UPDATED US "National Security": Revealing the Sprawl of "Top-Secret America"...in 2007 (Shorrock)

UPDATED 1030 GMT: The Washington Post has now published the third and final part of its series, a look at the "intelligence complex" in Fort Meade, Maryland.



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On Monday, as The Washington Post launched its high-profile three-part series, "Top Secret America", on the vase intelligence network not only within the Government but amongst private contractors, we noted: "Much of this was known by close observers of US politics and foreign policy years before that, soon after — and indeed before — a US invasion of Iraq which was marked by faulty intelligence, wayward covert action, and a distortion of effective (and legal) policy at home and abroad."

For all the information put forth by Dana Priest and William Arkin, it is worth noting --- since the series does not do so --- those who had already documented the expanding sprawl of "intelligence" in and beyond the National Insecurity State. One of those reporters is Tim Shorrock, who published articles in Salon, Mother Jones, and The Nation between 2003 and 2007 and then the book Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing.

Shorrock's view of the Post series?

[They] their best to obfuscate what contractors really do for US intelligence. They're eight years behind and still haven't caught up. Basically their stories are throwing big numbers at readers—such as the fact that of 854,000 people with top security clearances, 265,000 are contractors. But that's work that can be done by interns; there's virtually nothing in their series about the broader picture—like what it means to have private for-profit companies operating at the highest levels of our national security."

UPDATED The Perils of US Intelligence: A “Top-Secret World” Beyond Control (Priest/Arkin)
US “National Security”: More on the Sprawling “Top Secret America” (Priest/Arkin)

This is Shorrock's article, "The Corporate Takeover of US Intelligence",  from Salon in June 2007:

More than five years into the global "war on terror," spying has become one of the fastest-growing private industries in the United States. The federal government relies more than ever on outsourcing for some of its most sensitive work, though it has kept details about its use of private contractors a closely guarded secret. Intelligence experts, and even the government itself, have warned of a critical lack of oversight for the booming intelligence business.

On May 14, at an industry conference in Colorado sponsored by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the U.S. government revealed for the first time how much of its classified intelligence budget is spent on private contracts: a whopping 70 percent.

The DNI figures show that the aggregate number of private contracts awarded by intelligence agencies rose by about 38 percent from the mid-1990s to 2005. But the surge in outsourcing has been far more dramatic measured in dollars: Over the same period of time, the total value of intelligence contracts more than doubled, from about $18 billion in 1995 to about $42 billion in 2005.

"Those numbers are startling," said Steven Aftergood, the director of the Project on Government Secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists and an expert on the U.S. intelligence budget. "They represent a transformation of the Cold War intelligence bureaucracy into something new and different that is literally dominated by contractor interests."

Because of the cloak of secrecy thrown over the intelligence budgets, there is no way for the American public, or even much of Congress, to know how those contractors are getting the money, what they are doing with it, or how effectively they are using it. The explosion in outsourcing has taken place against a backdrop of intelligence failures for which the Bush administration has been hammered by critics, from Saddam Hussein's fictional weapons of mass destruction to abusive interrogations that have involved employees of private contractors operating in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Aftergood and other experts also warn that the lack of transparency creates conditions ripe for corruption.

Trey Brown, a DNI press officer, told Salon that the 70 percent figure disclosed by Everett refers to everything that U.S. intelligence agencies buy, from pencils to buildings to "whatever devices we use to collect intelligence." Asked how much of the money doled out goes toward big-ticket items like military spy satellites, he replied, "We can't really talk about those kinds of things."

The media has reported on some contracting figures for individual agencies, but never before for the entire U.S. intelligence enterprise. In 2006, the Washington Post reported that a "significant majority" of the employees at two key agencies, the National Counterterrrorism Center and the Pentagon's Counter-Intelligence Field Activity office, were contractors (at CIFA, the number was more than 70 percent). More recently, former officers with the Central Intelligence Agency have said the CIA's workforce is about 60 percent contractors.

But the statistics alone don't even show the degree to which outsourcing has penetrated U.S. intelligence --- many tasks and services once reserved exclusively for government employees are being handled by civilians. For example, private contractors analyze much of the intelligence collected by satellites and low-flying unmanned aerial vehicles, and they write reports that are passed up to the line to high-ranking government officials. They supply and maintain software programs that can manipulate and depict data used to track terrorist suspects, both at home and abroad, and determine what targets to hit in hot spots in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such data is also at the heart of the National Security Agency's massive eavesdropping programs and may be one reason the DNI is pushing Congress to grant immunity tocorporations that may have cooperated with the NSA over the past five years. Contractors also provide collaboration tools to help individual agencies communicate with each other, and they supply security tools to protect intelligence networks from outside tampering.

Outsourcing has also spread into the realm of human intelligence. At the CIA, contractors help staff overseas stations and provide disguises used by agents working under cover. According to Robert Baer, the former CIA officer who was the inspiration for the character played by George Clooney in the film "Syriana," a contractor stationed in Iraq even supervises where CIA agents go in Baghdad and whom they meet. "It's a completely different culture from the way the CIA used to be run, when a case officer determined where and when agents would go," he told me in a recent interview. "Everyone I know in the CIA is leaving and going into contracting whether they're retired or not."

Read rest of article....

US "National Security": More on the Sprawling "Top Secret America" (Priest/Arkin)

The Washington Post has published the second part of the high-profile series by Dana Priest and William Arkin, based on two years of investigation, of the sprawling US "national security state", which now takes in hundreds of thousands of private personnel as well as Government employees:

In June, a stone carver from Manassas chiseled another perfect star into a marble wall at CIA headquarters, one of 22 for agency workers killed in the global war initiated by the 2001 terrorist attacks.

The intent of the memorial is to publicly honor the courage of those who died in the line of duty, but it also conceals a deeper story about government in the post-9/11 era: Eight of the 22 were not CIA officers at all. They were private contractors.

US “National Security”: Revealing the Sprawl of “Top-Secret America”…in 2007 (Shorrock)
UPDATED The Perils of US Intelligence: A “Top-Secret World” Beyond Control (Priest/Arkin)

To ensure that the country's most sensitive duties are carried out only by people loyal above all to the nation's interest, federal rules say contractors may not perform what are called "inherently government functions." But they do, all the time and in every intelligence and counterterrorism agency, according to a two-year investigation by The Washington Post.

What started as a temporary fix in response to the terrorist attacks has turned into a dependency that calls into question whether the federal workforce includes too many people obligated to shareholders rather than the public interest -- and whether the government is still in control of its most sensitive activities. In interviews last week, both Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and CIA Director Leon Panetta said they agreed with such concerns.

The Post investigation uncovered what amounts to an alternative geography of the United States, a Top Secret America created since 9/11 that is hidden from public view, lacking in thorough oversight and so unwieldy that its effectiveness is impossible to determine.

It is also a system in which contractors are playing an ever more important role. The Post estimates that out of 854,000 people with top-secret clearances, 265,000 are contractors. There is no better example of the government's dependency on them than at the CIA, the one place in government that exists to do things overseas that no other U.S. agency is allowed to do.

Private contractors working for the CIA have recruited spies in Iraq, paid bribes for information in Afghanistan and protected CIA directors visiting world capitals. Contractors have helped snatch a suspected extremist off the streets of Italy, interrogated detainees once held at secret prisons abroad and watched over defectors holed up in the Washington suburbs. At Langley headquarters, they analyze terrorist networks. At the agency's training facility in Virginia, they are helping mold a new generation of American spies.

Through the federal budget process, the George W. Bush administration and Congress made it much easier for the CIA and other agencies involved in counterterrorism to hire more contractors than civil servants. They did this to limit the size of the permanent workforce, to hire employees more quickly than the sluggish federal process allows and because they thought - wrongly, it turned out - that contractors would be less expensive.

Nine years later, well into the Obama administration, the idea that contractors cost less has been repudiated, and the administration has made some progress toward its goal of reducing the number of hired hands by 7 percent over two years. Still, close to 30 percent of the workforce in the intelligence agencies is contractors.

Read rest of article....

UPDATED The Perils of US Intelligence: A "Top-Secret World" Beyond Control (Priest/Arkin)

UPDATED 1500 GMT: Acting Director of National Intelligence David Gompert has put out an innocuous statement (at least it's not "anonymous", like the one fed to ABC's George Stephanopoulos --- see 1430 GMT) on the Washington Post story: "The reporting does not reflect the Intelligence Community we know....The fact is, the men and women of the Intelligence Community have improved our operations, thwarted attacks, and are achieving untold successes every day."

With respect, Mr Gompert, perhaps the point of the story is the community "you know" but the one that you should know about, given its size and apparent consequences?

UPDATED 1430 GMT: Spencer Ackerman has a sharp take on the Washington Post "package", including not only the Priest/Arkin article but the linked source material:

US “National Security”: Revealing the Sprawl of “Top-Secret America”…in 2007 (Shorrock)
US “National Security”: More on the Sprawling “Top Secret America” (Priest/Arkin)

Dana Priest and William Arkin of The Washington Post have now published their much-anticipated exposéof the "top-secret world" of US intelligence services, which extends far beyond official bodies such as the Central Intelligence Agency.

It includes a searchable database cataloging what an estimated 854,000 employees and legions of contractors are apparently up to. Users can now to see just how much money these government agencies are spending and where those top secret contractors are located. Check out this nine-page list of agencies and contractors involved in air and satellite observations, for instance. No wonder it scares the crap out of Official Washington: it’s bound to provoke all sorts of questions — both from taxpayers wondering where their money goes, and from U.S. adversaries looking to penetrate America’s spy complex.

But this piece is about much more than dollars. It’s about what used to be called the Garrison State — the impact on society of a Praetorian class of war-focused elites. Priest and Arkin call it "Top Secret America" and it’s so big, and grown so fast, that it’s replicated the problem of disconnection within the intelligence agencies that facilitated America’s vulnerability to a terrorist attack. With too many analysts and too many capabilities documenting too much, with too few filters in place to sort out the useful stuff or discover hidden connections, the information overload is its own information blackout. “We consequently can’t effectively assess whether it is making us more safe,” a retired Army three-star general who recently assessed the system tells the reporters."

Glenn Greenwald has also posted a lengthy consideration of the implications of the "unchecked Surveillance State":  "The Real U.S. Government -- the network of secret public and private organizations which comprise the National Security and Surveillance State -- expands and surveills and pilfers and destroys without much attention and with virtually no real oversight or accountability."

On the insipid side of the ledger, ABC News celebrity anchorman George Stephanopoulos channels the inevitable anonymous "Administration source" trying to trash the story: "The database...is 'troubling'...[because] it could become a road map for adversaries."

Beyond the relative merits of these responses, notice the twist here in the 21st-century media world. The chatter is not about the newspaper article, as it would have been in olden days, but about an on-line database. That in itself is testament not only to the changed dynamics brought by the Internet but by the "traditional" media's hope for survival and relevance: the Post has put in extensive effort to frame this story as an ongoing resource for scrutiny of the US Government.

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POSTED 0730 GMT: Credit to Priest and Arkin for important journalism, based on research since 2008. However, much of this was known by close observers of US politics and foreign policy years before that, soon after --- and indeed before --- a US invasion of Iraq which was marked by faulty intelligence, wayward covert action, and a distortion of effective (and legal) policy at home and abroad. (Indeed, Arkin brought some of this to light, albeit in a blog tucked away on The Post's website.) Why did we not see such vital investigations on front pages then?

The top-secret world the government created in response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, has become so large, so unwieldy and so secretive that no one knows how much money it costs, how many people it employs, how many programs exist within it or exactly how many agencies do the same work.

These are some of the findings of a two-year investigation by The Washington Post that discovered what amounts to an alternative geography of the United States, a Top Secret America hidden from public view and lacking in thorough oversight. After nine years of unprecedented spending and growth, the result is that the system put in place to keep the United States safe is so massive that its effectiveness is impossible to determine.

The investigation's other findings include:

* Some 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies work on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States.

* An estimated 854,000 people, nearly 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington, D.C., hold top-secret security clearances.

* In Washington and the surrounding area, 33 building complexes for top-secret intelligence work are under construction or have been built since September 2001. Together they occupy the equivalent of almost three Pentagons or 22 U.S. Capitol buildings - about 17 million square feet of space.

* Many security and intelligence agencies do the same work, creating redundancy and waste. For example, 51 federal organizations and military commands, operating in 15 U.S. cities, track the flow of money to and from terrorist networks.

* Analysts who make sense of documents and conversations obtained by foreign and domestic spying share their judgment by publishing 50,000 intelligence reports each year - a volume so large that many are routinely ignored.

These are not academic issues; lack of focus, not lack of resources, was at the heart of the Fort Hood shooting that left 13 dead, as well as the Christmas Day bomb attempt thwarted not by the thousands of analysts employed to find lone terrorists but by an alert airline passenger who saw smoke coming from his seatmate.

They are also issues that greatly concern some of the people in charge of the nation's security.

"There has been so much growth since 9/11 that getting your arms around that - not just for the DNI [Director of National Intelligence], but for any individual, for the director of the CIA, for the secretary of defense - is a challenge," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said in an interview with The Post last week.

In the Department of Defense, where more than two-thirds of the intelligence programs reside, only a handful of senior officials - called Super Users - have the ability to even know about all the department's activities. But as two of the Super Users indicated in interviews, there is simply no way they can keep up with the nation's most sensitive work.

"I'm not going to live long enough to be briefed on everything" was how one Super User put it. The other recounted that for his initial briefing, he was escorted into a tiny, dark room, seated at a small table and told he couldn't take notes. Program after program began flashing on a screen, he said, until he yelled ''Stop!" in frustration.

"I wasn't remembering any of it," he said.

Underscoring the seriousness of these issues are the conclusions of retired Army Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, who was asked last year to review the method for tracking the Defense Department's most sensitive programs. Vines, who once commanded 145,000 troops in Iraq and is familiar with complex problems, was stunned by what he discovered.

Read rest of article....

American Media Analysis: When is Torture Not Torture? (Hint: If the US is Involved....)

There has been a fuss over the last week over a study, pursued by students at Harvard University, that found:

"From the early 1930s until the modern story broke in 2004, the newspapers that covered waterboarding almost uniformly called the practice torture or implied it was torture....By contrast, from 2002‐2008, the studied newspapers almost never referred to waterboarding as torture....In addition, the newspapers are much more likely to call waterboarding torture if a country other than the United States is the perpetrator."

Perhaps the most striking finding of the study was that the apparent catalyst for a shift in terminology was the revelation in early 2004 that the US military and private contractors were abusing detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

Bill Keller, the executive editor of The New York Times was so unsettled by the criticism that it put out a statement, “When using a word amounts to taking sides in a political dispute, our general practice is to supply the readers with the information to decide for themselves. Thus we describe the practice [waterboarding] vividly, and we point out that it is denounced by international covenants and in American tradition as a form of torture.”

Perhaps more provocatively, Keller indicated that the entire Harvard report was an unhelpful distraction: “I think this Kennedy School study — by focusing on whether we have embraced the politically correct term of art in our news stories — is somewhat misleading and tendentious.”

The conclusion of the study:

The results of this study demonstrate that there was a sudden, significant, shift in major print media’s treatment of waterboarding at the beginning of the 21st century.

The media’s modern coverage of waterboarding did not begin in earnest until 2004, when the first stories about abuses at Abu Ghraib were released. After this point, articles most often used words such as “harsh” or “coercive” to describe waterboarding or simply gave the practice no treatment,

rather than labeling it torture as they had done for the previous seven decades.

There is also a significant discrepancy between the point of view offered by news articles and opinion pieces published in these papers. Opinion pieces were much more likely to characterize waterboarding as torture, suggesting that the private opinion of the editors and contributors did not align with the formal face the papers were presenting in their objective reporting.

Yet what caused this change in waterboarding’s treatment over time? Our data does not give any specific reason for this shift, but merely points to the existence of this change in syntax. A piece published by the public editor of The NY Times, Clark Hoyt, suggests that these choices were made deliberately by journalists and their editors, perhaps in an effort to remain neutral in the debate going on in the U.S. If the classification of waterboarding as torture is unclear, Hoyt suggests, then it is irresponsible for journalists to preempt this debate by labeling it as such.

The willingness of the newspapers to call the practice torture prior to 2004 seems to refute this claim. According to the data, for almost a century before 2004 there was consensus within the print media that waterboarding was torture. Yet once reports of the use of waterboarding by the CIA and other abuses by the U.S. surfaced, this consensus no longer held, despite the fact that the editors themselves seem to have still been convinced that waterboarding was torture, often labeling it as such in their editorials.

The classification of waterboarding is not unclear; the current debate cannot be so divorced from its historical roots. The status quo ante was that waterboarding is torture, in American law, international law,20 and in the newspapers’ own words. Had the papers not changed their coverage, it would still have been called torture. By straying from that established norm, the newspapers imply disagreement with it, despite their claims to the contrary. In the context of their decades‐long practice, the newspaper’s sudden equivocation on waterboarding can hardly be termed neutral.

Read the full report....

Afghanistan: All Politics is Local --- Al-Qa'eda and the War (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes Rethink Afghanistan:

In our latest video from Rethink Afghanistan, we closed by asking, "Afghanistan got your attention now?" The answer is apparently a resounding YES.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Complexities: Insurgents, Reconciliation, and “Al Qa’eda” (Rodriguez/King)

As the US President's "emergency" war supplemental funding finally hobbles onto the floor for a vote in Congress, months after it was requested, it is facing furious opposition up to the last moment.  Republican and "Blue Dog" Democratic legislators are already being publicly exposed as hypocrites on fiscal responsibility, and that cry will only get louder if the spending is approved.

President Obama himself has faced a stinging rebuke from Congress for his comments about lawmakers' "obsession" with the war, and the Out of Afghanistan Caucus continues to chip away at what little appetite for war remains in congress.

Robert Naiman writes,, "While press reports suggest that when the dust settles, the Pentagon will have the war money, it's likely that a record number of Representatives will go on the record in opposition to open-ended war and occupation."

That's a big deal for those members of Congress, but we have to remember where this challenge is coming from. These may be progressive warriors and heroes of the peace movement, but they're also still craven politicians who spend every second of their free time begging folks (either you or a lobbyist, depending on who takes the initiative) to support them so they can remain in office.

And this is Democratic President Obama's war in Afghanistan, so the massive, highly-coordinated anti-war push in congress can't be pinned on the machinations of the Democratic party. There is no chance in hell the President's partisan apparatchiks would be managing this kind of opposition to the White House, which means this is entirely the work of grassroots citizens' movements. Even though we're talking about a massive war thousands of miles away in Afghanistan and Pakistan, "all politics is local," and it is average citizens who are making a difference.

Put bluntly, Americans are pissed off about the war, and Congress has absolutely no choice but to act upon that anger. But rest assured, supporters of the war are not going to quietly wind down their endless battle because of a little Congressional pushback. And if the past is any indication, when popular anger with the war reaches these prominent levels, war-makers will play the strongest, most sacred card they have: Al-Qa'eda.

The warnings are only effective if you buy into the official spin surrounding the Global War on Terror (GWOT), with the US engaged in war across the entire globe with a terrorist army called Al-Qa'eda. It brings to mind the disturbing vision of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. Almost for that reason alone, the warning of both President Bush and President Obama resonate powerfully with most Americans.

However, if you strip away the official spin, a reasonable and realistic understanding of the threat that Al-Qa'eda poses reveals that even this basic justification for the war in Afghanistan is just another hollow excuse for a useless and catastrophically expensive foreign occupation.

Right away, let's get rid of a little conventional wisdom. The commonly accepted defense against the Al-Qa'eda argument is that these terrorists are stupid. They can't build a working car bomb, they can't blow up their own pants on a plane, or they just wind up blowing up themselves.They're inept, and therefore less of a threat. That's a little too close to tempting fate if you ask me. It's practically daring the terrorists to do something. Bring it on, dummies!

But there are also many, many innocent dead people, mostly Muslims, who would likely love to quibble with the characterization of terrorists as incompetent, that is if they hadn't already been murdered by Al-Qa'eda. A bomb in Peshawar does the same thing a bomb in New York City does: it kills people. The fact that the US has lucked out on the last few attacks is no reason to dismiss the violence of which Al-Qa'eda is still quite capable.

My choice of language there, the "violence Al-Qa'eda is capable of", is itself laced with some unhelpful conventional wisdom. I am implying that Al-Qa'eda is a coherent organization, a rational actor engaging in policy. But that's not really true.

The key to understanding the true nature of Al-Qa'eda is right there in the name. Al-Qa'eda means "the base", but that's not base as in a military base. It is base as in database. It is a list of information, in this case, a global Rolodex of members of like-minded groups and individuals willing to engage in Jihad. It's a Craigslist for terrorism. Each "member" of Al-Qa'eda, whether that's the old guard like Zawahiri in Pakistan or newcomers like Shabaab in Somalia, signs on to a franchise, carrying with it certain responsibilities, and thus they become a member of Al-Qa'eda.

For example, there was an Islamic insurgent group operating in Algeria known as the GSPC. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States dramatically increased its counter-terrorism relationship with the Algerian government. This new support changed the tide of the civil war, and the GSPC was brought to its knees. Facing defeat, the GSPC signed on to Al-Qa'eda, and overnight the old insurgent group, GSPC, disappeared with the exception of a few marginalized fringe groups. Al-Qa'eda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was born.

Algerian recruits went to training camps in Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, etc. Some waged jihad in those countries (becoming what the US military's "foreign fighters"), while others returned with knowledge, applying their new training to fresh campaigns of commando raids and IEDs against their home government.

With the Al-Qa'eda franchise came other perks, of course, including connection to international organized crime networks (narcotics, weapons, and human trafficking) as well as the nourishing supply of hard currency from regional oil sheiks that only the Al-Qa'eda brand can deliver. But at no point is there any sort of rigid, hierarchical structure to the organization of Al-Qa'eda. It is not as if the leaders of AQIM take orders from Osama bin Laden, or that they all get together over a map and plan out the global Caliphate. It's membership in a club --- social networking for Jihadists.

What this means is that there technically is no such thing as "defeating Al-Qa'eda." Quite simply, there is nothing there to defeat. Andrew Exum writes:

In general, we Americans --- especially some of our friends on the American Right --- tend to overestimate the importance of what we do in comparison to what local actors do. (Iraq and Afghanistan, seriously, should have taught us better.) That doesn't mean we fold up our tents and head home: we just have to be realistic about what we can hope to achieve through the application of U.S. power, military force especially.

Another way of saying that: "All politics is local". In Algeria, there isn't really an Al-Qa'eda there for us to fight, there is the same religious insurgency, a local phenomenon, that was there before the franchise and will be there after the franchise. The "foreign fighters", whether that's Algerians in Pakistan or Pakistanis in Algeria, are products of their local conditions. To stop AQIM, you have to resolve the issues in Algeria. To stop Al-Qa'eda in Pakistan, you have to resolve the issues in Pakistan.

How do we do that? So far the United States has used the military, but as we see in Algeria, and indeed everywhere else, that only drives the local actors, the insurgent groups, extremists, criminals, etc. even closer to a relationship with Al-Qa'eda. It makes the local problem a global problem, exacerbating it beyond control.

The Al-Qa'eda franchise that the US is primarily concerned with is in Pakistan (almost none remain in Afghanistan). Just as expected, the military efforts there have solidified the relationship between Al-Qa'eda and the local actors, in this case the groups comprising the Taliban. As a consequence of assassinating the older, more pragmatic leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, many Taliban groups are led by younger, inexperienced commanders who are far more susceptible to the radicalism of Al-Qa'eda. The war has gone on so long now that many of the foreign fighters have stayed and intermarried into local communities, embedding their ideology firmly into the status quo.

So not only is the Taliban now closer to Al-Qa'eda, they become more indistinguishable with every new drone strike and special forces raid. To reduce the terrorist threat, the US has to do something besides use the military.

To stop the Taliban, they have to be approached as the local actors they are. For instance, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has supposedly opened negotiations with the Haqqani network, which is part of the "Pakistan Taliban", as opposed to the "Afghan Taliban" led by Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura. The Haqqani network is very much a radical Islamic militant group, but they are also an asset of the Pakistani military in their "strategic depth" against India (that is, they kill Indians). Their existence relies on support from the military, so when the Pakistani Army demanded they sever their ties with Al-Qa'eda, they did so.

At Foreign Policy's AfPak Channel, we see this [emphasis mine]:

Moreover, the relationship is reportedly strained because of the Haqqanis' ties to the Pakistani state -- an enemy of al-Qaeda. Pakistani authorities have conducted a number of raids on Haqqani compounds that house al-Qaeda men and supplies, but Haqqani fighters are often left untouched.[...]

Former and current Haqqani Network commanders say that their movement is closer to the Quetta Shura's nationalist rhetoric than al-Qaeda's vision of global jihad, but some members of the group espouse al-Qaeda-like language. The Haqqanis have avoided the anti-Pakistan rhetoric common to al-Qaeda and the TTP. In June 2006, Jalaluddin Haqqani's office released a letter arguing that attacking Pakistan "is not our policy. Those who agree with us are our friends and those who do not agree and [continue to wage] an undeclared war against Pakistan are neither our friends nor shall we allow them in our ranks." Sirajuddin Haqqani has gone further, explaining in an interview that he opposed "any attempt by Muslims to launch attacks in non-Muslim countries." In May 2009, he argued to two French journalists: "It is a mistake to think that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are pursuing the same aim. Al-Qaeda is trying to spread its influence throughout the world. This does not interest us. The Taliban's aim is to liberate Afghanistan from foreign troops."

But the Pakistani military's role doesn't stop the bleeding over of Al-Qa'eda's global ideology, particularly into the younger members of the organization. The Haqqani networks and its affiliates still supply foreign fighters and suicide bombers sympathetic to Al-Qa'eda operations, even if this isn't the express policy of the top leadership.

To reduce the extremism in Pakistan, the US has several options, none guaranteed to work, but also none nearly as damaging and horrific as its current policy of war. The Pakistani military's relationship with the Taliban must be destroyed, which requires a complete end to their national security strategy of "strategic depth," the use of terrorism and insurgencies against India. While the US cannot directly force the military to do this, they can engage exclusively with Pakistan's democratically-elected civilian government. This would empower the government, which has no desire for war with India, to rein in the Army and intelligence services and end their support of terrorism.

This would also allow the Pakistani state to fully extend its authority into Taliban territory, rather than simply cutting a deal with the militants. If Pakistani citizens in the farthest reaches of the tribal areas had the same rule of law (which is itself in dire need of reform) as Pakistanis in suburban Karachi, the environment that produces Al-Qa'eda sympathizers would be dramatically reduced. The US can influence this with development aid, encouragement of a proper education system, and assistance in sustainable energy projects.

Most importantly, the US can end its war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our policy provides the perfect narrative for Al-Qa'eda, as Londonstani writes:

Pakistani 1: "Western countries are trying to destroy Islam. They fear us more than the Chinese. We are the only people who have a system that challenges theirs. They know their system has failed, so they are trying to destroy us before everyone becomes Muslim. They have always hated us. They want to keep us poor. Our rulers have been bought by them. Our rulers sold us for big houses in London and New York. Now Western soldiers and contractors roam around our country looking for ways to steal from us and control us. We are paying the price. If we don't fight, they will rob us and leave us to die in the gutter."

Pakistani 2: "Peace is a good thing. You are a Muslim, right? We are all about peace. We love it. Fighting is not the answer. Peace is the answer. Just take it easy, be good and everything will sort itself out."

Presenting your ideas as part of a bigger picture is much more persuasive than just chucking them randomly out there. The ideology of Islamist extremism has a very effective big-picture story. On the other side, the narrative is a bit...well,... lacking.

We can't make them believe we're not violent, oppressive invaders, because we are violent, oppressive invaders. They're going to come up with loony "conspiracy theories" like the US supports the Taliban, because we support the Army and intelligence services which supports the Taliban. It's just that simple.

Having a reasonable, civilian-only foreign policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan is what will reduce the threat of Al-Qa'eda, not an expensive and bloody occupation. War feeds Al-Qa'eda, and it feeds the Taliban. The local issues must be addressed, primarily by local actors, and it must be done with transparency and legitimacy. The US should not support military despots in Islamabad or mafia chieftains in Kabul. The US should not be occupying Afghanistan or conducting air strikes and raids in Pakistan, nor should it allow the proliferation of private mercenary groups in these groups, which feed into the idea of the US as lawless invaders.

Obviously you can't completely eliminate the threat of terrorism. Terrorism is a crime, like robbery or murder. Reducing the number of individuals willing to engage in this crime can be done through policy choices, but there is clearly still a role for law enforcement agencies to play.

However, there is a difference between terrorism being a natural occurrence, and our overseas wars blatantly churning out new terrorist recruits. While terrorism will still exist, its scope and degree can be dramatically slashed simply by ending the US wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and lest we forget, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and everywhere else we're engaging in violent, military conflict with Al-Qa'eda affiliates (both real and imagined).

An end to the war is already in sight, not because of any powerful interference, but because local citizens pushed their representatives to block the president's escalation. Similarly, when the supporters of the intervention make their frightening warnings about Al-Qa'eda, the answer again is not war, but local solutions led by the citizens themselves, not the US. A change in US foreign policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a focus on development and rule of law instead of war, is what is required.

But before we can see that change, the war itself has to end. Just don't let them scare you with Al-Qa'eda.