Afghanistan & US Politics: National Interests and Ending the War (Mull)

Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes at Rethink Afghanistan:

By now, the full implications of the data contained in the 91,000 Wikileaks files are starting to sink in. Americans have been questioning the war for some time now, and they're finally putting their foot down and demanding an end. Thousands of calls are pouring in to Congress from around the country, all demanding a NO vote on today's war funding vote, and thousands more are signing a petition declaring "the Wikileaks ‘War Logs’ are further evidence of a brutal war that’s not worth the cost. I vote, and I demand my elected officials end this war by Dec. 2011."

Afghanistan: At Least 45 Civilians Killed in Rocket Attack

Sure, war supporters gave it the old college try. The White House and other political leadership stressed that the leaks contained no new information, incidentally clearing up once and for all the confusion we had over whether they were ignorant or merely incompetent and negligent prosecutors of US foreign policy. Some even tried to deflect the argument on to Wikileaks operator Julian Assange, as if the leak coming from him --- or Paris Hilton or Spider-Man --- has anything to do with the information it contained.

But their arguments are for naught, the war is now simply indefensible. These leaks confirm and validate the criticism so far levied against the war in Afghanistan. The headline in an article by Gareth Porter, "Leaked Reports Make Afghan War Policy More Vulnerable", seems like the understatement of the century:

Among the themes that are documented, sometimes dramatically but often through bland military reports, are the seemingly casual killing of civilians away from combat situations, night raids by special forces that are often based on bad intelligence, the absence of legal constraints on the abuses of Afghan police, and the deeply rooted character of corruption among Afghan officials.

The most politically salient issue highlighted by the new documents, however, is Pakistan's political and material support for the Taliban insurgency, despite its ostensible support for U.S. policy in Afghanistan.

You could pick just one of those things Porter mentions and it could spell catastrophe for the war. Instead we have all of them. It does more than make the war policy more vulnerable, it puts any war supporting politician in Washington in serious electoral peril.

Left to their own devices, the mainstream media will craft their own stupid and obnoxious narratives about "lefty insurgencies" or "anti-incumbent fever," and this will poison the eventual policy outcome. However, if we understand the facts now, and see this as not only a US political dilemma but as part of a global anti-war movement finally winding up at President Obama's doorstep, then the US can begin to accelerate its withdrawal more responsibly than the standard media narratives might allow (Get out now! No, stay forever!).

This is not simply a reaction to a failed policy, it is an articulation of an independent vision of selfish foreign and domestic policy interests. Americans, our NATO allies, and even our progressive allies in Pakistan are all working to end the war. Domestically, political candidates who are putting ,members of Congress in electoral peril are doing so as a response to outcry from their constituents.

Elaine Marshall, candidate for Senate in North Carolina, has been a strong opponent of the President's escalation in Afghanistan. She says that, throughout her campaign she has been approached by supporters who tell her, "‘I appreciate your stance, I appreciate you talking about it, I appreciate that you’re looking at more than just the headlines." She explained in an interview with the Seminal:

I live in North Carolina, a strong military state. When you talk to people who’ve been [to war], and you understand the sacrifices folks are making, and then you look at the reason why they are stepping up to make that sacrifice, or those maybe joined before the actual situation came up and they now, because they’re good soldiers, become involved in it. In our prior engagements for the most part, we had a goal. We knew who the enemy was, we knew why we were there, we had a line drawn that we knew would be success, achievement, victory. We don’t have any of that in the war in Afghanistan.

The same is true for candidate Tommy Sowers, running for Missouri's 8th congressional district. He recently published an opinion piece questioning the President's strategy of bolstering Afghan security forces, and asking whether or not such a massive, long-term financial commitment was feasible in the economic environment. He has received high praise for his essay, as well as for his position on the war itself, as he conducted town halls across the state. He explained what he was hearing from his constituents in an interview with me and Jason Rosenbaum last week:

First, across the country, districts like this carry the burden of the war in a visceral way. When I’m in a room, I ask folks if they are veterans or if they’re related to people currently serving – it’s almost the entire room. So, on a very personal level, these people are asking, "What are we accomplishing over there?" A lot of families ask their own family members that are over there this question.

Second, on a fiscal level, this district has suffered under Republican incumbent rule in terms of infrastructure. There’s great concern about the debt, and people ask, "Why are we spending so much money over there?"

Sowers served in combat during the Iraq war, and many in Marshall's family chose to serve their country in the military, so it's clear where their personal convictions are rooted. And the overflow of public outcry and support from their constituents gives them the momentum to go from average anti-war candidates to populist juggernauts.

Did you catch Sowers' comment about "suffering under incumbent rule"? The electoral peril is not a hypothetical, it's very real. Sowers is coming directly at his opponent on this issue. He told us:

My opponent sits on the NATO parliamentary assembly, so you’d think she’d have an interest in the issue, but I’m not certain she’s even visited Afghanistan. The only thing I’ve heard from her is we need to do everything over there – more troops, more money. That’s what you get with a former lobbyists trying to influence military policy.

His opponent doesn't even have much chance to reverse her position, her hands are already all over this war. Now she's staring down the barrel of Tommy Sowers, all because she couldn't even hedge her bets on an exit timetable. She had to do the lobbyist thing and give it all away, "more troops, more money". Marshall's opponent in North Carolina is no better, refusing to fund a $32 billion one-year extension for teachers on one hand while on the other having plenty of freebie money for Wall Street and the war-makers.

It's too late to change positions or blow this off as some kind of far-left anomaly in the primaries. These folks have had their resumes scrutinized, they've won their nominations, and now they've moved on to delivering a spirited beating to their opponents.

But what happens when they do get to Washington? That's where we truly see the selfish national interests laid out. They will not simply block the war and call it a day. Marshall has talked about expanding international cooperation in terms of developing Afghanistan, as well as reforming our port/border security with an eye on counter-terrorism. Sowers also has a definite objective in mind when it comes to securing US interests in Afghanistan.

I’m a secure our nation sort of guy, an ass-kicking Democrat. I think we should pursue and kill and capture terrorists where they are. That’s the problem in Afghanistan, we’re pursuing them where they were. For every special forces team tied up training an Afghan police force that one day won’t be paid is a special forces team that can’t operate in Yemen, Pakistan or Somalia. [...]

My strategy is informed by history. We are fighting an ideology. I’ve seen first hand when I had price on my head in Iraq. But there’s ways to fight this war much more intelligently.

Look back to the history of the cold war, how did we combat that? We contained, we deterred, we used trade, aid, proxies. And we occasionally sent guys like me to kill and capture the real bad folks. Overall, we let the system collapse in on itself.

Sowers is putting forward his own strategy for fighting terrorism. I've made my reservations about that strategy clear, but these candidates are not mirror images of activist bloggers; they are independent political actors. Sowers and Marshall are not conforming to any ideological constraints. They are putting forward their own, selfish national security strategies and are backed by popular momentum.

Pakistan is where we see those same selfish interests replicated. Just as our candidates look out for the United States, Pakistanis are looking out only for their country. Take, for example, their reaction to the Wikileaks' "War Diary" confirmation of the involvement of Pakistani army and intelligence services with the insurgency. Mosharraf Zaidi writes:

Virtually no serious commentator or analyst anywhere, even those embedded deep in the armpit of the Pakistani establishment, claims that the Pakistani state was not instrumental in the creation, training and sustenance of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. Given the nature of the relationship between the Pakistani state and the Afghan Taliban, one that goes right to the genetic core of the Taliban, it is hard to imagine that all ties can ever be severed. Again, for serious people, this is an issue that is done and dusted. Pakistan's state, and indeed, its society, had, has and will continue to have linkages with the Afghan Taliban. Moral judgments about these linkages are external to this fact.

These linkages do, however, deserve the scrutiny of the Pakistani parliament. If somehow, Pakistanis are involved in supporting any kind of violence against anyone, that kind of support had better be couched in a clear national security framework that articulates why it is okay for Pakistanis to underwrite such violence. Absent such a framework, the violence is illegal, and the space for speculation and innuendo about Pakistan is virtually infinite. It is that space that Pakistan's fiercest critics exploit when they generate massive headlines out of small nuggets of insignificant and stale information that implicates Pakistan in anti-US violence in Afghanistan (among other things).

Zaidi is representative of a broader progressive movement in Pakistan, the closest parallel and ally that Americans have there, and yet what is his response? It is not a call for an immediate end to Pakistan's "Strategic Depth", its support of militants, and there is no mourning the loss of American lives because of that policy. There is only acknowledgement that the relationship with militants --- specifically the Afghan Taliban ---  is deeply embedded in Pakistani society, as well as a call for the government to better articulate this relationship in a "national security framework".

Zaidi is not looking out for our best interests --- refraining from support to militants who kill American soldiers --- he's looking out for Pakistan's best interests, and that includes their historic ties to militancy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jammu & Kashmir, etc. Seems harsh, but it is a parallel to the US. When was the last time an American pundit, even a liberal one, shed a tear for the thousands of Pakistani soldiers and policemen killed doing our selfish American bidding? The answer would be never.

But there's also the actual Pakistani anti-war movement. Appealing directly to the principles of the "American Founding Fathers", the group calling itself the Coalition of Conscience put forward this list of demands:

1. The foreign presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan is part of problem rather than the solution; > The coalition Governments must immediately order a cessation of all military and sting operations in the region and allow peace to be negotiated.


2. Al-Qaeda is a convenient tool to blanket all opposition to US policies in the region and impose unilateral policies; > All efforts to use this pretext to prolong the presence in the region and to pursue an international agenda other than peace must cease.


3. On going coalition operations have a fragmenting effect on both Pakistan and Afghanistan; > All coalition operations with divisive effects must be stopped.


4. The entire spectrum of violence and instability in Pakistan is a backwash from Afghanistan created by the presence of foreign forces. Support to insurgent and terrorist groups in FATA and Balochistan originate from Afghanistan. If this is not stopped, the instability will spread to other regions as well; > We demand the Government of Pakistan to make its own independent policies to ensure peace and development in the region; the mother of all civilizations.


5. Afghan movement is led by leaders who are indigenous to Afghanistan and legitimate representatives of resistance to foreign occupation; > These leaders must be treated as party to peace and brought into a comprehensive dialogue process as reflected in Pak-Afghan Jirga of 2007.


6. Failing a clear timetable from the coalition for the cessation of war; > The Government of Pakistan will be urged to exercise this nation’s legitimate right to secure its interests against all hostile bases inside Afghanistan, supporting and funding terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan.


7. In order to ensure long term stability and prosperity in the region; > The Government of Pakistan must carry forward the inconclusive negotiations of 1996 and assist all Afghans (Resistance and Northern Alliance) to mediate peace. We welcome support from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and China with no covert agendas.


8. It is not Pakistan’s responsibility to ensure logistics for coalition forces in Afghanistan knowing well that much of it is used to destabilize and terrorize Pakistanis; > This support must stop unless approved by UN and conducted under transparent international safeguards and inspections.


9. Gross violations and exercise of human rights on selective bases are widely documented; > All Pakistani prisoners kept by coalition countries, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in illegal detention centers must be brought back immediately and subjected to Pakistani courts.


10. Rendition centers, trials under duress and extra judicial killings including drones and blanket air strikes violate basic human rights; > War reparations and criminal trials of coalition leaders who have knowingly falsified evidence in support of war before their own people; their Parliaments; and before the UN Security Council must be brought before Law. All Pakistani leaders guilty of same must be tried under Pakistan laws.

The "coalition Governments" they refer to are the US and NATO allies. They are demanding "independent policies" from the Pakistani government, a reference to American interference. Most of the rest is pretty mundane, nothing you haven't seen from almost any other peace movement, Pakistani or otherwise. But make a special note of Number Six:

Failing a clear timetable from the coalition for the cessation of war; > The Government of Pakistan will be urged to exercise this nation’s legitimate right to secure its interests against all hostile bases inside Afghanistan, supporting and funding terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan.

That means war with the United States. All of our troops operating supply lines in Pakistan, all of our troops stationed in Afghanistan, all of our intelligence centers and facilities for launching drone and special forces raids --- these are what they are referring to by "all hostile bases." When I warned about the collapse of Pakistan, and our troops getting caught in the middle of it, this what I meant. From their perspective, our war is the root of their terrorism and insurgencies, and they will react to secure themselves.

This is the state of the present anti-war movement, in the United States and in Pakistan. In the US, Americans are putting forward their own policies, an end to the war, revamped port security, as well over-the-horizon counter-terrorism. In Pakistan, they are demanding an end to the war, our war, which is so destabilizing for their country.

None of this is remotely ideological or partisan, nor is it merely reactionary to the existing policy of war. It is an independent calculation of interests.

Ending the war is firmly in our national interests, and any politician who doesn't start supporting the United States will be put in serious danger of losing their seat. How long until our war supporting representatives come to be seen as puppets for Hamid Karzai and General Kayani, much the same as some Pakistani politicians are viewed as puppets of the United States?

With the leaks confirming so much of the criticism about the war, every action the supporters take is automatically drenched in blood. Every time they are voting for more war funding, they are voting for American soldiers to be killed by InterServices Inteligence and Pakistan Army operatives. Every time they vote against an exit timetable, they are voting against the economic interests of the United States.

This is what's happening as we watch the war disintegrate in front of us. The facts show that the war is destroying our economy, it is making us less safe, and continuing it will lead to even further disaster. There is no angry far left, no hippies, no anti-incumbent fever, no bleeding-heart liberals, and no wobbly pacifists. There are only Americans stepping up and taking their country back, back from the catastrophe of war, and setting it on a better path toward securing our interests at home and in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Anyone who still supports the war, after all of our facts have been confirmed by the Wikileaks release, now stands firmly against American national interests, both domestic and foreign. The consequences will be hellish come November.

General Kayani's "Silent Coup" in Pakistan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Pakistan's General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the man over whom our leaders in Washington fawn and who sits atop the intensely destabilizing "Strategic Depth" networks in Afghanistan, has just been handed an extension of his term:

The Pakistani government on Thursday gave the country's top military official, army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, another three years in his post, a move that analysts said would bolster Pakistan's anti-terrorism fight and cement its role in neighboring Afghanistan.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani announced the extension in a late-night televised address to the nation. "To ensure the success of these [counter-terrorism] operations, it is the need of the hour that the continuity of military leadership should be maintained," he said.

The impact on our war in Afghanistan is obvious.  Call it "strategic depth" or "cementing its role": it all adds up to influence on Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qa'eda, and the future of all of these players in Afghanistan.

The crux of the development is that Kayani's extension is bad news for us, due to his cozy relationship with militants and terrorist organizations, as well as his undermining of the democratically-elected civilian government. But the details are important, especially as they could mean the difference between uncontrolled escalation and our planned military withdrawal from Afghanistan.

For the complete picture, a look at what a few experts (read: bloggers) are saying to determine the good, the bad, and the ugly ramifications that Kayani's extension has on the US war in Afghanistan.

For the good news, we have Shuja Nawaz writing for the New Atlanticist [emphasis mine]:

A major advantage that might accrue is that the certainty provided by the new term for the army chief will allow the civilian government to become confident in asserting itself in policy matters, knowing that the army chief will not overtly intervene in its affairs. This may help strengthen political institutions. At the same time, civilians must resist the temptation to turn to the army to lead the battle against militancy (a national endeavor not purely a military one) or to arbitrate differences on the political field.

These three years should also give Kayani time to assess the present Higher Defense Organization of Pakistan and perhaps come up with a more devolved structure for the army and a better system of command and control at the center. One possible scenario may include regional and centralized commands at four-star rank, appointed by the same authority who selects the service chiefs, and a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with real powers to regulate all the services while acting as the main military advisor of the government. This approach has been taken by the United States and many other modern militaries, so it would hardly be unprecedented. Without having a stake in the chairman's position in 2013, Kayani may be able to provide a dispassionate plan for the government to decide, well in advance of the next round of promotions in 2013. Any proposal that he presents as a disinterested party will have credibility and will also help override the parochial concerns of the army relative to the other services in Pakistan.

It would be more than good news, it would be great news, if Kayani did work to minimize the role of the military in government, and created a civilian-military relationship similar to the US. But that only works if the first part of the statement is true: Kayani's interference in politics ceases, allowing the civilian government to become more confident.

That's where the bad news comes in. This is not a case of the Army backing away from its role in politics. it is, in fact, a craven arrangement with the ruling political party. Arif Rafiq writes at AfPak Channel [emphasis mine]:

Perceptions aside, three more years of Kayani could conceivably provide continuity to both Pakistan's military and political setup. In recent months, the consensus in Pakistan was that Kayani would receive a two-year extension. Gilani's choice of three years was a surprise. But not by mere coincidence, Gilani's government also has three years remaining in its tenure. And so it's certainly possible that there is a deal between Gilani's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Kayani, perhaps involving foreign guarantors, to let this ship sail for three more years (with Gilani wearing the captain's hat steering an imaginary wheel and Kayani actually in control). Indeed, Gilani alluded to a possible deal when he said today that Pakistan's four major "stakeholders" -- the president, prime minister, army chief, and Supreme Court chief justice -- are in a "secure position" till 2013. [...]

And so for Kayani, who has managed to become the darling of many of Pakistan's nationalists and Islamists, there is some risk involved in continuing for another three years as army chief. If he ties himself too close to the PPP, he -- and more importantly, the Pakistani Army -- could lose a critical support base and sink along with the current government, unless he maintains a political distance and continues to pursue a semi-nationalist security policy.

Gilani projects a false sense of confidence in the viability of Pakistan's current political-military setup. This is Pakistan. The Kayani extension provides a short-term ceasefire between the PPP and the army, but it will also likely produce re-alignments among its fractious power brokers. And another head-on clash between any two of them is not far from reality.

Cutting a deal with the ruling elites of the status quo to stay in power is not the same as Kayani becoming a "disinterested party" in the government. That's not a democratic government, it's a puppet. In that sense Kayani's extension could be considered another in Pakistan's long history of military coups, albeit a silent one. This will agitate the opposition parties, namely the PML-N, and the Islamist party would not be out of line to call for new, early elections, simply as a way of "re-checking" the legitimacy of the PPP-Kayani government.

But that's not the worst part for the US war in Afghanistan. Pakistan's internal politics are important to us, but it's Kayani's national security and foreign policy that have truly ugly implications for the US. B. Raman writes on his blog [emphasis mine]:

In the counter-insurgency operations against the TTP he has had partial successes in the Swat Valley, South Waziristan, Bajaur and Orakzai agencies. Under his leadership, the Army has been able to deny the TTP territorial control in these areas, but has not been able to destroy their capability for terrorist strikes and commando-style raids in tribal as well as non-tribal areas. While arresting some leaders of the Afghan Taliban, who were living in Karachi and other non-tribal areas, he has avoided action against the Afghan Taliban leadership operating from the tribal areas.

He has avoided any action against Al Qaeda elements which have taken sanctuary in the non-tribal areas. Under Musharraf, the Army and the ISI were much more active against Al Qaeda in the non-tribal areas than they have been under Kayani. The anger of Al Qaeda and its associates against Musharraf because of the action taken by the Army and the ISI was responsible for the virulent campaign of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri against Musharraf and the Army. They abused Musharraf as apostate, collaborator of the Hindus etc and thrice tried to kill him---once in Karachi and twice in Rawalpindi. Compared to that, there is hardly any Al Qaeda campaign against Kayani. There is a greater threat to Mr.Zardari from Al Qaeda than to Kayani. The Army and the ISI have managed to create an impression in the tribal areas that Mr.Zardari and not Gen.Kayani is responsible for the facilities extended to the US for its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the tribal areas. Since Gen.Kayani took over, while many Al Qaeda leaders have been killed in the tribal areas by the Drone strikes, there have been very few arrests of Al Qaeda elements in the non-tribal areas. Al Qaeda feels more secure in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan today than it was under Musharraf.

If you missed that, let me spell it out for you: Kayani's extension is good for Al-Qa'eda. Yes, that Al-Qa'eda. The terrorist guys.

Then there's all that other stuff about the Afghan Taliban - Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura in Balochistan, as well as the Haqqani network, who are responsible for the vast majority of terrorist and insurgent attacks on our US troops in Afghanistan.

How does the US feel about this? Nawaz:

The United States has studiously avoided taking a public position but conversations with U.S. diplomats and military officials over the past few months indicated their deep interest in the future of General Kayani and a noticeable desire to see him remain at the helm of affairs in Pakistan.

Rafiq:

Some of Pakistan's nationalist and Islamist commentators have also reacted with suspicion toward Kayani's extension, describing it as a result of Hillary Clinton's "lobbying"

Raman:

Kayani is thought of well both by the Pentagon and the PLA leadership

And a flashback to Sue Pleming's report on Kayani's visit to Washington:

Guests crowded around Kayani at the annual Pakistani National Day party at the embassy, posing for photos and jostling for the military leader’s ear.[...]

U.S. senators and Obama administration officials lined up to speak to the slim and dapper general, who Pakistani media say rules the roost back home but is also central to U.S. relations with Islamabad.

Damn, we really love this guy. What are we thinking? Whatever it is we like about him --- his style, his centred demeanour, his subtle hand in politics - General Kayani is still just another military dictator, another crook in a long line of corrupt, tyrannical, warmongering thugs. He is not our ally, not our friend, and his extension, now a full-fledged dictatorship complete with a compliant, ruling political party, is just plain bad news for the United States.

The US must immediately end all military aid to Pakistan, and should pursue sanctions against the ruling elites in the PPP until such time as their government can prove its legitimacy by way of free and fair democratic elections. Barring such extreme measures, the US must engage exclusively with Pakistan's civilian government, while working toward greater inclusion of opposition parties like the PML-N (who are presently too close to radical Saudi Arabia, and could stand to be moderated with more international influence).

More importantly, the US must end its war in Afghanistan. Not only is not in our interests to fight a civil war in Afghanistan, but it is even less in our interests to have our US troops used as pieces in Kayani's personal chessboard. Our troops fight and die for our national defense, not for Kayani's insane militarist objectives against India. Pakistan is catastrophically unstable, and US military leaders are moving to escalate our involvement. Further war in the region will prove to be disastrous for the US.

Reforming our relations with the Pakistani government can be slow and doesn't have to be as extreme as an immediate freeze. The PPP government can be allowed time and support to again free themselves of Kayani's control, such as when they tried to grab control of the ISI, Pakistan's terror-supporting spy agency, in 2008. But we cannot wait to end the war in Afghanistan.

The war puts Americans in danger, it is destroying our economy, and now with Kayani's empowerment, our objectives in Afghanistan become all the more hopeless and impossible. We have to bring our troops home, get them out of this civil war in Afghanistan and proxy war with Pakistan, and only then can we move on to accomplishing our objectives, be they counter-terrorism, development, or human rights.

We must end this war now, lest one more US soldier die so that General Kayani can "cement his role" in Afghanistan.

Pakistan: Connections from Democracy to Civil War (and How to Change Them)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Earlier this week, I wrote about an impending civil war in Pakistan, projecting a possible "complete collapse of Pakistan as a recognizable entity", not because of its geography --- it has survived breakaway provinces before, with national identities still intact --- but because of its structure as a modern, democratic society.  Some readers were understandably skeptical.

Afghanistan Projection: Pakistan’s “Strategic Depth” & Endless War (Mull)

Beyond the violence and anti-Americanism we see in the Western press, Pakistan offers much that we foreigners can recognise. It has a powerful military and institutions of civil society much like the West, but it also has fervent patriotic pride, struggles with women's and minority rights, and a constant battle between secular progressives and conservative fundamentalists that will be instantly familiar to any American. Far from the alien, failed state portrayed on television, Pakistan is a vibrant, cosmopolitan society dealing with the same grand cultural questions as those in many other countries.

So how do you get from this to complete collapse? How could a painstakingly constructed democracy disintegrate, and how could a powerful, western-backed military fail so miserably to protect the nation in the face of what seems only to be illiterate, fascist hill people and their sickeningly backward superstitions?

The problem is not only one of perception, that we take both the Pakistan we love (liberal, educated patriots) and the Pakistan we hate (wicked, violent Taliban) for granted --- always there, never changing. More than that, Pakistan's uncertain future is the direct result of deliberate policy choices by the US, Pakistan, and many others. The collapse will not be sudden and spectacular; it will be the slow culmination of years, decades, of decisions and actions, both large and small, from the enormously important to the pathetically insignificant.

Every ISAF soldier, every night raid, every civilian casualty, every fresh Taliban recruit, every drone strike, every Blackwater mercenary, every stolen election we overlook, every elected representative we sideline and marginalize, every "strategic summit" with General Kiyani and General Musharraf before him, every unaccountable dollar we funnel to the corrupt in Kabul, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi, every single, tiny action is a pinprick to the stability of the region, an almost unnoticeable chipping away at the integrity of Pakistan, as well as its neighbor Afghanistan.

Pakistan is equally liable, with its long history of supporting terrorists and militants, its capitulation to the worst extremist and de-stabilizing elements in society, its willingness to betray democracy in favor of dictatorship, its negation of long-term national goals for short-term gains from unhelpful foreign alliances, its victimization of its own citizens (first in East Pakistan, now in Balochistan), and of course the inexplicably obsessive appetite for, the fetish of Pakistan's elite for war with India.

These individual policies in turn feed our mistaken perceptions. We see them as isolated, not in their complete context. Sure the civilian casualties recruit militants, we say, but we're fighting a war. Sure the war in Afghanistan is bad, but we're pushing the extremists across the border. Sure the extremists in Pakistan are bad, but we support the western-educated Army. Sure the Army is unelected, but the civilian government is corrupt. And on and on it goes until there's simply nothing left. Afghanistan destroyed, Pakistan inflamed, and our own country politically and economically ripping apart at the seams. It all adds up, whether we're awake to it or not.

None of this is new information, mind you. These are well-documented facts that have been discussed at length in this space. But how is it that the democracy in Pakistan, the liberal, educated modern society so similar to that of the US, can break down? What does an American soldier in Kandahar, Afghanistan have to do with the democratic government in Islamabad, Pakistan, or any of these seemingly disparate and disconnected issues?

We can see that connection on the Internet. First, a report in the Christian Science Monitor [emphasis mine]:

“its now time to implenet islam [sic] and hang black water, rehamn malik and zardari till death,” posts one user, referring to the private American security firm, Pakistan’s interior minister, and Pakistan's president.

That [Facebook Wall Post] appeared on the page of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a global Islamist party that denounces democracy and campaigns for the establishment of a global caliphate (akin to an empire) based on Islamic Law. The user goes by “Commander Khattab,” the name of deceased Chechen guerrilla leader.[...]

[Hizb-ut-Tahrir spokesman Naveed Butt] claims that the SMS blasts are beginning to influence its target audience of “influential people” such as parliamentarians, lawyers, students, and journalists. “We’re steadily growing in number, as educated people realize democracy will never deliver. Practically they are seeing there is no way out for Pakistan. Secularism will never work. People are committing suicide, people are dying.”...

Khutum-e-Naboohat faces no such difficulties in keeping its operations running. According to Mr. Rashid, wealthy donors help pay the bills while the tech-savvy youngsters among its ranks maintain their website.

“We either work from home or from the computers here in the mosque,” says Umar Shah, a web designer. “It’s important to spare time for this mission because it’s a matter of our faith.”...

“The government has never tried to stop it,” [Saleem-ul-Haque Khan] says.

The government hasn't done anything to stop the extremists plotting its destruction, but it has taken other actions. From Reporters Without Borders [emphasis mine]:

“The situation of online free expression is deteriorating in Pakistan,” the press freedom organisation said. “The vice has been tightening since access to Facebook was blocked in mid-May. The country seems to want massive Internet surveillance and is moving towards a targeted filtering system that is neither transparent nor respectful of rights and freedoms.”

Among the sites to be kept under watch are Yahoo!, MSN, Hotmail, YouTube, Google, Islam Exposed, In the Name of Allah, Amazon and Bing. Thirteen sites have already been blocked including www.skepticsannotatedbible.com, www.middle-east-info.org, www.faithfreedom.org, www.thereligionofpeace.com, www.abrahamic-faith.com, www.muhammadlied.com, www.prophetofdoom.net, www.worldthreats.com,www.voiceofbelievers.com and www.walidshoebat.com.

The government can monitor and block access to sites like YouTube and Google, sites which allow the free flow of information not only for blasphemy but also for dissent, accountability, and all manner of democratic movements. Meanwhile the extremist, anti-government forces are allowed to flourish without fear. Right there is everything you need to know to see the grand connection.

Why is the government blocking access to dissent? Because the extremists call it blasphemous. Why must the government give in to this? Because it is weakened from both the American marginalization of democracy and the foreign backing of extremists, allowing the Taliban to "punch above its weight" and forcing the government to punch far below its. Where is the real power in Pakistan? With the Army and intelligence services, supported by the US, who then in turn support the extremists and militants. What allows those extremists to advance into Pakistani society? They blur the issues of the US war in Afghanistan and our policies in Pakistan ("black water") into domestic politics ("hang...zardari").

The liberal, educated Pakistani democrat has an ally in the extremist who wants to fight the US puppet government, who in turn has an ally in the Taliban fighting the Americans, who in turn has an ally in Afghanistan whose family was killed by NATO bombs, who in turn has an ally in the Pakistani intelligence services, them an ally in the Army, and those in the Army undermine the government which, of course, then sets off the liberal, educated Pakistani democrat.

Get the picture? This is where it all crashes together, the crossroads of the war in Afghanistan, "Strategic Depth", undermining democracy in Pakistan - everything. This is how it works out, how we'll see the "complete collapse of Pakistan as a recognizable entity." There is no awesome explosion, no moment of shattering, no one culprit on which to pin all the blame.

This is what the complete collapse will look like. No one left we can recognise as an ally, only violent resistance, war, and destruction. No more vibrant, democratic society, no more progressive struggles, no more women's, minority, or even human rights. Only war remains, in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, and likely spreading out into India and across the entire sub-continent.

However, just because these problems are so enormous does not mean that they cannot be solved. In fact, the exact same principles that went into creating these problems --- the disconnections of individual actions --- are precisely what will work for us.

Pakistani citizens are standing up, rejecting the extremists' calls for violence, fighting the corruption of their elected officials, and working in all branches of the government to reform their fragile system. Each individual adds up into a movement, and that movement adds up to stifling their country's descent into civil war.

But we as Americans also have a responsibility to act individually. Every time you call congress (dial (202) 224-3121 and ask for your representative), every meeting you attend, every bit of pressure on your government --- it all adds up. A few concerned filmmakers and journalists becomes Rethink Afghanistan. A couple of dedicated bloggers becomes Firedoglake. A handful of progressive activists becomes ActBlue. Small, disconnected acts turn into a huge movement. Your short meeting at your congressman's office turns into their vote for reforming our policies toward the region, into ending the war in Afghanistan, peace in Pakistan, and free and stable governments for both Pakistanis and Afghans.

No one action created the horrendous instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and no one person, not even President Obama, can end the war and solve these problems by themselves. The problems will be solved the same way they were created, through concerned, individual citizens taking action for themselves.

Afghanistan: Republican Chairman Steele Stumbles, "Progressive" Reaction Fumbles (Mull)

EA correspondent Iosh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

It shouldn't be breaking news to anyone that the Chairman of the Republican Party, Michael Steele, said something stupid. His silliness is well known. Pretty much every time he opens his mouth in public, something bad happens to Republicans.

Only this time, his bumbling was somewhat relevant to us. Here's Chairman Steele on Afghanistan:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIRmkef2wZo[/youtube]

The [General] McChrystal incident, to me, was very comical. I think it's a reflection of the frustration that a lot of our military leaders has with this Administration and their prosecution of the war in Afghanistan.

Keep in mind again, federal candidates, this was a war of Obama's choosing. This was not something that the United States had actively prosecuted or wanted to engage in. It was one of those areas of the total board of foreign policy [where] we would be in the background sort of shaping the changes that were necessary in Afghanistan as opposed to directly engaging troops.

But it was the President who was trying to be cute by half by building a script demonizing Iraq, while saying the battle really should in Afghanistan. Well, if he is such a student of history, has he not understood that you know that's the one thing you don't do, is engage in a land war in Afghanistan? Alright, because everyone who has tried over a thousand years of history has failed, and there are reasons for that. There are other ways to engage in Afghanistan...

That's a mess of a statement. Steele's decision to Rethink Afghanistan is very much appreciated, especially since he's joining the majority of Americans on that point of view, but unfortunately I'm not sure his comments are particu,larly helpful. They likely won't change a lot of minds, if any at all on his side of the political aisle.

What is of far more concern, however, is the reaction from the Democrats, and I'm sorry to say it isn't any better. If anything, it's worse than any of Steele's stumblings.

Steele's dialogue is a little unclear, but here are the points he made:

• The war in Afghanistan is Obama's choice


• Previously, the US had not "actively prosecuted or wanted to engage in" the war


• Obama campaigned against Iraq, while threatening to escalate in Afghanistan


• History teaches that engaging "in a land war in Afghanistan" is unwise and/or impossible


• There are alternatives to engaging in Afghanistan

With the exception of his "land war in Afghanistan" assertion, what he said was true.

Obviously, the war is Obama's choice. He's the Commander in Chief, and for the last several years Congress has all but abdicated its role in the use of military force, so any decision to remain or escalate in Afghanistan is entirely President Obama's. No, Obama did not personally begin the invasion --- that was President Bush --- but the idea that Obama had no choice in the matter is simply ridiculous.

Was the US actively prosecuting or engaging in a massively bloody and expensive counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan before President Obama's decision to escalate? No, it was not. The US under Bush began with around 12,000 troops in Afghanistan, and even as the situation deteriorated year after year, they only reach a max of around 32,000 in 2008. What happened next? President Obama took office, and the number of troops doubled. Now it is triple what it was when he came into office, almost 100,000.

And yes, he campaigned on that, just as Steele said:

As President, I would deploy at least two additional brigades to Afghanistan to re-enforce our counter-terrorism operations and support NATO’s efforts against the Taliban. As we step up our commitment, our European friends must do the same, and without the burdensome restrictions that have hampered NATO’s efforts. We must also put more of an Afghan face on security by improving the training and equipping of the Afghan Army and Police, and including Afghan soldiers in U.S. and NATO operations.

We must not, however, repeat the mistakes of Iraq. The solution in Afghanistan is not just military – it is political and economic. As President, I would increase our non-military aid by $1 billion. These resources should fund projects at the local level to impact ordinary Afghans, including the development of alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers. And we must seek better performance from the Afghan government, and support that performance through tough anti-corruption safeguards on aid, and increased international support to develop the rule of law across the country.

Above all, I will send a clear message: we will not repeat the mistake of the past, when we turned our back on Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal. As 9/11 showed us, the security of Afghanistan and America is shared. And today, that security is most threatened by the al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuary in the tribal regions of northwest Pakistan.

Finally, was Steele right about there being alternatives to the war in Afghanistan? Yes. We talk about them all the time here, ranging from development aid to a free press to engagement with regional governments. There are many, many options besides the disastrous war policy, covering all of the US' national security interests including counter-terrorism and stable governance.

Steele's comment about not engaging in a land war in Afghanistan? Yeah, this is just stupid.  I'm guessing that Steele is trying to riff on the advice of a British general to the House of Lords in the early 1960s, "Do not go fighting with your land armies in China." Or maybe he is a film buff and took in the line from The Princess Bride, "Never get involved in a land war in Asia." Throughout the period of de-colonisation of east Asia (and much of the rest of world) during the 20th century, indigenous militant movements defeated European colonists and gained independence. The obvious example is the war in Vietnam, devastatingly lost first by the French and later by the Americans.

You don't get involved in a "land war" because the natives will beat the crap out of your modern tanks and planes. It's not pretty, so don't even try it.

I get Steele's sentiment: military adventurism is definitely not a smart policy for the US. But that doesn't really have anything to do with Afghanistan in this context. Yes, Afghanistan is hard to invade, but so is Helsinki, Finland or Fresno, California. Nobody likes an invading army. The insurgents are not fighting us because they are in Afghanistan, they're fighting us because we are in Afghanistan. That's not our country.

Yet even if his comments weren't especially helpful, Steele still comes out on top. At least he was honest, right?

Match him up with the supposedly critical "progressive" commentators. We'll use Spencer Ackerman as our example.

Now we all love Ackerman; he's a smart guy and a clever writer. Everyone reads him, and even though he's a stout progressive, his readership spans the political spectrum. Ackerman has a clear understanding of the topics he covers, and for that reason he's a must-read far outside progressive circles.

But more than occasionally he says something that goes off-line. Maybe it's that he downplays the civilian horrors of war, or his position too closely mirrors that of the comanders in Afghanistan. For me, it's his creepy obsession with the military executing American citizens.

This is one of those times when he's not exactly doing the left, or himself, any favors.

Hey Michael Steele: there was this thing that happened on September 11, 2001 that you might have read about. Long story short: it resulted in the U.S. invading Afghanistan.

Hey Spencer Ackerman: remember how that mission was a complete and total failure? You might have read about it. Long story short: we didn't catch Osama bin Laden, as a Senate Commitee report pondered:

Bin Laden expected to die. His last will and testament, written on December 14, reflected his fatalism. “Allah commended to us that when death approaches any of us that we make a bequest to parents and next of kin and to Muslims as a whole,” he wrote, according to a copy of the will that surfaced later and is regarded as authentic. [...]

But the Al Qaeda leader would live to fight another day. Fewer than 100 American commandos were on the scene with their Afghan allies and calls for reinforcements to launch an assault were rejected. Requests were also turned down for U.S. troops to block the mountain paths leading to sanctuary a few miles away in Pakistan. The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines. Instead, the U.S. command chose to rely on airstrikes and untrained Afghan militias to attack bin Laden and on Pakistan’s loosely organized Frontier Corps to seal his escape routes. On or around December 16, two days after writing his will, bin Laden and an entourage of bodyguards walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan’s unregulated tribal area. Most analysts say he is still there today.

Yep, the guys responsible for the 9/11 attacks "walked unmolested" into Pakistan. Nine years ago. 2001. What does that have to do with occupying Afghanistan with 100,000 troops right now in 2010? Since I'm sure Ackerman would appreciate a Simpsons reference, let's note, "The opportunity to prove yourself a hero is long gone." The guys responsible for funding and supporting the 9/11 attacks haven't been in Afghanistan for nearly a decade. Our occupation there has nothing to do with capturing bin Laden, or even Al-Qa'eda as whole (they're gone).

Well, maybe Ackerman means we have to stop Afghanistan from being a safe haven for Al-Qa'eda. Too bad, that's also in Pakistan. We've known that for years, too.

Thus, as the Pentagon was making preparations for launching Operation Enduring Freedom, it was known even to its own experts in its intelligence community that the Pakistan army and its ISI were the creators and sponsors of not only the Taliban, but also of al-Qaeda, which emerged as the most dreaded jihadi terrorist organization of the world after bin Laden shifted from the Sudan to Jalalabad in Afghanistan in 1996, from where he subsequently moved to Kandahar.

Despite this, the US chose to rely on the Pakistan army and the ISI for logistics and intelligence support in its operation to wipe out the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the IIF. The army and President General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military dictator, who had sponsored and used jihadi terrorism in an attempt to achieve Pakistan's strategic objectives against India (destabilizing India and annexing Jammu and Kashmir) and Afghanistan (strategic depth), were sought to be projected as the US's stalwart ally in the "war against terrorism" and rewarded for their ostensible cooperation through the resumption of generous economic and military assistance, which had remained curtailed since the Pressler Amendment was invoked against Pakistan in 1990 for clandestinely developing a military nuclear capability and further cut after the Chagai nuclear tests of 1998 and the overthrow of the elected government headed by Nawaz Sharif, the then prime minister, by the army in October, 1999.

See? We know Al-Qa'eda and the Taliban are in Pakistan; we know they're supported by the Pakistani state. So why are we in Afghanistan? Are we planning on occupying it forever, just to make sure that we "molest" the hell out of bin Laden when he crosses the border next time? What's the decade-long hold up?

To be fair, Ackerman is only spinning another variation of the Al-Qa'eda excuse. We expected that. The real travesty here is this:

Now, if you want to say that “the one thing you don’t do is engage in a land war in Afghanistan,” congratulations, hippie! You’re now part of the antiwar movement in this country, so you might as well argue forthrightly for the Obama administration to pull out before Gen. Petraeus — who arrives in Kabul any minute now — has an opportunity to do whatever he can. [...]

You can criticize Obama’s decision to escalate that war. But you’ll also have to explain why muddling through or pulling out better serve U.S. interests against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And maybe you can make that case. But your fantasy of the Afghanistan war doesn’t inspire confidence.

Got that? If you question the US policy in Afghanistan, you're a "hippy!" You're not serious, just some jerk who doesn't want to give General  David Petraeus a fair shake. I mean really, what is the peace movement's strategy for Afghanistan? "Muddling through or pulling out." That it's, absolutely nothing more, just those two things.

This kind of bullshit is just outrageous. Surely Ackerman is aware of the beating the war is taking in congress.

The vote in the House last night was complex, involving amendments, self-executing rules, budgets and statutory and non-statutory caps. David Dayen has some of the rundown, though more of the story keeps coming out. However, the big news of the night to me and others organizing against escalation in Afghanistan was the vote on the McGovern amendment.

The McGovern amendment, if it had passed:

• Would require the president to provide a plan and timetable for drawing down our forces in Afghanistan and identify any variables that could require changes to that timetable.


• Would safeguard U.S. taxpayer dollars by ensuring all U.S. activity in Afghanistan be overseen by an Inspector General.


• Require the President to update Congress on the progress of that plan and timetable

If it had passed, that amendment would have been the beginning of the end of our war in Afghanistan, forcing the President to commit not just to a start of the drawdown – perhaps 2011 – but to and end of the war.

Does that sound like "muddling through or pulling out" to anyone? No, it's clearly a responsible timetable for ending the war as the conditions merit, with the addition of new regulations and benchmarks to ensure that any progress made during this timetable is sustainable for the long-term, to include the responsible use of taxpayer funds. Muddling through? Are you crazy?

It gets better. The McGovern amendment got 162 votes in the House, an incredible number of members going on the record in support of ending the war. That 162 includes such notable hippies as Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Rep. Jane Harman, and Rep. Bart Stupak.

And just what exactly is the new US commander, General Petraeus, supposed to do when he arrives in Kabul? Will he make Karzai less corrupt? Will Karzai become more legitimate? Will Pakistan end its national security strategy of support terrorists and militants? Will Afghans stop being killed by NATO forces, or will they just learn to love it? Will Petraeus personally ensure that every dollar goes to the right place, nothing is wasted or funneled to the Taliban? All of our troops will stop dying? How will Petraeus do this? OK, so he arrives in Kabul any minute now. Then what?

So what do we get out of all of this, from Steele's awkward comments to Ackerman's inexplicable reaction? Easy: The war in Afghanistan has nothing to do with the left, the right, liberal, conservative, socialist, fascist, Republican, Democrat, Independent, Green, Labour, Hawk, Pacifist.... These political concepts just don't mean anything in the context of this war.

If we go by the definitions of these ridiculous political terms, these nonsense buzzwords created and fueled by our media and politicians, then the entire field of US foreign policy becomes completely unintelligible. Put bluntly, it's gibberish. Baby talk.

Ending the war is just smart policy. The United States has absolutely nothing to gain from a war in Afghanistan. Nothing. There's no Al-Qa'eda there, we're not going to magically turn it into a thriving democracy and stalwart regional ally just because we send in a few more guys with guns. There's just nothing there for us. We could bring those troops home, so we're not scrambling around like idiots every time there's a wildfire in California or a hurricane in the Gulf. We could be spending much less than the trillions we're spending now, and we could use it to buy things we actually need. Jobs, infrastructure, energy, education, whatever it is you can think of, the US desperately needs it.

Ignore the partisan bickering. The facts show that the war is ruining the country, it is ruining Afghanistan and it is ruining Pakistan. It has to end, whether you're a progressive like Ackerman or a conservative like Steele.

Afghanistan: All Politics is Local --- Al-Qa'eda and the War (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes Rethink Afghanistan:

In our latest video from Rethink Afghanistan, we closed by asking, "Afghanistan got your attention now?" The answer is apparently a resounding YES.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Complexities: Insurgents, Reconciliation, and “Al Qa’eda” (Rodriguez/King)

As the US President's "emergency" war supplemental funding finally hobbles onto the floor for a vote in Congress, months after it was requested, it is facing furious opposition up to the last moment.  Republican and "Blue Dog" Democratic legislators are already being publicly exposed as hypocrites on fiscal responsibility, and that cry will only get louder if the spending is approved.

President Obama himself has faced a stinging rebuke from Congress for his comments about lawmakers' "obsession" with the war, and the Out of Afghanistan Caucus continues to chip away at what little appetite for war remains in congress.

Robert Naiman writes,, "While press reports suggest that when the dust settles, the Pentagon will have the war money, it's likely that a record number of Representatives will go on the record in opposition to open-ended war and occupation."

That's a big deal for those members of Congress, but we have to remember where this challenge is coming from. These may be progressive warriors and heroes of the peace movement, but they're also still craven politicians who spend every second of their free time begging folks (either you or a lobbyist, depending on who takes the initiative) to support them so they can remain in office.

And this is Democratic President Obama's war in Afghanistan, so the massive, highly-coordinated anti-war push in congress can't be pinned on the machinations of the Democratic party. There is no chance in hell the President's partisan apparatchiks would be managing this kind of opposition to the White House, which means this is entirely the work of grassroots citizens' movements. Even though we're talking about a massive war thousands of miles away in Afghanistan and Pakistan, "all politics is local," and it is average citizens who are making a difference.

Put bluntly, Americans are pissed off about the war, and Congress has absolutely no choice but to act upon that anger. But rest assured, supporters of the war are not going to quietly wind down their endless battle because of a little Congressional pushback. And if the past is any indication, when popular anger with the war reaches these prominent levels, war-makers will play the strongest, most sacred card they have: Al-Qa'eda.

The warnings are only effective if you buy into the official spin surrounding the Global War on Terror (GWOT), with the US engaged in war across the entire globe with a terrorist army called Al-Qa'eda. It brings to mind the disturbing vision of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. Almost for that reason alone, the warning of both President Bush and President Obama resonate powerfully with most Americans.

However, if you strip away the official spin, a reasonable and realistic understanding of the threat that Al-Qa'eda poses reveals that even this basic justification for the war in Afghanistan is just another hollow excuse for a useless and catastrophically expensive foreign occupation.

Right away, let's get rid of a little conventional wisdom. The commonly accepted defense against the Al-Qa'eda argument is that these terrorists are stupid. They can't build a working car bomb, they can't blow up their own pants on a plane, or they just wind up blowing up themselves.They're inept, and therefore less of a threat. That's a little too close to tempting fate if you ask me. It's practically daring the terrorists to do something. Bring it on, dummies!

But there are also many, many innocent dead people, mostly Muslims, who would likely love to quibble with the characterization of terrorists as incompetent, that is if they hadn't already been murdered by Al-Qa'eda. A bomb in Peshawar does the same thing a bomb in New York City does: it kills people. The fact that the US has lucked out on the last few attacks is no reason to dismiss the violence of which Al-Qa'eda is still quite capable.

My choice of language there, the "violence Al-Qa'eda is capable of", is itself laced with some unhelpful conventional wisdom. I am implying that Al-Qa'eda is a coherent organization, a rational actor engaging in policy. But that's not really true.

The key to understanding the true nature of Al-Qa'eda is right there in the name. Al-Qa'eda means "the base", but that's not base as in a military base. It is base as in database. It is a list of information, in this case, a global Rolodex of members of like-minded groups and individuals willing to engage in Jihad. It's a Craigslist for terrorism. Each "member" of Al-Qa'eda, whether that's the old guard like Zawahiri in Pakistan or newcomers like Shabaab in Somalia, signs on to a franchise, carrying with it certain responsibilities, and thus they become a member of Al-Qa'eda.

For example, there was an Islamic insurgent group operating in Algeria known as the GSPC. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States dramatically increased its counter-terrorism relationship with the Algerian government. This new support changed the tide of the civil war, and the GSPC was brought to its knees. Facing defeat, the GSPC signed on to Al-Qa'eda, and overnight the old insurgent group, GSPC, disappeared with the exception of a few marginalized fringe groups. Al-Qa'eda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was born.

Algerian recruits went to training camps in Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, etc. Some waged jihad in those countries (becoming what the US military's "foreign fighters"), while others returned with knowledge, applying their new training to fresh campaigns of commando raids and IEDs against their home government.

With the Al-Qa'eda franchise came other perks, of course, including connection to international organized crime networks (narcotics, weapons, and human trafficking) as well as the nourishing supply of hard currency from regional oil sheiks that only the Al-Qa'eda brand can deliver. But at no point is there any sort of rigid, hierarchical structure to the organization of Al-Qa'eda. It is not as if the leaders of AQIM take orders from Osama bin Laden, or that they all get together over a map and plan out the global Caliphate. It's membership in a club --- social networking for Jihadists.

What this means is that there technically is no such thing as "defeating Al-Qa'eda." Quite simply, there is nothing there to defeat. Andrew Exum writes:

In general, we Americans --- especially some of our friends on the American Right --- tend to overestimate the importance of what we do in comparison to what local actors do. (Iraq and Afghanistan, seriously, should have taught us better.) That doesn't mean we fold up our tents and head home: we just have to be realistic about what we can hope to achieve through the application of U.S. power, military force especially.

Another way of saying that: "All politics is local". In Algeria, there isn't really an Al-Qa'eda there for us to fight, there is the same religious insurgency, a local phenomenon, that was there before the franchise and will be there after the franchise. The "foreign fighters", whether that's Algerians in Pakistan or Pakistanis in Algeria, are products of their local conditions. To stop AQIM, you have to resolve the issues in Algeria. To stop Al-Qa'eda in Pakistan, you have to resolve the issues in Pakistan.

How do we do that? So far the United States has used the military, but as we see in Algeria, and indeed everywhere else, that only drives the local actors, the insurgent groups, extremists, criminals, etc. even closer to a relationship with Al-Qa'eda. It makes the local problem a global problem, exacerbating it beyond control.

The Al-Qa'eda franchise that the US is primarily concerned with is in Pakistan (almost none remain in Afghanistan). Just as expected, the military efforts there have solidified the relationship between Al-Qa'eda and the local actors, in this case the groups comprising the Taliban. As a consequence of assassinating the older, more pragmatic leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, many Taliban groups are led by younger, inexperienced commanders who are far more susceptible to the radicalism of Al-Qa'eda. The war has gone on so long now that many of the foreign fighters have stayed and intermarried into local communities, embedding their ideology firmly into the status quo.

So not only is the Taliban now closer to Al-Qa'eda, they become more indistinguishable with every new drone strike and special forces raid. To reduce the terrorist threat, the US has to do something besides use the military.

To stop the Taliban, they have to be approached as the local actors they are. For instance, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has supposedly opened negotiations with the Haqqani network, which is part of the "Pakistan Taliban", as opposed to the "Afghan Taliban" led by Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura. The Haqqani network is very much a radical Islamic militant group, but they are also an asset of the Pakistani military in their "strategic depth" against India (that is, they kill Indians). Their existence relies on support from the military, so when the Pakistani Army demanded they sever their ties with Al-Qa'eda, they did so.

At Foreign Policy's AfPak Channel, we see this [emphasis mine]:

Moreover, the relationship is reportedly strained because of the Haqqanis' ties to the Pakistani state -- an enemy of al-Qaeda. Pakistani authorities have conducted a number of raids on Haqqani compounds that house al-Qaeda men and supplies, but Haqqani fighters are often left untouched.[...]

Former and current Haqqani Network commanders say that their movement is closer to the Quetta Shura's nationalist rhetoric than al-Qaeda's vision of global jihad, but some members of the group espouse al-Qaeda-like language. The Haqqanis have avoided the anti-Pakistan rhetoric common to al-Qaeda and the TTP. In June 2006, Jalaluddin Haqqani's office released a letter arguing that attacking Pakistan "is not our policy. Those who agree with us are our friends and those who do not agree and [continue to wage] an undeclared war against Pakistan are neither our friends nor shall we allow them in our ranks." Sirajuddin Haqqani has gone further, explaining in an interview that he opposed "any attempt by Muslims to launch attacks in non-Muslim countries." In May 2009, he argued to two French journalists: "It is a mistake to think that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are pursuing the same aim. Al-Qaeda is trying to spread its influence throughout the world. This does not interest us. The Taliban's aim is to liberate Afghanistan from foreign troops."

But the Pakistani military's role doesn't stop the bleeding over of Al-Qa'eda's global ideology, particularly into the younger members of the organization. The Haqqani networks and its affiliates still supply foreign fighters and suicide bombers sympathetic to Al-Qa'eda operations, even if this isn't the express policy of the top leadership.

To reduce the extremism in Pakistan, the US has several options, none guaranteed to work, but also none nearly as damaging and horrific as its current policy of war. The Pakistani military's relationship with the Taliban must be destroyed, which requires a complete end to their national security strategy of "strategic depth," the use of terrorism and insurgencies against India. While the US cannot directly force the military to do this, they can engage exclusively with Pakistan's democratically-elected civilian government. This would empower the government, which has no desire for war with India, to rein in the Army and intelligence services and end their support of terrorism.

This would also allow the Pakistani state to fully extend its authority into Taliban territory, rather than simply cutting a deal with the militants. If Pakistani citizens in the farthest reaches of the tribal areas had the same rule of law (which is itself in dire need of reform) as Pakistanis in suburban Karachi, the environment that produces Al-Qa'eda sympathizers would be dramatically reduced. The US can influence this with development aid, encouragement of a proper education system, and assistance in sustainable energy projects.

Most importantly, the US can end its war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our policy provides the perfect narrative for Al-Qa'eda, as Londonstani writes:

Pakistani 1: "Western countries are trying to destroy Islam. They fear us more than the Chinese. We are the only people who have a system that challenges theirs. They know their system has failed, so they are trying to destroy us before everyone becomes Muslim. They have always hated us. They want to keep us poor. Our rulers have been bought by them. Our rulers sold us for big houses in London and New York. Now Western soldiers and contractors roam around our country looking for ways to steal from us and control us. We are paying the price. If we don't fight, they will rob us and leave us to die in the gutter."

Pakistani 2: "Peace is a good thing. You are a Muslim, right? We are all about peace. We love it. Fighting is not the answer. Peace is the answer. Just take it easy, be good and everything will sort itself out."

Presenting your ideas as part of a bigger picture is much more persuasive than just chucking them randomly out there. The ideology of Islamist extremism has a very effective big-picture story. On the other side, the narrative is a bit...well,... lacking.

We can't make them believe we're not violent, oppressive invaders, because we are violent, oppressive invaders. They're going to come up with loony "conspiracy theories" like the US supports the Taliban, because we support the Army and intelligence services which supports the Taliban. It's just that simple.

Having a reasonable, civilian-only foreign policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan is what will reduce the threat of Al-Qa'eda, not an expensive and bloody occupation. War feeds Al-Qa'eda, and it feeds the Taliban. The local issues must be addressed, primarily by local actors, and it must be done with transparency and legitimacy. The US should not support military despots in Islamabad or mafia chieftains in Kabul. The US should not be occupying Afghanistan or conducting air strikes and raids in Pakistan, nor should it allow the proliferation of private mercenary groups in these groups, which feed into the idea of the US as lawless invaders.

Obviously you can't completely eliminate the threat of terrorism. Terrorism is a crime, like robbery or murder. Reducing the number of individuals willing to engage in this crime can be done through policy choices, but there is clearly still a role for law enforcement agencies to play.

However, there is a difference between terrorism being a natural occurrence, and our overseas wars blatantly churning out new terrorist recruits. While terrorism will still exist, its scope and degree can be dramatically slashed simply by ending the US wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and lest we forget, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and everywhere else we're engaging in violent, military conflict with Al-Qa'eda affiliates (both real and imagined).

An end to the war is already in sight, not because of any powerful interference, but because local citizens pushed their representatives to block the president's escalation. Similarly, when the supporters of the intervention make their frightening warnings about Al-Qa'eda, the answer again is not war, but local solutions led by the citizens themselves, not the US. A change in US foreign policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a focus on development and rule of law instead of war, is what is required.

But before we can see that change, the war itself has to end. Just don't let them scare you with Al-Qa'eda.