The Latest from Iran (26 July): Behind the International Screen

2055 GMT: Moscow is Not Amused. Looks like President Ahmadinejad went too far in his shtick of "Russia is aiding and abetting the US-Israel plot to attack Arab allies of Iran".

The Russian Foreign Ministry has put out a statement, "For us the recent public statements of the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are categorically unacceptable....[They] distorted Russia's objective approach, our independent, constructive line towards the Iranian nuclear programme with the aim of finding a political and diplomatic resolution. We consider that instead of fruitless and irresponsible rhetoric, the Iranian leadership should take concrete, constructive steps towards the speediest regulation of the situation."

Iran Analysis: Re-Defining the Green Movement (Verde)
UPDATED Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.
The Latest from Iran (25 July): The Re-Appearing Fatwa

2000 GMT: Academic Corner. Sima, the student newspaper at Ferdowsi University, has been banned.

1915 GMT: "Khamenei Must Go" (cont. --- see 1115 GMT). Ahmad Ghabel, seminary lecturer and author, has followed up his recent criticism of the Supreme Leader with a statement that arrests have happened with the approval of Ayatollah Khamenei and "the Iranian people are free on bail".

1910 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Canada has followed the European Union in imposing additional sanctions on Tehran, notably in the energy sector.

1630 GMT: The International Front. Forget the talking tough (see 1500 GMT): the theme today from Tehran is openness to discussions. Islamic News Republic Agency and Fars News are both highlighting the statement of Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's nuclear organisation, "The clear message of this letter [to the International Atomic Energy Agency] was Iran's complete readiness to hold negotiations over the fuel for the Tehran reactor without any conditions."

1500 GMT: Talking Tough Time. The Iranian Foreign Ministry has criticised the latest measures adopted by the European Union (see 1430 GMT), "Sanctions… will only complicate matters and move away [the parties] from mutual understanding."

Yeah, yeah, whatever (the Iranians are actually angling for talks, via contact with EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Turkey and Brazil's mediation, with the EU on the uranium issue). If you want some macho fire-breathing, you have to go to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who reveals the Obama Administration is "one of lies":

You witnessed what they did to Palestinians; Israeli settlements in Palestine are expanding by the day and the Zionist regime destroys mosques and of course Gaza is still under siege....Americans wrongly perceive Lebanon as a toy but they should be more careful lest this toy severs their hand.

On the surface they condemn terrorism but behind the curtain they support terrorists… as it became clear, during [Jundullah ringleader Abdolmalek] Rigi's confessions, that he was linked to the US and NATO and they supported this terrorist cell.

1430 GMT: Sanctions Watch. The European Union has formally adopted a package of new sanctions against Iran, targeting foreign trade, banking, and energy.

1425 GMT: Oil Squeeze. Reuters reports, from a shipping document, that only three cargoes of gasoline have so far reached Iran in July, far less than the seasonal norm, because of the pressure of sanctions.

Traditionally during the summer season, with people driving on holidays, Iran needs 11-13 cargoes a month.

The three cargoes this month and were supplied by Turkish refiner Tupras and the trading arm of China's Sinopec, Unipec. Another cargo is expected to arrive from Venezuela.

1150 GMT: Mousavi's Latest. Mir Hossein Mousavi, in his most recent speech, has discussed the "untold story" of the war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988.

1123 GMT: Revolutionary Guard in Control? Mehdi Karroubi, in an interview with BBC Persian, has declared that there is now an effective "monopoly" by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and the Basij militia in the country.

1120 GMT: Parliament v. President. Reformist MP Hojatoleslam Qodratollah Alikhani has complained about President Ahmadinejad's "joy" at US and UN sanctions, saying that he hopes this has not increased the prospect of war.

1115 GMT: "Khamenei Must Go". Noted Iranian intellectual Abdolkarim Soroush, now living in exile, has complemented recent calls --- from Mohsen Kadivar and Ahmad Ghabel outside the country and Isa Saharkhiz inside it --- for the Supreme Leader to step down.

1040 GMT: Rumour of Day. Parleman News claims that the Hojjatieh Society has formally applied for a licence.

Hojjatieh has provoked much comment and speculation since its founding as a semi-clandestine Shi'a organisation in 1953. It was forced to dissolve after a speech by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1983, but stories circulate that it is connected to President Ahmadinejad and other senior figures in the Iranian regime.

1035 GMT: Energy Squeeze? Deputy Minister of Oil Alireza Zeighami has said,"We need $46 billion to finish our refinery projects." The funds will contribute to new capacity for 5 billion litres of liquid fuel.

Some numbers for comparison: the $46 billion is more than 15 times the $3.1 billion in Foreign Direct Investment in 2009 --- a number pushed by Iranian officials as a sign of the country's growth --- and 92 times the amount of the $500 million bond project announced today for the South Pars gas and oil field.

1015 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Rah-e-Sabz reports that former President Hashemi Rafsanjani will visit Hamzeh Karami, the director of Jumhoriat website and a senior official at Islamic Azad University, in hospital. Karami, detained soon after the June 2009 election, is in intensive care with a heart condition.

Last summer, Karami's "confession" in a televised trial in Tehran was used to implicate Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi Hashemi, in alleged fraud and misconduct over the election.

1010 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Agence France Presse has picked up the story --- noted in our updates yesterday --- that journalist Emad Baghi, detained in December 2009 and recently released on bail, has been given a one-year sentence and banned for five years from political activities from charges in a 2008 case.

1000 GMT: Reviewing the Supreme Leader. An entry on an Iranian blog puts forth supposed reaction from clerics in Qom to Ayatollah Khameini's fatwa, "I am the Rule of the Prophet".

0955 GMT: Picture of Day. Mir Hossein Mousavi meets reformist politician Mohsen Armin, recently released from detention on $200,000 bail:



0950 GMT: Parliament v. Government. Vice Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar has reiterated that the Majlis will stand up to the Ahmadinejad Government, rejecting its implementation measures.

0945 GMT: Concessions to the Villagers? Kalemeh claims that a new Government directive removes limits on social security for Sunni residents in rural areas.

0935 GMT: Setting the Record Straight. Fereshteh Ghazi interviews the family of Mohammad-Hossein Feiz, shot dead in protests on 30 June 2009. They reveal that Feiz was not a Basij militiaman, as the regime claimed, but a demonstrator.

0930 GMT: Economy Watch. Iran Negah posts a video interview with a girl living in poverty in Tehran. She says, "God only helps rich people." (Persian2English has an English translation.)

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HnT7xl5zYDM[/youtube]

0925 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Peyke Iran claims that student Vahid Asghari has had his nose and ribs broken in Bushehr Prison.

0920 GMT: Parliament v. Government. Members of Parliament are continuing to threaten impeachment of Minister of Agriculture Sadegh Khalilian over claims that imports are driving down rice prices received by Iranian farmers.

0800 GMT: Water Pressure. Amidst stories of impurities and shortages in Iran's water supply, Tehran's Yaft-Abad quarter has installed a temporary water filter.

0730 GMT: Music of Dissent. Shahin Najafi, an Iranian musician and poet now living in Germany, has released "Vay Koshte Maro", a song of protest against the current Government.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xTrlthfbcHQ[/youtube]

0725 GMT: Parliament v. President. The influential member of Parliament, Gholam-Reza Mesbahi-Moghaddam, has emphasised that "not all hardliners accepted the elimination of reformists" in the post-election conflict.

0720 GMT: The Saharkhiz Criticism. Persian2English has now posted the first part of journalist Isa Saharkhiz's statement in court --- featured on EA last week --- with its direct criticism of the Supreme Leader.

0715 GMT: No, No, Talk about the War. Press TV keeps up the Iranian state line, "Shameful Defeats Awaits US in 3rd War". The article features the Sunday comments of Brigadier General Masoud Jayazeri, “The United States, which has already suffered two heavy, disgraceful defeats against Hezbollah and Hamas in the region, can start a new war with a third country to endure another defeat.”

0710 GMT: So what is happening inside Iran? Credit to two "Western" outlets for stories that defy the trend of Nukes and War.

The Los Angeles Times posts a summary of "New Series of Attacks on Members of the Bahai Faith in Iran".

The Guardian of London picks up on the story --- reported in our updates yesterday --- of the disappearance of prominent human rights lawyer Mohammad Mostafaei and the arrest of his wife and brother-in-law. Mostafaei represents Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, the Iranian woman whose death sentence for adultery has provoked international criticism of Tehran.

0630 GMT: The lead stories in the media this morning on Iran are far from what is happening inside Tehran.

From the Iranian Government's point of view, the weekend's meeting between the Turkish, Brazilian, and Iranian Foreign Ministers is the platform to focus attention on the uranium enrichment issue. Paralleling the rhetoric denouncing the West, notably in the speeches of President Ahmadinejad, the possibility of renewed discussions --- raised by Iran's statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency today --- comes to the fore. The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, says, "The Tehran nuclear declaration on a possible nuclear fuel swap is a good base for the sides to build confidence. Iran has prepared its response to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Vienna group which will be sent within the next two or three days."

And from the US --- not from the Government, I hasten to add, but from the chattering classes --- the topic is not resolution but war. CNN's Sunday interview with Michael Hayden, the head of the CIA in the Bush Administration, is the latest pretext to take speculation from someone far from the centre of developments and turn into a Most Important Prediction.

Indeed, there is a convenient symmetry here. On one side, those who desire regime change in Iran can do so with little reference to politics, society, religion, or any other matter inside the country --- it's always and only the spectral "imminent threat" that is featured. On the other, those who support the Iranian Government --- irrespective of what it does inside the country --- can avoid troubling themselves with human rights, justice, and legitimacy. Instead, they can raise the speculative and unsupported to a clear-and-present danger and argue that the avoidance of a US-Iran war takes priority.

Iran Special: Khamenei's "I Am the Rule of the Prophet" Fatwa --- Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

First, a summary of what Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed in his fatwa on Tuesday:

*Khamenei is claiming that he is a cleric of the highest rank who possesses all the required credentials to hold the position of “velayat-e-faqih” (Supreme Leader).

LATEST Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
Iran Analysis: Voices Raised — Removing the Supreme Leader (Verde)

Many Shia clerics and scholars, including the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, believed in 1989 that Khamenei did not have the required religious credentials to permit him to hold the position of Supreme Leader. Other regime officials have said that Khamenei has the credentials, but such claims were made in political speeches. This time the claim is made in the name of a religious edict and by Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that his rule is a direct succession to that of the Prophet and the Shia Imams.

During recent months, as he has been trying to cope with the fallout of the crisis within the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has repeatedly compared himself to the first Shia Imam and his opponents to the Imam’s enemies. Now he is claiming that he is not only the successor of the Imams, but of the Prophet too.

*Khamenei is claiming that he is the ruler of the Muslim of the world.

In the regime's past, political declarations claimed that the Supreme Leader is the leader of all of the world’s Muslims. This time Khamenei is claiming it himself.

The issue? Around 90% of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis. Sunni Islam does not recognize Shia Grand Ayatollahs and the Islamic Republic’s principle of religious jurisprudence. This declaration will not go down well with the Sunnis, especially as it comes from Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that obeying his orders is compulsory.

Since very early days of the Islamic Republic, the assumption has been that the order to the Supreme Leader must be obeyed. More than three decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has seen the need to remind everyone of that fact.

(Note: some religious scholars believe that, due to his limited religious credentials, Khamenei does not have the authority to issue fatwas. We will ignore these concerns for now.)

The obvious significance of this fatwa is that Khamenei is saying that his orders must be carried out without failure. This fatwa will make it easier for Khamenei to insist that his wishes are carried out by all factions of the Islamic Republic, for example, in complicated situations like the recent Islamic Azad University crisis. It will be easier to fire officials to be sacked or disqualify candidates from elections. All that will be required is reference to this fatwa.

The not-so-obvious significances?

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic the Supreme Leader is the highest authority in the country. During the time of Ayatollah Khomeini and since Khamenei came to power, it has always been assumed that the Supreme Leader’s orders must be carried out.

A dramatic demonstration of this was during the reformist-dominated Sixth Majlis (2000-2004). The Parliament was debating a new law that would have revoked the draconian press controls which had been passed by the Fifth Majlis. Khamenei wrote to the Parliament asking for the liberalized press law to be halted, and Mehdi Karroubi, who was then the Speaker, stopped the passage. He cited the order from Khamenei and said it must be obeyed.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to intervene in his capacity as Supreme Leader in many instances. The latest episode came only yesterday with the revelation that two Siatan and Baluchistan MPs, who resigned in protest of the government’s inability to provide effective security for the province, withdrew their resignation on Khamenei’s orders.

Another example: after the vote of confidence over Ahmadinejad’s cabinet last summer, then Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar revealed the Khamenei had ordered MPs to vote Yes, saying that otherwise many ministers would not have obtained the required support. In that instance, even after Khamenei’s intervention, three proposed ministers did not get the vote of confidence.

And another example: the Majlis investigation into allegations of corruption against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi were blocked by an order from Khamenei.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to act more as a senior administrator of the Islamic Republic than as a Supreme Leader who is supposed to preside over state affairs. His need yesterday to remind everyone that orders must be obeyed points to an uncertainty he might have about the effectiveness of that administration.

This could mean that Khamenei’s authority is not as solid as it was in the past. For example, last summer President Ahmadinejad refused to follow Khamenei’s order and remove his ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai from the post of First Vice President until the order was made public by the Supreme Leader’s office. From the other side of the political spectrum, despite Khamenei’s insistence that the 2009 presidential elections were fair and the elections issue is over, the reformists are refusing to back down and have at times not only disobeyed the Supreme Leader but mocked him too. Then there is the Parliament vote to block the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution decision on Islamic Azad University, asserting the President's control. That vote was in direct contravention of Khamenei’s (and, before him, Khomeini’s) statements that the Majlis should not interfere in the decisions taken by the SCCR.

Over the past year Khamenei has struggled to assert his political authority within the regime. He is being defied by senior figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami. He has been criticised by politicians like Hashemi Rafsanjani and by clerics like Ayatollah Dastgheib. He has found it hard to force them into obeying him.

The same can be said about the general public. During street demonstrations, there have chats of “Death to Dictator” and “Death to Khamenei”. The Supreme Leader has not been able to persuade all of his people to accept his decisions. He has instead been forced into using brute force and detention against his opponents. The regime’s security forces, with naked and gruesome violence, cleared the streets of demonstrators last year, and the intelligence forces have jailed many members of the opposition.

The resulting problem is that Khamenei has not been able to demonstrate that he has any real authority in Iran beyond the use of force by his security personnel. Any seemingly minor incident thus has the potential to become a spiralling crisis. Furthermore, many opposition figures who are in jail are now taking any possible opportunity to challenge his authority (Examples include recent statements by Isa Saharkhiz and Ahmad Ghabel). The regime’s authority is no longer that of its positive qualities, but that of its muscle, and that muscle may be starting to get tired.

On the conservative side there problems too. The conservative-dominated Majlis voted in the case of Islamic Azad University and the SCCR case in contravention of Khamenei’s views. That forced the Supreme Leader to give out two separate orders to Azad University and SCCR and to set up a panel to look into the case.Even the estalbishment of the panel suggests that Khamenei’s opinion is not strong enough for regime insiders to accept his decisions. Leading MP Ali Motahari has said that although he follows the Supreme Leader, he will voice his disquiet about issues too, and another conservative, Morteza Nabavi, has said that many of his colleagues are giving up.

Add to this the failure of the Ahmadinejad Government to cope with many of the problems in the country and, in some cases, its "success" in making matters worse. On 19 June 2009, Khamenei said clearly that he considers Ahmadinejad closer to him than even his decades-old friend Rafsanjani. The starting point of  the incompetence of the Ahmadinejad administration is the demonstration that the Supreme Leader is not able to choose the right people for the right job.

On the religious front, the clerics in Qom have refused to publicly back Khamenei’s post-election decisions. This has led to the Supreme Leader calling them imperceptive confidants and criticising them regularly. In contrast, after the 4 June humiliation of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the clerics were effusive with their support for Hassan's grandfather, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and praised his personal and religious qualities.

In recent months some criticism of Khamenei has been taken to a new level. Last year most of the criticism was directed at specific actions or decisions, but now some of the criticism has become personal to the point of demanding Khamenei’s removal from the post of Supreme Leader --- examples include statements by  (example: statements by Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saharkhiz, and Ghabel.) This criticism is coming not from an foreign-based opposition that has no allegiance to the Islamic Republic but from former regime insiders with substantial revolutionary credentials.

And the fatwa may not check the criticism. Many high-ranking Shia clerics will probably be upset because Khamenei is saying that, during the age of absence (of the 12th Shia Imam Mahdi), he is the rightful successor of that Imam. Doing so, he is usurping the claim of legitimacy of the Grand Ayatollahs,  that they are here to guide the faithful while the 12th Imam is hidden. And many Shia scholars do not accept the rule of the Jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih) during the age of absence. They assert that any claim of rule by an Islamic state during the period that the 12th Imam is hidden is a false pretence, since a true Islamic state can only be set up by him. Others who try to take this role are impostors.

Last year, the main talk was ofthe  illegitimacy of the Ahamdinejad as president. Now the issue seems to be shifting to the unsuitability of Khamenei for the post of Supreme Leader. This new fatwa may be an attempt at countering the challenges against the Supreme Leader himself. But one is left wondering if it will not backfire as did Khamenei’s message of condolence for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s death last year or his fatwa trying to ban Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Fiestival) in March.

But note the difference: if this declaraton backfires, the consequences will be far more dramatic.