The Latest from Iran (26 July): Behind the International Screen

2055 GMT: Moscow is Not Amused. Looks like President Ahmadinejad went too far in his shtick of "Russia is aiding and abetting the US-Israel plot to attack Arab allies of Iran".

The Russian Foreign Ministry has put out a statement, "For us the recent public statements of the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are categorically unacceptable....[They] distorted Russia's objective approach, our independent, constructive line towards the Iranian nuclear programme with the aim of finding a political and diplomatic resolution. We consider that instead of fruitless and irresponsible rhetoric, the Iranian leadership should take concrete, constructive steps towards the speediest regulation of the situation."

Iran Analysis: Re-Defining the Green Movement (Verde)
UPDATED Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.
The Latest from Iran (25 July): The Re-Appearing Fatwa

2000 GMT: Academic Corner. Sima, the student newspaper at Ferdowsi University, has been banned.

1915 GMT: "Khamenei Must Go" (cont. --- see 1115 GMT). Ahmad Ghabel, seminary lecturer and author, has followed up his recent criticism of the Supreme Leader with a statement that arrests have happened with the approval of Ayatollah Khamenei and "the Iranian people are free on bail".

1910 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Canada has followed the European Union in imposing additional sanctions on Tehran, notably in the energy sector.

1630 GMT: The International Front. Forget the talking tough (see 1500 GMT): the theme today from Tehran is openness to discussions. Islamic News Republic Agency and Fars News are both highlighting the statement of Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's nuclear organisation, "The clear message of this letter [to the International Atomic Energy Agency] was Iran's complete readiness to hold negotiations over the fuel for the Tehran reactor without any conditions."

1500 GMT: Talking Tough Time. The Iranian Foreign Ministry has criticised the latest measures adopted by the European Union (see 1430 GMT), "Sanctions… will only complicate matters and move away [the parties] from mutual understanding."

Yeah, yeah, whatever (the Iranians are actually angling for talks, via contact with EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Turkey and Brazil's mediation, with the EU on the uranium issue). If you want some macho fire-breathing, you have to go to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who reveals the Obama Administration is "one of lies":

You witnessed what they did to Palestinians; Israeli settlements in Palestine are expanding by the day and the Zionist regime destroys mosques and of course Gaza is still under siege....Americans wrongly perceive Lebanon as a toy but they should be more careful lest this toy severs their hand.

On the surface they condemn terrorism but behind the curtain they support terrorists… as it became clear, during [Jundullah ringleader Abdolmalek] Rigi's confessions, that he was linked to the US and NATO and they supported this terrorist cell.

1430 GMT: Sanctions Watch. The European Union has formally adopted a package of new sanctions against Iran, targeting foreign trade, banking, and energy.

1425 GMT: Oil Squeeze. Reuters reports, from a shipping document, that only three cargoes of gasoline have so far reached Iran in July, far less than the seasonal norm, because of the pressure of sanctions.

Traditionally during the summer season, with people driving on holidays, Iran needs 11-13 cargoes a month.

The three cargoes this month and were supplied by Turkish refiner Tupras and the trading arm of China's Sinopec, Unipec. Another cargo is expected to arrive from Venezuela.

1150 GMT: Mousavi's Latest. Mir Hossein Mousavi, in his most recent speech, has discussed the "untold story" of the war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988.

1123 GMT: Revolutionary Guard in Control? Mehdi Karroubi, in an interview with BBC Persian, has declared that there is now an effective "monopoly" by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and the Basij militia in the country.

1120 GMT: Parliament v. President. Reformist MP Hojatoleslam Qodratollah Alikhani has complained about President Ahmadinejad's "joy" at US and UN sanctions, saying that he hopes this has not increased the prospect of war.

1115 GMT: "Khamenei Must Go". Noted Iranian intellectual Abdolkarim Soroush, now living in exile, has complemented recent calls --- from Mohsen Kadivar and Ahmad Ghabel outside the country and Isa Saharkhiz inside it --- for the Supreme Leader to step down.

1040 GMT: Rumour of Day. Parleman News claims that the Hojjatieh Society has formally applied for a licence.

Hojjatieh has provoked much comment and speculation since its founding as a semi-clandestine Shi'a organisation in 1953. It was forced to dissolve after a speech by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1983, but stories circulate that it is connected to President Ahmadinejad and other senior figures in the Iranian regime.

1035 GMT: Energy Squeeze? Deputy Minister of Oil Alireza Zeighami has said,"We need $46 billion to finish our refinery projects." The funds will contribute to new capacity for 5 billion litres of liquid fuel.

Some numbers for comparison: the $46 billion is more than 15 times the $3.1 billion in Foreign Direct Investment in 2009 --- a number pushed by Iranian officials as a sign of the country's growth --- and 92 times the amount of the $500 million bond project announced today for the South Pars gas and oil field.

1015 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Rah-e-Sabz reports that former President Hashemi Rafsanjani will visit Hamzeh Karami, the director of Jumhoriat website and a senior official at Islamic Azad University, in hospital. Karami, detained soon after the June 2009 election, is in intensive care with a heart condition.

Last summer, Karami's "confession" in a televised trial in Tehran was used to implicate Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi Hashemi, in alleged fraud and misconduct over the election.

1010 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Agence France Presse has picked up the story --- noted in our updates yesterday --- that journalist Emad Baghi, detained in December 2009 and recently released on bail, has been given a one-year sentence and banned for five years from political activities from charges in a 2008 case.

1000 GMT: Reviewing the Supreme Leader. An entry on an Iranian blog puts forth supposed reaction from clerics in Qom to Ayatollah Khameini's fatwa, "I am the Rule of the Prophet".

0955 GMT: Picture of Day. Mir Hossein Mousavi meets reformist politician Mohsen Armin, recently released from detention on $200,000 bail:



0950 GMT: Parliament v. Government. Vice Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar has reiterated that the Majlis will stand up to the Ahmadinejad Government, rejecting its implementation measures.

0945 GMT: Concessions to the Villagers? Kalemeh claims that a new Government directive removes limits on social security for Sunni residents in rural areas.

0935 GMT: Setting the Record Straight. Fereshteh Ghazi interviews the family of Mohammad-Hossein Feiz, shot dead in protests on 30 June 2009. They reveal that Feiz was not a Basij militiaman, as the regime claimed, but a demonstrator.

0930 GMT: Economy Watch. Iran Negah posts a video interview with a girl living in poverty in Tehran. She says, "God only helps rich people." (Persian2English has an English translation.)

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HnT7xl5zYDM[/youtube]

0925 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Peyke Iran claims that student Vahid Asghari has had his nose and ribs broken in Bushehr Prison.

0920 GMT: Parliament v. Government. Members of Parliament are continuing to threaten impeachment of Minister of Agriculture Sadegh Khalilian over claims that imports are driving down rice prices received by Iranian farmers.

0800 GMT: Water Pressure. Amidst stories of impurities and shortages in Iran's water supply, Tehran's Yaft-Abad quarter has installed a temporary water filter.

0730 GMT: Music of Dissent. Shahin Najafi, an Iranian musician and poet now living in Germany, has released "Vay Koshte Maro", a song of protest against the current Government.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xTrlthfbcHQ[/youtube]

0725 GMT: Parliament v. President. The influential member of Parliament, Gholam-Reza Mesbahi-Moghaddam, has emphasised that "not all hardliners accepted the elimination of reformists" in the post-election conflict.

0720 GMT: The Saharkhiz Criticism. Persian2English has now posted the first part of journalist Isa Saharkhiz's statement in court --- featured on EA last week --- with its direct criticism of the Supreme Leader.

0715 GMT: No, No, Talk about the War. Press TV keeps up the Iranian state line, "Shameful Defeats Awaits US in 3rd War". The article features the Sunday comments of Brigadier General Masoud Jayazeri, “The United States, which has already suffered two heavy, disgraceful defeats against Hezbollah and Hamas in the region, can start a new war with a third country to endure another defeat.”

0710 GMT: So what is happening inside Iran? Credit to two "Western" outlets for stories that defy the trend of Nukes and War.

The Los Angeles Times posts a summary of "New Series of Attacks on Members of the Bahai Faith in Iran".

The Guardian of London picks up on the story --- reported in our updates yesterday --- of the disappearance of prominent human rights lawyer Mohammad Mostafaei and the arrest of his wife and brother-in-law. Mostafaei represents Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, the Iranian woman whose death sentence for adultery has provoked international criticism of Tehran.

0630 GMT: The lead stories in the media this morning on Iran are far from what is happening inside Tehran.

From the Iranian Government's point of view, the weekend's meeting between the Turkish, Brazilian, and Iranian Foreign Ministers is the platform to focus attention on the uranium enrichment issue. Paralleling the rhetoric denouncing the West, notably in the speeches of President Ahmadinejad, the possibility of renewed discussions --- raised by Iran's statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency today --- comes to the fore. The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, says, "The Tehran nuclear declaration on a possible nuclear fuel swap is a good base for the sides to build confidence. Iran has prepared its response to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Vienna group which will be sent within the next two or three days."

And from the US --- not from the Government, I hasten to add, but from the chattering classes --- the topic is not resolution but war. CNN's Sunday interview with Michael Hayden, the head of the CIA in the Bush Administration, is the latest pretext to take speculation from someone far from the centre of developments and turn into a Most Important Prediction.

Indeed, there is a convenient symmetry here. On one side, those who desire regime change in Iran can do so with little reference to politics, society, religion, or any other matter inside the country --- it's always and only the spectral "imminent threat" that is featured. On the other, those who support the Iranian Government --- irrespective of what it does inside the country --- can avoid troubling themselves with human rights, justice, and legitimacy. Instead, they can raise the speculative and unsupported to a clear-and-present danger and argue that the avoidance of a US-Iran war takes priority.

The Latest from Iran (22 July): Confusing Regime

2125 GMT: Today's All-is-Well Alert. Iran's police chief Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam has declared that there is no smuggling of gas and oil across Iran's borders.

Then again, maybe all is not well: despite there being no smuggling, Ahmadi-Moghaddam has said the budget for border defence is inadequate.

2115 GMT: Religious Difficulties. Mohammad Nasser Saghaie Biriya, the President's religious advisor has resigned, allegedly because of divisions over the enforcement of hijab.

Saghaie Biriya is a disciple of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who has been seen as Ahmadinejad's religious mentor.

NEW Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.
Iran Special: Khamenei’s “I Am the Rule of the Prophet” Fatwa — Strength or Weakness? (Verd
The Latest from Iran (21 July): Khamenei Rattled?

2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Detained student activist Arsalan Abadi has been sentenced to six years in prison by an appellate court. Abadi, arrested during the Ashura protests on 27 December, had originally been given a nine-year term.

2055 GMT: Regime v. Rafsanjani. Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami has tried to put former President Hashemi Rafsanjani in his place, saying that his position is still the same as it was on 19 June last year, when the Supreme Leader tried to close off debate over the result of the Presidential election. Khatami said Rafsanjani's s future depends on Ayatollah Khamenei's decisions and the elections for the head of Expediency Council, the position Rafsanjani currently holds.

1945 GMT: Prohibiting Remembrance. Back from a break to catch up with this news from Wednesday....

The National Front of Iran has announced that security forces pressured the organisation into cancelling its public events. The head of the National Front was that any gathering in 7th Tir Square and boarding the bus to travel to Baboyeh Cemetery is prohibited.

On 21 July 1953, demonstrators protested the dismissal of the nationalist Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, and were killed inby security forces of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The victims were laid to rest in Baboyeh.

1310 GMT: Scattering the Students. Rah-e-Sabz reports that Tehran University's dormitories will be evacuated this summer, with students distributed across the city.

1245 GMT: Economy Watch. Reformist MP Mohammad Reza Khabbaz has declared that excessive imports will break the back of domestic production.

1000 GMT: (Refuting the) Rumour of the Day. MP Qodratollah Alikhani identifying the mis-information put out by Javan, the newspaper linked to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, dismisses its latest tale that Green leaders met in a hotel sauna.

0954 GMT: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Film Expert. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has announced that a High Council for Cinema, led by the President, has been established.

An EA correspondent ponders, "What would be the titles of the films considered by this Council?"

0945 GMT: Education Corner. The licence of the Islamic Association at the University of Kashan has been revoked by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education is reportedly sending religious missonaries to 3000 girls' schools in Tehran.
0855 GMT: Sanctions. MP Mohsen Nariman has challenged the Government's official line: "Claiming that sanctions have no effects is political propaganda."

0810 GMT: Staying on Point. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is continuing to ensure that his credentials on foreign policy are not in question, saying on Wednesday that the Iran-Brazil-Turkey declaration on a uranium swap is the only solution to the nuclear issue and adding that sanctions are sure to result in failure.
0805 GMT: Getting the Right Clerics in Place. According to Rooz Online, Seyed Reza Taghavi, the head of policy for Friday Prayers, has said 60 Friday Prayer clerics will be "retired" this summer.

0705 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Azam Visemeh after her release from detention yesterday:



0700 GMT: In the Bazaar. Nejat Bahrami, writing for insideIRAN, analyses, "Bazaari Criticism of Ahmadinejad Bursts into the Open":

Another factor that can bring the bazaar and the opposition closer to each other is the role of the government. Mistakes made by the government and their impact should never be underestimated. Continuation of failed economic policies by the Ahmadinejad administration and further pressure on Iran by the international community can further intensify the economic crisis in Iran and alienate some parts of this important, influential group of merchants.

0655 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Two overviews of interest this morning....

Shayan Ghajar writes in insideIRAN, "Sanctions Open Iran to Russian, Chinese Firms", while Ardalan Sayami's analysis in Rooz Online is that "Sanctions Turn the Government to the Private Sector".

0635 GMT: A Clue on the Fatwa? Personally, I believe that the first audience for the Supreme Leader's supposed fatwa on Tuesday was the senior clerics of Qom, some of whom have been unsettled throughout the post-election crisis and many of whom were roused to anger by the June attacks on Seyed Hassan Khomeini and on the houses of Grand Ayatollah Sane'i and the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. (Using this line of reasoning, a possible reason for the "disappearance" of the fatwa is that it was not received well by those clerics.)

Support for this interpretation comes in Rah-e-Sabz, which posts a provocative account of Ayatollah Khamenei's recent journey to Qom and his meetings with the clerics.

0605 GMT: Perhaps the most spirited response to our coverage since Tuesday of the Supreme Leader's alleged fatwa --- "I am the Rule of the Prophet" --- has come from a reader who say, "Nothing new, he has simply reiterated the meaning of the velayat-e-faqih [clerical supremacy] as originally articulated by the late Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini....It is not always good to murky the water as you like doing here."

With respect, I beg to differ. While the content of Ayatollah Khameini's declaration has its precendents, it has not taken on the form of a fatwa, at least not under this Supreme Leader. And, as always, the distinction lays in timing, context, and developments: Why now? To what end? And what has happened to the fatwa, which has "disappeared" from many Iranian state outlets?

Mr Verde takes another look in an analysis.

Meanwhile....

Mousavi's Latest

Almost lost in the confusion over the Supreme Leader's statement --- did he or didn't he? --- was Mir Hossein Mousavi's intervention in a meeting with professors.

Mousavi, unwittingly intersecting with the presentation of and uncertainty over Khamenei's words, condemned “fabrication” and “distortion” of truth by the Government and stressed that “systematic lies” are the signs of the “decline” of a system. He said the media of the Green Movement should make every effort to “unravel” these lies and counter the “ominous phenomenon": “We must provide our people with a truthful analysis of every situation that the government represents through lies; even though our possibilities are not as much as the authoritarian government.”

Mousavi also spoke about the recent bombings in southeastern Iran, declaring that the problems of the ethnic groups in the border regions must be a priority and maintaining that terrorism can only be confronted through “development coupled with justice".

Power Crisis

Tabnak reports that electricity prices for farmers will increase 10-fold.

Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)

EA has caught up in a mystery for 36 hours, as Ayatollah Khamenei's dramatic fatwa --- "I am the Rule of the Prophet" --- started to disappear from Iranian state media.

Given the timing of the Supreme Leader's supposed declaration and the religious and political circumstances, what happened and what does it mean? Mr Verde, who put out the initial interpretation of the fatwa (strength or weakness?) on Wednesday, takes a look:

Khamenei’s own site, unlike the case of other fatwas such as the March pronouncement that the Fire Festival is evil, did not publish the “I am the Prophet” fatwa. Instead, in its newsfeed, it had a link to a page announcing the fatwa on another site.

Iran Special: Khamenei’s “I Am the Rule of the Prophet” Fatwa — Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Issuing of the fatwa in that form was a disaster.

Before explaining, a basic point: most of the statements and claims that Khamenei makes in the fatwa are nothing new. Both the terminology and the substance have been used before by Islamic Republic officials. The only relatively new claim is that he is a successor of the Prophet Mohammad (although he alluded to this before when he was meeting Iranian officials and, to back up his demand that people should follow him, quoted a verse from the Qu'ran that asks Muslims to follow the Prophet). One of the titles that regime officials used to use to describe Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei is “rahba-r moslemin-e jahan” (the leader of the Muslims of the world). Another is “nayebe barhagh-e emam-e zaman” (the rightful successor of the hidden Imam).

Sine all this has been said before, why is the current episode a disaster? Well....

*This time Khamenei, who is the Islamic Republic’s highest authority, is personally making these claims about his status. Up to now he and other regime officials would have had plausible deniability if questioned about these dubious claims, attributing them to low-level people and declaring this is not our official position. Now it is going to be very difficult to give a convincing answer, say to Saudi officials who might have a question or two about claims of being a rightful successor to the Prophet or leader of the Muslims of the world. Similar problems will arise if the Supreme Leader's circle is questioned Shia Muslim scholars and clerics like Iraq's Ayatollah Sistani.

*The fact that Khamenei is making this claim BEFORE any other independent senior clerics and Grand Ayatollahs have made such a declaration suggests that he is trying to grab for himself the position of successor to the Prophet, rather than following the consensus of Shia clerics. If any other Grand Ayatollahs now back up Khamenei’s claims, it will appear as if they were forced into it by the regime.

*Such a fatwa is the same as officially admitting the end of the rule of law and an end to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.

Challenges to the regime claim that it is taking parts of the Constitution, such as Article 110 which covers the authority of the Supreme Leader, and expanding them to the point where other articles --- people’s right to determine their own destiny, independence of the judiciary, Parliament’s duty to pass legislation --- become useless. Khamenei’s interventions, as in the Islamic Azad University crisis or the corruption case of 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, render the rule of law ineffective.

Now Khamenei is saying that he has the right to do as he pleases, not ifs and no buts. He sees no necessity for the constitution and the laws of the land, as he --- the rightful successor to the Prophet and the Imams and the leader of the Muslims of the world --- can decide whenever he wants what should or should not be done. This will lead to charges that the country is being ruled in an arbitrary manner. It will also reduce any elections to the superfluous. If such a fatwa were to stand, then elected officials would become courtiers in Khamenei’s service, not the servants of the people.

*The timing could not have been worse. One of the aims of last week's bombing in southeastern Iran is to create tensions between the Shias and Sunnis there and across Iran. This fatwa only increases the Shia-Sunni tensions.

*This fatwa is a clear sign of the weakness of Khamenei on a personal and a political level. Personally, because he sees the need to elevate himself to the level of the Prophet. Politically, because he may be seeing that his orders are not being obeyed; so he has to use violence to force through his will and has to hide behind the Prophet to make himself look respectable.

Still, Khamenei and his advisors have long held the views that are expressed in the fatwa. Why release it in this dramatic form?

*Perhaps Khamenei is finding it increasing difficult to run the day-to-day affairs of the state, due to insubordination from all quarters, and wanted this fatwa to be the reason for people to follow orders and the threat in case they do not.

*Perhaps this was supposed to be a “private” statement --- like the rumoured fatwa from Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi ordering election manipulation last year --- and it was leaked. If it was leaked officially, then it is a serious miscalculation. If it was leaked unofficially, then Khamenei should be very worried about who would publicise such a sensitive statement.

*Perhaps it is to test the water before an official declaration.

*Perhaps Khamenei is preparing for a big push against the reformists and is trying to claim unquestionable legitimacy for himself.

*Perhaps the Supreme Leader is trying to counter criticism of killings and detentions by saying that this is what the Prophet would have done.

*Perhaps it is, rather in desperation, aimed at pushing back against criticism of Khamenei, only some of which may be in the public domain.

*Perhaps the infighting amongst the conservatives/principalists is to the point where it is worrying Khamenei. He is therefore trying to remind them that he is the top man and they should not forget that.

*Perhaps Khamenei is feeling that he is under pressure not from the reformists but from President Ahmadinejad, who is looking to bypass the Supreme Leader, the conservatives who are upset about the Government's rule, and the traditionalists who are seeing that Ahamdinejad is trying to sideline them.

Thanks to Khamenei’s handling of the post-election crisis, his other option is giving in to the reformists, something he had been desperately tying to avoid for over a decade now. So he is forced to make a very grand declaration in an attempt to defend himself.

*Perhaps this is personal vanity on the part of Khamenei.

I would watch for reactions from the reformists and senior clerics; however, my preliminary assessment is that the public appearance of the fatwa, however it came about, seems to have been big a mistake. I would not be surprised if it was expunged like the misguided declaration on the "sacrilege" of the Fire Festival.

Iran Special: Khamenei's "I Am the Rule of the Prophet" Fatwa --- Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

First, a summary of what Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed in his fatwa on Tuesday:

*Khamenei is claiming that he is a cleric of the highest rank who possesses all the required credentials to hold the position of “velayat-e-faqih” (Supreme Leader).

LATEST Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
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Many Shia clerics and scholars, including the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, believed in 1989 that Khamenei did not have the required religious credentials to permit him to hold the position of Supreme Leader. Other regime officials have said that Khamenei has the credentials, but such claims were made in political speeches. This time the claim is made in the name of a religious edict and by Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that his rule is a direct succession to that of the Prophet and the Shia Imams.

During recent months, as he has been trying to cope with the fallout of the crisis within the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has repeatedly compared himself to the first Shia Imam and his opponents to the Imam’s enemies. Now he is claiming that he is not only the successor of the Imams, but of the Prophet too.

*Khamenei is claiming that he is the ruler of the Muslim of the world.

In the regime's past, political declarations claimed that the Supreme Leader is the leader of all of the world’s Muslims. This time Khamenei is claiming it himself.

The issue? Around 90% of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis. Sunni Islam does not recognize Shia Grand Ayatollahs and the Islamic Republic’s principle of religious jurisprudence. This declaration will not go down well with the Sunnis, especially as it comes from Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that obeying his orders is compulsory.

Since very early days of the Islamic Republic, the assumption has been that the order to the Supreme Leader must be obeyed. More than three decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has seen the need to remind everyone of that fact.

(Note: some religious scholars believe that, due to his limited religious credentials, Khamenei does not have the authority to issue fatwas. We will ignore these concerns for now.)

The obvious significance of this fatwa is that Khamenei is saying that his orders must be carried out without failure. This fatwa will make it easier for Khamenei to insist that his wishes are carried out by all factions of the Islamic Republic, for example, in complicated situations like the recent Islamic Azad University crisis. It will be easier to fire officials to be sacked or disqualify candidates from elections. All that will be required is reference to this fatwa.

The not-so-obvious significances?

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic the Supreme Leader is the highest authority in the country. During the time of Ayatollah Khomeini and since Khamenei came to power, it has always been assumed that the Supreme Leader’s orders must be carried out.

A dramatic demonstration of this was during the reformist-dominated Sixth Majlis (2000-2004). The Parliament was debating a new law that would have revoked the draconian press controls which had been passed by the Fifth Majlis. Khamenei wrote to the Parliament asking for the liberalized press law to be halted, and Mehdi Karroubi, who was then the Speaker, stopped the passage. He cited the order from Khamenei and said it must be obeyed.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to intervene in his capacity as Supreme Leader in many instances. The latest episode came only yesterday with the revelation that two Siatan and Baluchistan MPs, who resigned in protest of the government’s inability to provide effective security for the province, withdrew their resignation on Khamenei’s orders.

Another example: after the vote of confidence over Ahmadinejad’s cabinet last summer, then Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar revealed the Khamenei had ordered MPs to vote Yes, saying that otherwise many ministers would not have obtained the required support. In that instance, even after Khamenei’s intervention, three proposed ministers did not get the vote of confidence.

And another example: the Majlis investigation into allegations of corruption against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi were blocked by an order from Khamenei.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to act more as a senior administrator of the Islamic Republic than as a Supreme Leader who is supposed to preside over state affairs. His need yesterday to remind everyone that orders must be obeyed points to an uncertainty he might have about the effectiveness of that administration.

This could mean that Khamenei’s authority is not as solid as it was in the past. For example, last summer President Ahmadinejad refused to follow Khamenei’s order and remove his ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai from the post of First Vice President until the order was made public by the Supreme Leader’s office. From the other side of the political spectrum, despite Khamenei’s insistence that the 2009 presidential elections were fair and the elections issue is over, the reformists are refusing to back down and have at times not only disobeyed the Supreme Leader but mocked him too. Then there is the Parliament vote to block the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution decision on Islamic Azad University, asserting the President's control. That vote was in direct contravention of Khamenei’s (and, before him, Khomeini’s) statements that the Majlis should not interfere in the decisions taken by the SCCR.

Over the past year Khamenei has struggled to assert his political authority within the regime. He is being defied by senior figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami. He has been criticised by politicians like Hashemi Rafsanjani and by clerics like Ayatollah Dastgheib. He has found it hard to force them into obeying him.

The same can be said about the general public. During street demonstrations, there have chats of “Death to Dictator” and “Death to Khamenei”. The Supreme Leader has not been able to persuade all of his people to accept his decisions. He has instead been forced into using brute force and detention against his opponents. The regime’s security forces, with naked and gruesome violence, cleared the streets of demonstrators last year, and the intelligence forces have jailed many members of the opposition.

The resulting problem is that Khamenei has not been able to demonstrate that he has any real authority in Iran beyond the use of force by his security personnel. Any seemingly minor incident thus has the potential to become a spiralling crisis. Furthermore, many opposition figures who are in jail are now taking any possible opportunity to challenge his authority (Examples include recent statements by Isa Saharkhiz and Ahmad Ghabel). The regime’s authority is no longer that of its positive qualities, but that of its muscle, and that muscle may be starting to get tired.

On the conservative side there problems too. The conservative-dominated Majlis voted in the case of Islamic Azad University and the SCCR case in contravention of Khamenei’s views. That forced the Supreme Leader to give out two separate orders to Azad University and SCCR and to set up a panel to look into the case.Even the estalbishment of the panel suggests that Khamenei’s opinion is not strong enough for regime insiders to accept his decisions. Leading MP Ali Motahari has said that although he follows the Supreme Leader, he will voice his disquiet about issues too, and another conservative, Morteza Nabavi, has said that many of his colleagues are giving up.

Add to this the failure of the Ahmadinejad Government to cope with many of the problems in the country and, in some cases, its "success" in making matters worse. On 19 June 2009, Khamenei said clearly that he considers Ahmadinejad closer to him than even his decades-old friend Rafsanjani. The starting point of  the incompetence of the Ahmadinejad administration is the demonstration that the Supreme Leader is not able to choose the right people for the right job.

On the religious front, the clerics in Qom have refused to publicly back Khamenei’s post-election decisions. This has led to the Supreme Leader calling them imperceptive confidants and criticising them regularly. In contrast, after the 4 June humiliation of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the clerics were effusive with their support for Hassan's grandfather, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and praised his personal and religious qualities.

In recent months some criticism of Khamenei has been taken to a new level. Last year most of the criticism was directed at specific actions or decisions, but now some of the criticism has become personal to the point of demanding Khamenei’s removal from the post of Supreme Leader --- examples include statements by  (example: statements by Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saharkhiz, and Ghabel.) This criticism is coming not from an foreign-based opposition that has no allegiance to the Islamic Republic but from former regime insiders with substantial revolutionary credentials.

And the fatwa may not check the criticism. Many high-ranking Shia clerics will probably be upset because Khamenei is saying that, during the age of absence (of the 12th Shia Imam Mahdi), he is the rightful successor of that Imam. Doing so, he is usurping the claim of legitimacy of the Grand Ayatollahs,  that they are here to guide the faithful while the 12th Imam is hidden. And many Shia scholars do not accept the rule of the Jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih) during the age of absence. They assert that any claim of rule by an Islamic state during the period that the 12th Imam is hidden is a false pretence, since a true Islamic state can only be set up by him. Others who try to take this role are impostors.

Last year, the main talk was ofthe  illegitimacy of the Ahamdinejad as president. Now the issue seems to be shifting to the unsuitability of Khamenei for the post of Supreme Leader. This new fatwa may be an attempt at countering the challenges against the Supreme Leader himself. But one is left wondering if it will not backfire as did Khamenei’s message of condolence for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s death last year or his fatwa trying to ban Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Fiestival) in March.

But note the difference: if this declaraton backfires, the consequences will be far more dramatic.

The Latest from Iran (18 July): Bazaar Resolutions?

2030 GMT: Bazaar Shutdowns. A different type of bazaar closing today, as the stalls of Sunni vendors in Zahedan --- site of last Thursday's suicide bombings --- were attacked by plainclothes assailants.

2013 GMT: "Nobody Watches Our TV" Shocker. Ayatollah Haeri Shirazi, a member of the Assembly of Experts, has noted the difficulty in preventing access to programmes through satellites and then complained, “The current situation is not so much in our favour. Our [TV] productions do not have any viewers. They are not attractive enough. It is just like our soccer. Our soccer team is ranked 70th in the world just like our cultural, TV, and film productions.”

NEW Iran’s New Guidance: Good, Good Lovin’ (But Only at Night)
Change for Iran: Why Twitter Has Made a Difference
Iran Analysis: When “War Chatter” Poses as Journalism (Step Up, Time Magazine)
The Latest from Iran (17 July): Back to “Normal”?

2010 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Students and lawyers Zoubin Nasiri, Kazem Taghdiri, and Ali Tahami have been detained for three weeks.

2000 GMT: A Message to the Clergy. Gholam Reza Mesbahi Moghaddam, of the Association of Combatant Clergy, has said that those establishing "jame'eye voaz velayi" (clergy supporting the Supreme Leader) should stop creating division. Mesbahi Moghaddam said he did not accept the new organisation and warned that clergy should not act as a political party.

1940 GMT: The Bazaar Strikes. Observers are trying to get to grips with the significance of the last 12 days of closings and conflicts in Iran's bazaars. Even the Los Angeles Times attempts an interpretation, but the most interesting reading comes from Rah-e-Sabz, which assesses whether the bazaaris or the "conservative" Motalefeh Party --- historically a key force in the bazaars --- has been the driving force behind the revolt against the Government's proposed 70% business tax increase.

1910 GMT: Parliament v. President. Members of Parliament told Minister of Trade Mehdi Ghazanfari that "he is lying in their faces" when he said that agricultural exports are higher than imports. Ghazanfari received a negative vote and is one step closer to impeachment.

MPs claimed that a "mafia" of 3 or 4 people are responsible for fruit imports and noted that even Iran's prayer cloths come from China.

1855 GMT: Ali Asghari, the Parliamentary advisor from Iran's Strategic Center, has warned that the country cannot be governed by one faction behaving like a clan. Asghari says cooperation of hardliners and reformists is necessary to overcome the crisis.

1850 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Labour activist Mansur Osanloo, whose family was visited by Mehdi Karroubi this weekend (see 1535 GMT), has again been charged with propaganda against the system.

1844 GMT: Guardian Council Manoeuvres. We reported earlier this week that the appointment of three of the six "legal" representatives on the 12-member Guardian Council was going to be a setback for "hardliners" and President Ahmadinejad, with their favourites --- including current member Gholam-Hossein Elham not on the shortlist.

The three appointments have now been made, with Mohammad Reza Alizadeh, Mohammad Salimi, and Siamak Rahpeyk taking their seats. Still, there are rumblings: MP and Government foe Ahmad Tavakoli complaining that the process was too hasty.

1840 GMT: Musical Shutdown. Reports indicate that all concerts of the National Orchestra have been cancelled for a year.

1800 GMT: Mahmoud Stays on Script. Asked about Thursday's suicide bombings in Zahedan, President Ahmadinejad pulled out all the phrases for the Islamic Republic News Agency:

"No grouping other than US-backed terrorist groups which are devoid of human feelings can commit such acts....We are friends with the Pakistani nation,…but the Pakistani government should be held accountable....The puppeteers pulling the strings in this show will get nothing....Such aggressive policies will only fuel public hatred."

The only interesting twist in that script is Ahmadinejad's reference to Pakistan: is he really threatening a strain in relations --- note the remarks of a leading MP earlier today that Iran might send troops into Pakistan to chase terrorists (see 1520 GMT) --- or is this a bit of posturing?

1550 GMT: After the Bombing. A third member of Parliament, Hossein Ali Shahriari, has resigned over security issues following last Thursday's suicide bombings in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.

1540 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Peyke Iran claims that Layla Tavassoli has been sentenced to two years in prison for participation in demonstrations and for an interview with Radio Farda and BBC Persian.

RAHANA claims that detained women's rights activist Mahboubeh Karami has been denied surgery on her nose.

1535 GMT: Karroubi Watch. Visiting the family of detained labour activist Mansur Osanloo, Mehdi Karroubi recalled:

At the time when we started our resistance and Imam [Khomeini] started his campaign, the foundations of the revolution was based on this principle that no one would suffer from oppression. The barbaric practices that now are being committed against individuals and their families is an oppression against the people that even the Shah’s regime, with all its corruption, would not have committed. I, as a member of this system, am ashamed, but I don’t see these treatments as part of Imam [Khomeini]’s path and Islam.

Osanloo's daughter-in-law was allegedly kidnapped and beaten in June.

Karroubi expressed the hope that all political prisoners would be freed and offered condolences to those mourning the loss of loved ones after last Thursday's bombings in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.

1520 GMT: Foreign Poses. The head of Parliament's National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, is putting out a lot of wisdom today. After meeting the Swiss ambassador, who represents American interests, Boroujerdi claimed that the US Congress has informed the Swiss envoy that it is ready to hold negotiations with Iran. Boroujerdi responded, "[When] the US is aiding terrorists and caused the Zahedan incident and imposed unilateral sanctions beyond [the UN Security Council] resolution, how can it expect [us] to negotiate?"

(Mr Boroujerdi, please do get in touch with us and let us know which US Congressmen have been talking to you of this hope for discussions --- because we haven't seen any sign of this back-channel being established.)

Boroujerdi also raised the possibility of sending Iranian forces into Pakistan to fight "terrorism".

1525 GMT: Fashion Police. Back from a break to find that Iran Prosecutor General Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei has called for tighter enforcement of the criminal code against dangerous fashion: "Unfortunately the law ... which considers violation of the Islamic dress code as a punishable crime, has not been implemented in the country in the past 15 years. Under the law, violators of public chastity should be punished by being sentenced to up to two months in jail or 74 lashes."

But has Mohseni-Ejei talked to the President about this? After all, it was only a few weeks ago that Ahmadinejad was warning against the excesses of the "morality police".

0930 GMT: Defiance. The Parliament has passed a  bill mandating the pursuit of 20% enrichment of uranium. The legislation now needs approval by the Guardian Council.

The bill also requires Iran to "retaliate" against the inspection of Iranian ships and any refusal of fuel to Iranian planes at international airports.

0920 GMT: Energy Watch (Revolutionary Guard Edition). Rooz Online claims that the supposed withdrawal of companies linked to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps from gas projects in the South Pars field is actually a deception. Trying to avoid Western sanctions, the IRGC has merely changed the name of the company involved in the project, retaining the head.

0750 GMT: Sunday Diversions. In the Sydney Morning Herald, Michelle Wranik writes of a two-day visit to Isfahan in which she "is charmed --- and perpetually delayed --- by the kindness of Iranians."

And we bring news from a different front with a look at Iran's latest guidance, "Good, Good Lovin' (But Only at Night)".

0650 GMT: Doing It for the Young People. Reformist MP Darius Ghanbari notes that the budget of Iran's National Youth Organisation has tripled to $39 million, but claims that the Government abuses this for propaganda festivals instead of supporting youth over problems such as unemployment, unstable marriages, and depression.

Meanwhile Minister of Science and Higher Education Kamran Daneshjoo says his ministry wants to return students to Iran by creating job opportunities.

0630 GMT: We start this morning at the Tehran Bazaar where --- after a day of conflicting reports --- it appears that business is back "as usual". Mehr News publishes a set of photographs showing open stalls and the bustle of shoppers:



Yet even this apparent settlement, with the compromise of a 15% business tax increase --- the Government had tried to impose 70% --- has its far-from-resolved aspects. There is the longer-term economic issue, with the Government now receiving only about $4.5 billion of the $20 billion it had hoped to reap from the measure, and then there's the lingering presence of what it takes to get the "normal" in Iran. Note our emphasis in the following paragraph from the Los Angeles Times:

"Every year we used to manage to convince the tax office to pay a 7% increase compared to the previous year," said one wholesaler in the fabric market, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal by security forces keeping a close tab on merchants. "Now it's 15%. It seems like the tax office is the winner."

And then there's the other fronts....

The Aftermath of the Bombing

While the regime puts out the rat-a-tat-tat of "foreign involvement" in Thursday's suicide bombings in Sistan and Baluchistan Province in southeastern Iran, one of the two members of Parliaments who resigned over the event, Abbas Ali Noura, puts a  far different question: "Does the blood of Sistan and Baluchistan people have less colour than that of people in Burkina Faso [in Africa]?"

Parliament v. President

Reformist MP Hossein Kashefi, with a bit of coding, puts in this jab --- published in the far-from-reformist Aftab News --- at the Government on behalf of the people, "One party corresponds in no way with Imam [Khomeini]'s views; we shouldn't present him as someone who didn't accept democratic bases [for the Islamic Republic]."