Iran Analysis: Twisting & Turning to Prove the Leader is Supreme (Verde)

On Wednesday we noted a speech by Ayatollah Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, but our takeaway line was his "conspiracy theory" that the US and Saudi Arabia were paying $1 billion and putting up a bounty of another $50 billion for regime change in Tehran.

Mr Verde has gone through the speech and discovers that the bigger but untold story of Jannati's speech is even more interesting, given its connection with the Supreme Leader's "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa:

There is a lot of mention of God in the speech, with the point being that God has saved the Revolution from its enemies. Jannati says, “God gave up Imam Khomeini” and adds later, “In the same way that he protected Moses from danger, God saved Imam [Khomeini] and the Revolution." He uses the example, "The events of Tabas [the site of the failed attempt by US forces to rescue the US Embassy hostages in 1980] which was help from God, showed that God himself is the protector of the Revolution and this invisible help has been a reoccurring theme in the history of the Revolution”.

Jannati then talks about the attempted assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei in the early 1980s  and says that although al the doctors and Khamenei himself did not believe that he would live, God saved him. He says, “At the time of the passing of Imam Khomeini, God delivered the position of the leader of the revolution to the Supreme Leader [Khamenei], and he was tasked by God to protect this revolution and this regime and to continue the path of [the first Shia] Imam Ali.

Jannati then links challenges past and present to show that God will ensure the Supreme Leader will overcome “in addition to the enormous sedition of 88 [post-2009 election protests], other seditions took place during the leadership of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei too which in some cases came close to overthrowing the regime, but the same God that was the protector of the Revolution in the events of Tabas [1980] again saved the Revolution."

Interpretation

1. Note Jannati's constant references to God's protection of the regime, intervening at time to save it. This could be a sign that regime officials are being forced to rely more on this claim and less on the reassurance that the regime is popular and upheld by the people. It is worth watching for signs of this in speeches by other officials.

2. Jannati uses the title “Grand Ayatollah” for Khamenei. This is not the first time this has occurred, but it may be relevant to the “I am the Rule of the Prophet” fatwa.

3. Jannati's statement that God delivered the leadership to Khamenei supports the Supreme Leader's claim in his fatwa that his authority is like that of the Prophet.

4. Jannati's reference to the post-election protests as “enormous sedition of 88” contradicts the main regime line is that the protestors were few in number and that there never was a crisis.

5. Note Jannati's revelations that the regime was on the brink of overthrow on several occasions during the leadership of Khamenei. As far as I know, this is the first time any regime official has even talked about the possibility of the toppling of the regime, yet alone speak of "several occasions" and linking this to post-election protests.

6. Jannati's proclamation of the $1 billion "regime change" payment and the promised $50 billion is even more ridiculous than his other declarations. Up to now such claims were about millions of dollars; now it seems the rates have risen sharply.

The Latest from Iran (25 July): The Re-Appearing Fatwa

2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Kayvan Samimi, chief editor of the banned publication Nameh has been given a six-year jail term and has been banned from social, political, and cultural activities for 15 years.

1845 GMT: Defining Irony. From Press TV:

An Iranian lawmaker says Tehran plans to file a lawsuit against the US over the inhumane policies adopted by Washington towards the people of Iran.

"It has been agreed that the issue of US violation of human rights as well as its double standard policies be raised in the international community and a lawsuit be filed to seek compensation for some of the damages inflicted on Iran because of it," member of the Majlis Human Rights Committee Zohreh Elahian said on Sunday.

The Iranian lawmaker said American media have turned human rights into a tool by means of which they manipulate world public opinion, adding, “The US uses human rights to pressure Iran while this country does not observe even the most basic articles of the human rights law.”

NEW Iran Analysis: Re-Defining the Green Movement (Verde)
Iran Analysis: Rafsanjani Bowing Out? (Abedin)
UPDATED Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.
The Latest from Iran (24 July): Reviewing the Situation

1825 GMT: The International Front. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has confirmed statements by his Turkish and Brazilian counterparts (see 1410 GMT) that Iran will be ready for discussions on its nuclear programme after the month of Ramadan ends in the second week of September.

1820 GMT: Easing the Energy Squeeze? Mehr News claims that Iran has signed a $1.29 billion deal sending its natural gas to Turkey, which secure 77% of the required funding for completing the 660-kilometre pipeline.

Iran currently exports 25 million cubic meters of natural gas to Turkey per day and the figure could rise to 30 million cubic meters a day.

1810 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. An appellate court has upheld the two-year sentence of Garmsar Azad University student Masoud Babapour.

Journalist Emaduddin Baghi has been sentenced to one year in prison and a five-year ban on political and media activities.

The punishment is not in connection with Baghi's December 2009 arrest, which followed his interview with the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri for BBC Persian, but stems from a 2008 case. Baghi is currently free on bail.

1458 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Ali Malihi has been sentenced to four years in prison.

1454 GMT: Energy Squeeze. Emad Hosseini of Parliament's Energy Commission says the situation with Iran's ministry overseeing electricity and water is at its worst point since the Revolution.

1450 GMT: Economy Watch. Aftab News reports that 600 workers at Khuzestan Pipe Factory have not been paid for 15 months.

1440 GMT: Economy Watch (China Edition). Aftab News summarises how local products are being replaced by Chinese imports, including green raisins in Kashmar, handicrafts in Isfahan, rice in Caspian Sea provinces. Perhaps "caraways in Kerman" (for British readers, equal to "coals to Newcastle") will be next?

Mehr drives home the point with pictures of the old Carpet Bazaar in Qom, now closed because of imported Chinese rugs.

1435 GMT: Rahnavard Watch. Activist Zahra Rahnavard, meeting a group of political activists, has declared: “A part of the current government sees women as a serious threat. They attack women in the streets, prisons, and in their media in different ways, and by repression, torture, and character assassination they are putting women under unprecedented pressure. These kinds of treatments have saddened noble Iranian men and for sure will strengthen their resistance for democracy and freedom. Of course the Green Movement also realizes that achieving its high values will not be possible without women’s presence and paying attention to their demands.”

1430 GMT: And a Kidnapped Activist? Hoda Saber of the National Religious Front is missing, possibly kidnapped, after leaving the office on Saturday afternoon.

1425 GMT: The Missing Lawyer. The Committee of Human Rights Reporters reports that prominent human rights lawyer Mohammad Mostafaei is missing and his wife and brother-in-law have been detained.

Earlier in the week Mostafaei was summoned to the Prosecutor's Office in Evin Prison and questioned for four hours. Security forces tried to arrest Mostafaei yesterday afternoon but could not find him, arresting family members near his office instead.

Mostafaei is the lawyer of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, whose death sentence for adultery has provoked international criticism of the Iranian regime.

1420 GMT: Labour Front. Human Rights Activists News Agency reports that Saeed Torabian, an activist with the Tehran Bus Workers Union, has been prevented from working after his recent release from detention.

1415 GMT: Economy Watch. Another sign of the recession? Khabar Online reports that automobile companies have closed and traders are in big difficulties because of low prices.

1410 GMT: International Front. Back at EA headquarters to find that the foreign ministers of Turkey and Brazil, following a meeting with Iranian counterpart Manouchehr Mottaki, are saying they will press Iran and the "5+1" powers (US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, France) to meet "as soon as possible" on Tehran's uranium-enrichment programme, possibly with discussions in Kabul.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said that Iran was "ready to begin negotiations", specifically citing a possible exchange with European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, and that Tehran will send a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency on Monday.

Davutoglu suggests talks might begin soon after the holy month of Ramadan ends in the second week of September.

0950 GMT: Education Corner. Peyke Iran claims the Government's new effort for "Islamisation" of schools has begun.

Saadollah Nasiri, a member of Parliament's educational commission has said that "retiring" professors is discrimination, with the Government using "scientific stagnation" as a pretext to remove "secular" or anti-Government academics. (http://www.rahesabz.net/story/20110/)

Meanwhile, Minister of Science and Higher Education Kamran Daneshjoo, according to Fars News, has said that Iran needs about 22,000 academics for social sciences. Daneshjoo's statements are considered by some as a call to replace existing staff with "suitable" scholars. (http://news.gooya.com/politics/archives/2010/07/108086.php)

0945 GMT: Parliament v. Government. Reformist
MP Hojatoleslam Qodratollah Alikhani: "Instead of denying it, President Ahmadinejad should at least apologise for the incompetence and mismanagement of his Government leading to sanctions and unemployment." (http://www.parlemannews.ir/?n=12598)

The enquiry by the Majlis into the conduct of Minister of Agriculture Khalilian after summer vacation. (http://www.khabaronline.ir/news-78207.aspx)

0940 GMT: International Front. The foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey and Brazil are meeting in Istanbul to discuss developments since their declaration this spring for talks on Iran's uranium enrichment. (http://aje.me/9WcZMD)

0855 GMT: Rumour of Day. Green Voice of Freedom claims that the President's chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai is overseeing construction of a large residential complex in Belarus, implying that this is preparation for the event that regime leaders will have to flee the country.

0735 GMT: Mahmoud is Not So Mean. President Ahmadinejad today advised the "West", "We recommend them not to continue with their misconducts and observe the rights of nations if they seek to improve their position in the future. This will serve their own interests....We advocate logic and friendship. Every country that establishes friendly relations with Iran benefits this policy."

Ahmadinejad specifically addressed European countries, "Your misbehavior will bring nothing to you but discredit. It will have no impact on the Iranian nation."

0730 GMT: Now That's Just Mean. First Vice President Mohammad Reza AN's Rahimi, opening inaugurating an environmental fair, has said that "Westerners" are filthier than goats.

0700 GMT: We have posted a separate analysis by Mr Verde, "Re-Defining the Green Movement".

0650 GMT: Talking Tough. Iran's military leaders have tried to match the "war chatter" from some groups in the US with declarations across the media: Revolutionary Guards head Jafari says the US does not dare attack, and former commander Yahya Rahim-Safavi describes air and sea conflict if the Americans did.

My favourite quote, however --- representing both Iranian tough talk and the simplication of it by media in the "West" --- is in the Associated Press from former navy head Morteza Saffari, "We have set aside 100 military vessels for each (US) warship to attack at the time of necessity."

0644 GMT: Revolutionary Guards' Jafari "We Are Not United". Yesterday we noted the statement of the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, that leaders of sedition would be dealt with in a timely fashion.

We missed the more intriguing part of the speech:Jafari admitted for the first time in public that some IRGC commanders --- Mohsen Rashid, Moh Ozlati Moghaddam, Hemmat, Bakeri, Zeynoddin --- had supported the opposition, but added that they should not be "eliminated".

0640 GMT: Protesting the Execution. The BBC has posted an article on Saturday's rally in London for Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, the Iranian woman sentenced to death for adultery.

0635 GMT: The Memorial for the Poet. Tehran Bureau has posted one of Ahmad Shamlou's poems, "In This Blind Alley", published soon after the 1979 Revolution. Yesterday security forces dispersed those gathered for the memorial for the 10th anniversary of Shamlou's death.

0630 GMT: Only the "Right" Knowledge, Please. There are reports that Wikipedia was blocked in Iran yesterday.

0540 GMT: Here today, gone tomorrow, back again the day after tomorrow....

The case of the Supreme Leader''s "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa took another turn last night when, having receded in the Iranian state media, it suddenly appeared on Ayatollah Khamenei's website. (When it was put out on Tuesday, it was put out in locations to which the website linked, not the site itself.)

The fatwa asserting that the Supreme Leader acts for the Imams and the Prophet Mohammad and must be obeyed is part of a longer treatise in response to a follower's question about the obligations to velayat-e-faqih (clerical supremacy).

Meanwhile....

Trouble for the Guards in the Oilfield

Revolutionary Guards commander Sardar Ghasemi has admitted the construction firm Khatam-ol Anbia, associated with the Guards, is hindered by old technology and "rusty oil wells". The firm had been awarded a major contract to develop the South Pars gas and oil field, after the withdrawal of foreign companies, but has since pulled back from the project.

Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)

EA has caught up in a mystery for 36 hours, as Ayatollah Khamenei's dramatic fatwa --- "I am the Rule of the Prophet" --- started to disappear from Iranian state media.

Given the timing of the Supreme Leader's supposed declaration and the religious and political circumstances, what happened and what does it mean? Mr Verde, who put out the initial interpretation of the fatwa (strength or weakness?) on Wednesday, takes a look:

Khamenei’s own site, unlike the case of other fatwas such as the March pronouncement that the Fire Festival is evil, did not publish the “I am the Prophet” fatwa. Instead, in its newsfeed, it had a link to a page announcing the fatwa on another site.

Iran Special: Khamenei’s “I Am the Rule of the Prophet” Fatwa — Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Issuing of the fatwa in that form was a disaster.

Before explaining, a basic point: most of the statements and claims that Khamenei makes in the fatwa are nothing new. Both the terminology and the substance have been used before by Islamic Republic officials. The only relatively new claim is that he is a successor of the Prophet Mohammad (although he alluded to this before when he was meeting Iranian officials and, to back up his demand that people should follow him, quoted a verse from the Qu'ran that asks Muslims to follow the Prophet). One of the titles that regime officials used to use to describe Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei is “rahba-r moslemin-e jahan” (the leader of the Muslims of the world). Another is “nayebe barhagh-e emam-e zaman” (the rightful successor of the hidden Imam).

Sine all this has been said before, why is the current episode a disaster? Well....

*This time Khamenei, who is the Islamic Republic’s highest authority, is personally making these claims about his status. Up to now he and other regime officials would have had plausible deniability if questioned about these dubious claims, attributing them to low-level people and declaring this is not our official position. Now it is going to be very difficult to give a convincing answer, say to Saudi officials who might have a question or two about claims of being a rightful successor to the Prophet or leader of the Muslims of the world. Similar problems will arise if the Supreme Leader's circle is questioned Shia Muslim scholars and clerics like Iraq's Ayatollah Sistani.

*The fact that Khamenei is making this claim BEFORE any other independent senior clerics and Grand Ayatollahs have made such a declaration suggests that he is trying to grab for himself the position of successor to the Prophet, rather than following the consensus of Shia clerics. If any other Grand Ayatollahs now back up Khamenei’s claims, it will appear as if they were forced into it by the regime.

*Such a fatwa is the same as officially admitting the end of the rule of law and an end to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.

Challenges to the regime claim that it is taking parts of the Constitution, such as Article 110 which covers the authority of the Supreme Leader, and expanding them to the point where other articles --- people’s right to determine their own destiny, independence of the judiciary, Parliament’s duty to pass legislation --- become useless. Khamenei’s interventions, as in the Islamic Azad University crisis or the corruption case of 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, render the rule of law ineffective.

Now Khamenei is saying that he has the right to do as he pleases, not ifs and no buts. He sees no necessity for the constitution and the laws of the land, as he --- the rightful successor to the Prophet and the Imams and the leader of the Muslims of the world --- can decide whenever he wants what should or should not be done. This will lead to charges that the country is being ruled in an arbitrary manner. It will also reduce any elections to the superfluous. If such a fatwa were to stand, then elected officials would become courtiers in Khamenei’s service, not the servants of the people.

*The timing could not have been worse. One of the aims of last week's bombing in southeastern Iran is to create tensions between the Shias and Sunnis there and across Iran. This fatwa only increases the Shia-Sunni tensions.

*This fatwa is a clear sign of the weakness of Khamenei on a personal and a political level. Personally, because he sees the need to elevate himself to the level of the Prophet. Politically, because he may be seeing that his orders are not being obeyed; so he has to use violence to force through his will and has to hide behind the Prophet to make himself look respectable.

Still, Khamenei and his advisors have long held the views that are expressed in the fatwa. Why release it in this dramatic form?

*Perhaps Khamenei is finding it increasing difficult to run the day-to-day affairs of the state, due to insubordination from all quarters, and wanted this fatwa to be the reason for people to follow orders and the threat in case they do not.

*Perhaps this was supposed to be a “private” statement --- like the rumoured fatwa from Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi ordering election manipulation last year --- and it was leaked. If it was leaked officially, then it is a serious miscalculation. If it was leaked unofficially, then Khamenei should be very worried about who would publicise such a sensitive statement.

*Perhaps it is to test the water before an official declaration.

*Perhaps Khamenei is preparing for a big push against the reformists and is trying to claim unquestionable legitimacy for himself.

*Perhaps the Supreme Leader is trying to counter criticism of killings and detentions by saying that this is what the Prophet would have done.

*Perhaps it is, rather in desperation, aimed at pushing back against criticism of Khamenei, only some of which may be in the public domain.

*Perhaps the infighting amongst the conservatives/principalists is to the point where it is worrying Khamenei. He is therefore trying to remind them that he is the top man and they should not forget that.

*Perhaps Khamenei is feeling that he is under pressure not from the reformists but from President Ahmadinejad, who is looking to bypass the Supreme Leader, the conservatives who are upset about the Government's rule, and the traditionalists who are seeing that Ahamdinejad is trying to sideline them.

Thanks to Khamenei’s handling of the post-election crisis, his other option is giving in to the reformists, something he had been desperately tying to avoid for over a decade now. So he is forced to make a very grand declaration in an attempt to defend himself.

*Perhaps this is personal vanity on the part of Khamenei.

I would watch for reactions from the reformists and senior clerics; however, my preliminary assessment is that the public appearance of the fatwa, however it came about, seems to have been big a mistake. I would not be surprised if it was expunged like the misguided declaration on the "sacrilege" of the Fire Festival.

Iran Special: Khamenei's "I Am the Rule of the Prophet" Fatwa --- Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

First, a summary of what Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed in his fatwa on Tuesday:

*Khamenei is claiming that he is a cleric of the highest rank who possesses all the required credentials to hold the position of “velayat-e-faqih” (Supreme Leader).

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Many Shia clerics and scholars, including the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, believed in 1989 that Khamenei did not have the required religious credentials to permit him to hold the position of Supreme Leader. Other regime officials have said that Khamenei has the credentials, but such claims were made in political speeches. This time the claim is made in the name of a religious edict and by Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that his rule is a direct succession to that of the Prophet and the Shia Imams.

During recent months, as he has been trying to cope with the fallout of the crisis within the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has repeatedly compared himself to the first Shia Imam and his opponents to the Imam’s enemies. Now he is claiming that he is not only the successor of the Imams, but of the Prophet too.

*Khamenei is claiming that he is the ruler of the Muslim of the world.

In the regime's past, political declarations claimed that the Supreme Leader is the leader of all of the world’s Muslims. This time Khamenei is claiming it himself.

The issue? Around 90% of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis. Sunni Islam does not recognize Shia Grand Ayatollahs and the Islamic Republic’s principle of religious jurisprudence. This declaration will not go down well with the Sunnis, especially as it comes from Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that obeying his orders is compulsory.

Since very early days of the Islamic Republic, the assumption has been that the order to the Supreme Leader must be obeyed. More than three decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has seen the need to remind everyone of that fact.

(Note: some religious scholars believe that, due to his limited religious credentials, Khamenei does not have the authority to issue fatwas. We will ignore these concerns for now.)

The obvious significance of this fatwa is that Khamenei is saying that his orders must be carried out without failure. This fatwa will make it easier for Khamenei to insist that his wishes are carried out by all factions of the Islamic Republic, for example, in complicated situations like the recent Islamic Azad University crisis. It will be easier to fire officials to be sacked or disqualify candidates from elections. All that will be required is reference to this fatwa.

The not-so-obvious significances?

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic the Supreme Leader is the highest authority in the country. During the time of Ayatollah Khomeini and since Khamenei came to power, it has always been assumed that the Supreme Leader’s orders must be carried out.

A dramatic demonstration of this was during the reformist-dominated Sixth Majlis (2000-2004). The Parliament was debating a new law that would have revoked the draconian press controls which had been passed by the Fifth Majlis. Khamenei wrote to the Parliament asking for the liberalized press law to be halted, and Mehdi Karroubi, who was then the Speaker, stopped the passage. He cited the order from Khamenei and said it must be obeyed.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to intervene in his capacity as Supreme Leader in many instances. The latest episode came only yesterday with the revelation that two Siatan and Baluchistan MPs, who resigned in protest of the government’s inability to provide effective security for the province, withdrew their resignation on Khamenei’s orders.

Another example: after the vote of confidence over Ahmadinejad’s cabinet last summer, then Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar revealed the Khamenei had ordered MPs to vote Yes, saying that otherwise many ministers would not have obtained the required support. In that instance, even after Khamenei’s intervention, three proposed ministers did not get the vote of confidence.

And another example: the Majlis investigation into allegations of corruption against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi were blocked by an order from Khamenei.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to act more as a senior administrator of the Islamic Republic than as a Supreme Leader who is supposed to preside over state affairs. His need yesterday to remind everyone that orders must be obeyed points to an uncertainty he might have about the effectiveness of that administration.

This could mean that Khamenei’s authority is not as solid as it was in the past. For example, last summer President Ahmadinejad refused to follow Khamenei’s order and remove his ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai from the post of First Vice President until the order was made public by the Supreme Leader’s office. From the other side of the political spectrum, despite Khamenei’s insistence that the 2009 presidential elections were fair and the elections issue is over, the reformists are refusing to back down and have at times not only disobeyed the Supreme Leader but mocked him too. Then there is the Parliament vote to block the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution decision on Islamic Azad University, asserting the President's control. That vote was in direct contravention of Khamenei’s (and, before him, Khomeini’s) statements that the Majlis should not interfere in the decisions taken by the SCCR.

Over the past year Khamenei has struggled to assert his political authority within the regime. He is being defied by senior figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami. He has been criticised by politicians like Hashemi Rafsanjani and by clerics like Ayatollah Dastgheib. He has found it hard to force them into obeying him.

The same can be said about the general public. During street demonstrations, there have chats of “Death to Dictator” and “Death to Khamenei”. The Supreme Leader has not been able to persuade all of his people to accept his decisions. He has instead been forced into using brute force and detention against his opponents. The regime’s security forces, with naked and gruesome violence, cleared the streets of demonstrators last year, and the intelligence forces have jailed many members of the opposition.

The resulting problem is that Khamenei has not been able to demonstrate that he has any real authority in Iran beyond the use of force by his security personnel. Any seemingly minor incident thus has the potential to become a spiralling crisis. Furthermore, many opposition figures who are in jail are now taking any possible opportunity to challenge his authority (Examples include recent statements by Isa Saharkhiz and Ahmad Ghabel). The regime’s authority is no longer that of its positive qualities, but that of its muscle, and that muscle may be starting to get tired.

On the conservative side there problems too. The conservative-dominated Majlis voted in the case of Islamic Azad University and the SCCR case in contravention of Khamenei’s views. That forced the Supreme Leader to give out two separate orders to Azad University and SCCR and to set up a panel to look into the case.Even the estalbishment of the panel suggests that Khamenei’s opinion is not strong enough for regime insiders to accept his decisions. Leading MP Ali Motahari has said that although he follows the Supreme Leader, he will voice his disquiet about issues too, and another conservative, Morteza Nabavi, has said that many of his colleagues are giving up.

Add to this the failure of the Ahmadinejad Government to cope with many of the problems in the country and, in some cases, its "success" in making matters worse. On 19 June 2009, Khamenei said clearly that he considers Ahmadinejad closer to him than even his decades-old friend Rafsanjani. The starting point of  the incompetence of the Ahmadinejad administration is the demonstration that the Supreme Leader is not able to choose the right people for the right job.

On the religious front, the clerics in Qom have refused to publicly back Khamenei’s post-election decisions. This has led to the Supreme Leader calling them imperceptive confidants and criticising them regularly. In contrast, after the 4 June humiliation of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the clerics were effusive with their support for Hassan's grandfather, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and praised his personal and religious qualities.

In recent months some criticism of Khamenei has been taken to a new level. Last year most of the criticism was directed at specific actions or decisions, but now some of the criticism has become personal to the point of demanding Khamenei’s removal from the post of Supreme Leader --- examples include statements by  (example: statements by Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saharkhiz, and Ghabel.) This criticism is coming not from an foreign-based opposition that has no allegiance to the Islamic Republic but from former regime insiders with substantial revolutionary credentials.

And the fatwa may not check the criticism. Many high-ranking Shia clerics will probably be upset because Khamenei is saying that, during the age of absence (of the 12th Shia Imam Mahdi), he is the rightful successor of that Imam. Doing so, he is usurping the claim of legitimacy of the Grand Ayatollahs,  that they are here to guide the faithful while the 12th Imam is hidden. And many Shia scholars do not accept the rule of the Jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih) during the age of absence. They assert that any claim of rule by an Islamic state during the period that the 12th Imam is hidden is a false pretence, since a true Islamic state can only be set up by him. Others who try to take this role are impostors.

Last year, the main talk was ofthe  illegitimacy of the Ahamdinejad as president. Now the issue seems to be shifting to the unsuitability of Khamenei for the post of Supreme Leader. This new fatwa may be an attempt at countering the challenges against the Supreme Leader himself. But one is left wondering if it will not backfire as did Khamenei’s message of condolence for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s death last year or his fatwa trying to ban Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Fiestival) in March.

But note the difference: if this declaraton backfires, the consequences will be far more dramatic.