Iran Special: Khamenei's "I Am the Rule of the Prophet" Fatwa --- Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

First, a summary of what Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed in his fatwa on Tuesday:

*Khamenei is claiming that he is a cleric of the highest rank who possesses all the required credentials to hold the position of “velayat-e-faqih” (Supreme Leader).

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Many Shia clerics and scholars, including the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, believed in 1989 that Khamenei did not have the required religious credentials to permit him to hold the position of Supreme Leader. Other regime officials have said that Khamenei has the credentials, but such claims were made in political speeches. This time the claim is made in the name of a religious edict and by Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that his rule is a direct succession to that of the Prophet and the Shia Imams.

During recent months, as he has been trying to cope with the fallout of the crisis within the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has repeatedly compared himself to the first Shia Imam and his opponents to the Imam’s enemies. Now he is claiming that he is not only the successor of the Imams, but of the Prophet too.

*Khamenei is claiming that he is the ruler of the Muslim of the world.

In the regime's past, political declarations claimed that the Supreme Leader is the leader of all of the world’s Muslims. This time Khamenei is claiming it himself.

The issue? Around 90% of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis. Sunni Islam does not recognize Shia Grand Ayatollahs and the Islamic Republic’s principle of religious jurisprudence. This declaration will not go down well with the Sunnis, especially as it comes from Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that obeying his orders is compulsory.

Since very early days of the Islamic Republic, the assumption has been that the order to the Supreme Leader must be obeyed. More than three decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has seen the need to remind everyone of that fact.

(Note: some religious scholars believe that, due to his limited religious credentials, Khamenei does not have the authority to issue fatwas. We will ignore these concerns for now.)

The obvious significance of this fatwa is that Khamenei is saying that his orders must be carried out without failure. This fatwa will make it easier for Khamenei to insist that his wishes are carried out by all factions of the Islamic Republic, for example, in complicated situations like the recent Islamic Azad University crisis. It will be easier to fire officials to be sacked or disqualify candidates from elections. All that will be required is reference to this fatwa.

The not-so-obvious significances?

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic the Supreme Leader is the highest authority in the country. During the time of Ayatollah Khomeini and since Khamenei came to power, it has always been assumed that the Supreme Leader’s orders must be carried out.

A dramatic demonstration of this was during the reformist-dominated Sixth Majlis (2000-2004). The Parliament was debating a new law that would have revoked the draconian press controls which had been passed by the Fifth Majlis. Khamenei wrote to the Parliament asking for the liberalized press law to be halted, and Mehdi Karroubi, who was then the Speaker, stopped the passage. He cited the order from Khamenei and said it must be obeyed.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to intervene in his capacity as Supreme Leader in many instances. The latest episode came only yesterday with the revelation that two Siatan and Baluchistan MPs, who resigned in protest of the government’s inability to provide effective security for the province, withdrew their resignation on Khamenei’s orders.

Another example: after the vote of confidence over Ahmadinejad’s cabinet last summer, then Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar revealed the Khamenei had ordered MPs to vote Yes, saying that otherwise many ministers would not have obtained the required support. In that instance, even after Khamenei’s intervention, three proposed ministers did not get the vote of confidence.

And another example: the Majlis investigation into allegations of corruption against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi were blocked by an order from Khamenei.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to act more as a senior administrator of the Islamic Republic than as a Supreme Leader who is supposed to preside over state affairs. His need yesterday to remind everyone that orders must be obeyed points to an uncertainty he might have about the effectiveness of that administration.

This could mean that Khamenei’s authority is not as solid as it was in the past. For example, last summer President Ahmadinejad refused to follow Khamenei’s order and remove his ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai from the post of First Vice President until the order was made public by the Supreme Leader’s office. From the other side of the political spectrum, despite Khamenei’s insistence that the 2009 presidential elections were fair and the elections issue is over, the reformists are refusing to back down and have at times not only disobeyed the Supreme Leader but mocked him too. Then there is the Parliament vote to block the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution decision on Islamic Azad University, asserting the President's control. That vote was in direct contravention of Khamenei’s (and, before him, Khomeini’s) statements that the Majlis should not interfere in the decisions taken by the SCCR.

Over the past year Khamenei has struggled to assert his political authority within the regime. He is being defied by senior figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami. He has been criticised by politicians like Hashemi Rafsanjani and by clerics like Ayatollah Dastgheib. He has found it hard to force them into obeying him.

The same can be said about the general public. During street demonstrations, there have chats of “Death to Dictator” and “Death to Khamenei”. The Supreme Leader has not been able to persuade all of his people to accept his decisions. He has instead been forced into using brute force and detention against his opponents. The regime’s security forces, with naked and gruesome violence, cleared the streets of demonstrators last year, and the intelligence forces have jailed many members of the opposition.

The resulting problem is that Khamenei has not been able to demonstrate that he has any real authority in Iran beyond the use of force by his security personnel. Any seemingly minor incident thus has the potential to become a spiralling crisis. Furthermore, many opposition figures who are in jail are now taking any possible opportunity to challenge his authority (Examples include recent statements by Isa Saharkhiz and Ahmad Ghabel). The regime’s authority is no longer that of its positive qualities, but that of its muscle, and that muscle may be starting to get tired.

On the conservative side there problems too. The conservative-dominated Majlis voted in the case of Islamic Azad University and the SCCR case in contravention of Khamenei’s views. That forced the Supreme Leader to give out two separate orders to Azad University and SCCR and to set up a panel to look into the case.Even the estalbishment of the panel suggests that Khamenei’s opinion is not strong enough for regime insiders to accept his decisions. Leading MP Ali Motahari has said that although he follows the Supreme Leader, he will voice his disquiet about issues too, and another conservative, Morteza Nabavi, has said that many of his colleagues are giving up.

Add to this the failure of the Ahmadinejad Government to cope with many of the problems in the country and, in some cases, its "success" in making matters worse. On 19 June 2009, Khamenei said clearly that he considers Ahmadinejad closer to him than even his decades-old friend Rafsanjani. The starting point of  the incompetence of the Ahmadinejad administration is the demonstration that the Supreme Leader is not able to choose the right people for the right job.

On the religious front, the clerics in Qom have refused to publicly back Khamenei’s post-election decisions. This has led to the Supreme Leader calling them imperceptive confidants and criticising them regularly. In contrast, after the 4 June humiliation of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the clerics were effusive with their support for Hassan's grandfather, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and praised his personal and religious qualities.

In recent months some criticism of Khamenei has been taken to a new level. Last year most of the criticism was directed at specific actions or decisions, but now some of the criticism has become personal to the point of demanding Khamenei’s removal from the post of Supreme Leader --- examples include statements by  (example: statements by Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saharkhiz, and Ghabel.) This criticism is coming not from an foreign-based opposition that has no allegiance to the Islamic Republic but from former regime insiders with substantial revolutionary credentials.

And the fatwa may not check the criticism. Many high-ranking Shia clerics will probably be upset because Khamenei is saying that, during the age of absence (of the 12th Shia Imam Mahdi), he is the rightful successor of that Imam. Doing so, he is usurping the claim of legitimacy of the Grand Ayatollahs,  that they are here to guide the faithful while the 12th Imam is hidden. And many Shia scholars do not accept the rule of the Jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih) during the age of absence. They assert that any claim of rule by an Islamic state during the period that the 12th Imam is hidden is a false pretence, since a true Islamic state can only be set up by him. Others who try to take this role are impostors.

Last year, the main talk was ofthe  illegitimacy of the Ahamdinejad as president. Now the issue seems to be shifting to the unsuitability of Khamenei for the post of Supreme Leader. This new fatwa may be an attempt at countering the challenges against the Supreme Leader himself. But one is left wondering if it will not backfire as did Khamenei’s message of condolence for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s death last year or his fatwa trying to ban Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Fiestival) in March.

But note the difference: if this declaraton backfires, the consequences will be far more dramatic.

Comments

[News vom 21. Juli « Arsh]

[...] Fatwa: Khamenei erklärt sich zum Führer aller Muslime [...]

[WitteKr]

Thank you Mr. Verde! Chrystal clear... but I'm still wondering why the fatwa disappeared from so many Iranian official websites, only hours after it was published. Any idea?

[Bijan77]

Mr Verde -

Thank you for sharing your thoughts on this matter. Very informative as always.

If my memory serves correctly, it was Rafsanjani who "pushed" Khamanei through to become SL. In articles I have read I have never seen thoughts as to why he would do this. Do you have any thoughts?

Regards,

[Kurt]

I think the reasoning that Rafsanjani "produced" the purported recommendations of Khomeini, was he believed that since he could not be SL, he would promote a pliable one with little credentials or following. Of course, two decades later, and this gambit has backfired. Or, as this article suggests, maybe Khamene'i has become a little too big for his britches?

[Bijan77]

Kurt -

Thank you for the response. It is close to thoughts I had but was curious if there were "known" underlying reasons behind Raffers moves aside from the notion it would allow himself to have indirect influence across all IRI matters. This seems the most logical answer.

Regards,

[Verde_e]

WitteKr,

Re. “why the fatwa disappeared from so many Iranian official websites, only hours after it was published. Any idea?”

I am guessing because it was a mistake to publish it in the first place. It portrays Khamenei as isolated, despotic and with very grand visions of himself.

Scott (2120 GMT in http://enduringamerica.com/2010/07/21/the-latest-from-iran-21-july-khamenei-rattled/" rel="nofollow">http://enduringamerica.com/2010/07/21/the-lates...) is raising the possibility that it might be a fake; part of a campaign of misinformation. If so, it would have to be by some very powerful people. Maybe it is real but was not intended for general release, or, as mentioned above, it was “withdrawn” after it backfired, like the Fire Festival fatwa.

Regards,

Verde

[Verde_e]

Bijan77,

Re. “If my memory serves correctly, it was Rafsanjani who "pushed" Khamanei through to become SL. In articles I have read I have never seen thoughts as to why he would do this. Do you have any thoughts?”

I agree with Kurt. The idea was probably to have a weak and low ranking person like Khamenei as a figurehead in the SL position with Rafsanjani as president and Ahmad Khomeini as the son of the founder of the IR having a free hand in running the country. As we see it did not work out that way.

Khamenei was able to use his links with the regime’s intelligence community (he was Khoemini’s rep in intelligence matters for a long time and had good connections) to establish his own power base, which he used later during the “chain murders”. There are rumours that the same chain murders team also killed Ahmadi Khomeini, making it look like a natural death. This would mean that Khamenei had gotten rid of Khomeini Jr in order to be free of one of the two people who brought him to power. Since Khamenei did not have acceptable religious credentials he was forced to seek the help of other clerics to make up for it. This is when people like Hashemi-Shahroudi (who was not long before the spokesman for the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and had suddenly become “Iranian”) and Mesbah-Yazdi came into play. They were able to use Khamenei’s weakness in religious matters to form a powerbase for themselves.

Regards,
Verde

[Bijan77]

Thank you for the reply Verde.

[Baz]

Re the Fatwa.

I know that the left hand of the Regime does not know what the right hand is doing - BUT, for a Fatwa supposedly from the hand of the SL, I find it very difficult to believe that it could be written, then published, then almost immediately withdrawn - without something very strange going on. Even they are not that incompetent!

All kinds of questions come to mind - written by who, published by who, withdrawn by who. Perhaps it was written by Khamenei in an opium daze?? Or by someone else trying to stir up trouble??

Barry

[Megan]

Bijan,

Quid pro quo. I make you SL and you stay out of my way in raiding the country to become a billionaire. I lie and tell everyone Khomeini wanted you as his replacement and you stay quite when I fix the election to become president.

[Ramin]

A very insightful and well written piece. Thank you, Mr. Verde. The biggest threat to AN, SL & Co. are their own mistakes. And the Green Movement can be proud to challenge these thugs to that extent that they are forced to do errors...