Pakistan: The Conflict Continues

On Thursday, we noted that while Pakistan has receded from the headlines, the situation in the country is far from settled. Fighting continues between the Pakistani military and the insurgency with millions displaced. Asia Times Online continues to provide some of the best coverage of the situation, with Syed Saleem Shahzad posting this article:

Pakistan fights for its tribal soul

KARACHI - Pakistan's month-long military operation in the Malakand Division of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which includes the scene of especially heavy fighting in the Swat Valley, has, per official figures, cost the lives of over 1,300 militants and led to the displacement of 3.5 million civilians.

The battle is far from over.

Under relentless pressure from the United States to get the job done once and for all, Pakistan is opening up new fronts in an attempt to wipe out Taliban militants and the al-Qaeda "franchise" under which they operate.

On Thursday morning, the Pakistan Air Force conducted strikes in Orakzai Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and ground and air operations have started in the Frontier Regions (Jani Khel - the tribal areas adjacent to the city) of Bannu district in NWFP. Al-Qaeda's shura (council) is believed to operate from Jani Khel.

The military is also expected to move in strength into the South Waziristan tribal area to go after a nexus that includes Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, Punjabi militants, Uzbeks and al-Qaeda. Clashes are reported to have already taken place.
Washington has reacted positively to the Pakistani initiatives, but garrison headquarters in Rawalpindi, the twin city of the capital Islamabad, are nervous. The top brass are aware of the tough fight their troops have had in Malakand Division and the resentment the operations have caused across the country.

Tuesday's attack on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar, the capital of NWFP, in which 19 people, including two United Nations staff, were killed and 70 wounded, is a stark reminder of the dangers of fighting the American war in the region.

Contacts familiar with the background to the attack told Asia Times Online it was approved by al-Qaeda and carried out by a nexus of militants that included Hakeemullah Mehsud of Orakzai Agency (a relative of Baitullah Mehsud), members of the Sunni militant group Laskhar-e-Jhangvi from the town of Darra Adam Khel in NWFP and the Omar group from the Frontier Regions of Peshawar.

In a message to Asia Times Online, a senior militant leader maintained that the operation had also aimed to take out US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials staying at the hotel. They were said to be in talks with Pakistani officials to work out ways to protect the 90% of NATO supplies for Afghanistan that pass through Peshawar.

This account, however, was disputed by Qudsia Qadri, editor-in-chief of the Pakistani Daily Financial Post, who told Asia Times Online that she stayed in the five-star hotel for a few days until Tuesday afternoon and she had not seen any FBI or NATO officials.

"The occupancy of the hotel was hardly 5%. I met a few foreigners, in the gym and at breakfast, but they were all working with NGOs [non-governmental agencies] to help the internally displaced people of Malakand," said Qadri.

How the attack was conceived

Baitullah Mehsud, al-Qaeda members and Punjabi militants live in North Waziristan and South Waziristan, remote regions on the border with Afghanistan far from Khyber Agency, through which NATO supplies pass, Kurram Agency, a hub of anti-Taliban Shi'ite forces, and Peshawar.

None of these three areas has indigenous Taliban. Therefore, Orakzai Agency, the only tribal area that does not have a border with Afghanistan, was chosen to station Taliban from South Waziristan and other regions.

By the beginning of this year, Orakzai Agency had been taken over by the Taliban and declared an Islamic emirate. The amir (leader) was Moulvi Saeed, but the public face was Hakeemullah Mehsud, a lieutenant of Baitullah Mehsud imported from South Waziristan.

Gradually, they brought in criminal elements, including anti-Shi'ite fugitives of the Laskhar-e-Jhangvi, and placed them in Darra Adam Khel, just on the outskirts of Peshawar. The Omar group was assigned to the frontier regions of Peshawar. With these groups in place, Khyber Agency and Peshawar could easily be accessed - exactly as happened with Tuesday's hotel attack.

The Pakistani security forces are braced for similar attacks now that the battle is being extended into South Waziristan and other tribal areas. At the same time, ethnic and political clashes have risen to unprecedented levels in the southern port city of Karachi, through which most of NATO's supplies enter Pakistan.

In the past week, over 50 people have been killed. The anti-Taliban Muttahida Quami Movement is attributed with most of the killing in a fight against members of a breakaway faction. Retaliation is expected in the coming days, which could result in even heavier bloodshed. The situation could become so bad that the military would have to intervene. The problem is, its forces are already spread thin in the north.

For the time being, these northern areas remain the prime concern, and the militants and al-Qaeda are ready.

Safe havens in the Hindu Kush

The Eastern Hindu Kush range, also known as the High Hindu Kush range, is mostly located in northern Pakistan and the Nuristan and Badakhshan provinces of Afghanistan.

This chain of mountains connects with several smaller ranges, such as Spin Ghar, the Tora Bora, the Suleman Range, Toba Kakar, and creates a natural corridor that passes through the entire Pakistani tribal areas and the Afghan border provinces all the way to the Pakistani coastal area in Balochistan province.

By 2008, al-Qaeda had taken control of the 1,500-square-kilometer corridor - something it had planned to do since fleeing Afghanistan when the Taliban were defeated by US-led forces in December 2001.

Al-Qaeda decided then to build a regional ideologically motivated franchise in South Asia to thwart the strategic designs of Western powers in the area.

While US forces were vainly trying to hunt down al-Qaeda in the Tora Bora mountains, the group was focused on establishing links with organizations such as the Jaishul al-Qiba al-Jihadi al-Siri al-Alami and Jundallah in the Pakistani tribal areas and organizing the recruitment of Pakistanis and Afghans to those organizations. The underlying reason for doing this was to destroy the local political and social structures and in their place establish an al-Qaeda franchise.

The plan worked. Today, in many parts of the Hindu Kush corridor, centuries-old tribal systems and their connections with the Pakistani establishment through an appointed political agent have been replaced by a system of Islamic warlordism.

The old breed of tribal elders, religious clerics and tribal chiefs, loyal to Pakistan and its systems, has been wiped out, to be replaced by warlords such as Haji Omar, Baitullah Mehsud, (slain) Nek Mohammad and (slain) Abdullah Mehsud. They are all al-Qaeda allies, and allow al-Qaeda freedom of movement in their areas within the corridor.

Al-Qaeda members from abroad also use the corridor to enter the Pakistani tribal areas. It is not always safe. Recently, security agencies arrested four Saudi nationals in Mohmand Agency. They were named only as Ahmed, Ali, Mohammad and Obaidullah and had arrived in Pakistan from Saudi Arabia in 2008-09 after passing through Iran. Had they traveled through Pakistani cities towards the tribal areas, they would most likely have been arrested much earlier.

Recently, al-Qaeda broadened its network by forging closer links with the Pakistani-based Iranian insurgency group Jundallah, which operates from around Turbat in Pakistan's Balochistan province.

Pakistan at a crossroads

This situation has brought Pakistan to a crossroads. Al-Qaeda has in many areas devastated the traditional tribal systems and established its franchise in very strategic terrain.

The country's administrative systems and law-enforcing agencies were not designed to cope with such developments. The only response it has been able to come up with is to mobilize the military - a controversial decision that could yet backfire.

There are several reasons why the militants were able to undermine the tribes. The militant organizations are highly organized, battle-hardened, heavily armed and well funded. And importantly, while tribal influence is limited to its own area, its own people, the militant organizations have cross-tribal, cross-border and international linkages. And while the tribes are bound by their tribal traditions and customary laws (riwaj), the militant organizations are not. They have out-gunned, out-funded and out-organized the tribal malik (leader) and his tribe.

Pakistan had planned to prop up the tribes, as the real strength of a country is its people. No government, whether civilian or military, can function or succeed until it has public support behind it.

This it started doing by signing agreements with selected tribes. These included ones with Sufi Mohammad in Malakand to prop up the administrative system. However, international pressure - mainly from Washington - forced Pakistan to abandon this roadmap in place of full-frontal military engagement with the militants.

Up until the latest offensive that began in Swat and which is now being extended, military action usually petered out after securing only temporary success. The government of the day generally lacked the will to go for the kill, and there remained segments within the intelligence apparatus and military sympathetic to the militants.

It now appears the government is prepared for a long fight, but ultimately it will have to take control of the corridor that provides the militants with the space from which to attack, regroup and attack again.

This would have to involve stepped-up cooperation with forces in Afghanistan to jointly patrol the border, and most importantly, a renewed attempt to revive the tribal systems where they have been infiltrated by militants.

Individually, these are mammoth tasks, in combination almost impossible. And as the planes and tanks roll in greater numbers across greater areas of Pakistan, these goals risk being lost in the fog of war.

Transcript: Holbrooke Press Briefing on Pakistan (10 June)

It is stunning how Pakistan, which only a month was the subject of speculation on Government collapse and the Taliban taking over nuclear weapons, has receded from the headlines. Part of the explanation is the screen of the Pakistani military's "success" in clearing insurgents out of cities like Mingora. The bigger story remains, however: the manoeuvring between Islamabad and the insurgency in and beyond the Swat Valley has left more than two million Pakistanis "internally displaced".

A briefing by President Obama's envoy Richard Holbrooke on Wednesday captured (inadvertently, possibly) the tension as he says in different places: "The military is still in the process of cleaning out Swat and Buner and other areas" vs. "It’s not a good sight, but it has not yet reached the level of a situation where people are dying of cholera."

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: This trip was the idea of President Obama. It was not one of the regularly scheduled trips to Afghanistan, Pakistan that I have been making. I’ve made two already, both of which included stops in India. This was, at President Obama’s personal direction, a trip to go only to Pakistan in the region – I also went to the Gulf – and to show American concern and support for the humanitarian crisis enveloping western Pakistan and to offer more support.

That support was embodied in a presidential commitment, which we announced the evening I arrived, of an additional $200 million for refugee relief in the western part of Pakistan, as an additional request to the Congress in the supplemental now being debated. So the $200 million we don’t have yet, it’s very important, and we announced it subject to congressional approval.

Just a personal footnote, I’m not going to use the phrase, IDP, in this briefing, internally displaced people. I dislike that word. These are human beings. They’re farmers, they’re pharmacists, they’re jewelers, they’re school teachers. And already just calling them “refugees” takes away their individuality. But giving them an initial like IDP is, to my mind, just – it’s a bureaucratic euphemism. I’ve spent a lot of time in the tents, in two of the 19 camps, and I just can’t call them IDPs; it’s just a personal thing.

I’d love to change the phrase, IDPs, to internal refugees, because that’s what they are. What’s the difference between a person who crosses a border because he or she has lost their home in fighting, to a person who doesn’t cross the border? Until 10 years ago, the UNHCR didn’t even think the IDPs were part of their responsibility. And when I was ambassador to the UN under President Clinton, I took that on as a mission, and I’m glad UNHCR now accepts them. And now we ought to start calling them what they are. There’s no difference between a refugee who crossed a border and doesn’t, except their international status.

So we announced the $200 million as a request to Congress, and we went out there and we went to the refugee camps, and we saw the conditions out there.

I think the first thing to say is that it’s not a good sight, but it has not yet reached the level of a situation where people are dying of cholera. There’s no cholera epidemic yet. But the rainy season hasn’t begun. Eighty to ninety percent of the people are staying in private houses or in schools. That relieves the burden on the international community to put up tent cities. I visited two of the tent cities. But the schools, the houses are overburdened. There’s – the longer this goes on, the more critical it’s going to be.

Now, the refugees I talked to clearly understood why they had been displaced. They didn’t like the Taliban. They – one of them, one man sitting in a unventilated tent with one of his wives and about seven of his 15 children said to me that – quite memorably, he said, “I used to live in heaven and now I live in hell.” These are people from the highlands and it’s much cooler up there. And he went on to describe this beautiful house he had which is now being used temporarily by the army, and he said, “I’ve just got to get back.” He was a mechanic.

And the highest priority is for these people to be able to return to their homes as quickly as possible, but – and I cannot stress this too highly – to get back, they need security. And the military is still in the process of cleaning out Swat and Buner and other areas. And that job is not yet complete.

In addition, the amount of money that the United States and the international community are contributing is only for the relief phase. The UN request was somewhere around $560 million. Don’t hold me to the exact amount. The United States support so far is between $310 and $330 million. Normally, the U.S. gives about a quarter to a third of international support. In this case, we are currently well over 50 percent. And this Administration has requested our friends and allies in the Gulf states and in Europe and in other parts of the world to help with this effort. The U.S. cannot bear this burden at this level.

And besides which, the reconstruction phase is going to cost just as much as the relief phase. So this is a major, major crisis. It’s been often stated that this is the big migration – biggest migration flow since partition in 1947. So a word of clarification: That is not true. There were 10 to 12 million refugees during the Bangladesh war in 1971. But it is the largest flow of refugees or displaced people in Pakistan and India since partition, so just to clarify that point.

We are – now let me step up to the political issues. Pakistan is absolutely critical to our most vital national security interests. You’ve heard everyone say that in different forms. We all understand the complexities of Pakistan and the issues that you’ve all reported on so many times. But in the end, success in Afghanistan requires success and stability in Pakistan. The two issues are integrally related. And hence, sometimes people use the shorthand Af-Pak, but that’s not a popular phrase in Pakistan or Afghanistan for obvious reasons. And we would prefer not to use it in public. But the reason for it was to stress the interrelatedness of the two, something which had been neglected in the last eight years.

And in that sense, the trilateral summit hosted by President Obama and Secretary Clinton on May 6th and 7th was a very big step forward. The amount of attention we’re giving Pakistan is a big step forward. And I deliberately did not go to Afghanistan on this trip to emphasize that our focus on this trip, at presidential instructions, was Pakistan.

I went on to four Gulf states – Oman, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar – to talk to them about our parallel strategic interests. I did not go to Saudi Arabia because the President had been there three days earlier and because I had been there three weeks ago. But I can say with confidence that all of the states in the Gulf have a similar point of view on the strategic importance of Pakistan – and their long, historic ties. Oman – for example, until 1958, the Oman national borders included a large chunk of what’s now Baluchistan. And there’s a tremendous connection between Oman and the area of Pakistan that’s now Baluchistan.

Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar also have very close ties – historic, economic and strategic. So we share a common point of view. But there’s not a coordination of policies at this point. That is something we’re just talking about. But I’m very gratified at the strategic symmetry between us. Everyone recognizes that instability in Pakistan poses a threat to everywhere else, and we are very gratified by the movements of the Pakistani Government.

What I saw in Pakistan on this trip was the slow emergence of a consensus behind the government’s actions. I spent time with Nawaz Sharif, a good deal of time, leader of the opposition, just after he had his political rights restored. A lot of time with President Zardari, time with General Kiyani and his top team, including General Pasha, the head of ISI, and with members of civic society. And everywhere, there was a dramatic change in attitudes from my previous trips because of the outrages of the Taliban and their supporters, and this was widely recognized.

You all know that the Pearl Hotel was attacked yesterday by some terrorists, another major hotel in Peshawar. My impression is that this is enraging the population. It’s not going to work, provided the government gives the security necessary. And this is a daunting task for Pakistan, which is under so much economic pressure. It has so many other problems, a short supply of energy, all the other issues which you’re familiar with. But the government is addressing it. And I found a new determination in Islamabad. And I carried the support of President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and the U.S. Government with me.

P.J., I think, if I didn’t leave anything out, I’ll – we’ll just open it to questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Can you just identify yourselves? I know some of you but not all.

QUESTION: I’m Bob Burns --

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Oh, I know Bob, yeah.

QUESTION: -- from AP. Mr. Ambassador, U.S. officials have generally spoken approvingly of what the Pakistani military has been doing in the areas you visited, but I’m wondering if you think that they are carrying that out with strategic purpose to include the capacity to deal with the internally displaced people and to deal with the issue of pushing Taliban back across the border into Afghanistan and the consequences of that.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: There is a strategic purpose, obviously, Bob. We do not know enough about what’s going on on the ground to reach definitive judgments. But we have talk – I talked to General Kiyani and General Pasha and General Mustafa about this, and they – their strategic purpose was clear, and they feel that they now have popular support for what they’re doing.

But I want to stress that the refugees must be able to return. Those camps and those temporary facilities cannot harden into a permanent refugee settlement as has happened in so many other parts of the world. So the test is not simply the military phase, but the ability of the government to get those people back into their homes as quickly as possible and provide them security.

I think what you have quoted American officials as saying is my view, too. All of us are impressed by the military’s initiatives in recent weeks. But the military themselves will say that they fully understand that the test is still to come, the second test. But I want to underline, because so much of what we say here bounces out in Islamabad in a different context, that we are very supportive of what has been – of what the government is doing, and we look for every way we can to support them. And while we’re all focused on the relief effort now, it is the reconstruct – it is the return and reconstruction phase and security to be provided them that will be the basic test.

QUESTION: Farah Stockman with The Boston Globe. Thanks for coming to talk to us. First question is: Can the Pakistani military hold Swat? They’ve gone in before and the Taliban have just come back. What will be different this time?

And my second question is that this Administration has spent a lot of work trying to get Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States all on the same page militarily and to coordinate, but it doesn’t seem to have filtered down on the ground. There still seems to be a lot of animosity between Afghan army and Pakistan army among the officers, and how do you change that?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Your first question was why will it be different this time?

QUESTION: How can – can they hold Swat?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Let’s see. Let’s see why it will be different. I think the previous experiences you describe were quite different in scope. The Pakistan army has moved a great deal of troops to the west this time, a very large number, and it’s made a difference.

On your second question, the history of Afghan-Pakistan relations is complicated, and very few people in this country have studied it, although everybody in Pakistan knows the story. And I’ve been learning about it by reading books as I go along and it’s – and so what you’re talking about there is a historic problem that has – that predates 9/11, that predates the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but which was exacerbated enormously by what happened in the ‘70s and the ‘80s and after 9/11. And I’m – none of us are trying to change the DNA of a historic relationship that’s rooted in deep, deep national feelings on both sides of a disputed border. What we are trying to do is encourage cooperation.

So Secretary of State Clinton invited the foreign ministers, intelligence chiefs, and other senior officials here in February to participate in our strategic review and start the trilateral dialogue. That was so successful that the President decided to invite Presidents Zardari and Karzai here on May 6th and 7th. With them came the ministers of interior, agriculture, the intelligence chiefs, the finance chiefs, and several other pairs of people.

And one of the things we discovered was that some of these ministers have never met before. The two interior ministers didn’t know each other. The two agriculture ministers didn’t know each other. The two finance ministers didn’t know each other. In our breakout sessions, chaired in the intelligence community by Leon Panetta, in the interior department by FBI Director Mueller, finance by Deputy Secretary Jack Lew, and agriculture by Tom Vilsack, we found that once they come together, they have a lot to talk about. Subcommittees were set up on every issue. In agriculture, for example, we set up three task forces: one on food security; one on water resources; and I can’t remember the third one now, but there’s a third one. These are ongoing. We can’t have another trilateral summit till after the Afghan elections, but at the operational level these (inaudible) in every field.

So I want to be clear on this question, because we’ve spent a lot of time trying to answer your question. We’re not trying to change history. We’re trying to deal with the historical realities that are there and get people to cooperate. There is no way that success is possible if there isn’t cooperation across this disputed demarcation line. We all understand that. And in the last eight years, no attention was paid – none – to getting the governments together. Once in a while there was a theatrical event, but this is a sustained effort. Part of my staff is focused entirely on this issue on a full-time basis.

Two weeks ago, President Obama asked for an update on what had happened since the trilateral summit and how we were doing. And we handed to him 19 action plans on everything from detainee policy to agriculture to border crossing checkpoints. We have one to go, women’s affairs. We were waiting for Melanne Verveer and Judith McHale and others to come into the building, and we’re working on that one now. And the Secretary of State and I have suggested to Melanne, who is – I don’t even know what her official title is, the Secretary’s Assistant for Women’s Affairs.

MR KELLY: Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Well, Melanne is a – Ambassador, sorry.

MR KELLY: Ambassador-at-Large.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Ambassador-at-Large for Women’s Affairs. Well, Melanne is going to go out there, and we’re going to work on an action plan.

So that is the way we’re addressing your problem. We’re not trying to change history. And I really hope that’s clear, because we’re living – we’re not trying to change anything except to get them to cooperate.

Somebody in the back here. Okay. Well, yes – yeah.

QUESTION: Thank you, sir. I’m Raghubir Goyal from India Globe and Asia Today. Mr. Ambassador, you have taken a very critical job in a critical area, which is, as you already said, very important. First of all, do you see, sir, light at the end of the dark tunnel and if this no-man’s land will be now forever no-man’s land anymore?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Lights at the end of the tunnel is a metaphor I don’t ever wish to return to – (laughter) – because I began my career in another war, in another planet, in another century, and that was the most famous phrase.

All I can tell you is that this Administration believes that what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan is of vital interest to our national security. And --

QUESTION: But –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: And that India is a country that we must keep in the closest consultations with. At midnight last night, I spoke to Under Secretary of State Bill Burns immediately after he had landed in New Delhi. He is carrying a presidential letter to the Indian Government. He is carrying the messages that I would have carried if I had had time to go to New Delhi on this trip, but I couldn't do it. On my first two trips to the region, I went to New Delhi. I’ll be seeing your new ambassador here next week. I’ve already met with her twice. And we consider India an absolutely critical country in the region. They’re not part of the problem, but they are vitally affected, and we want to work closely with them.

QUESTION: A follow-up to this question? What’s the message the President is sending to India in this presidential letter?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: It’s a private letter. But the important thing is that the number three person in the Department of State has gone to India to reaffirm immediately after the election – the Indians were very frank with us. They wanted to keep in touch with us during the election period, but they had to wait through the election, just like we do. It’s the world’s two greatest democracies.

But Bill Burns is now beginning the dialogue with the newly elected government in an atmosphere of great positive feelings. And without getting into Indian politics, all I can say is that all of us – Secretary Clinton, Bill Burns, myself, President Obama – everyone looks forward to working with the newly elected Indian Government.

QUESTION: Ambassador Holbrooke, Elise Labott with CNN. Thank you. To get back to the humanitarian situation, I mean, some of these villages seem to have been completely ravaged, as you mentioned. And I’m wondering if you think that this is a necessary casualty of the war with the Taliban, or do you think that the Pakistani tactics are not necessarily suited to a counterinsurgency operation and they could benefit from more training or more assistance from the United States and more targeted operations that might not necessarily create these conditions?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: No useful purpose would be served by my second-guessing military tactics on the ground in a combat zone that I was unable to visit on this trip. I did fly over it on a previous trip further north in Bajaur, and I saw some of the villages you’re describing. And – but not knowing exactly what’s happened in that area at the level you’re talking about – I understand your question. It’s a question I’m very interested in, having seen this in a lot of other combat zones. But I’m not going to speculate on it till we get in there.

And it’s – but when you talk to the villagers in the tents – and I recognize that if I go in there, I may not get straight answers from people because there’s a lot of officials and a lot of cameras around, although we tried to keep the press out. But when you talk to them – and I need to stress this – they really understand why the military came in. They want the Taliban out. They hate them, and they think they have destroyed this piece of heaven which was Swat. And so I’m not – there’s no question that a lot of destruction has taken place. That’s why I emphasized the reconstruction phase. But this is something we’ll find out more about as time goes on.

QUESTION: Ambassador Holbrooke, do you yet see evidence --

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Wait a minute. Let me call on my old buddy here.

QUESTION: Charlie Wolfson with CBS.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I think you’re the – I think Charlie’s the only one in the room who actually was here when I started in the government, so we got to give him a shot, right?

QUESTION: I don’t know. I don’t know. I don’t know if I’ve been here that long, but –

Long enough. (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Okay, all right, I – you win that one.

QUESTION: Dayton, ok, but not back to the light at the end of the tunnel.

In your discussions with the political leadership in Pakistan, can you give us an idea of your assessment of whether they’re strong enough to carry the fight through and win and – both politically and on the military side?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I think they are.

QUESTION: Ambassador Holbrooke? Ambassador Holbrooke, Arshad Mohammed of Reuters.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Yes.

QUESTION: Do you yet see evidence that the Pakistani Government has a broad counterinsurgency strategy, one that goes beyond simply the military aspects to the kinds of political, economic, educational and other aspects that may be needed to prevail over the long term?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: They outlined to us a strategy – for a comprehensive strategy with particular attention to their economic needs. And I would draw your attention to the fact that they have some IMF/World Bank repayment deadlines coming up as early as July 1st, which put additional burden on this country. And again, we want to help them. I’ll leave it to each one of you to decide whether it fulfills your definition of a comprehensive strategy. I read in the papers they have one, I read in the papers they don’t have one. That’s not my job to make an assessment. My job is to encourage them and support them and not infringe on their sovereignty.

QUESTION: Ambassador Holbrooke --

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Well, let me just go to – just a minute, Indira. Let me go to the back.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Ambassador Holbrooke, I am from Interfax, Russia. How do you view the role of Russia in resolution of the crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: On every trip I’ve made to Afghanistan as a private citizen and as a government official, I’ve called on your remarkable ambassador in Kabul, Ambassador Kabulov – I’m not making his name up, he’s Ambassador Kabulov in Kabul – who has been serving almost continuously in one capacity or another in Afghanistan for over 30 years. We have had this discussion.

He states, as does Sergey Lavrov, the former – my former counterpart at the UN, that the Russians share the same objectives. In our international dialogue, which is an important part of what we’re doing in this Administration, reaching out to other countries like the Gulf states, which I already mentioned – I’ve been in China, Japan and South Korea, Turkey, the EU, and I’ll be going to other countries – in that dialogue, we consider Russia a very important component. They have a major role to play, and I believe we have the same objectives.

QUESTION: But in practical terms?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: To be determined.

QUESTION: Paul Richter with LA Times. I wonder if you have any concern that the money that’s being appropriated by the U.S. for civilian purposes in Pakistan – I’m not talking about the new refugee aid, but the $1.5 billion, that there are --

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Kerry-Lugar.

QUESTION: Yeah, that there are enough specific purposes for that money. I mean, I understand there are some people who are concerned that there is – that the process is so new that some of this money may not have a good purpose immediately.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: If you ask me whether every penny that goes into foreign assistance programs is equally valuable, I think we all know the answer. It’s a very – it’s very difficult to be sure that every penny is spent perfectly. But that’s equally true of domestic programs; that’s the nature of the beast. What I can say is that Pakistan needs our help and that help is in our own national security interests. And that’s why the President has endorsed the bill by Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar. In fact, remember that it was originally called the Biden-Lugar-Obama bill when it came up last year and didn’t pass. It’s a very important piece of legislation. And Chairman Berman has got a similar bill in the House.

But if you’re asking how every penny of that is going to be allocated, it is laid out in broad terms in the bill, you can read it for yourself. And the specifics of allocations have to be worked out when it passes, as we hope it will quite soon.

QUESTION: Kirit Radia with ABC News. Much has been said and written about the Pakistani reluctance to adopt a counterinsurgency strategy and to accept U.S. help in training their forces in doing so. Can you tell if in your meetings recently with Pakistan officials, if you believe that they have now agreed to do that? And then, on one other point on the bombing yesterday, if you can clarify a point in some reports that the U.S. was preparing to either purchase or lease that building for use as a consulate, if you could tell us about that?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: The latter point, we were looking at it – the Pearl Hotel in Peshawar, you mean?

QUESTION: Yes.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Yeah, we were looking at it.

QUESTION: But it had not been done already, was it?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: No, it hadn’t been done, but it was the one – it was sort of an obvious place to look at. And I had stayed there. And on your first question on training, the Pakistanis are very proud and zealous in emphasizing their sovereignty. They have always said that it is a red line to have no boots – no foreign boots on the ground, in their own phrase. And we respect that. And what we – and how we can help them in regard to maintenance or equipment training issues and so on, is up to them to determine. But our presence in Pakistan on the military side will always be extremely limited.

Jill?

QUESTION: Sir, thank you. Jill Dougherty from CNN. Ambassador, do you believe that the U.S. right now has sufficient supply routes into Afghanistan to supply U.S. troops?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: You know, honestly, Jill, you’ve got to ask David Petraeus that. I follow it vaguely, and I’ll be seeing him tonight, and I’ll get updated. But he’s the one who’s been doing the northern route issue. He’s – I think he will say yes, but let the military talk for themselves on that.

MR. CROWLEY: We have time for one or two more questions.

QUESTION: Mina Al-Oraibi, Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: From where?

QUESTION: Asharq Al-Awsat, Arabic language paper.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Based where?

QUESTION: In the UK, distributing internationally.

I wanted to ask you about what you mentioned regarding the Gulf states. You said that, you know, there’s symmetry in how you strategically view Pakistan, but what about the coordination? You said there’s not enough coordination. What sort of coordination are you looking for, and did you have specific requests from the Gulf countries when you went there as – with financial aid?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: No. I do not go to the Gulf to ask for money, like everyone else has so often and, by the way, that I often did in private business. They don’t want to – they don’t want us to come in and say, “Where the check?” I want to establish in a dialogue of mutual respect with these countries whether we have a strategic symmetry. If we do, then policies and coordination will logically proceed in accordance with the individual views of each country. And it’s going to be completely different for the United Arab Emirates than it will be for Oman, for obvious reasons. And each country will deal with it as they wish.

The important thing is that for the first time, the United States is having an extended, serious strategic dialogue. So I didn’t go out there and say – on a fundraising mission. That is for each country to decide. And I’m glad you asked this question, because it’s always assumed – and I want to point something else out. I was the third special envoy to visit these countries in the last six weeks. George Mitchell was there on the Mideast issues, and Dennis Ross was there on the Iran issue. So we are putting a great deal of attention – and then the President went to Riyadh for a historically important meeting with King Abdullah. So there’s a – this is – we’re only in the fifth month of this Administration, and we’re trying to establish an intellectual strategic base.

QUESTION: Ambassador --

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Oh, Indira, yes, sorry.

QUESTION: Thank you. Indira Lakshmanan from Bloomberg. I wanted to follow up on something you made reference to earlier about Pakistan having moved a lot of its troops to the western Afghan front. Please give us some details on exactly how many they have, because we also understand that India says that, actually, the number of troops that have been moved there is simply back to the pre-Mumbai bombing levels. And so it seems that it’s a status quo, as opposed to significant change.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I’m not going to give you figures for the simplest of reasons: It’s for the Pakistan Government to announce their own force deployments, not for me to make a headline here. But I will say that the number of troops that have been moved west is clearly larger than the number that were moved east after the Mumbai bombing. And I don’t believe there’d be any question on that.

QUESTION: And the ROZs and the Berman bill, can you tell us anything about that?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Yes, thank you for that. The Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, which were proposed in the House and Senate by a coalition of people led in the House by Chris Van Hollen from Maryland and in the Senate by Maria Cantwell, is a high-priority item for the United States Government. President Obama has twice referred to it in speeches, calling on the Congress to pass it. We have been in extensive communications with the leadership in the House and Senate, particularly the House, because it has to originate in the House.

The legislative process is complicated, and I don’t want to drag you through every detail of it. And in any case, since I haven’t talked to anyone since last night about it, it may have changed. These things are run by the Speaker. But I did have an opportunity to talk to Speaker Pelosi and to Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, to Chairman Berman, and to many other members of the committee on both sides of the aisle in the last three days, as have General Jones at the White House has also spoken to the Congress and other people in the legislative affairs areas of both State and the White House, and perhaps higher-level people who I’m unaware of.

And this legislation is vitally important to our national interests in Pakistan. And if you want more details on it, I would refer you to P.J., and he can give you the outlines of what it does. It’s complicated, but it is tremendously important. And I want to make a point: The area on the Pakistan side of the border, the area covered by these ROZs, Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, is where the refugees are. And when they go back to houses which have been destroyed and shops which have been destroyed and try to rebuild their lives, an opportunity for them to have this kind of chance through this bill is all the more important. This bill has been around for three or four years, but it never got to this stage before. We have a real possibility of getting it passed in the next few days and weeks. And it’s never been more important, because it is exactly where the refugees are.

Thank you very much.

A New Combination? The Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan Meeting

Last Sunday there was an important summit, in symbolism and possibly in policy, in Tehran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad welcomed his Afghan and Pakistani counterparts, Hamid Karzai and Asif Ali Zardari.

Few in the US and Britain noticed the meeting, set out by the Iranians as both a complement and a counter-weight to the American strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So we think this analysis by Iran Review, which includes pointed references to the "training [of] skilled troops in Afghanistan", counter-narcotics efforts, and a joint Iranian-Pakistani gas pipeline, deserves close attention.

Cooperation Triangle versus Talibanism

In the midst of the fighting between the Pakistani Army and the Taliban insurgents, Tehran played host to the presidents of its eastern neighbors, namely Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Asif Ali Zardari and Hamid Karzai in their summit with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran opened the file of a crisis which is facing total impasse.

The idea of holding the summit had been proposed by Tehran before. Iran’s proposed strategy was to mobilize the triangle’s potentials and capabilities to contain a regional threat. But to make such a line of thinking operational obviously required some time and opportunity.

The chance was provided when the schemes and tactics of trans-regional players had reached dead-end in Afghanistan and all the parties involved in the dispute, including Europe and the US admitted the failure of the NATO and underlined the significant role Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly the Islamic Republic of Iran could play in this respect.

Now eight years have passed since George Bush issued the order to attack Afghanistan, however neither the Pentagon nor the NATO have any clear strategy to pull out of this fatal war. This is under conditions that the war in Afghanistan and the show of power by the Taliban has triggered riots in Pakistan as well. In the meantime, the Obama administration which is faced with a crisis of loss of credit, has urged its Afghan and Pakistani partners to put an immediate end to the war.

For the same reason, eyes are fixed on Iran and Russia as two powerful neighbors in the region. The invitation to Iran to attend the Hague conference was extended in this very line. It is also precisely due to Tehran’s influential role that Bernd Mutzelberg, the special envoy of Europe on Afghanistan and Pakistan will be traveling to Iran soon.

One reason that the West has turned to Iran as a key to solve the crisis goes back to a decade ago. Eight years ago, Iran was one of the countries which played a significant role in the overthrow of the Taliban. But this is not the only reason for the international community to tilt towards Tehran. In the Afghan crisis test, the Iranians refrained from ambitions and share demanding as other rivals did. This wisdom made the people and statesmen in Kabul and Islamabad to turn to Iranian diplomacy. The outcome of this change of outlook was the March conference in Pakistan where 32 countries reached initial agreement on regional security arrangements and war on terror.

Undoubtedly, the main axis of the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan summit in Tehran was war on terror but not the kind of war drawn up by George Bush and his secretary of state Condoleezza Rice.

Iran is after offering a solution which could minimize the presence of foreign troops in the region. Iran’s political logic is that Bush’s strategic mistakes were the cause of revival of Talibanism. Now again, the US missile attacks on the Pakistani territory has left impacts similar to what is happening in Afghanistan.

One of Iran’s strategic solutions in this respect is training skilled military troops in Afghanistan. Tehran believes that if the Afghan government succeeds in raising its defense and combat capabilities it would be able to fight against the Taliban without relying on foreign forces. For Iran, elimination of Talibanism in Afghanistan and Pakistan has significance beyond security issues. Taliban are now involved in producing a big portion of narcotic drugs and the Taliban insurgents are providing the cost of their dirty war from unending puppy cultivation and narcotic drugs. Therefore, one of Iran’s unchanging policies has been to check transit of narcotic drugs. For the same reason, Iran hopes that a rooted campaign against narcotic drugs would be launched in Afghanistan through extermination of the Taliban.

According to evidences, the terrorist networks would recruit their soldiers from among the poor. Therefore, providing welfare to the people and reconstruction of Afghanistan could prevent further influence of the Taliban among the vulnerable classes in the country. The Tehran summit would certainly discuss and present practical solutions in aiding Afghanistan in this connection.

For Iran, fighting against the Pakistani Taliban enjoys the same significance as countering their followers in Afghanistan.

Iran has been working on its gas pipeline project with Pakistan for years now. The security of Pakistan and its stability depends on containing Talibanism. As long as Pakistan lacks political and economic instability due to terrorism the implementation of the gas pipeline would not be possible. For the same reason, during the Tokyo conference, Tehran voluntarily extended an aid of 330 million dollars to the Islamabad government so that its fight against the Taliban would become more tangible.

In the opinion of observers, under the present conditions that the Pakistani army is engaged in heavy fighting with the Taliban, Iran enjoys potentials whereby to mobilize financial and moral supports for Islamabad.

Pakistan's War in the Swat Valley: A First-Hand Reflection

Editor's Note: We have been following with great concern the developments in northwest Pakistan, where Government forces are carrying out an offensive against insurgents and more than two million people have been placed. Karina Bracken, a colleague at our partner the Clinton Institute for American Studies in Dublin, met a Pakistani man whose family are in the Swat Valley. "Salman Ashraf" is a pseudonym, to protect the identity of his relatives.

It is in a cafe in Dublin that I meet Salman Ashraf, far from his native Swat Valley in Pakistan. He is gently spoken but speaks with sincerity and conviction about the recent events in his hometown of Mingora.

Many people have been watching the recent situation in Pakistan with concern for the state’s stability and the possible threat to international security if the region should fall completely to the Taliban. Ashraf’s fears are more personal and immediate: he is anxious for the safety and welfare of his family who live in the largest town in the valley. Speaking in our comfortable surroundings, he confides, “I was very worried last week. There had been a curfew imposed and my sister was still there. I heard on Friday that she had gotten out with her family. I was so relieved.”

From the beginning of our interview, Ashraf was careful to offer a context, going back more than 60 years, for the conflict:

In 1947 when Pakistan and India were divided, Swat Valley was left to rule itself. The ruler at the time was well-educated; he built schools, hospitals and roads. In 1969 Swat Valley eventually came under Pakistani rule. Under the previous ruler, the system of law was close to that of Islam. Justice was fair and swift. After the merge with Pakistan, justice was slow, disputes took years to resolve and the people became fed up with the system. Therefore, they welcomed the revolt in 1993 that brought sharia law to the region. Islamic rule was introduced into the courts system... but it didn’t work very well.

Meanwhile the Pakistani government tended to ignore rural places like Swat and instead focused on development of the big cities such as Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore. Therefore in 1999 another group rose up against the government in an armed movement, fighting for the introduction of sharia law – or rather their own interpretation of sharia. These people were professional fighters; militants who had fought in the Afghan-Russian war and today reside in the mountains. Some of the fighters are local, others have come from Afghanistan and some reports even suggest Chechnya. My personal view is that these are professional fighters looking for hotspots. They want to destabilise the region and the country. They are very well equipped, organised and modern; they are on a level similar to the Pakistani army.

Ashraf explained that the fighters initially "had some support from the general population of Swat":

You see, people were frustrated with the ineffectual justice system in place. However when the government agreed to the militants’ terms and the ceasefire was signed; they would not give up their weapons. “These Kalashnikovs are a part of our culture”, they would say. The local people finally realised that the fighters did not really want sharia, they just wanted to rule. That has been the case ever since.”

Ashraf explains that he is not against the introduction of sharia law, but he firmly believes that under the Taliban it would be bad for the Pakistani people:

Sharia law is actually very fair. These militants have no religious education. What they want to implement is their own incorrect interpretation of sharia. For example, look at Mullah Fazlullah who has attracted attention for his daily incitements to violence. Fazlullah used to be a chair lift operator, and he now broadcasts on FM radio to encourage the fighters. His father-in-law is a religious leader who also wants sharia law, but the difference is that he does not want to rule. Unlike Fazlullah he believes in a peaceful demonstration to achieve sharia.

Ashraf still has questions about the relationship between the Pakistani Government and its supposed enemies, "I have found it very strange that the Pakistani army have not been able to find Fazlullah and his supporters. Nearly every one who lives in the area knows where he is. It does beg questions about the organisation and overall aims of the Pakistani army.” However, he adds that, where before the recent offensive against the militants, there was not much support for President Zardari, now a large majority of Pakistanis are behind the government’s actions in Swat.

During the fighting Ashraf has been able to obtain little news beyond reports of the destruction of schools and the murder of policemen, whose bodies are often left in the town square. These actions, among others, were the Taliban’s attempts to intimidate the locals:

Now that people have left the region they can speak out, but in previous weeks they could not criticise for fear of their safety and that of their families. The Taliban have terrorised them. There is no one there to protect them.

One day I phoned my brother and he was very upset. I asked him why he was at home and not at work. He was saying that every morning there is a dead body in the local square. Even though there is usually a crowd, he does not want to go near it. But that morning he could not help seeing one of them. He said he had to come home as he could not stay in work. I am worried about how his will affect him, but particularly his young children. It is such inhumanity for them to witness. It is an un-Islamic thing to do.

In terms of fiscal support, the Taliban generally do not look for money off small businesses in Swat. Instead they look for big sums of money off the wealthiest. However, I have heard stories of them going to people’s houses and demanding that one member of their family must join them.

So, amidst this suffering, do the population support the militants? Ashraf answers with conviction:

It is simple. The large scale migration shows that they do not. When the fighting began, many fled the area. Everyone is now counting on the Pakistani army. The people say “We do not care about our houses, our businesses. Just get rid of these fighters and give us our Valley, our home, back.”

Apart from one brother living in Britain, Ashraf’s family are all still living in Pakistan. They have been directly affected by the violence, unable to sustain themselves and eventually having to leave. Despite or, rather, because of that displacement, Ashraf is visibly relieved, speaking to his family both morning and night. However, he looks beyond his family with concern:

They are staying with friends and relatives. Those in the refugee camps have not been so lucky. It is against our way of life to live in a tent. I don’t think that the Pakistani government will be able to deal with this humanitarian crisis on their own. They will need international help and aid.

But what does "help" entail? Ashraf carefully negotiates the issue of American involvement:

The U.S. should support the Pakistani government, but they must do it behind closed doors. If the U.S. interrupted it would just enflame the anti-American rhetoric of the militants and they could exploit the general weariness that the population already has against America. I can understand the feelings of the Pakistani people, but my opinions are different. After all, the only reason I was able to afford a university education in Pakistan was because I received a scholarship from the U.S. due to the disturbance caused by the earlier war in Afghanistan.

Before he said good-bye, I asked Ashraf if he believed that the situation in Swat could be resolved. His answer was very personal and very uncertain:

We have to wait and see what happens now. I hope someday to go back to Mingora and Swat. I want to go back to see my family. I want my kids to see where their family is from. However, I don’t know if I will ever be able to return.