it is these individuals who should be charged and taken to court.

Honorable Head of the Court, Members of the Jury and all those present,

Taking into consideration the evidence presented above and in my statement of defense isn’t my illegal incarceration in various prisons against Article 32 of our Constitution?

Let us assume for one moment that the authorities at the Ministry of Intelligence and the interrogators at the Revolutionary Court’s 3rd Security Branch in Tehran were wrong in assuming that there was a conspiracy theory and their accusations that I participated in demonstrations and encouraged people to participate as well were false. After hearing my defense and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, when it became clear to them that the charges were invalid and as such they were dropped, should they not have closed my file and released me from prison and removed any punishment in order to not violate the laws as defined in the Constitution? Was my incarceration for more than a year not in violation of Article 32 of our Constitution? They claimed that I had committed a crime against the national security of our nation, in order to make sure that I would be deprived of any leave of absence from prison. As a result, I was unable to even attend to the construction of my mother’s charitable organization, in honor of my martyred brother Saeed Saharkhiz, depriving dozens of orphaned infants of free services. We will never know how many lives would have been saved had we have been able to provide access to this charity and its free services.

The same Article of the Constitution (Article 32) emphasizes: “…. a preliminary trial should be completed as swiftly as possible”. Assuming that the initial charges had not been dropped, does keeping someone incarcerated for 380 days translate into a “swift completion of a preliminary trial” and adhering to the law in the Islamic Republic’s Judiciary system? Who is responsible for the violation of this Article? Which person, what post and which entities should be punished based on the principles of this Article? Is the branch that is under the direct leadership of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, whose head is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader in violation of the law? Or has the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic failed to meet his obligations effectively under paragraph 2 of Article 110 of the Constitution, in other words: “Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system.”?

In that case is he [the Supreme Leader] not subject to the 111th Article in the Constitution that insists: “Whenever the Leader becomes incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties, or loses one of the qualifications mentioned in Articles 5 and 109, or it becomes known that he did not possess some of the qualifications initially, he will be dismissed…”?

No matter what, the question of who has been in violation of the 32nd Article of our Constitution and the specific punishment of such violation must be addressed.

The Latest from Iran (17 July): Back to "Normal"?

2020 GMT: A Just Republic. Meeting students, former President Mohammad Khatami has declared that people want freedom and a republic compatible with religion.

2015 GMT: Electricity Squeeze. Power shortages are reportedly causing daily losses of millions of dollars for domestic companies, especially in Tehran area. The schedule of rotating closures announced by the Ministry of Energy is not being implemented.

NEW Change for Iran: Why Twitter Has Made a Difference
UPDATED Iran Analysis: When “War Chatter” Poses as Journalism (Step Up, Time Magazine)
Iran: Thursday’s Suicide Bombings in Zahedan
The Latest from Iran (16 July): Explosions and Conflict

2005 GMT: The Sanctions. It appears that Germany may be accepting the restrictions on Iranian banks: reports indicate Bank Sepah accounts in Frankfurt will be closed.

A study by a former US Treasury Department analyst had found that five German banks continue to do business with Iranian entities sanctioned by the most recent UN Security Council measures and that four major Iranian banks sanctioned by the Treasury Department or the Security Council continued to operate in Germany.

1940 GMT: Not Diplomatic Immunity (cont.). The Swiss and Iranian Governments have denied earlier reports (see 1605 GMT) in Iran's state media that Switzerland's Ambassador was detained for hours on a journey to northeastern Iran.

Switzerland's foreign ministry said Ambassador Livia Leu Agosti had only been "checked by local police during a trip". Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said that the story had "been covered inaccurately and wrongly".

1935 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani has joined in the condemnation of Thursday's bombing in Zahedan,  "Historical records show that in Iran and countries like Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine..., terrorists and occupiers have never been and never will be able to achieve their ominous objectives through bloodshed and the massacre of innocents."

However, Rafsanjani --- at least in the summary of his remarks --- did not echo the theme of blaming outside powers such as the US for supporting the attacks.

1815 GMT: The Bazaar Strikes. Green Voice of Freedom, summarising this week's strikes, adds Isfahan and Mashaad to Tehran and Tabriz.

1605 GMT: Not Diplomatic Immunity. Iranian authorites detained the Swiss Ambassador, Livia Leu Agosti, freeing her a few hours later.

Agosti was travelling in North Khorasan Province in northeastern Iran when she was arrested Diplomatic immunity did not apply, according to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, ""because her identity was not established at the time".

It is not clear why the Ambassador was detained.

1545 GMT: Russia, Iran, and the Oil Squeeze. I thought, given this week's news about agreement for a joint oil bank, that Moscow and Tehran were now good energy buddies despite the international sanctions.

So how to explain this bit of Tehran pressure?

Oil Minister Massoud Mirkazemi warned on Saturday that Iran will blacklist foreign firms like Russian energy giant Lukoil that pull out of projects because of sanctions against Tehran: "If one of the companies acts against Iran, we will be forced to consider the reality and put that company on a blacklist."..."They will no longer work in our country," he said.

Mirkazemi singled out the case of Lukoil, which announced it was pulling out in March as new UN, US and EU sanctions over Tehran's controversial nuclear programme loomed. The minister said the Russian firm had reneged on its commitments in the Anaran oilfield which it discovered in western Iran in 2005.

But he added that Iran might consider continuing to work with Lukoil "if we can adjust the content of the agreement."

1410 GMT: A Different Line on Zahedan Bombing. An interesting alternative to the US-Iran dynamic on blame for Thursday's two suicide bombings in southeastern Iran. The reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front has said that “an iron fist” is not an adequate response to the problems in Sistan & Baluchistan . Indeed, the violence occurs amidst the “coup d’etat government’s policies of intimidation, violence, and oppression which is being forced on every aspect of every single Iranian's life, equally”.

1245 GMT: In Case Another Excuse Was Needed for US-Iran Scrapping. President Obama has condemned the Zahedan bombings as an "intolerable offense".

Those words, however, are not going to stem the Iran Government's rhetoric over the attack. Revolutionary Guard commander Massoud Jazayeri has warned, "Jundollah has been supported by America for its terrorist acts in the past....America will have to await the fallout of such criminal and savage measures."

And it looks like Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is going to join in: "The terrorist attack in the southeast of the country took place with the backing of the US....We have strong documents and intelligence that [executed Jundullah leader Abdolmalek] Rigi was linked to the US, and the US supported him in terror against Iran."

1100 GMT: The Zahedan Bombings. The Government's changing line on Thursday's suicide bombings --- Jundullah is no longer responsible since they had been "defeated" --- is being challenged. Heshmatollah Fallahatpisheh, a member of Parliament's National Security Commission, has demanded publication of documents about Jundullah.

1050 GMT: Parliament v. President (On All Fronts). Challenges here, there, and everywhere....

Ahmad Tavakoli has maintained his leading role in the pressure against the Government, asking for an investigation of former Tehran Prosecutor General and current Presidential aide Saeed Mortazavi over the Kahrizak Prison abuse case.

On the economic front, Elyas Naderan has announced a plan to return Iran Telecom to public control. Emad Hosseini has declared that there is no possibility of implementing subsidy cuts.

And just getting personal, reformist Abdollah Ramezanzadeh has filed a complaint against pro-Ahmadinejad MP Sattar Hedayatkhah.

1045 GMT: More Feuding over Universities. The Guardian Council has rejected a Parliament project supporting the establishment and strengthening of independent academic centres.

1010 GMT: Parliament v. President. Khabar Online claims 80% of members of Parliament have approved the demand for impeachment of Minister of Agriculture Sadegh Khaliliyan.

1005 GMT: Regime Moves to "Hard War"? Bahram Rafiee in Rooz Online posts the analysis that the rhetoric of the regime is shifting from a "soft war" to "hard war" with its enemies. He cites an example in the Supreme Leader's speech to Revolutionary Guard commanders this week, “All national officials must carry out their heavy duties in the various fields and be ready to confront anything as they have been for the past 31 years. Certainly, and without any doubt, the great Iranian nation and the Islamic republic will continue to emerge victorious from this perpetual struggle, as they have been in the past.”

0830 GMT: After the Bombings. Iranian state media reports that 40 suspects have been arrested over Thursday's double suicide bombing in southeastern Iran. State TV has shown thousands attending victims' funerals, chanting "Death to Terrorists" and "Down with the US".

0810 GMT: We have posted a Saturday feature, "Change for Iran: Why Twitter Has Made a Difference".

0710 GMT: A Philosopher's Stand. The German philosopher Otfried Höffe has written in Frankfurter Allgemeine that he will not attend UNESCO's World Day of Philosophy in Tehran, given the human rights abuses of the "unpredictable dictatorship": "With [Immanuel] Kant's reflections on the relationship between philosophy and revelation, I wanted to contribute to our understanding of religion in a highly industrialized country. But now I see myself forced to withdraw from the commitment."

0625 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Azeri activist Firouz Yousefi has been released on bail after being arrested for acts against national security.

0555 GMT: Beyond the tragedy of at least 27 lives lost and 300 people wounded in Thursday's explosions in southeastern Iran (see yesterday's updates), there was the curiosity of the Iranian regime trying to resurrect the "normal" after the event.

Initially, Iran's state media had blamed the Baluch insurgent group Jundullah --- who did indeed claim responsibility --- for the two suicide bombings. Then some official somewhere realised that this would expose the recent narrative that, with a crackdown on Jundullah and the executive Abdolmalek Rigi, order and security had been restored.

And so the media line was revised: the bombings were no longer the work of Jundullah but of some mysterious "hard-line" Sunni group. "Normal" would come in the allegation --- for this is always the allegation --- that "the US, Israel, and some European countries" (the Revolutionary Guard's Yadollah Javani) were behind "terrorist attacks...trained, financed and equipped form beyond the borders" (Deputy Minister of Interior Ali Abdollahi). Washington even hid its perfidy behind the false "humanitarian gesture" of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's condemnation of the bombings.

But this was not only the curiosity of the "normal". For the not-exactly-normal incident in Zahedan might serve the regime by deflecting attention from life that is not-exactly-normal elsewhere. With Iran back to work today, one question is whether bazaar merchants in Tehran and Tabriz join in or whether some stoppage or strike continues.

And there is the bread-and-butter conflict within the establishment. The New York Times has taken notice in an article, "Iran’s President Now Aims at Rivals Among Conservatives" --- which might also should have considered, "Iran's Conservatives Now Aim at the President" --- and adds this information. "Moderate conservative" Morteza Nabavi said in an interview published Friday, "“Now that they [the Government] think they have ejected the reformists, maybe they think it is time to remove their principalist opponents.”

Nabavi also indicated that part of the conflict stems from the beliefs of Ahmadinejad and allies over the return with Shia's "disappeared" or "hidden Imam: “These people say they have direct contact with the 12th imam so they can lead us. This is not just a matter of opposition to government by the clergy but something much deeper.”