Afghanistan LiveBlog: Wikileaks & The Truth About the US Occupation

UPDATE 2010 GMT: Nick Schifrin at ABC follows up on the angle that the Wikileaks documents show officials from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence aiding the Afghan insurgency.

Al Jazeera interviews the former head of ISI, General Hamid Gul, who denies the claims:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqkQKk9S_8E&feature=youtu.be[/youtube]

Afghanistan: At Least 45 Civilians Killed in Rocket Attack
Afghanistan: The Wikileaks “War Diary” of 91,000 Documents
General Kayani’s “Silent Coup” in Pakistan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Mull)

UPDATE 1655 GMT: And how is Afghan President Karzai using the Wikileaks "War Diary"? To turn attention to Pakistan: "The recent documents leaked out to the media clearly support and verify Afghanistan's all-time position that success over terrorism does not come with fighting in Afghan villages, but by targeting its sanctuaries and financial and ideological sources across the borders. Our efforts against terrorism will have no effect as long as these sanctuaries and sources remain intact."

UPDATE 1515 GMT: Amy Davidson in The New Yorker starts from one incident revealed in the Wikileaks document:

The Obama Administration has already expressed dismay that WikiLeaks publicized the documents, but a leak informing us that our tax dollars may be being used as seed money for a protection racket associated with a narcotics-trafficking enterprise is a good leak to have. And the checkpoint incident is, again, only one report, from one day. It will take some time to go through everything WikiLeaks has to offer—the documents cover the period from January, 2004, to December, 2009—but it is well worth it, especially since the war in Afghanistan is not winding down, but ramping up...."

And reaches this conclusion:

After more than eight years at war, how carefully are we even looking at Afghanistan? The [New York] Times had a piece in Sunday’s paper on the strange truth that our expenditure since 9/11 of a trillion dollars on two wars has barely scraped our consciousness. Fifty-eight Americans have died in Afghanistan so far this month; one of them—Edwin Wood, of Oklahoma—was eighteen years old. Maybe the WikiLeaks documents will make those numbers less abstract."

UPDATE 1455 GMT: Andrew Bacevich assesses in The New Republic:

"The real significance of the Wikileaks action is...[that] it shows how rapidly and drastically the notion of 'information warfare' is changing. Rather than being defined as actions undertaken by a government to influence the perception of reality, information warfare now includes actions taken by disaffected functionaries within government to discredit the officially approved view of reality. This action is the handiwork of subversives, perhaps soldiers, perhaps civilians. Within our own national security apparatus, a second insurgent campaign may well have begun. Its purpose: bring America’s longest war to an end. Given the realities of the digital age, this second insurgency may well prove at least as difficult to suppress as the one that preoccupies General Petraeus in Kabul."

And Andrew Sullivan on his Daily Dish blog:

When one weighs the extra terror risk from remaining in Afghanistan, the absurdity of our chief alleged ally actually backing the enemy, the impossibility of an effective counter-insurgency when the government itself is corrupt and part of the problem, the brutality of the enemy in intimidating the populace in ways no civilized occupying force can counter, the passage of ten years in which any real chance at success was squandered ... the logic for withdrawal to the more minimalist strategy originally favored by Obama after the election and championed by Biden thereafter seems overwhelming.

When will the president have the balls to say so?

UPDATE 1445 GMT: Simon Tisdall in The Guardian of London uses the documents to write, "How the US is Losing the Battle for Hearts and Minds".

Meanwhile we have posted on a specific incident on Friday which demonstrates the complications of military intervention and that supposed battle for hearts and minds, "At Least 45 Civilians Killed in Rocket Attack".

UPDATE 1145 GMT: The BBC is working the angle, "Cases of Afghan civilians allegedly killed by British troops have been revealed among thousands of leaked US military documents....The records include references to at least 21 incidents involving UK troops. The Ministry of Defence said it had been unable to verify the claims and it would not speculate on specific cases."

UPDATE 1140 GMT: Wikileaks director Julian Assange is currently holding a press conference. Take-away quotes: "The course of the war needs to change. The manner in which it needs to change is not yet clear"; "It’s war, it’s one damn thing after another. It is the continuous small events."

UPDATE 0920 GMT: "The Afghan government is shocked with the report that has opened the reality of the Afghan war," said spokesman Siamak Herawi.

UPDATE 26 July 0910 GMT: The White House has issued a far-from-surprising response to the Wikileaks "War Diary". National Security Adviser General James Jones said such classified information "could put the lives of Americans and our partners at risk".

(Older readers may remember that the "national security" line was the response put out by the Nixon White House when the "Pentagon Papers" on the Vietnam War were published in 1971.)

And by the way, Jones added --- repeating a line put out by White House officials within hours of the story breaking --- the episode has little to do with us: the documents cover 2004 to 2009, before President Obama "announced a new strategy with a substantial increase in resources for Afghanistan".

UPDATE 2205 GMT: Simon Tisdall in The Guardian has a different approach based on the documents: "Iran is engaged in an extensive covert campaign to arm, finance, train and equip Taliban insurgents, Afghan warlords allied to al-Qaida and suicide bombers fighting to eject British and western forces from Afghanistan, according to classified US military intelligence reports contained in the war logs."

UPDATE 2155 GMT: Der Spiegel has posted a full package of articles. It also has an exposé of the Pakistan connection with the Taliban but also considers "German Naivety" with "trouble in the growing north" and profiles "Task Force 373", the US "black" unit hunting down targets for death or detention (the Guardian also has an article on the unit). It also has the first critiques of American operations: one on drones --- "the flaws of the silent killer" --- and one on "The Shortcomings of US Intelligence Services".

UPDATE 2145 GMT: The second New York Times article is a snapshot of Combat Outpost Keating:

"The outpost’s fate, chronicled in unusually detailed glimpses of a base over nearly three years, illustrates many of the frustrations of the allied effort: low troop levels, unreliable Afghan partners and an insurgency that has grown in skill, determination and its ability to menace."

UPDATE 2140 GMT: The first New York Times special report based on the Wikileaks documents focuses not on American but Pakistani involvement:

Americans fighting the war in Afghanistan have long harbored strong suspicions that Pakistan’s military spy service has guided the Afghan insurgency with a hidden hand, even as Pakistan receives more than $1 billion a year from Washington for its help combating the militants, according to a trove of secret military field reports to be made public Sunday.

The documents, to be made available by an organization called WikiLeaks, suggest that Pakistan, an ostensible ally of the United States, allows representatives of its spy service to meet directly with the Taliban in secret strategy sessions to organize networks of militant groups that fight against American soldiers in Afghanistan, and even hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders.

Taken together, the reports indicate that American soldiers on the ground are inundated with accounts of a network of Pakistani assets and collaborators that runs from the Pakistani tribal belt along the Afghan border, through southern Afghanistan, and all the way to the capital, Kabul.

Much of the information — raw intelligence and threat assessments gathered from the field in Afghanistan— cannot be verified and likely comes from sources aligned with Afghan intelligence, which considers Pakistan an enemy, and paid informants. Some describe plots for attacks that do not appear to have taken place.



But many of the reports rely on sources that the military rated as reliable."

UPDATE 2130 GMT: The New York Times has now posted a few of the documents and its first article on "The War Logs" of Wikileaks. The take-away points:

¶ The Taliban have used portable heat-seeking missiles against allied aircraft, a fact that has not been publicly disclosed by the military. This type of weapon helped the Afghan mujahedeen defeat the Soviet occupation in the 1980s.

¶ Secret commando units like Task Force 373 — a classified group of Army and Navy special operatives — work from a “capture/kill list” of about 70 top insurgent commanders. These missions, which have been stepped up under the Obama administration, claim notable successes, but have sometimes gone wrong, killing civilians and stoking Afghan resentment.

¶ The military employs more and more drone aircraft to survey the battlefield and strike targets in Afghanistan, although their performance is less impressive than officially portrayed. Some crash or collide, forcing American troops to undertake risky retrieval missions before the Taliban can claim the drone’s weaponry.

¶ The Central Intelligence Agency has expanded paramilitary operations inside Afghanistan. The units launch ambushes, order airstrikes and conduct night raids. From 2001 to 2008, the C.I.A. paid the budget of Afghanistan’s spy agency and ran it as a virtual subsidiary.

Over all, the documents do not contradict official accounts of the war. But in some cases the documents show that the American military made misleading public statements — attributing the downing of a helicopter to conventional weapons instead of heat-seeking missiles or giving Afghans credit for missions carried out by Special Operations commandos.



White House officials vigorously denied that the Obama administration had presented a misleading portrait of the war in Afghanistan.

---
Nick Davies and David Leigh write for The Guardian of London:

A huge cache of secret US military files today provides a devastating portrait of the failing war in Afghanistan, revealing how coalition forces have killed hundreds of civilians in unreported incidents, Taliban attacks have soared and NATO commanders fear neighbouring Pakistan and Iran are fuelling the insurgency.

The disclosures come from more than 90,000 records of incidents and intelligence reports about the conflict obtained by the whistleblowers' website Wikileaks in one of the biggest leaks in US military history. The files, which were made available to the Guardian, the New York Times and the German weekly Der Spiegel, give a blow-by-blow account of the fighting over the last six years, which has so far cost the lives of more than 320 British and over 1,000 US troops.

Their publication comes amid mounting concern that Barack Obama's "surge" strategy is failing and as coalition troops hunt for two US navy sailors captured by the Taliban south of Kabul on Friday.

The war logs also detail:

• How a secret "black" unit of special forces hunts down Taliban leaders for "kill or capture" without trial.

• How the US covered up evidence that the Taliban has acquired deadly surface-to-air missiles.

• How the coalition is increasingly using deadly Reaper drones to hunt and kill Taliban targets by remote control from a base in Nevada.

• How the Taliban has caused growing carnage with a massive escalation of its roadside bombing campaign, which has killed more than 2,000 civilians to date.

In a statement, the White House said the chaotic picture painted by the logs was the result of "under-resourcing" under Obama's predecessor, saying: "It is important to note that the time period reflected in the documents is January 2004 to December 2009."

The White House also criticised the publication of the files by Wikileaks: "We strongly condemn the disclosure of classified information by individuals and organisations, which puts the lives of the US and partner service members at risk and threatens our national security. Wikileaks made no effort to contact the US government about these documents, which may contain information that endanger the lives of Americans, our partners, and local populations who co-operate with us."

The logs detail, in sometimes harrowing vignettes, the toll on civilians exacted by coalition forces: events termed "blue on white" in military jargon. The logs reveal 144 such incidents. Some of these casualties come from the controversial air strikes that have led to Afghan government protests in the past, but a large number of previously unknown incidents also appear to be the result of troops shooting unarmed drivers or motorcyclists out of a determination to protect themselves from suicide bombers. At least 195 civilians are admitted to have been killed and 174 wounded in total, although this is likely to be an underestimate because many disputed incidents are omitted from the daily snapshots reported by troops on the ground and then collated, sometimes erratically, by military intelligence analysts.

General Kayani's "Silent Coup" in Pakistan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Pakistan's General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the man over whom our leaders in Washington fawn and who sits atop the intensely destabilizing "Strategic Depth" networks in Afghanistan, has just been handed an extension of his term:

The Pakistani government on Thursday gave the country's top military official, army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, another three years in his post, a move that analysts said would bolster Pakistan's anti-terrorism fight and cement its role in neighboring Afghanistan.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani announced the extension in a late-night televised address to the nation. "To ensure the success of these [counter-terrorism] operations, it is the need of the hour that the continuity of military leadership should be maintained," he said.

The impact on our war in Afghanistan is obvious.  Call it "strategic depth" or "cementing its role": it all adds up to influence on Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qa'eda, and the future of all of these players in Afghanistan.

The crux of the development is that Kayani's extension is bad news for us, due to his cozy relationship with militants and terrorist organizations, as well as his undermining of the democratically-elected civilian government. But the details are important, especially as they could mean the difference between uncontrolled escalation and our planned military withdrawal from Afghanistan.

For the complete picture, a look at what a few experts (read: bloggers) are saying to determine the good, the bad, and the ugly ramifications that Kayani's extension has on the US war in Afghanistan.

For the good news, we have Shuja Nawaz writing for the New Atlanticist [emphasis mine]:

A major advantage that might accrue is that the certainty provided by the new term for the army chief will allow the civilian government to become confident in asserting itself in policy matters, knowing that the army chief will not overtly intervene in its affairs. This may help strengthen political institutions. At the same time, civilians must resist the temptation to turn to the army to lead the battle against militancy (a national endeavor not purely a military one) or to arbitrate differences on the political field.

These three years should also give Kayani time to assess the present Higher Defense Organization of Pakistan and perhaps come up with a more devolved structure for the army and a better system of command and control at the center. One possible scenario may include regional and centralized commands at four-star rank, appointed by the same authority who selects the service chiefs, and a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with real powers to regulate all the services while acting as the main military advisor of the government. This approach has been taken by the United States and many other modern militaries, so it would hardly be unprecedented. Without having a stake in the chairman's position in 2013, Kayani may be able to provide a dispassionate plan for the government to decide, well in advance of the next round of promotions in 2013. Any proposal that he presents as a disinterested party will have credibility and will also help override the parochial concerns of the army relative to the other services in Pakistan.

It would be more than good news, it would be great news, if Kayani did work to minimize the role of the military in government, and created a civilian-military relationship similar to the US. But that only works if the first part of the statement is true: Kayani's interference in politics ceases, allowing the civilian government to become more confident.

That's where the bad news comes in. This is not a case of the Army backing away from its role in politics. it is, in fact, a craven arrangement with the ruling political party. Arif Rafiq writes at AfPak Channel [emphasis mine]:

Perceptions aside, three more years of Kayani could conceivably provide continuity to both Pakistan's military and political setup. In recent months, the consensus in Pakistan was that Kayani would receive a two-year extension. Gilani's choice of three years was a surprise. But not by mere coincidence, Gilani's government also has three years remaining in its tenure. And so it's certainly possible that there is a deal between Gilani's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Kayani, perhaps involving foreign guarantors, to let this ship sail for three more years (with Gilani wearing the captain's hat steering an imaginary wheel and Kayani actually in control). Indeed, Gilani alluded to a possible deal when he said today that Pakistan's four major "stakeholders" -- the president, prime minister, army chief, and Supreme Court chief justice -- are in a "secure position" till 2013. [...]

And so for Kayani, who has managed to become the darling of many of Pakistan's nationalists and Islamists, there is some risk involved in continuing for another three years as army chief. If he ties himself too close to the PPP, he -- and more importantly, the Pakistani Army -- could lose a critical support base and sink along with the current government, unless he maintains a political distance and continues to pursue a semi-nationalist security policy.

Gilani projects a false sense of confidence in the viability of Pakistan's current political-military setup. This is Pakistan. The Kayani extension provides a short-term ceasefire between the PPP and the army, but it will also likely produce re-alignments among its fractious power brokers. And another head-on clash between any two of them is not far from reality.

Cutting a deal with the ruling elites of the status quo to stay in power is not the same as Kayani becoming a "disinterested party" in the government. That's not a democratic government, it's a puppet. In that sense Kayani's extension could be considered another in Pakistan's long history of military coups, albeit a silent one. This will agitate the opposition parties, namely the PML-N, and the Islamist party would not be out of line to call for new, early elections, simply as a way of "re-checking" the legitimacy of the PPP-Kayani government.

But that's not the worst part for the US war in Afghanistan. Pakistan's internal politics are important to us, but it's Kayani's national security and foreign policy that have truly ugly implications for the US. B. Raman writes on his blog [emphasis mine]:

In the counter-insurgency operations against the TTP he has had partial successes in the Swat Valley, South Waziristan, Bajaur and Orakzai agencies. Under his leadership, the Army has been able to deny the TTP territorial control in these areas, but has not been able to destroy their capability for terrorist strikes and commando-style raids in tribal as well as non-tribal areas. While arresting some leaders of the Afghan Taliban, who were living in Karachi and other non-tribal areas, he has avoided action against the Afghan Taliban leadership operating from the tribal areas.

He has avoided any action against Al Qaeda elements which have taken sanctuary in the non-tribal areas. Under Musharraf, the Army and the ISI were much more active against Al Qaeda in the non-tribal areas than they have been under Kayani. The anger of Al Qaeda and its associates against Musharraf because of the action taken by the Army and the ISI was responsible for the virulent campaign of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri against Musharraf and the Army. They abused Musharraf as apostate, collaborator of the Hindus etc and thrice tried to kill him---once in Karachi and twice in Rawalpindi. Compared to that, there is hardly any Al Qaeda campaign against Kayani. There is a greater threat to Mr.Zardari from Al Qaeda than to Kayani. The Army and the ISI have managed to create an impression in the tribal areas that Mr.Zardari and not Gen.Kayani is responsible for the facilities extended to the US for its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the tribal areas. Since Gen.Kayani took over, while many Al Qaeda leaders have been killed in the tribal areas by the Drone strikes, there have been very few arrests of Al Qaeda elements in the non-tribal areas. Al Qaeda feels more secure in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan today than it was under Musharraf.

If you missed that, let me spell it out for you: Kayani's extension is good for Al-Qa'eda. Yes, that Al-Qa'eda. The terrorist guys.

Then there's all that other stuff about the Afghan Taliban - Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura in Balochistan, as well as the Haqqani network, who are responsible for the vast majority of terrorist and insurgent attacks on our US troops in Afghanistan.

How does the US feel about this? Nawaz:

The United States has studiously avoided taking a public position but conversations with U.S. diplomats and military officials over the past few months indicated their deep interest in the future of General Kayani and a noticeable desire to see him remain at the helm of affairs in Pakistan.

Rafiq:

Some of Pakistan's nationalist and Islamist commentators have also reacted with suspicion toward Kayani's extension, describing it as a result of Hillary Clinton's "lobbying"

Raman:

Kayani is thought of well both by the Pentagon and the PLA leadership

And a flashback to Sue Pleming's report on Kayani's visit to Washington:

Guests crowded around Kayani at the annual Pakistani National Day party at the embassy, posing for photos and jostling for the military leader’s ear.[...]

U.S. senators and Obama administration officials lined up to speak to the slim and dapper general, who Pakistani media say rules the roost back home but is also central to U.S. relations with Islamabad.

Damn, we really love this guy. What are we thinking? Whatever it is we like about him --- his style, his centred demeanour, his subtle hand in politics - General Kayani is still just another military dictator, another crook in a long line of corrupt, tyrannical, warmongering thugs. He is not our ally, not our friend, and his extension, now a full-fledged dictatorship complete with a compliant, ruling political party, is just plain bad news for the United States.

The US must immediately end all military aid to Pakistan, and should pursue sanctions against the ruling elites in the PPP until such time as their government can prove its legitimacy by way of free and fair democratic elections. Barring such extreme measures, the US must engage exclusively with Pakistan's civilian government, while working toward greater inclusion of opposition parties like the PML-N (who are presently too close to radical Saudi Arabia, and could stand to be moderated with more international influence).

More importantly, the US must end its war in Afghanistan. Not only is not in our interests to fight a civil war in Afghanistan, but it is even less in our interests to have our US troops used as pieces in Kayani's personal chessboard. Our troops fight and die for our national defense, not for Kayani's insane militarist objectives against India. Pakistan is catastrophically unstable, and US military leaders are moving to escalate our involvement. Further war in the region will prove to be disastrous for the US.

Reforming our relations with the Pakistani government can be slow and doesn't have to be as extreme as an immediate freeze. The PPP government can be allowed time and support to again free themselves of Kayani's control, such as when they tried to grab control of the ISI, Pakistan's terror-supporting spy agency, in 2008. But we cannot wait to end the war in Afghanistan.

The war puts Americans in danger, it is destroying our economy, and now with Kayani's empowerment, our objectives in Afghanistan become all the more hopeless and impossible. We have to bring our troops home, get them out of this civil war in Afghanistan and proxy war with Pakistan, and only then can we move on to accomplishing our objectives, be they counter-terrorism, development, or human rights.

We must end this war now, lest one more US soldier die so that General Kayani can "cement his role" in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Shocker: Taliban Training Killer "Monkey Soldiers"

And now a tale of the challenge that the US and international forces face in Afghanistan....

Recently a "British-based media agency" --- one we are still trying to track down --- put out a press release that its reporters had spotted and photographed  "monkey soldiers" holding AK-47 rifles and Bren light machine guns in the Waziristan tribal region near the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. American experts were warning of the "monkey terrorists".

Chinese media were lured in by the press release and soon its reports of the new Killer Monkey phenomenon were racing across the Web. By 9 July, the story was in China's English-language People's Daily, complete with this military analysis:

The emergence of "monkey soldiers" is the result of asymmetrical warfare. The United States launched the war in Afghanistan using the world's most advanced weapons such as highly-intelligent robots to detect bombs on roadsides and unmanned aerial vehicles to attack major Taliban targets. In response, the Taliban forces have tried any possible means and figured out a method to train monkeys as "replacement killers" against American troops.

This claim was backed up by the revelation --- well, new to me at least --- that "between the 1960s and the 1970s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) trained massive 'monkey soldiers' in the Vietnam War and dispatched armed monkeys to dangerous jungles to launch assaults on Vietnamese soldiers". The report added a bit of monkey- and other creature-related psychological warfare:

Analysts believe that apart from using "monkey killers" to attack the American troops, the Taliban also sought to arouse Western animal protectionists to pressure their governments to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.

And, at the end, there was even philosophical reflection: "When armed animals enter interpersonal wars, what kind of world will we face? This cannot but arouse our reflections and concerns."

All quite amusing --- or frightening? --- but surely that was the end of the Monkey Line.

No. Dallas Blog went beyond its normal Texas market to ponder, "If President Barack Obama withdraws from the war in Afghanistan, he would be the first commander-in-chief in American history to surrender to an army of monkeys; and we’re not talking about fighting the Planet of the Apes." The very-conservative "Gateway Pundit" blog (Where Hope Finally Made a Comeback") greeted the news with an "Allahu Akbar!".

Suddenly the New York Post was declaring "Jihad Monkey!" A NATO spokesman was having to say on the record, “We have absolutely nothing that leads us to believe that this tale could be even remotely based in reality,” while a specialist on primates was brought in for this wondrous pondering:

While you could train a monkey to shoot a gun, I certainly wouldn’t want to be anywhere in the neighborhood after that. I rather doubt you could trust its aim....

But in all cases, they are trained and reinforced by giving them food treats. So the Taliban would definitely have to bring along a large supply of bananas to keep up the morale of their monkey troops.

Readers were split between those with genuine warnings of the new monkey military threat, those were confused, and those who saw an opportunity for a laugh. But the end of this Monkey's Tale awaited the concise analysis of "Eliza"....

"It's gorilla warfare!"

Afghanistan Projection: Pakistan's "Strategic Depth" & Endless War (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mullis the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

If everything works out perfectly in our counterinsurgency strategy, or if congress forces a binding timetable in line with popular support, the United States will begin slowly drawing down its forces in Afghanistan in July 2011. It's only the start, it will be tremendously slow, and the military leadership will likely fight it every step of the way (if Iraq is any indication, that is).

Afghanistan: Republican Chairman Steele Stumbles, “Progressive” Reaction Fumbles (Mull)

July 2011. That's one year from now --- 12 months. If June's casualty numbers remain constant, more than a thousand Americans wi'll die before then, at minimum another $80 billion will be spent, and then we just start leaving. After that there's no clear evidence of exactly how long it will take before the US has completely removed its military presence from Afghanistan, and possibly Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, etc., although there's no evidence we're planning on leaving those places either.

This is a good thing. It's good that Congress is starting to listen to its constituents, and is taking action to hold President Obama to his timetable for withdrawal. Afghanistan is America's longest war, and with such ethereal objectives as "stability" and "preventing safe havens for extremism", the war can seem endlessly un-winnable, stretching on for decades as long as we're content to let it happen. That we have a goal in sight, July 2011, is absolutely a victory.

Unfortunately, it's not good enough. Pakistan's national security policy of supporting terrorist groups and militias as proxies against India, known as "strategic depth", is accelerating out of control, and they are either deliberately or inadvertently engineering a globalized religious war, a clash of civilisations. Both terrorist and insurgent elements are evolving, with the Taliban co-opting Al-Qa'eda's idea of religious war to legitimize its fight against the Pakistani state, and Al-Qa'eda in turn co-opting the Taliban's objective of confronting India to legitimize the sub-continent as the premier theater of global jihad. Hawkish India, for one, will not take these developments lightly.

If pressure on Congress is not increased, if the US remains on the slow, ambiguous timetable it is on now, it will be caught right in the middle of this clash. The bloodbath of Iraq in 2006 was only a preview of what will happen if there is a civil war in Pakistan, or a (nuclear?) war between Pakistan and India. Or both. If the US does not expedite its withdrawal, as well as dramatically reform its policies toward the region as a whole, we will very quickly be sucked into that conflagration.

"Strategic Depth", Pakistan's support of militants, is a carefully crafted national security strategy. However, it is easiest to understand in the context of state-sponsored terrorism. During the 1970s and 1980s, many Arab governments supported terrorist groups as a form of internal security. The oppressive Arab dictators would facilitate terrorist recruiting and training so long as they went off to wage jihad in Lebanon, or Palestine, or Israel, or anywhere else but at home. In doing so, they ensured that any violent radicals were engaged elsewhere, while clinging to scraps of Islamic legitimacy for their brutal police states. It is "strategic depth" for domestic purposes.

Pakistan's calculation is just the same, only adapted to military and foreign policy. Pakistan is able to wage a war against India through terrorism and militancy (Taliban puppets in Kabul, Lashkar-e-Taipa puppets at home), while maintaining some legitimacy with its own constituency (elite Punjabi Pakistanis). Furthermore, Pakistan's military-owned industries are able to win massive amounts of contracts and investments from the US and China among others, and in return offer up meaningless victories (capturing an Al-Qa'eda commander for the Americans, shutting down a Uighur training camp for the Chinese). All the while the Army safely maintains its truly-important insurgent assets for use against India. It is state-sponsored terrorism as foreign policy, and it's been very successful for them so far.

But the terrorists and militants themselves also benefit from this relationship, and they may now be adapting beyond the control of the Pakistani military and intelligence services. Just as the Arab governments discovered, state-sponsored terrorism always comes back to bite you. Syria learned from Lebanon, Egypt learned from the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Saudis learned from Al-Qa'eda that it is only a matter of time before the militants turn on you. In the same way, the Taliban is now turning from the US in Afghanistan and onto the Pakistani state.

We see this in the recent attack on a Sufi Muslim shrine in Lahore, Pakistan. Sufi are the majority in Pakistan, centered in its Punjab region with the country's elite. The Taliban, with their Deoband Islam, are in the minority, focused in the Pashtun tribal areas. The shrine bombing shows that Al-Qa'eda's idea of war for Islamic purity has taken hold within the Taliban, and they are able to pivot from a local liberation movement fighting the Americans to a religious jihad against the Pakistani state as represented by the heretical Sufi Islam.

China Hand writes:

Beyond the demands of Deobandi faith, igniting a religious struggle against popular Sufism is almost a tactical necessity. Fighting against the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps is not the same as battling the NATO and U.S. unbelievers in Afghanistan.

The Pakistan Taliban are locked in a battle with the military forces of an Islamic state and need the trappings of a sustained Islamic religious struggle inside Pakistan in order to sustain its legitimacy, motivate its followers, and divide its opposition.

In fact, attacking Sufi religious practices is probably integral to the entire Taliban strategy of polarizing Pakistani society by attacking a weak link—the popular but difficult to defend (on strict Islamic terms) worship of local saints whose interred bodies reputedly have magic powers.

The central province of Punjab hosts several important Sufi shrines, raising the terrifying specter of attacks on heterodox religious practices in Pakistan’s heartland by an ostentatiously righteous, militant, and ascendant religious group whose stated mission is to rescue Islam not only from the West but from idolatry within its own ranks.

And, as a reading of Sikan indicates, challenging popular Sufism also means challenging the authority of the custodians who obtained legitimacy, wealth, and power from their control of the shrines and promises to link the Taliban to a populist, anti-elitist message that may find resonance in the impoverished areas of Pakistan far beyond its Pashtun base.

There's not much hope that even the Sufi majority can withstand an open civil war against the Deobandi minority:

If the conflict comes, the [Sufi] are likely to be outgunned.

The Pashtun Deobandi are militant, supported by zakat (Islamic charity contributions) from Saudi Arabia, and have numerous friends and supporters within Pakistan’s security apparatus.

The pacifist, underfunded, and underorganized Barelvi—with the exception of the reliably violent MQM in Karachi—appear to be reliant upon Pakistan’s rickety and equivocal civilian government to take the battle to the Taliban.

Those numerous friends and supporters within the security apparatus is the "strategic depth," the state sponsorship. That sponsorship may have given them enough strength to finally ignite an all-out civil war. At that point we are no longer talking about isolated Pashtun insurgencies and rural-urban disparities, we are looking at the complete collapse of Pakistan as a recognizable entity. Like Iraq, Pakistan is a wealthy, militarized, and industrialized society and the consequences of its shattered social fabric will be hell on earth. Only Pakistan also happens to have an extensive nuclear weapons arsenal. Iraq, famously, did not.

In addition to the Taliban, the Pakistani Al-Qa'eda franchises have also adapted with the support of "strategic depth". They are now carrying out attacks against targets in India, claiming other Pakistan-supported militant attacks as their own, or both.

From Raman's Strategic Analysis:

There are two types of messages purporting to be from Al Qaeda relating to India. The first are video or audio messages of Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri relating to the global jihad and the global intifada in which there are references to India, including Kashmir. These have been authenticated by Western intelligence agencies on the basis of voice recognition. They are in the form of general criticism of India or general threats and not specific.

The second are messages claiming responsibility on behalf of [Al Qaeda fil Hind, "Al-Qaeda in India"] for specific acts of terrorism in India such as the Mumbai suburban train explosions of July 2006, the Mumbai terrorist strikes of 26/11 and the Pune German bakery explosion and warning of future acts of terrorism against global sports events in India. These are messages circulated through the Internet or through phone calls by persons whose voices could not be identified. There is no way of establishing the authenticity of these messages. We must take them seriously for further investigation and strengthening physical security. At the same time, we should take care not to walk into any trap of the ISI to divert suspicion away from the LET and other Pakistani jihadi organizations and from the ISI for serious acts of terrorism in Indian territory by creating an impression that those were carried out by Al Qaeda.

So there's no concrete evidence that Al-Qa'eda in India exists as of yet, but the perception that it does exist is growing. Even if it is Pakistani intelligence services trying to create a mythical Al-Qa'eda, that doesn't change the fact that each new terrorist attack in India will be seen as a victory for Al-Qa'eda's jihad. And with each new "victory" come new "foreign fighters" willing to take up arms. The myth becomes reality, whether you want it to or not. And not only in India, but in Kashmir as well.

Eric Randolph writes:

On 15 June, Al Qaeda announced that it has a new branch, Al Qaeda in Kashmir (AQK), according to a report in Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor [subscription needed]. The group is apparently led by Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri, who claimed responsibility for the February bombing of the German Bakery in Pune, India. [...]

The announcement of AQK is significant, however, since it shows Al Qaeda trying to bolster what it clearly thinks is an emerging front in the global jihad: India. The LeT have already shown an interest in extending anti-Indian militancy beyond localised issues such as Kashmir. The LeT opposes India not just because of specific policies and actions, but for its very existence - as a perceived enemy of Islam. Hence, attacks such as those in Mumbai, as well as earlier bombings in which it is likely to have played a role, strike at symbols of India’s success – its economic growth and its acceptance into the global (i.e. Western) community. The appearance of the Al Qaeda brand name in the region is part of this process: framing the conflict between India and Pakistan as a global, ahistorical phenomenon, divorced from immediate political concerns and thus insulating the jihad from any progress in negotiations between the two governments.  Who belongs to which group is less important than the symbolism that this latest development suggests.

Al-Qa'eda can fully open the entire sub-continent as a theater for jihad, and coupled with the collapse of nuclear-armed Pakistan and the presumable Indian military response, we have the Clash of Civilizations. Pakistan vs India becomes Islam vs the Hindu Superpower. And stuck right there in the middle of it is 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan, soon to be controlled by a Taliban-Karzai power-sharing government, a puppet of Pakistan's "strategic depth". To say it will be ugly is an epic understatement.

We may be in the process of pulling ourselves back from the brink of endless war in Afghanistan, but that doesn't stop anyone else from sucking us back in. Whatever our pretensions about 9/11 and denying terrorists a safe haven in Afghanistan, there's no turning back once we've been sucked into a massive blowout on the sub-continent.

Congress must be forced to not only institute a binding timetable for the President, but to accelerate that timetable in every conceivable way possible. Funding must be cut, programs discontinued, missions aborted. Nothing the US could (doubtfully) accomplish before July 2011 will change the events in Pakistan and India. We can eradicate the corruption in Kandahar, but that won't deter the Deobandi-Sufi civil war in Pakistan. We can install perfect governments-in-a-box in every single province in Afghanistan, it won't stop Al-Qa'eda from waging its jihad in Kashmir and India. We can't afford the blood and treasure that the war is costing now, much less if it explodes across the region.

The US must accelerate its withdrawal timetable, but it also must dramatically reform its policy toward Pakistan. Waiting another year before beginning to leave Afghanistan is also another year spent dumping billions of dollars and sophisticated military technology into the hands of Pakistan's military and intelligence services, those most responsible for the stoking the civil war and terrorism with their "strategic depth." The US must engage with and empower the democratically elected civilian government. It is they who must be strengthened in the battle against extremism, not the Army and ISI. But even this is simply taking yet another side in yet another civil war, and if the past is any indication, the US is by no means guaranteed success even if we try.

It is good to celebrate what has been accomplished in ending the war. It is good that 65% of Americans now support the timetable, and that congress is starting to act on that. But more pressure must be brought to bear on your local representatives. The timetable must be sped up, the US must begin drawing down before July 2011 and certainly at a much faster pace than is currently planned. The maneuvering for a post-US Afghanistan has accelerated out of control, and if we don't move fast enough, if  Congress isn't forced to step up efforts, there may be no such thing as a post-US Afghanistan. Quite frankly, if we don't start leaving now, we may never leave at all.

Afghanistan: Republican Chairman Steele Stumbles, "Progressive" Reaction Fumbles (Mull)

EA correspondent Iosh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

It shouldn't be breaking news to anyone that the Chairman of the Republican Party, Michael Steele, said something stupid. His silliness is well known. Pretty much every time he opens his mouth in public, something bad happens to Republicans.

Only this time, his bumbling was somewhat relevant to us. Here's Chairman Steele on Afghanistan:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIRmkef2wZo[/youtube]

The [General] McChrystal incident, to me, was very comical. I think it's a reflection of the frustration that a lot of our military leaders has with this Administration and their prosecution of the war in Afghanistan.

Keep in mind again, federal candidates, this was a war of Obama's choosing. This was not something that the United States had actively prosecuted or wanted to engage in. It was one of those areas of the total board of foreign policy [where] we would be in the background sort of shaping the changes that were necessary in Afghanistan as opposed to directly engaging troops.

But it was the President who was trying to be cute by half by building a script demonizing Iraq, while saying the battle really should in Afghanistan. Well, if he is such a student of history, has he not understood that you know that's the one thing you don't do, is engage in a land war in Afghanistan? Alright, because everyone who has tried over a thousand years of history has failed, and there are reasons for that. There are other ways to engage in Afghanistan...

That's a mess of a statement. Steele's decision to Rethink Afghanistan is very much appreciated, especially since he's joining the majority of Americans on that point of view, but unfortunately I'm not sure his comments are particu,larly helpful. They likely won't change a lot of minds, if any at all on his side of the political aisle.

What is of far more concern, however, is the reaction from the Democrats, and I'm sorry to say it isn't any better. If anything, it's worse than any of Steele's stumblings.

Steele's dialogue is a little unclear, but here are the points he made:

• The war in Afghanistan is Obama's choice


• Previously, the US had not "actively prosecuted or wanted to engage in" the war


• Obama campaigned against Iraq, while threatening to escalate in Afghanistan


• History teaches that engaging "in a land war in Afghanistan" is unwise and/or impossible


• There are alternatives to engaging in Afghanistan

With the exception of his "land war in Afghanistan" assertion, what he said was true.

Obviously, the war is Obama's choice. He's the Commander in Chief, and for the last several years Congress has all but abdicated its role in the use of military force, so any decision to remain or escalate in Afghanistan is entirely President Obama's. No, Obama did not personally begin the invasion --- that was President Bush --- but the idea that Obama had no choice in the matter is simply ridiculous.

Was the US actively prosecuting or engaging in a massively bloody and expensive counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan before President Obama's decision to escalate? No, it was not. The US under Bush began with around 12,000 troops in Afghanistan, and even as the situation deteriorated year after year, they only reach a max of around 32,000 in 2008. What happened next? President Obama took office, and the number of troops doubled. Now it is triple what it was when he came into office, almost 100,000.

And yes, he campaigned on that, just as Steele said:

As President, I would deploy at least two additional brigades to Afghanistan to re-enforce our counter-terrorism operations and support NATO’s efforts against the Taliban. As we step up our commitment, our European friends must do the same, and without the burdensome restrictions that have hampered NATO’s efforts. We must also put more of an Afghan face on security by improving the training and equipping of the Afghan Army and Police, and including Afghan soldiers in U.S. and NATO operations.

We must not, however, repeat the mistakes of Iraq. The solution in Afghanistan is not just military – it is political and economic. As President, I would increase our non-military aid by $1 billion. These resources should fund projects at the local level to impact ordinary Afghans, including the development of alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers. And we must seek better performance from the Afghan government, and support that performance through tough anti-corruption safeguards on aid, and increased international support to develop the rule of law across the country.

Above all, I will send a clear message: we will not repeat the mistake of the past, when we turned our back on Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal. As 9/11 showed us, the security of Afghanistan and America is shared. And today, that security is most threatened by the al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuary in the tribal regions of northwest Pakistan.

Finally, was Steele right about there being alternatives to the war in Afghanistan? Yes. We talk about them all the time here, ranging from development aid to a free press to engagement with regional governments. There are many, many options besides the disastrous war policy, covering all of the US' national security interests including counter-terrorism and stable governance.

Steele's comment about not engaging in a land war in Afghanistan? Yeah, this is just stupid.  I'm guessing that Steele is trying to riff on the advice of a British general to the House of Lords in the early 1960s, "Do not go fighting with your land armies in China." Or maybe he is a film buff and took in the line from The Princess Bride, "Never get involved in a land war in Asia." Throughout the period of de-colonisation of east Asia (and much of the rest of world) during the 20th century, indigenous militant movements defeated European colonists and gained independence. The obvious example is the war in Vietnam, devastatingly lost first by the French and later by the Americans.

You don't get involved in a "land war" because the natives will beat the crap out of your modern tanks and planes. It's not pretty, so don't even try it.

I get Steele's sentiment: military adventurism is definitely not a smart policy for the US. But that doesn't really have anything to do with Afghanistan in this context. Yes, Afghanistan is hard to invade, but so is Helsinki, Finland or Fresno, California. Nobody likes an invading army. The insurgents are not fighting us because they are in Afghanistan, they're fighting us because we are in Afghanistan. That's not our country.

Yet even if his comments weren't especially helpful, Steele still comes out on top. At least he was honest, right?

Match him up with the supposedly critical "progressive" commentators. We'll use Spencer Ackerman as our example.

Now we all love Ackerman; he's a smart guy and a clever writer. Everyone reads him, and even though he's a stout progressive, his readership spans the political spectrum. Ackerman has a clear understanding of the topics he covers, and for that reason he's a must-read far outside progressive circles.

But more than occasionally he says something that goes off-line. Maybe it's that he downplays the civilian horrors of war, or his position too closely mirrors that of the comanders in Afghanistan. For me, it's his creepy obsession with the military executing American citizens.

This is one of those times when he's not exactly doing the left, or himself, any favors.

Hey Michael Steele: there was this thing that happened on September 11, 2001 that you might have read about. Long story short: it resulted in the U.S. invading Afghanistan.

Hey Spencer Ackerman: remember how that mission was a complete and total failure? You might have read about it. Long story short: we didn't catch Osama bin Laden, as a Senate Commitee report pondered:

Bin Laden expected to die. His last will and testament, written on December 14, reflected his fatalism. “Allah commended to us that when death approaches any of us that we make a bequest to parents and next of kin and to Muslims as a whole,” he wrote, according to a copy of the will that surfaced later and is regarded as authentic. [...]

But the Al Qaeda leader would live to fight another day. Fewer than 100 American commandos were on the scene with their Afghan allies and calls for reinforcements to launch an assault were rejected. Requests were also turned down for U.S. troops to block the mountain paths leading to sanctuary a few miles away in Pakistan. The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines. Instead, the U.S. command chose to rely on airstrikes and untrained Afghan militias to attack bin Laden and on Pakistan’s loosely organized Frontier Corps to seal his escape routes. On or around December 16, two days after writing his will, bin Laden and an entourage of bodyguards walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan’s unregulated tribal area. Most analysts say he is still there today.

Yep, the guys responsible for the 9/11 attacks "walked unmolested" into Pakistan. Nine years ago. 2001. What does that have to do with occupying Afghanistan with 100,000 troops right now in 2010? Since I'm sure Ackerman would appreciate a Simpsons reference, let's note, "The opportunity to prove yourself a hero is long gone." The guys responsible for funding and supporting the 9/11 attacks haven't been in Afghanistan for nearly a decade. Our occupation there has nothing to do with capturing bin Laden, or even Al-Qa'eda as whole (they're gone).

Well, maybe Ackerman means we have to stop Afghanistan from being a safe haven for Al-Qa'eda. Too bad, that's also in Pakistan. We've known that for years, too.

Thus, as the Pentagon was making preparations for launching Operation Enduring Freedom, it was known even to its own experts in its intelligence community that the Pakistan army and its ISI were the creators and sponsors of not only the Taliban, but also of al-Qaeda, which emerged as the most dreaded jihadi terrorist organization of the world after bin Laden shifted from the Sudan to Jalalabad in Afghanistan in 1996, from where he subsequently moved to Kandahar.

Despite this, the US chose to rely on the Pakistan army and the ISI for logistics and intelligence support in its operation to wipe out the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the IIF. The army and President General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military dictator, who had sponsored and used jihadi terrorism in an attempt to achieve Pakistan's strategic objectives against India (destabilizing India and annexing Jammu and Kashmir) and Afghanistan (strategic depth), were sought to be projected as the US's stalwart ally in the "war against terrorism" and rewarded for their ostensible cooperation through the resumption of generous economic and military assistance, which had remained curtailed since the Pressler Amendment was invoked against Pakistan in 1990 for clandestinely developing a military nuclear capability and further cut after the Chagai nuclear tests of 1998 and the overthrow of the elected government headed by Nawaz Sharif, the then prime minister, by the army in October, 1999.

See? We know Al-Qa'eda and the Taliban are in Pakistan; we know they're supported by the Pakistani state. So why are we in Afghanistan? Are we planning on occupying it forever, just to make sure that we "molest" the hell out of bin Laden when he crosses the border next time? What's the decade-long hold up?

To be fair, Ackerman is only spinning another variation of the Al-Qa'eda excuse. We expected that. The real travesty here is this:

Now, if you want to say that “the one thing you don’t do is engage in a land war in Afghanistan,” congratulations, hippie! You’re now part of the antiwar movement in this country, so you might as well argue forthrightly for the Obama administration to pull out before Gen. Petraeus — who arrives in Kabul any minute now — has an opportunity to do whatever he can. [...]

You can criticize Obama’s decision to escalate that war. But you’ll also have to explain why muddling through or pulling out better serve U.S. interests against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And maybe you can make that case. But your fantasy of the Afghanistan war doesn’t inspire confidence.

Got that? If you question the US policy in Afghanistan, you're a "hippy!" You're not serious, just some jerk who doesn't want to give General  David Petraeus a fair shake. I mean really, what is the peace movement's strategy for Afghanistan? "Muddling through or pulling out." That it's, absolutely nothing more, just those two things.

This kind of bullshit is just outrageous. Surely Ackerman is aware of the beating the war is taking in congress.

The vote in the House last night was complex, involving amendments, self-executing rules, budgets and statutory and non-statutory caps. David Dayen has some of the rundown, though more of the story keeps coming out. However, the big news of the night to me and others organizing against escalation in Afghanistan was the vote on the McGovern amendment.

The McGovern amendment, if it had passed:

• Would require the president to provide a plan and timetable for drawing down our forces in Afghanistan and identify any variables that could require changes to that timetable.


• Would safeguard U.S. taxpayer dollars by ensuring all U.S. activity in Afghanistan be overseen by an Inspector General.


• Require the President to update Congress on the progress of that plan and timetable

If it had passed, that amendment would have been the beginning of the end of our war in Afghanistan, forcing the President to commit not just to a start of the drawdown – perhaps 2011 – but to and end of the war.

Does that sound like "muddling through or pulling out" to anyone? No, it's clearly a responsible timetable for ending the war as the conditions merit, with the addition of new regulations and benchmarks to ensure that any progress made during this timetable is sustainable for the long-term, to include the responsible use of taxpayer funds. Muddling through? Are you crazy?

It gets better. The McGovern amendment got 162 votes in the House, an incredible number of members going on the record in support of ending the war. That 162 includes such notable hippies as Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Rep. Jane Harman, and Rep. Bart Stupak.

And just what exactly is the new US commander, General Petraeus, supposed to do when he arrives in Kabul? Will he make Karzai less corrupt? Will Karzai become more legitimate? Will Pakistan end its national security strategy of support terrorists and militants? Will Afghans stop being killed by NATO forces, or will they just learn to love it? Will Petraeus personally ensure that every dollar goes to the right place, nothing is wasted or funneled to the Taliban? All of our troops will stop dying? How will Petraeus do this? OK, so he arrives in Kabul any minute now. Then what?

So what do we get out of all of this, from Steele's awkward comments to Ackerman's inexplicable reaction? Easy: The war in Afghanistan has nothing to do with the left, the right, liberal, conservative, socialist, fascist, Republican, Democrat, Independent, Green, Labour, Hawk, Pacifist.... These political concepts just don't mean anything in the context of this war.

If we go by the definitions of these ridiculous political terms, these nonsense buzzwords created and fueled by our media and politicians, then the entire field of US foreign policy becomes completely unintelligible. Put bluntly, it's gibberish. Baby talk.

Ending the war is just smart policy. The United States has absolutely nothing to gain from a war in Afghanistan. Nothing. There's no Al-Qa'eda there, we're not going to magically turn it into a thriving democracy and stalwart regional ally just because we send in a few more guys with guns. There's just nothing there for us. We could bring those troops home, so we're not scrambling around like idiots every time there's a wildfire in California or a hurricane in the Gulf. We could be spending much less than the trillions we're spending now, and we could use it to buy things we actually need. Jobs, infrastructure, energy, education, whatever it is you can think of, the US desperately needs it.

Ignore the partisan bickering. The facts show that the war is ruining the country, it is ruining Afghanistan and it is ruining Pakistan. It has to end, whether you're a progressive like Ackerman or a conservative like Steele.