Pakistan: The Conflict Continues

On Thursday, we noted that while Pakistan has receded from the headlines, the situation in the country is far from settled. Fighting continues between the Pakistani military and the insurgency with millions displaced. Asia Times Online continues to provide some of the best coverage of the situation, with Syed Saleem Shahzad posting this article:

Pakistan fights for its tribal soul

KARACHI - Pakistan's month-long military operation in the Malakand Division of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which includes the scene of especially heavy fighting in the Swat Valley, has, per official figures, cost the lives of over 1,300 militants and led to the displacement of 3.5 million civilians.

The battle is far from over.

Under relentless pressure from the United States to get the job done once and for all, Pakistan is opening up new fronts in an attempt to wipe out Taliban militants and the al-Qaeda "franchise" under which they operate.

On Thursday morning, the Pakistan Air Force conducted strikes in Orakzai Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and ground and air operations have started in the Frontier Regions (Jani Khel - the tribal areas adjacent to the city) of Bannu district in NWFP. Al-Qaeda's shura (council) is believed to operate from Jani Khel.

The military is also expected to move in strength into the South Waziristan tribal area to go after a nexus that includes Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, Punjabi militants, Uzbeks and al-Qaeda. Clashes are reported to have already taken place.
Washington has reacted positively to the Pakistani initiatives, but garrison headquarters in Rawalpindi, the twin city of the capital Islamabad, are nervous. The top brass are aware of the tough fight their troops have had in Malakand Division and the resentment the operations have caused across the country.

Tuesday's attack on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar, the capital of NWFP, in which 19 people, including two United Nations staff, were killed and 70 wounded, is a stark reminder of the dangers of fighting the American war in the region.

Contacts familiar with the background to the attack told Asia Times Online it was approved by al-Qaeda and carried out by a nexus of militants that included Hakeemullah Mehsud of Orakzai Agency (a relative of Baitullah Mehsud), members of the Sunni militant group Laskhar-e-Jhangvi from the town of Darra Adam Khel in NWFP and the Omar group from the Frontier Regions of Peshawar.

In a message to Asia Times Online, a senior militant leader maintained that the operation had also aimed to take out US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials staying at the hotel. They were said to be in talks with Pakistani officials to work out ways to protect the 90% of NATO supplies for Afghanistan that pass through Peshawar.

This account, however, was disputed by Qudsia Qadri, editor-in-chief of the Pakistani Daily Financial Post, who told Asia Times Online that she stayed in the five-star hotel for a few days until Tuesday afternoon and she had not seen any FBI or NATO officials.

"The occupancy of the hotel was hardly 5%. I met a few foreigners, in the gym and at breakfast, but they were all working with NGOs [non-governmental agencies] to help the internally displaced people of Malakand," said Qadri.

How the attack was conceived

Baitullah Mehsud, al-Qaeda members and Punjabi militants live in North Waziristan and South Waziristan, remote regions on the border with Afghanistan far from Khyber Agency, through which NATO supplies pass, Kurram Agency, a hub of anti-Taliban Shi'ite forces, and Peshawar.

None of these three areas has indigenous Taliban. Therefore, Orakzai Agency, the only tribal area that does not have a border with Afghanistan, was chosen to station Taliban from South Waziristan and other regions.

By the beginning of this year, Orakzai Agency had been taken over by the Taliban and declared an Islamic emirate. The amir (leader) was Moulvi Saeed, but the public face was Hakeemullah Mehsud, a lieutenant of Baitullah Mehsud imported from South Waziristan.

Gradually, they brought in criminal elements, including anti-Shi'ite fugitives of the Laskhar-e-Jhangvi, and placed them in Darra Adam Khel, just on the outskirts of Peshawar. The Omar group was assigned to the frontier regions of Peshawar. With these groups in place, Khyber Agency and Peshawar could easily be accessed - exactly as happened with Tuesday's hotel attack.

The Pakistani security forces are braced for similar attacks now that the battle is being extended into South Waziristan and other tribal areas. At the same time, ethnic and political clashes have risen to unprecedented levels in the southern port city of Karachi, through which most of NATO's supplies enter Pakistan.

In the past week, over 50 people have been killed. The anti-Taliban Muttahida Quami Movement is attributed with most of the killing in a fight against members of a breakaway faction. Retaliation is expected in the coming days, which could result in even heavier bloodshed. The situation could become so bad that the military would have to intervene. The problem is, its forces are already spread thin in the north.

For the time being, these northern areas remain the prime concern, and the militants and al-Qaeda are ready.

Safe havens in the Hindu Kush

The Eastern Hindu Kush range, also known as the High Hindu Kush range, is mostly located in northern Pakistan and the Nuristan and Badakhshan provinces of Afghanistan.

This chain of mountains connects with several smaller ranges, such as Spin Ghar, the Tora Bora, the Suleman Range, Toba Kakar, and creates a natural corridor that passes through the entire Pakistani tribal areas and the Afghan border provinces all the way to the Pakistani coastal area in Balochistan province.

By 2008, al-Qaeda had taken control of the 1,500-square-kilometer corridor - something it had planned to do since fleeing Afghanistan when the Taliban were defeated by US-led forces in December 2001.

Al-Qaeda decided then to build a regional ideologically motivated franchise in South Asia to thwart the strategic designs of Western powers in the area.

While US forces were vainly trying to hunt down al-Qaeda in the Tora Bora mountains, the group was focused on establishing links with organizations such as the Jaishul al-Qiba al-Jihadi al-Siri al-Alami and Jundallah in the Pakistani tribal areas and organizing the recruitment of Pakistanis and Afghans to those organizations. The underlying reason for doing this was to destroy the local political and social structures and in their place establish an al-Qaeda franchise.

The plan worked. Today, in many parts of the Hindu Kush corridor, centuries-old tribal systems and their connections with the Pakistani establishment through an appointed political agent have been replaced by a system of Islamic warlordism.

The old breed of tribal elders, religious clerics and tribal chiefs, loyal to Pakistan and its systems, has been wiped out, to be replaced by warlords such as Haji Omar, Baitullah Mehsud, (slain) Nek Mohammad and (slain) Abdullah Mehsud. They are all al-Qaeda allies, and allow al-Qaeda freedom of movement in their areas within the corridor.

Al-Qaeda members from abroad also use the corridor to enter the Pakistani tribal areas. It is not always safe. Recently, security agencies arrested four Saudi nationals in Mohmand Agency. They were named only as Ahmed, Ali, Mohammad and Obaidullah and had arrived in Pakistan from Saudi Arabia in 2008-09 after passing through Iran. Had they traveled through Pakistani cities towards the tribal areas, they would most likely have been arrested much earlier.

Recently, al-Qaeda broadened its network by forging closer links with the Pakistani-based Iranian insurgency group Jundallah, which operates from around Turbat in Pakistan's Balochistan province.

Pakistan at a crossroads

This situation has brought Pakistan to a crossroads. Al-Qaeda has in many areas devastated the traditional tribal systems and established its franchise in very strategic terrain.

The country's administrative systems and law-enforcing agencies were not designed to cope with such developments. The only response it has been able to come up with is to mobilize the military - a controversial decision that could yet backfire.

There are several reasons why the militants were able to undermine the tribes. The militant organizations are highly organized, battle-hardened, heavily armed and well funded. And importantly, while tribal influence is limited to its own area, its own people, the militant organizations have cross-tribal, cross-border and international linkages. And while the tribes are bound by their tribal traditions and customary laws (riwaj), the militant organizations are not. They have out-gunned, out-funded and out-organized the tribal malik (leader) and his tribe.

Pakistan had planned to prop up the tribes, as the real strength of a country is its people. No government, whether civilian or military, can function or succeed until it has public support behind it.

This it started doing by signing agreements with selected tribes. These included ones with Sufi Mohammad in Malakand to prop up the administrative system. However, international pressure - mainly from Washington - forced Pakistan to abandon this roadmap in place of full-frontal military engagement with the militants.

Up until the latest offensive that began in Swat and which is now being extended, military action usually petered out after securing only temporary success. The government of the day generally lacked the will to go for the kill, and there remained segments within the intelligence apparatus and military sympathetic to the militants.

It now appears the government is prepared for a long fight, but ultimately it will have to take control of the corridor that provides the militants with the space from which to attack, regroup and attack again.

This would have to involve stepped-up cooperation with forces in Afghanistan to jointly patrol the border, and most importantly, a renewed attempt to revive the tribal systems where they have been infiltrated by militants.

Individually, these are mammoth tasks, in combination almost impossible. And as the planes and tanks roll in greater numbers across greater areas of Pakistan, these goals risk being lost in the fog of war.

Pakistan's War in the Swat Valley: A First-Hand Reflection

Editor's Note: We have been following with great concern the developments in northwest Pakistan, where Government forces are carrying out an offensive against insurgents and more than two million people have been placed. Karina Bracken, a colleague at our partner the Clinton Institute for American Studies in Dublin, met a Pakistani man whose family are in the Swat Valley. "Salman Ashraf" is a pseudonym, to protect the identity of his relatives.

It is in a cafe in Dublin that I meet Salman Ashraf, far from his native Swat Valley in Pakistan. He is gently spoken but speaks with sincerity and conviction about the recent events in his hometown of Mingora.

Many people have been watching the recent situation in Pakistan with concern for the state’s stability and the possible threat to international security if the region should fall completely to the Taliban. Ashraf’s fears are more personal and immediate: he is anxious for the safety and welfare of his family who live in the largest town in the valley. Speaking in our comfortable surroundings, he confides, “I was very worried last week. There had been a curfew imposed and my sister was still there. I heard on Friday that she had gotten out with her family. I was so relieved.”

From the beginning of our interview, Ashraf was careful to offer a context, going back more than 60 years, for the conflict:

In 1947 when Pakistan and India were divided, Swat Valley was left to rule itself. The ruler at the time was well-educated; he built schools, hospitals and roads. In 1969 Swat Valley eventually came under Pakistani rule. Under the previous ruler, the system of law was close to that of Islam. Justice was fair and swift. After the merge with Pakistan, justice was slow, disputes took years to resolve and the people became fed up with the system. Therefore, they welcomed the revolt in 1993 that brought sharia law to the region. Islamic rule was introduced into the courts system... but it didn’t work very well.

Meanwhile the Pakistani government tended to ignore rural places like Swat and instead focused on development of the big cities such as Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore. Therefore in 1999 another group rose up against the government in an armed movement, fighting for the introduction of sharia law – or rather their own interpretation of sharia. These people were professional fighters; militants who had fought in the Afghan-Russian war and today reside in the mountains. Some of the fighters are local, others have come from Afghanistan and some reports even suggest Chechnya. My personal view is that these are professional fighters looking for hotspots. They want to destabilise the region and the country. They are very well equipped, organised and modern; they are on a level similar to the Pakistani army.

Ashraf explained that the fighters initially "had some support from the general population of Swat":

You see, people were frustrated with the ineffectual justice system in place. However when the government agreed to the militants’ terms and the ceasefire was signed; they would not give up their weapons. “These Kalashnikovs are a part of our culture”, they would say. The local people finally realised that the fighters did not really want sharia, they just wanted to rule. That has been the case ever since.”

Ashraf explains that he is not against the introduction of sharia law, but he firmly believes that under the Taliban it would be bad for the Pakistani people:

Sharia law is actually very fair. These militants have no religious education. What they want to implement is their own incorrect interpretation of sharia. For example, look at Mullah Fazlullah who has attracted attention for his daily incitements to violence. Fazlullah used to be a chair lift operator, and he now broadcasts on FM radio to encourage the fighters. His father-in-law is a religious leader who also wants sharia law, but the difference is that he does not want to rule. Unlike Fazlullah he believes in a peaceful demonstration to achieve sharia.

Ashraf still has questions about the relationship between the Pakistani Government and its supposed enemies, "I have found it very strange that the Pakistani army have not been able to find Fazlullah and his supporters. Nearly every one who lives in the area knows where he is. It does beg questions about the organisation and overall aims of the Pakistani army.” However, he adds that, where before the recent offensive against the militants, there was not much support for President Zardari, now a large majority of Pakistanis are behind the government’s actions in Swat.

During the fighting Ashraf has been able to obtain little news beyond reports of the destruction of schools and the murder of policemen, whose bodies are often left in the town square. These actions, among others, were the Taliban’s attempts to intimidate the locals:

Now that people have left the region they can speak out, but in previous weeks they could not criticise for fear of their safety and that of their families. The Taliban have terrorised them. There is no one there to protect them.

One day I phoned my brother and he was very upset. I asked him why he was at home and not at work. He was saying that every morning there is a dead body in the local square. Even though there is usually a crowd, he does not want to go near it. But that morning he could not help seeing one of them. He said he had to come home as he could not stay in work. I am worried about how his will affect him, but particularly his young children. It is such inhumanity for them to witness. It is an un-Islamic thing to do.

In terms of fiscal support, the Taliban generally do not look for money off small businesses in Swat. Instead they look for big sums of money off the wealthiest. However, I have heard stories of them going to people’s houses and demanding that one member of their family must join them.

So, amidst this suffering, do the population support the militants? Ashraf answers with conviction:

It is simple. The large scale migration shows that they do not. When the fighting began, many fled the area. Everyone is now counting on the Pakistani army. The people say “We do not care about our houses, our businesses. Just get rid of these fighters and give us our Valley, our home, back.”

Apart from one brother living in Britain, Ashraf’s family are all still living in Pakistan. They have been directly affected by the violence, unable to sustain themselves and eventually having to leave. Despite or, rather, because of that displacement, Ashraf is visibly relieved, speaking to his family both morning and night. However, he looks beyond his family with concern:

They are staying with friends and relatives. Those in the refugee camps have not been so lucky. It is against our way of life to live in a tent. I don’t think that the Pakistani government will be able to deal with this humanitarian crisis on their own. They will need international help and aid.

But what does "help" entail? Ashraf carefully negotiates the issue of American involvement:

The U.S. should support the Pakistani government, but they must do it behind closed doors. If the U.S. interrupted it would just enflame the anti-American rhetoric of the militants and they could exploit the general weariness that the population already has against America. I can understand the feelings of the Pakistani people, but my opinions are different. After all, the only reason I was able to afford a university education in Pakistan was because I received a scholarship from the U.S. due to the disturbance caused by the earlier war in Afghanistan.

Before he said good-bye, I asked Ashraf if he believed that the situation in Swat could be resolved. His answer was very personal and very uncertain:

We have to wait and see what happens now. I hope someday to go back to Mingora and Swat. I want to go back to see my family. I want my kids to see where their family is from. However, I don’t know if I will ever be able to return.