UPDATED Afghanistan: At Least 45 Civilians Killed in Rocket Attack

UPDATE 27 July: From Reuters....

*Afghan government and NATO officials on Tuesday disputed each others' accounts of reports that over 50 civilians were killed after being caught up in fighting between foreign forces and Taliban insurgents.

Government spokesman Siamak Herawi said 52 people, many women and children, were killed by a NATO-rocket attack on Friday in Sangin, Helmand province, but the NATO-led force said a preliminary investigation had not yet revealed any civilian casualties....

Afghanistan LiveBlog: Wikileaks and The Truth About the US Occupation
Afghanistan: The Wikileaks “War Diary” of 91,000 Documents

Herawi said information that 52 civilians had been killed came from the country's intelligence service in the district.

Karzai strongly condemned the attack and asked NATO troops to prioritize the protection of civilians in their military campaign, his office said in a statement citing the same casualty figures for the attack.

ISAF, however, insisted that a joint investigation with the Afghan government had so far found no evidence of civilian deaths, while a provincial official suggested local residents could even have made it up....

An ISAF spokeswoman said the team was still in the area, trying to establish the truth.



"We take any civilian casualty very seriously but there was no report of operational activity in Rigi," said Lt. Cmdr. Katie Kendrick.*

Amidst the chatter over the Wikileaks "War Diary" of 91,000 documents on the military intervention in Afghanistan, Al Jazeera reports that a rocket attack on an Afghan village last Friday killed at least 45 civilians, including women and children.

Waheed Omar, a spokesman for Afghan President Hamid Karzai, said an investigation was underway to determine who was responsible for the attack in Sangin district in the southern province of Helmand.

According to witnesses, helicopter gunships fired on villagers who had been told by fighters to leave their homes, as a firefight with the International Security Assistance Force loomed.

According to witness accounts, men, women and children fled to Regey village and were fired on from helicopter gunships as they took cover.

Abdul Ghafar, 45, who said he lost "two daughters and one son and two sisters" in the attack, claimed that the gunship fired on areas of shelter: "Helicopters started firing on the compound killing almost everyone inside. We rushed to the house and there were eight children wounded and around 40 to 50 others killed.".

The BBC said it sent an Afghan reporter to Regey to interview residents, who described the attack and said they had buried 39 people.

Colonel Wayne Shanks, an ISAF spokesman, said the location of the reported deaths was "several kilometres away from where we had engaged enemy fighters". An investigation team dispatched after the casualty reports emerged "had accounted for all the rounds that were shot at the enemy....We found no evidence of civilian casualties."

Afghanistan LiveBlog: Wikileaks & The Truth About the US Occupation

UPDATE 2010 GMT: Nick Schifrin at ABC follows up on the angle that the Wikileaks documents show officials from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence aiding the Afghan insurgency.

Al Jazeera interviews the former head of ISI, General Hamid Gul, who denies the claims:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqkQKk9S_8E&feature=youtu.be[/youtube]

Afghanistan: At Least 45 Civilians Killed in Rocket Attack
Afghanistan: The Wikileaks “War Diary” of 91,000 Documents
General Kayani’s “Silent Coup” in Pakistan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Mull)

UPDATE 1655 GMT: And how is Afghan President Karzai using the Wikileaks "War Diary"? To turn attention to Pakistan: "The recent documents leaked out to the media clearly support and verify Afghanistan's all-time position that success over terrorism does not come with fighting in Afghan villages, but by targeting its sanctuaries and financial and ideological sources across the borders. Our efforts against terrorism will have no effect as long as these sanctuaries and sources remain intact."

UPDATE 1515 GMT: Amy Davidson in The New Yorker starts from one incident revealed in the Wikileaks document:

The Obama Administration has already expressed dismay that WikiLeaks publicized the documents, but a leak informing us that our tax dollars may be being used as seed money for a protection racket associated with a narcotics-trafficking enterprise is a good leak to have. And the checkpoint incident is, again, only one report, from one day. It will take some time to go through everything WikiLeaks has to offer—the documents cover the period from January, 2004, to December, 2009—but it is well worth it, especially since the war in Afghanistan is not winding down, but ramping up...."

And reaches this conclusion:

After more than eight years at war, how carefully are we even looking at Afghanistan? The [New York] Times had a piece in Sunday’s paper on the strange truth that our expenditure since 9/11 of a trillion dollars on two wars has barely scraped our consciousness. Fifty-eight Americans have died in Afghanistan so far this month; one of them—Edwin Wood, of Oklahoma—was eighteen years old. Maybe the WikiLeaks documents will make those numbers less abstract."

UPDATE 1455 GMT: Andrew Bacevich assesses in The New Republic:

"The real significance of the Wikileaks action is...[that] it shows how rapidly and drastically the notion of 'information warfare' is changing. Rather than being defined as actions undertaken by a government to influence the perception of reality, information warfare now includes actions taken by disaffected functionaries within government to discredit the officially approved view of reality. This action is the handiwork of subversives, perhaps soldiers, perhaps civilians. Within our own national security apparatus, a second insurgent campaign may well have begun. Its purpose: bring America’s longest war to an end. Given the realities of the digital age, this second insurgency may well prove at least as difficult to suppress as the one that preoccupies General Petraeus in Kabul."

And Andrew Sullivan on his Daily Dish blog:

When one weighs the extra terror risk from remaining in Afghanistan, the absurdity of our chief alleged ally actually backing the enemy, the impossibility of an effective counter-insurgency when the government itself is corrupt and part of the problem, the brutality of the enemy in intimidating the populace in ways no civilized occupying force can counter, the passage of ten years in which any real chance at success was squandered ... the logic for withdrawal to the more minimalist strategy originally favored by Obama after the election and championed by Biden thereafter seems overwhelming.

When will the president have the balls to say so?

UPDATE 1445 GMT: Simon Tisdall in The Guardian of London uses the documents to write, "How the US is Losing the Battle for Hearts and Minds".

Meanwhile we have posted on a specific incident on Friday which demonstrates the complications of military intervention and that supposed battle for hearts and minds, "At Least 45 Civilians Killed in Rocket Attack".

UPDATE 1145 GMT: The BBC is working the angle, "Cases of Afghan civilians allegedly killed by British troops have been revealed among thousands of leaked US military documents....The records include references to at least 21 incidents involving UK troops. The Ministry of Defence said it had been unable to verify the claims and it would not speculate on specific cases."

UPDATE 1140 GMT: Wikileaks director Julian Assange is currently holding a press conference. Take-away quotes: "The course of the war needs to change. The manner in which it needs to change is not yet clear"; "It’s war, it’s one damn thing after another. It is the continuous small events."

UPDATE 0920 GMT: "The Afghan government is shocked with the report that has opened the reality of the Afghan war," said spokesman Siamak Herawi.

UPDATE 26 July 0910 GMT: The White House has issued a far-from-surprising response to the Wikileaks "War Diary". National Security Adviser General James Jones said such classified information "could put the lives of Americans and our partners at risk".

(Older readers may remember that the "national security" line was the response put out by the Nixon White House when the "Pentagon Papers" on the Vietnam War were published in 1971.)

And by the way, Jones added --- repeating a line put out by White House officials within hours of the story breaking --- the episode has little to do with us: the documents cover 2004 to 2009, before President Obama "announced a new strategy with a substantial increase in resources for Afghanistan".

UPDATE 2205 GMT: Simon Tisdall in The Guardian has a different approach based on the documents: "Iran is engaged in an extensive covert campaign to arm, finance, train and equip Taliban insurgents, Afghan warlords allied to al-Qaida and suicide bombers fighting to eject British and western forces from Afghanistan, according to classified US military intelligence reports contained in the war logs."

UPDATE 2155 GMT: Der Spiegel has posted a full package of articles. It also has an exposé of the Pakistan connection with the Taliban but also considers "German Naivety" with "trouble in the growing north" and profiles "Task Force 373", the US "black" unit hunting down targets for death or detention (the Guardian also has an article on the unit). It also has the first critiques of American operations: one on drones --- "the flaws of the silent killer" --- and one on "The Shortcomings of US Intelligence Services".

UPDATE 2145 GMT: The second New York Times article is a snapshot of Combat Outpost Keating:

"The outpost’s fate, chronicled in unusually detailed glimpses of a base over nearly three years, illustrates many of the frustrations of the allied effort: low troop levels, unreliable Afghan partners and an insurgency that has grown in skill, determination and its ability to menace."

UPDATE 2140 GMT: The first New York Times special report based on the Wikileaks documents focuses not on American but Pakistani involvement:

Americans fighting the war in Afghanistan have long harbored strong suspicions that Pakistan’s military spy service has guided the Afghan insurgency with a hidden hand, even as Pakistan receives more than $1 billion a year from Washington for its help combating the militants, according to a trove of secret military field reports to be made public Sunday.

The documents, to be made available by an organization called WikiLeaks, suggest that Pakistan, an ostensible ally of the United States, allows representatives of its spy service to meet directly with the Taliban in secret strategy sessions to organize networks of militant groups that fight against American soldiers in Afghanistan, and even hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders.

Taken together, the reports indicate that American soldiers on the ground are inundated with accounts of a network of Pakistani assets and collaborators that runs from the Pakistani tribal belt along the Afghan border, through southern Afghanistan, and all the way to the capital, Kabul.

Much of the information — raw intelligence and threat assessments gathered from the field in Afghanistan— cannot be verified and likely comes from sources aligned with Afghan intelligence, which considers Pakistan an enemy, and paid informants. Some describe plots for attacks that do not appear to have taken place.



But many of the reports rely on sources that the military rated as reliable."

UPDATE 2130 GMT: The New York Times has now posted a few of the documents and its first article on "The War Logs" of Wikileaks. The take-away points:

¶ The Taliban have used portable heat-seeking missiles against allied aircraft, a fact that has not been publicly disclosed by the military. This type of weapon helped the Afghan mujahedeen defeat the Soviet occupation in the 1980s.

¶ Secret commando units like Task Force 373 — a classified group of Army and Navy special operatives — work from a “capture/kill list” of about 70 top insurgent commanders. These missions, which have been stepped up under the Obama administration, claim notable successes, but have sometimes gone wrong, killing civilians and stoking Afghan resentment.

¶ The military employs more and more drone aircraft to survey the battlefield and strike targets in Afghanistan, although their performance is less impressive than officially portrayed. Some crash or collide, forcing American troops to undertake risky retrieval missions before the Taliban can claim the drone’s weaponry.

¶ The Central Intelligence Agency has expanded paramilitary operations inside Afghanistan. The units launch ambushes, order airstrikes and conduct night raids. From 2001 to 2008, the C.I.A. paid the budget of Afghanistan’s spy agency and ran it as a virtual subsidiary.

Over all, the documents do not contradict official accounts of the war. But in some cases the documents show that the American military made misleading public statements — attributing the downing of a helicopter to conventional weapons instead of heat-seeking missiles or giving Afghans credit for missions carried out by Special Operations commandos.



White House officials vigorously denied that the Obama administration had presented a misleading portrait of the war in Afghanistan.

---
Nick Davies and David Leigh write for The Guardian of London:

A huge cache of secret US military files today provides a devastating portrait of the failing war in Afghanistan, revealing how coalition forces have killed hundreds of civilians in unreported incidents, Taliban attacks have soared and NATO commanders fear neighbouring Pakistan and Iran are fuelling the insurgency.

The disclosures come from more than 90,000 records of incidents and intelligence reports about the conflict obtained by the whistleblowers' website Wikileaks in one of the biggest leaks in US military history. The files, which were made available to the Guardian, the New York Times and the German weekly Der Spiegel, give a blow-by-blow account of the fighting over the last six years, which has so far cost the lives of more than 320 British and over 1,000 US troops.

Their publication comes amid mounting concern that Barack Obama's "surge" strategy is failing and as coalition troops hunt for two US navy sailors captured by the Taliban south of Kabul on Friday.

The war logs also detail:

• How a secret "black" unit of special forces hunts down Taliban leaders for "kill or capture" without trial.

• How the US covered up evidence that the Taliban has acquired deadly surface-to-air missiles.

• How the coalition is increasingly using deadly Reaper drones to hunt and kill Taliban targets by remote control from a base in Nevada.

• How the Taliban has caused growing carnage with a massive escalation of its roadside bombing campaign, which has killed more than 2,000 civilians to date.

In a statement, the White House said the chaotic picture painted by the logs was the result of "under-resourcing" under Obama's predecessor, saying: "It is important to note that the time period reflected in the documents is January 2004 to December 2009."

The White House also criticised the publication of the files by Wikileaks: "We strongly condemn the disclosure of classified information by individuals and organisations, which puts the lives of the US and partner service members at risk and threatens our national security. Wikileaks made no effort to contact the US government about these documents, which may contain information that endanger the lives of Americans, our partners, and local populations who co-operate with us."

The logs detail, in sometimes harrowing vignettes, the toll on civilians exacted by coalition forces: events termed "blue on white" in military jargon. The logs reveal 144 such incidents. Some of these casualties come from the controversial air strikes that have led to Afghan government protests in the past, but a large number of previously unknown incidents also appear to be the result of troops shooting unarmed drivers or motorcyclists out of a determination to protect themselves from suicide bombers. At least 195 civilians are admitted to have been killed and 174 wounded in total, although this is likely to be an underestimate because many disputed incidents are omitted from the daily snapshots reported by troops on the ground and then collated, sometimes erratically, by military intelligence analysts.

General Kayani's "Silent Coup" in Pakistan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Pakistan's General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the man over whom our leaders in Washington fawn and who sits atop the intensely destabilizing "Strategic Depth" networks in Afghanistan, has just been handed an extension of his term:

The Pakistani government on Thursday gave the country's top military official, army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, another three years in his post, a move that analysts said would bolster Pakistan's anti-terrorism fight and cement its role in neighboring Afghanistan.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani announced the extension in a late-night televised address to the nation. "To ensure the success of these [counter-terrorism] operations, it is the need of the hour that the continuity of military leadership should be maintained," he said.

The impact on our war in Afghanistan is obvious.  Call it "strategic depth" or "cementing its role": it all adds up to influence on Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qa'eda, and the future of all of these players in Afghanistan.

The crux of the development is that Kayani's extension is bad news for us, due to his cozy relationship with militants and terrorist organizations, as well as his undermining of the democratically-elected civilian government. But the details are important, especially as they could mean the difference between uncontrolled escalation and our planned military withdrawal from Afghanistan.

For the complete picture, a look at what a few experts (read: bloggers) are saying to determine the good, the bad, and the ugly ramifications that Kayani's extension has on the US war in Afghanistan.

For the good news, we have Shuja Nawaz writing for the New Atlanticist [emphasis mine]:

A major advantage that might accrue is that the certainty provided by the new term for the army chief will allow the civilian government to become confident in asserting itself in policy matters, knowing that the army chief will not overtly intervene in its affairs. This may help strengthen political institutions. At the same time, civilians must resist the temptation to turn to the army to lead the battle against militancy (a national endeavor not purely a military one) or to arbitrate differences on the political field.

These three years should also give Kayani time to assess the present Higher Defense Organization of Pakistan and perhaps come up with a more devolved structure for the army and a better system of command and control at the center. One possible scenario may include regional and centralized commands at four-star rank, appointed by the same authority who selects the service chiefs, and a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with real powers to regulate all the services while acting as the main military advisor of the government. This approach has been taken by the United States and many other modern militaries, so it would hardly be unprecedented. Without having a stake in the chairman's position in 2013, Kayani may be able to provide a dispassionate plan for the government to decide, well in advance of the next round of promotions in 2013. Any proposal that he presents as a disinterested party will have credibility and will also help override the parochial concerns of the army relative to the other services in Pakistan.

It would be more than good news, it would be great news, if Kayani did work to minimize the role of the military in government, and created a civilian-military relationship similar to the US. But that only works if the first part of the statement is true: Kayani's interference in politics ceases, allowing the civilian government to become more confident.

That's where the bad news comes in. This is not a case of the Army backing away from its role in politics. it is, in fact, a craven arrangement with the ruling political party. Arif Rafiq writes at AfPak Channel [emphasis mine]:

Perceptions aside, three more years of Kayani could conceivably provide continuity to both Pakistan's military and political setup. In recent months, the consensus in Pakistan was that Kayani would receive a two-year extension. Gilani's choice of three years was a surprise. But not by mere coincidence, Gilani's government also has three years remaining in its tenure. And so it's certainly possible that there is a deal between Gilani's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Kayani, perhaps involving foreign guarantors, to let this ship sail for three more years (with Gilani wearing the captain's hat steering an imaginary wheel and Kayani actually in control). Indeed, Gilani alluded to a possible deal when he said today that Pakistan's four major "stakeholders" -- the president, prime minister, army chief, and Supreme Court chief justice -- are in a "secure position" till 2013. [...]

And so for Kayani, who has managed to become the darling of many of Pakistan's nationalists and Islamists, there is some risk involved in continuing for another three years as army chief. If he ties himself too close to the PPP, he -- and more importantly, the Pakistani Army -- could lose a critical support base and sink along with the current government, unless he maintains a political distance and continues to pursue a semi-nationalist security policy.

Gilani projects a false sense of confidence in the viability of Pakistan's current political-military setup. This is Pakistan. The Kayani extension provides a short-term ceasefire between the PPP and the army, but it will also likely produce re-alignments among its fractious power brokers. And another head-on clash between any two of them is not far from reality.

Cutting a deal with the ruling elites of the status quo to stay in power is not the same as Kayani becoming a "disinterested party" in the government. That's not a democratic government, it's a puppet. In that sense Kayani's extension could be considered another in Pakistan's long history of military coups, albeit a silent one. This will agitate the opposition parties, namely the PML-N, and the Islamist party would not be out of line to call for new, early elections, simply as a way of "re-checking" the legitimacy of the PPP-Kayani government.

But that's not the worst part for the US war in Afghanistan. Pakistan's internal politics are important to us, but it's Kayani's national security and foreign policy that have truly ugly implications for the US. B. Raman writes on his blog [emphasis mine]:

In the counter-insurgency operations against the TTP he has had partial successes in the Swat Valley, South Waziristan, Bajaur and Orakzai agencies. Under his leadership, the Army has been able to deny the TTP territorial control in these areas, but has not been able to destroy their capability for terrorist strikes and commando-style raids in tribal as well as non-tribal areas. While arresting some leaders of the Afghan Taliban, who were living in Karachi and other non-tribal areas, he has avoided action against the Afghan Taliban leadership operating from the tribal areas.

He has avoided any action against Al Qaeda elements which have taken sanctuary in the non-tribal areas. Under Musharraf, the Army and the ISI were much more active against Al Qaeda in the non-tribal areas than they have been under Kayani. The anger of Al Qaeda and its associates against Musharraf because of the action taken by the Army and the ISI was responsible for the virulent campaign of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri against Musharraf and the Army. They abused Musharraf as apostate, collaborator of the Hindus etc and thrice tried to kill him---once in Karachi and twice in Rawalpindi. Compared to that, there is hardly any Al Qaeda campaign against Kayani. There is a greater threat to Mr.Zardari from Al Qaeda than to Kayani. The Army and the ISI have managed to create an impression in the tribal areas that Mr.Zardari and not Gen.Kayani is responsible for the facilities extended to the US for its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the tribal areas. Since Gen.Kayani took over, while many Al Qaeda leaders have been killed in the tribal areas by the Drone strikes, there have been very few arrests of Al Qaeda elements in the non-tribal areas. Al Qaeda feels more secure in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan today than it was under Musharraf.

If you missed that, let me spell it out for you: Kayani's extension is good for Al-Qa'eda. Yes, that Al-Qa'eda. The terrorist guys.

Then there's all that other stuff about the Afghan Taliban - Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura in Balochistan, as well as the Haqqani network, who are responsible for the vast majority of terrorist and insurgent attacks on our US troops in Afghanistan.

How does the US feel about this? Nawaz:

The United States has studiously avoided taking a public position but conversations with U.S. diplomats and military officials over the past few months indicated their deep interest in the future of General Kayani and a noticeable desire to see him remain at the helm of affairs in Pakistan.

Rafiq:

Some of Pakistan's nationalist and Islamist commentators have also reacted with suspicion toward Kayani's extension, describing it as a result of Hillary Clinton's "lobbying"

Raman:

Kayani is thought of well both by the Pentagon and the PLA leadership

And a flashback to Sue Pleming's report on Kayani's visit to Washington:

Guests crowded around Kayani at the annual Pakistani National Day party at the embassy, posing for photos and jostling for the military leader’s ear.[...]

U.S. senators and Obama administration officials lined up to speak to the slim and dapper general, who Pakistani media say rules the roost back home but is also central to U.S. relations with Islamabad.

Damn, we really love this guy. What are we thinking? Whatever it is we like about him --- his style, his centred demeanour, his subtle hand in politics - General Kayani is still just another military dictator, another crook in a long line of corrupt, tyrannical, warmongering thugs. He is not our ally, not our friend, and his extension, now a full-fledged dictatorship complete with a compliant, ruling political party, is just plain bad news for the United States.

The US must immediately end all military aid to Pakistan, and should pursue sanctions against the ruling elites in the PPP until such time as their government can prove its legitimacy by way of free and fair democratic elections. Barring such extreme measures, the US must engage exclusively with Pakistan's civilian government, while working toward greater inclusion of opposition parties like the PML-N (who are presently too close to radical Saudi Arabia, and could stand to be moderated with more international influence).

More importantly, the US must end its war in Afghanistan. Not only is not in our interests to fight a civil war in Afghanistan, but it is even less in our interests to have our US troops used as pieces in Kayani's personal chessboard. Our troops fight and die for our national defense, not for Kayani's insane militarist objectives against India. Pakistan is catastrophically unstable, and US military leaders are moving to escalate our involvement. Further war in the region will prove to be disastrous for the US.

Reforming our relations with the Pakistani government can be slow and doesn't have to be as extreme as an immediate freeze. The PPP government can be allowed time and support to again free themselves of Kayani's control, such as when they tried to grab control of the ISI, Pakistan's terror-supporting spy agency, in 2008. But we cannot wait to end the war in Afghanistan.

The war puts Americans in danger, it is destroying our economy, and now with Kayani's empowerment, our objectives in Afghanistan become all the more hopeless and impossible. We have to bring our troops home, get them out of this civil war in Afghanistan and proxy war with Pakistan, and only then can we move on to accomplishing our objectives, be they counter-terrorism, development, or human rights.

We must end this war now, lest one more US soldier die so that General Kayani can "cement his role" in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Document: Foreign Troops Out by 2014? (Owen/Brady)

Jonathan Owen and Brian Brady write for The Independent of London (note the lack of clarity as to whether the document covers US troops):

British troops are to pull out of Afghanistan by 2014, under a secret blueprint for drawing down coalition forces that is set to begin in a matter or months, it emerged last night. A leaked communiqué – a copy of which has been seen by The Independent on Sunday – reveals how President Hamid Karzai will announce the timetable for a "conditions-based and phased transition" at the International Conference on Afghanistan to be held in Kabul on Tuesday.

Afghanistan: The Failing Strategy to Train Local Forces (Owen/Brady)

The meeting --- which is set to map out the way ahead for the war-torn country --- will be attended by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, and foreign ministers from more 70 countries. An agreed version of the document, marked "not for circulation", was sent to senior diplomats yesterday by Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Special Representative in Afghanistan.

It states: "The international community expressed its support for the President of Afghanistan's objective that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) should lead and conduct military operations in all provinces by the end of 2014." This comes just weeks after Mr Hague hinted that British troops could leave by 2014, and is the first formal confirmation of the timescale that governments have been working towards behind the scenes to agree in recent months."

The communiqué goes on to pledge that the international community will continue to "provide the support necessary to increase security during this time, and the continued support in training, equipping and providing interim financing to the ANSF at every level to take on the task of securing their country". It adds: "The government of Afghanistan and the international community agreed to jointly assess provinces, with the aim of announcing by the end of 2010 that the process of transition is under way."

The announcement is one of many issues surrounding development and governance that will be addressed at the conference, as well as an $800m (£523m) five-year Afghan peace and reintegration programme that "aims to reintegrate in five years up to 36,000 ex-combatants and to reach 4,000 communities in 220 districts of 22 provinces". The document also outlines short-term goals for coalition troops. These include combating the opium trade by maintaining the provinces that are currently free of drug cultivation, and increasing the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan to 24 within 12 months. It also describes transparent elections in future as a matter of paramount importance.

President Karzai will tell delegates that the conference represents "a turning point" in Afghanistan's "transition to an era of Afghan-led peace, justice and more equitable development". He will also pledge that "expanding the day-to-day choices and capabilities of the Afghan people and ensuring their fundamental rights" will "remain the cornerstones of my government's approach to peace-building and comprehensive recovery".

A senior source in the British military confirmed yesterday that the blueprint was "a significant map laying out the stages on the way to withdrawal". He said: "The British government has been talking in terms of a 2014 withdrawal, but nobody has been able to produce a timetable identifying how and when things would happen. This document demonstrates that there is a will in the international community to have it done by then.

Read rest of article....

Afghanistan-Pakistan Complexities: Insurgents, Reconciliation, and "Al Qa'eda" (Rodriguez/King)

An interesting article, at many levels, from Alex Rodriguez and Laura King of the Los Angeles Times. It' s interesting not only for the information but the complexities which the reporters are trying to navigate: the links between Pakistani and Afghan groups, the links within Afghanistan, the clear efforts by officials and analysts to "spin" the story properly, and the never-absent spectre of "Al Qa'eda":

Prospects for an effort by Pakistan to broker a reconciliation between the government of neighboring Afghanistan and a violent wing of the Afghan Taliban depend on overcoming a major obstacle: severing long-standing relations between the militant group and Al Qaeda.

Afghanistan: A Winnable War? (Kagan & Kagan)

U.S. officials acknowledge that Pakistan has begun trying to seed a rapprochement between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Haqqani network, a branch of the Afghan Taliban that uses Pakistan to launch attacks on U.S., NATO and Afghan forces.

Driving Pakistan's effort is a desire to increase its influence over the government in Kabul and diminish any future role its archrival to the east, India, may have there once the U.S. begins pulling troops out, a withdrawal scheduled to start next summer.

The U.S. hopes that a combination of military pressure and inducements will entice some rank-and-file Taliban fighters to come over to the government side, but it has been cautious about Karzai's plans to reach out to Taliban commanders. It is likely to resist any deal Pakistan brokers in which the Haqqani network does not break ties with Al Qaeda, which date to the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan two decades ago.

In the meantime, the U.S. has targeted the organization's hideouts in the Pakistani tribal region of North Waziristan with drone strikes. Military officials also say they have taken the initiative against Haqqani fighters on the ground in eastern Afghanistan.

Experts say both Pakistan and Afghanistan realize that breaking the Haqqani network's ties with Al Qaeda is a prerequisite to any deal. They question whether it would ever happen.

Amir Rana, one of Pakistan's leading analysts on militant groups, said it's not possible for many militant groups, including the Haqqani network, to completely separate from Al Qaeda.

"What the Haqqani network and the other Taliban groups can offer is a guarantee that they will influence Al Qaeda to not attack U.S. or NATO forces, and a guarantee that their soil would not be used in a terrorist attack against the West," he said. "This is the maximum concession that the Taliban can offer."

Numbering in the thousands of fighters, the Haqqani network has a strong relationship with Pakistan's military and intelligence community that stretches 30 years, back to the time when Pashtun warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani organized mujahedin fighters against Soviet troops in the 1980s. Haqqani has now delegated authority over his network of fighters to his son, Sirajuddin.

The group moves freely between Afghanistan's eastern provinces and its headquarters in North Waziristan, where it has been left untouched by Pakistan's military. Experts believe the Haqqani network continues to provide Al Qaeda leaders and commanders sanctuary there.

U.S. leaders have frequently urged Pakistan to launch an offensive against Haqqani hideouts, recently backing those entreaties with evidence that the network was behind major attacks in Kabul and at Bagram air base, the U.S. facility north of the capital. The government in Islamabad, meanwhile, has brushed aside those demands, arguing that its forces are overstretched by extensive military operations against Taliban strongholds in surrounding tribal areas.

Analysts and former Pakistani military commanders, however, say the real reason that Islamabad has avoided military action against the Haqqani network is that it sees the group and other Afghan Taliban elements as a useful hedge against India's rapidly growing interests in Afghanistan.

Haqqani leaders have yet to signal whether they are interested in starting talks with Karzai's government.

In a report issued Monday, Jeffrey Dressler of the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington research organization, said the Haqqani group's ties to Al Qaeda were much closer than those of many other Taliban groups, and he expressed doubt that they could be broken.

Read rest of article....