Afghanistan Projection: Pakistan's "Strategic Depth" & Endless War (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mullis the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

If everything works out perfectly in our counterinsurgency strategy, or if congress forces a binding timetable in line with popular support, the United States will begin slowly drawing down its forces in Afghanistan in July 2011. It's only the start, it will be tremendously slow, and the military leadership will likely fight it every step of the way (if Iraq is any indication, that is).

Afghanistan: Republican Chairman Steele Stumbles, “Progressive” Reaction Fumbles (Mull)

July 2011. That's one year from now --- 12 months. If June's casualty numbers remain constant, more than a thousand Americans wi'll die before then, at minimum another $80 billion will be spent, and then we just start leaving. After that there's no clear evidence of exactly how long it will take before the US has completely removed its military presence from Afghanistan, and possibly Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, etc., although there's no evidence we're planning on leaving those places either.

This is a good thing. It's good that Congress is starting to listen to its constituents, and is taking action to hold President Obama to his timetable for withdrawal. Afghanistan is America's longest war, and with such ethereal objectives as "stability" and "preventing safe havens for extremism", the war can seem endlessly un-winnable, stretching on for decades as long as we're content to let it happen. That we have a goal in sight, July 2011, is absolutely a victory.

Unfortunately, it's not good enough. Pakistan's national security policy of supporting terrorist groups and militias as proxies against India, known as "strategic depth", is accelerating out of control, and they are either deliberately or inadvertently engineering a globalized religious war, a clash of civilisations. Both terrorist and insurgent elements are evolving, with the Taliban co-opting Al-Qa'eda's idea of religious war to legitimize its fight against the Pakistani state, and Al-Qa'eda in turn co-opting the Taliban's objective of confronting India to legitimize the sub-continent as the premier theater of global jihad. Hawkish India, for one, will not take these developments lightly.

If pressure on Congress is not increased, if the US remains on the slow, ambiguous timetable it is on now, it will be caught right in the middle of this clash. The bloodbath of Iraq in 2006 was only a preview of what will happen if there is a civil war in Pakistan, or a (nuclear?) war between Pakistan and India. Or both. If the US does not expedite its withdrawal, as well as dramatically reform its policies toward the region as a whole, we will very quickly be sucked into that conflagration.

"Strategic Depth", Pakistan's support of militants, is a carefully crafted national security strategy. However, it is easiest to understand in the context of state-sponsored terrorism. During the 1970s and 1980s, many Arab governments supported terrorist groups as a form of internal security. The oppressive Arab dictators would facilitate terrorist recruiting and training so long as they went off to wage jihad in Lebanon, or Palestine, or Israel, or anywhere else but at home. In doing so, they ensured that any violent radicals were engaged elsewhere, while clinging to scraps of Islamic legitimacy for their brutal police states. It is "strategic depth" for domestic purposes.

Pakistan's calculation is just the same, only adapted to military and foreign policy. Pakistan is able to wage a war against India through terrorism and militancy (Taliban puppets in Kabul, Lashkar-e-Taipa puppets at home), while maintaining some legitimacy with its own constituency (elite Punjabi Pakistanis). Furthermore, Pakistan's military-owned industries are able to win massive amounts of contracts and investments from the US and China among others, and in return offer up meaningless victories (capturing an Al-Qa'eda commander for the Americans, shutting down a Uighur training camp for the Chinese). All the while the Army safely maintains its truly-important insurgent assets for use against India. It is state-sponsored terrorism as foreign policy, and it's been very successful for them so far.

But the terrorists and militants themselves also benefit from this relationship, and they may now be adapting beyond the control of the Pakistani military and intelligence services. Just as the Arab governments discovered, state-sponsored terrorism always comes back to bite you. Syria learned from Lebanon, Egypt learned from the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Saudis learned from Al-Qa'eda that it is only a matter of time before the militants turn on you. In the same way, the Taliban is now turning from the US in Afghanistan and onto the Pakistani state.

We see this in the recent attack on a Sufi Muslim shrine in Lahore, Pakistan. Sufi are the majority in Pakistan, centered in its Punjab region with the country's elite. The Taliban, with their Deoband Islam, are in the minority, focused in the Pashtun tribal areas. The shrine bombing shows that Al-Qa'eda's idea of war for Islamic purity has taken hold within the Taliban, and they are able to pivot from a local liberation movement fighting the Americans to a religious jihad against the Pakistani state as represented by the heretical Sufi Islam.

China Hand writes:

Beyond the demands of Deobandi faith, igniting a religious struggle against popular Sufism is almost a tactical necessity. Fighting against the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps is not the same as battling the NATO and U.S. unbelievers in Afghanistan.

The Pakistan Taliban are locked in a battle with the military forces of an Islamic state and need the trappings of a sustained Islamic religious struggle inside Pakistan in order to sustain its legitimacy, motivate its followers, and divide its opposition.

In fact, attacking Sufi religious practices is probably integral to the entire Taliban strategy of polarizing Pakistani society by attacking a weak link—the popular but difficult to defend (on strict Islamic terms) worship of local saints whose interred bodies reputedly have magic powers.

The central province of Punjab hosts several important Sufi shrines, raising the terrifying specter of attacks on heterodox religious practices in Pakistan’s heartland by an ostentatiously righteous, militant, and ascendant religious group whose stated mission is to rescue Islam not only from the West but from idolatry within its own ranks.

And, as a reading of Sikan indicates, challenging popular Sufism also means challenging the authority of the custodians who obtained legitimacy, wealth, and power from their control of the shrines and promises to link the Taliban to a populist, anti-elitist message that may find resonance in the impoverished areas of Pakistan far beyond its Pashtun base.

There's not much hope that even the Sufi majority can withstand an open civil war against the Deobandi minority:

If the conflict comes, the [Sufi] are likely to be outgunned.

The Pashtun Deobandi are militant, supported by zakat (Islamic charity contributions) from Saudi Arabia, and have numerous friends and supporters within Pakistan’s security apparatus.

The pacifist, underfunded, and underorganized Barelvi—with the exception of the reliably violent MQM in Karachi—appear to be reliant upon Pakistan’s rickety and equivocal civilian government to take the battle to the Taliban.

Those numerous friends and supporters within the security apparatus is the "strategic depth," the state sponsorship. That sponsorship may have given them enough strength to finally ignite an all-out civil war. At that point we are no longer talking about isolated Pashtun insurgencies and rural-urban disparities, we are looking at the complete collapse of Pakistan as a recognizable entity. Like Iraq, Pakistan is a wealthy, militarized, and industrialized society and the consequences of its shattered social fabric will be hell on earth. Only Pakistan also happens to have an extensive nuclear weapons arsenal. Iraq, famously, did not.

In addition to the Taliban, the Pakistani Al-Qa'eda franchises have also adapted with the support of "strategic depth". They are now carrying out attacks against targets in India, claiming other Pakistan-supported militant attacks as their own, or both.

From Raman's Strategic Analysis:

There are two types of messages purporting to be from Al Qaeda relating to India. The first are video or audio messages of Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri relating to the global jihad and the global intifada in which there are references to India, including Kashmir. These have been authenticated by Western intelligence agencies on the basis of voice recognition. They are in the form of general criticism of India or general threats and not specific.

The second are messages claiming responsibility on behalf of [Al Qaeda fil Hind, "Al-Qaeda in India"] for specific acts of terrorism in India such as the Mumbai suburban train explosions of July 2006, the Mumbai terrorist strikes of 26/11 and the Pune German bakery explosion and warning of future acts of terrorism against global sports events in India. These are messages circulated through the Internet or through phone calls by persons whose voices could not be identified. There is no way of establishing the authenticity of these messages. We must take them seriously for further investigation and strengthening physical security. At the same time, we should take care not to walk into any trap of the ISI to divert suspicion away from the LET and other Pakistani jihadi organizations and from the ISI for serious acts of terrorism in Indian territory by creating an impression that those were carried out by Al Qaeda.

So there's no concrete evidence that Al-Qa'eda in India exists as of yet, but the perception that it does exist is growing. Even if it is Pakistani intelligence services trying to create a mythical Al-Qa'eda, that doesn't change the fact that each new terrorist attack in India will be seen as a victory for Al-Qa'eda's jihad. And with each new "victory" come new "foreign fighters" willing to take up arms. The myth becomes reality, whether you want it to or not. And not only in India, but in Kashmir as well.

Eric Randolph writes:

On 15 June, Al Qaeda announced that it has a new branch, Al Qaeda in Kashmir (AQK), according to a report in Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor [subscription needed]. The group is apparently led by Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri, who claimed responsibility for the February bombing of the German Bakery in Pune, India. [...]

The announcement of AQK is significant, however, since it shows Al Qaeda trying to bolster what it clearly thinks is an emerging front in the global jihad: India. The LeT have already shown an interest in extending anti-Indian militancy beyond localised issues such as Kashmir. The LeT opposes India not just because of specific policies and actions, but for its very existence - as a perceived enemy of Islam. Hence, attacks such as those in Mumbai, as well as earlier bombings in which it is likely to have played a role, strike at symbols of India’s success – its economic growth and its acceptance into the global (i.e. Western) community. The appearance of the Al Qaeda brand name in the region is part of this process: framing the conflict between India and Pakistan as a global, ahistorical phenomenon, divorced from immediate political concerns and thus insulating the jihad from any progress in negotiations between the two governments.  Who belongs to which group is less important than the symbolism that this latest development suggests.

Al-Qa'eda can fully open the entire sub-continent as a theater for jihad, and coupled with the collapse of nuclear-armed Pakistan and the presumable Indian military response, we have the Clash of Civilizations. Pakistan vs India becomes Islam vs the Hindu Superpower. And stuck right there in the middle of it is 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan, soon to be controlled by a Taliban-Karzai power-sharing government, a puppet of Pakistan's "strategic depth". To say it will be ugly is an epic understatement.

We may be in the process of pulling ourselves back from the brink of endless war in Afghanistan, but that doesn't stop anyone else from sucking us back in. Whatever our pretensions about 9/11 and denying terrorists a safe haven in Afghanistan, there's no turning back once we've been sucked into a massive blowout on the sub-continent.

Congress must be forced to not only institute a binding timetable for the President, but to accelerate that timetable in every conceivable way possible. Funding must be cut, programs discontinued, missions aborted. Nothing the US could (doubtfully) accomplish before July 2011 will change the events in Pakistan and India. We can eradicate the corruption in Kandahar, but that won't deter the Deobandi-Sufi civil war in Pakistan. We can install perfect governments-in-a-box in every single province in Afghanistan, it won't stop Al-Qa'eda from waging its jihad in Kashmir and India. We can't afford the blood and treasure that the war is costing now, much less if it explodes across the region.

The US must accelerate its withdrawal timetable, but it also must dramatically reform its policy toward Pakistan. Waiting another year before beginning to leave Afghanistan is also another year spent dumping billions of dollars and sophisticated military technology into the hands of Pakistan's military and intelligence services, those most responsible for the stoking the civil war and terrorism with their "strategic depth." The US must engage with and empower the democratically elected civilian government. It is they who must be strengthened in the battle against extremism, not the Army and ISI. But even this is simply taking yet another side in yet another civil war, and if the past is any indication, the US is by no means guaranteed success even if we try.

It is good to celebrate what has been accomplished in ending the war. It is good that 65% of Americans now support the timetable, and that congress is starting to act on that. But more pressure must be brought to bear on your local representatives. The timetable must be sped up, the US must begin drawing down before July 2011 and certainly at a much faster pace than is currently planned. The maneuvering for a post-US Afghanistan has accelerated out of control, and if we don't move fast enough, if  Congress isn't forced to step up efforts, there may be no such thing as a post-US Afghanistan. Quite frankly, if we don't start leaving now, we may never leave at all.

Afghanistan: Republican Chairman Steele Stumbles, "Progressive" Reaction Fumbles (Mull)

EA correspondent Iosh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

It shouldn't be breaking news to anyone that the Chairman of the Republican Party, Michael Steele, said something stupid. His silliness is well known. Pretty much every time he opens his mouth in public, something bad happens to Republicans.

Only this time, his bumbling was somewhat relevant to us. Here's Chairman Steele on Afghanistan:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIRmkef2wZo[/youtube]

The [General] McChrystal incident, to me, was very comical. I think it's a reflection of the frustration that a lot of our military leaders has with this Administration and their prosecution of the war in Afghanistan.

Keep in mind again, federal candidates, this was a war of Obama's choosing. This was not something that the United States had actively prosecuted or wanted to engage in. It was one of those areas of the total board of foreign policy [where] we would be in the background sort of shaping the changes that were necessary in Afghanistan as opposed to directly engaging troops.

But it was the President who was trying to be cute by half by building a script demonizing Iraq, while saying the battle really should in Afghanistan. Well, if he is such a student of history, has he not understood that you know that's the one thing you don't do, is engage in a land war in Afghanistan? Alright, because everyone who has tried over a thousand years of history has failed, and there are reasons for that. There are other ways to engage in Afghanistan...

That's a mess of a statement. Steele's decision to Rethink Afghanistan is very much appreciated, especially since he's joining the majority of Americans on that point of view, but unfortunately I'm not sure his comments are particu,larly helpful. They likely won't change a lot of minds, if any at all on his side of the political aisle.

What is of far more concern, however, is the reaction from the Democrats, and I'm sorry to say it isn't any better. If anything, it's worse than any of Steele's stumblings.

Steele's dialogue is a little unclear, but here are the points he made:

• The war in Afghanistan is Obama's choice


• Previously, the US had not "actively prosecuted or wanted to engage in" the war


• Obama campaigned against Iraq, while threatening to escalate in Afghanistan


• History teaches that engaging "in a land war in Afghanistan" is unwise and/or impossible


• There are alternatives to engaging in Afghanistan

With the exception of his "land war in Afghanistan" assertion, what he said was true.

Obviously, the war is Obama's choice. He's the Commander in Chief, and for the last several years Congress has all but abdicated its role in the use of military force, so any decision to remain or escalate in Afghanistan is entirely President Obama's. No, Obama did not personally begin the invasion --- that was President Bush --- but the idea that Obama had no choice in the matter is simply ridiculous.

Was the US actively prosecuting or engaging in a massively bloody and expensive counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan before President Obama's decision to escalate? No, it was not. The US under Bush began with around 12,000 troops in Afghanistan, and even as the situation deteriorated year after year, they only reach a max of around 32,000 in 2008. What happened next? President Obama took office, and the number of troops doubled. Now it is triple what it was when he came into office, almost 100,000.

And yes, he campaigned on that, just as Steele said:

As President, I would deploy at least two additional brigades to Afghanistan to re-enforce our counter-terrorism operations and support NATO’s efforts against the Taliban. As we step up our commitment, our European friends must do the same, and without the burdensome restrictions that have hampered NATO’s efforts. We must also put more of an Afghan face on security by improving the training and equipping of the Afghan Army and Police, and including Afghan soldiers in U.S. and NATO operations.

We must not, however, repeat the mistakes of Iraq. The solution in Afghanistan is not just military – it is political and economic. As President, I would increase our non-military aid by $1 billion. These resources should fund projects at the local level to impact ordinary Afghans, including the development of alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers. And we must seek better performance from the Afghan government, and support that performance through tough anti-corruption safeguards on aid, and increased international support to develop the rule of law across the country.

Above all, I will send a clear message: we will not repeat the mistake of the past, when we turned our back on Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal. As 9/11 showed us, the security of Afghanistan and America is shared. And today, that security is most threatened by the al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuary in the tribal regions of northwest Pakistan.

Finally, was Steele right about there being alternatives to the war in Afghanistan? Yes. We talk about them all the time here, ranging from development aid to a free press to engagement with regional governments. There are many, many options besides the disastrous war policy, covering all of the US' national security interests including counter-terrorism and stable governance.

Steele's comment about not engaging in a land war in Afghanistan? Yeah, this is just stupid.  I'm guessing that Steele is trying to riff on the advice of a British general to the House of Lords in the early 1960s, "Do not go fighting with your land armies in China." Or maybe he is a film buff and took in the line from The Princess Bride, "Never get involved in a land war in Asia." Throughout the period of de-colonisation of east Asia (and much of the rest of world) during the 20th century, indigenous militant movements defeated European colonists and gained independence. The obvious example is the war in Vietnam, devastatingly lost first by the French and later by the Americans.

You don't get involved in a "land war" because the natives will beat the crap out of your modern tanks and planes. It's not pretty, so don't even try it.

I get Steele's sentiment: military adventurism is definitely not a smart policy for the US. But that doesn't really have anything to do with Afghanistan in this context. Yes, Afghanistan is hard to invade, but so is Helsinki, Finland or Fresno, California. Nobody likes an invading army. The insurgents are not fighting us because they are in Afghanistan, they're fighting us because we are in Afghanistan. That's not our country.

Yet even if his comments weren't especially helpful, Steele still comes out on top. At least he was honest, right?

Match him up with the supposedly critical "progressive" commentators. We'll use Spencer Ackerman as our example.

Now we all love Ackerman; he's a smart guy and a clever writer. Everyone reads him, and even though he's a stout progressive, his readership spans the political spectrum. Ackerman has a clear understanding of the topics he covers, and for that reason he's a must-read far outside progressive circles.

But more than occasionally he says something that goes off-line. Maybe it's that he downplays the civilian horrors of war, or his position too closely mirrors that of the comanders in Afghanistan. For me, it's his creepy obsession with the military executing American citizens.

This is one of those times when he's not exactly doing the left, or himself, any favors.

Hey Michael Steele: there was this thing that happened on September 11, 2001 that you might have read about. Long story short: it resulted in the U.S. invading Afghanistan.

Hey Spencer Ackerman: remember how that mission was a complete and total failure? You might have read about it. Long story short: we didn't catch Osama bin Laden, as a Senate Commitee report pondered:

Bin Laden expected to die. His last will and testament, written on December 14, reflected his fatalism. “Allah commended to us that when death approaches any of us that we make a bequest to parents and next of kin and to Muslims as a whole,” he wrote, according to a copy of the will that surfaced later and is regarded as authentic. [...]

But the Al Qaeda leader would live to fight another day. Fewer than 100 American commandos were on the scene with their Afghan allies and calls for reinforcements to launch an assault were rejected. Requests were also turned down for U.S. troops to block the mountain paths leading to sanctuary a few miles away in Pakistan. The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines. Instead, the U.S. command chose to rely on airstrikes and untrained Afghan militias to attack bin Laden and on Pakistan’s loosely organized Frontier Corps to seal his escape routes. On or around December 16, two days after writing his will, bin Laden and an entourage of bodyguards walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan’s unregulated tribal area. Most analysts say he is still there today.

Yep, the guys responsible for the 9/11 attacks "walked unmolested" into Pakistan. Nine years ago. 2001. What does that have to do with occupying Afghanistan with 100,000 troops right now in 2010? Since I'm sure Ackerman would appreciate a Simpsons reference, let's note, "The opportunity to prove yourself a hero is long gone." The guys responsible for funding and supporting the 9/11 attacks haven't been in Afghanistan for nearly a decade. Our occupation there has nothing to do with capturing bin Laden, or even Al-Qa'eda as whole (they're gone).

Well, maybe Ackerman means we have to stop Afghanistan from being a safe haven for Al-Qa'eda. Too bad, that's also in Pakistan. We've known that for years, too.

Thus, as the Pentagon was making preparations for launching Operation Enduring Freedom, it was known even to its own experts in its intelligence community that the Pakistan army and its ISI were the creators and sponsors of not only the Taliban, but also of al-Qaeda, which emerged as the most dreaded jihadi terrorist organization of the world after bin Laden shifted from the Sudan to Jalalabad in Afghanistan in 1996, from where he subsequently moved to Kandahar.

Despite this, the US chose to rely on the Pakistan army and the ISI for logistics and intelligence support in its operation to wipe out the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the IIF. The army and President General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military dictator, who had sponsored and used jihadi terrorism in an attempt to achieve Pakistan's strategic objectives against India (destabilizing India and annexing Jammu and Kashmir) and Afghanistan (strategic depth), were sought to be projected as the US's stalwart ally in the "war against terrorism" and rewarded for their ostensible cooperation through the resumption of generous economic and military assistance, which had remained curtailed since the Pressler Amendment was invoked against Pakistan in 1990 for clandestinely developing a military nuclear capability and further cut after the Chagai nuclear tests of 1998 and the overthrow of the elected government headed by Nawaz Sharif, the then prime minister, by the army in October, 1999.

See? We know Al-Qa'eda and the Taliban are in Pakistan; we know they're supported by the Pakistani state. So why are we in Afghanistan? Are we planning on occupying it forever, just to make sure that we "molest" the hell out of bin Laden when he crosses the border next time? What's the decade-long hold up?

To be fair, Ackerman is only spinning another variation of the Al-Qa'eda excuse. We expected that. The real travesty here is this:

Now, if you want to say that “the one thing you don’t do is engage in a land war in Afghanistan,” congratulations, hippie! You’re now part of the antiwar movement in this country, so you might as well argue forthrightly for the Obama administration to pull out before Gen. Petraeus — who arrives in Kabul any minute now — has an opportunity to do whatever he can. [...]

You can criticize Obama’s decision to escalate that war. But you’ll also have to explain why muddling through or pulling out better serve U.S. interests against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And maybe you can make that case. But your fantasy of the Afghanistan war doesn’t inspire confidence.

Got that? If you question the US policy in Afghanistan, you're a "hippy!" You're not serious, just some jerk who doesn't want to give General  David Petraeus a fair shake. I mean really, what is the peace movement's strategy for Afghanistan? "Muddling through or pulling out." That it's, absolutely nothing more, just those two things.

This kind of bullshit is just outrageous. Surely Ackerman is aware of the beating the war is taking in congress.

The vote in the House last night was complex, involving amendments, self-executing rules, budgets and statutory and non-statutory caps. David Dayen has some of the rundown, though more of the story keeps coming out. However, the big news of the night to me and others organizing against escalation in Afghanistan was the vote on the McGovern amendment.

The McGovern amendment, if it had passed:

• Would require the president to provide a plan and timetable for drawing down our forces in Afghanistan and identify any variables that could require changes to that timetable.


• Would safeguard U.S. taxpayer dollars by ensuring all U.S. activity in Afghanistan be overseen by an Inspector General.


• Require the President to update Congress on the progress of that plan and timetable

If it had passed, that amendment would have been the beginning of the end of our war in Afghanistan, forcing the President to commit not just to a start of the drawdown – perhaps 2011 – but to and end of the war.

Does that sound like "muddling through or pulling out" to anyone? No, it's clearly a responsible timetable for ending the war as the conditions merit, with the addition of new regulations and benchmarks to ensure that any progress made during this timetable is sustainable for the long-term, to include the responsible use of taxpayer funds. Muddling through? Are you crazy?

It gets better. The McGovern amendment got 162 votes in the House, an incredible number of members going on the record in support of ending the war. That 162 includes such notable hippies as Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Rep. Jane Harman, and Rep. Bart Stupak.

And just what exactly is the new US commander, General Petraeus, supposed to do when he arrives in Kabul? Will he make Karzai less corrupt? Will Karzai become more legitimate? Will Pakistan end its national security strategy of support terrorists and militants? Will Afghans stop being killed by NATO forces, or will they just learn to love it? Will Petraeus personally ensure that every dollar goes to the right place, nothing is wasted or funneled to the Taliban? All of our troops will stop dying? How will Petraeus do this? OK, so he arrives in Kabul any minute now. Then what?

So what do we get out of all of this, from Steele's awkward comments to Ackerman's inexplicable reaction? Easy: The war in Afghanistan has nothing to do with the left, the right, liberal, conservative, socialist, fascist, Republican, Democrat, Independent, Green, Labour, Hawk, Pacifist.... These political concepts just don't mean anything in the context of this war.

If we go by the definitions of these ridiculous political terms, these nonsense buzzwords created and fueled by our media and politicians, then the entire field of US foreign policy becomes completely unintelligible. Put bluntly, it's gibberish. Baby talk.

Ending the war is just smart policy. The United States has absolutely nothing to gain from a war in Afghanistan. Nothing. There's no Al-Qa'eda there, we're not going to magically turn it into a thriving democracy and stalwart regional ally just because we send in a few more guys with guns. There's just nothing there for us. We could bring those troops home, so we're not scrambling around like idiots every time there's a wildfire in California or a hurricane in the Gulf. We could be spending much less than the trillions we're spending now, and we could use it to buy things we actually need. Jobs, infrastructure, energy, education, whatever it is you can think of, the US desperately needs it.

Ignore the partisan bickering. The facts show that the war is ruining the country, it is ruining Afghanistan and it is ruining Pakistan. It has to end, whether you're a progressive like Ackerman or a conservative like Steele.