Obama's Strategy in the Middle East: Resetting with Rhetoric One More Time

One useful way of considering tomorrow's grand Middle Eastern speech by President Obama is to recall that it was supposed to be delivered three or four months ago. Soon after the election, Obama's advisors briefed the press that the new President, within weeks of the Inauguration, would be addressing the world from Cairo. His high hopes for a new region, with the vision that long-term enemies could live and progress together, would be followed by talks fostered by US representatives.

Israel's invasion of Gaza ruined that plan, so the Obama White House went to Plan B. Obama's special envoy, George Mitchell, and then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made high-profile trips to the region; there were specific missions by diplomats, such as Jeffrey Feltman's and Daniel Shapiro's trip to Damascus. Middle Eastern leaders --- Abdullah of Jordan, Netanyahu of Israel, Abbas of the Palestinian Authority --- came to Washington.

The only hitch is that, after all the travel and photo opportunities, there has been no notable advance. Israel, now led by the Government of Benjamin Netanyahu, has not only balked at any prospect of talks that would lead to a Palestinian state or a headline measure such as a freeze on settlement expansion in Jerusalem and the West Bank. And, with Tel Aviv making no movement, Arab governments have pulled away from the symbolic advance of "recognition", for example, by allowing overflights of their countries by Israeli commercial planes.

So Obama takes the podium in Cairo, after talks in Saudi Arabia today, empty-handed. Speaking to the Israeli Parliament on Monday, Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly slapped down the American demand on settlements --- his Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, is in the US offering the "compromise" of "dismantling unauthorized settlement outposts", which does nothing to address the American concern about legally-authorized construction. Obama, rather weakly, told the BBC that he would look to Arab States to offer some measures for a regional peace process, knowing (I suspect) that there is no prospect of that. Saudi Arabia wants some signal from Tel Aviv that the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, launched by Riyadh, is a starting platform. Damascus, with Israel not even creeping towards a resumption of indirect talks, plays a waiting game.

What, oh what, can this President do? Well, he will do what he has done best so far. He will by-pass the specific difficulties with the clarion call to engagement based on mutual respect and interests. It worked in his Inaugural Speech, it worked in the Al-Arabiya television interview in January, and it worked in his address in Ankara (which is now our #1 story in the last eight months and continues to be in the Top 5 on most days). Obama's rhetoric may be derided by some domestic critics for its refusal to situate Islam as subservient to "American values" and for his "apologies" for past actions in US foreign policy, but it has succeeded with many overseas listeners precisely because it recognises those listeners, rather than demanding adherence first to an American position.

That is why, in recent days, Obama and his advisors have shifted from discussion of particular elements in a "peace process" to the general statement, repeated on two occasions by the President in his interview with National Public Radio on Monday, that it is "early in the process". The President will undoubtedly mention (according to McClatchy Newspapers, "forcefully endorse") a Palestinian state, but he will set out no timetable or specific steps towards that state. He will cite "areas of mutual interest" with Arab and Islamic countries but will be more concrete in his suggestions on defeating "violent extremism" than on negotiations toward political and economic agreements.

One could argue, of course, that is still quite an achievement after 4+ months in office, especially as every US President since Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 has pursued an Arab-Israeli settlement and none --- with the notable exception of Jimmy Carter --- has had a lasting success. And it looks like Obama will wow his observers in the American media (with the exception, of course, of ardently pro-Israeli outlets and of Bush Administration supporters who cling to the fiction that "democracy promotion" was the primary aim of that President's eight years in office). The working consensus is "a brave and possibly historic effort" with "an evenhanded approach", and Obama's rhetorical power is likely to sustain that praise.

(Beyond well-meaning support for the President, there are the more troubling hurrahs of self-serving sycophancy. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, after preening that he told Obama a joke during their 20 minutes of phone time, offers without further awareness or reflection: "The president has no illusions that one speech will make lambs lie down with lions. Rather, he sees it as part of his broader diplomatic approach that says: If you go right into peoples’ living rooms, don’t be afraid to hold up a mirror to everything they are doing, but also engage them in a way that says ‘I know and respect who you are.’ You end up — if nothing else — creating a little more space for U.S. diplomacy. And you never know when that can help.")

The issue, however, is whether Obama's audience in the Middle East and beyond will settle for feel-good but abstract advances. US supporters of the President are exalting his forthright stance on Israeli settlements, but the fact remains that Tel Aviv has been equally forthright so far in rebuffing Obama. If that intransigence continues, Washington's Plan B is vague, limited so far to talk of not guaranteeing an American veto in defence of Israel in the United Nations Security Council (and not even mentioning, as the George H.W. Bush Administration did, withholding of US economic and military aid).

And, of course, the settlements are only Tel Aviv's first line of defence against an attack for a two-state Israel-Palestine resolution. If Washington gets its way, there will then be the issue of the Israeli wall cutting across the West Bank, and then the issue of the status of Jerusalem, and then the Palestinian civilian "right of return" to the lands they lost in 1948, and then the Israeli military's "right of return" to the West Bank if it perceives a security threat, and then the small matter of a place called Gaza.

One might respond that Israel-Palestine is only one issue in the complexities of the region. True, but it is a touchstone issue (rather than, for example, Israel's preferred option of Iran). Symbolically, the failure to get a resolution that accords not respect but a meaningful economic and political status for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza will be held up by others, whether for the benevolent reason that they see it as an essential case of justice and rights or for the less-than-benevolent reason that they want to divert attention from issues in their own communities and countries or the very malevolent reason that they want to justify hostile and often violent action against perceived enemies.

But, for those who want a context beyond Israel and Palestine (or, rather, Israel and the West Bank of the Palestinian Authority), Obama has set himself even bigger problems. There are the questions of how Obama can walk the tight-rope between support for political freedom and US alliances, powerfully demonstrated by the location of the President's speech, with far-from-democratic regimes. A less noted but just as significant difficulty with "local" politics emerged in a question from National Public Radio:

You’ve mentioned the — many times, the importance of reaching out to Iran with an open hand; trying to engage that country. Are you also willing to try to engage with Hezbollah or Hamas?

Obama responded with a pretty firm "they can just shove off":

Iran is a huge, significant nation-state that has — you know, has, I think, across the international community been recognized as such. Hezbollah and Hamas are not. And I don’t think that we have to approach those entities in the same way.

The President might as well have said "illegitimate". When the NPR questioner persisted, "Does that change with [Hezbollah's] electoral gains?", Obama refused to grant the political party --- which is likely to be a significant, if not dominant, entity in Lebanon's ruling coalition after this month's elections --- any status:

If — at some point — Lebanon is a member of the United Nations. If at some point they are elected as a head of state, or a head of state is elected in Lebanon, that is a member of that organization, then that would raise these issues. That hasn’t happened yet.

There was a bit more flexibility --- but only a bit --- with Hamas, as Obama said "the discussions...could potentially proceed" if Hamas accepted the conditions of the US-UK-EU-Russia Quartet.

The danger for the President is that, for all his talk of respect and equality, many will see him continuing rather than renouncing the US priority of getting the "right" governments. Vice President Joe Biden's trip to Beirut in the midst of the electoral campaign did not go unnoticed by Lebanese observers. There are suspicions, after a West Bank firefight that killed two leading commanders of Hamas' military wing, that the US is supporting (and possibly prompting) the Palestinian Authority's crackdown on its rival for power. Maybe, in the context of a grand speech, these are just troubling and tangential details. In the absence of an American strategy that offers concrete measures as well as rhetoric, however, the details can take on significance.

I'm not sure that I want to share Robert Fisk's dark vision of tomorrow's events: "I haven't met an Arab in Egypt – or an Arab in Lebanon, for that matter – who really thinks that Obama's 'outreach' lecture in Cairo on Thursday is going to make much difference." On the other hand, I am just as unsettled by talk from the White House that they are "re-setting" the Middle East.

Because, as any gamer knows, you don't hit the Reset button when you are doing well. And while that might bring a change in fortunes, if you keep hitting Reset (the Inaugural Speech, the Al-Arabiya talk, Ankara, now Cairo), an observer may begin to think that no one ever wins.

Afghanistan Video: General McChrystal's Confirmation Hearing

No surprises in the Senate hearing for confirmation of General Stanley McChrystal, the proposed commander for US forces in Afghanistan. McChrystal offered a pre-emptive apology for his role in the "friendly fire" death of Pat Tillman, the American football player turned special forces soldier, and then gave chapter-and-verse support for the Administration's counter-insurgency approach:

Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy

A New Combination? The Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan Meeting

Last Sunday there was an important summit, in symbolism and possibly in policy, in Tehran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad welcomed his Afghan and Pakistani counterparts, Hamid Karzai and Asif Ali Zardari.

Few in the US and Britain noticed the meeting, set out by the Iranians as both a complement and a counter-weight to the American strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So we think this analysis by Iran Review, which includes pointed references to the "training [of] skilled troops in Afghanistan", counter-narcotics efforts, and a joint Iranian-Pakistani gas pipeline, deserves close attention.

Cooperation Triangle versus Talibanism

In the midst of the fighting between the Pakistani Army and the Taliban insurgents, Tehran played host to the presidents of its eastern neighbors, namely Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Asif Ali Zardari and Hamid Karzai in their summit with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran opened the file of a crisis which is facing total impasse.

The idea of holding the summit had been proposed by Tehran before. Iran’s proposed strategy was to mobilize the triangle’s potentials and capabilities to contain a regional threat. But to make such a line of thinking operational obviously required some time and opportunity.

The chance was provided when the schemes and tactics of trans-regional players had reached dead-end in Afghanistan and all the parties involved in the dispute, including Europe and the US admitted the failure of the NATO and underlined the significant role Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly the Islamic Republic of Iran could play in this respect.

Now eight years have passed since George Bush issued the order to attack Afghanistan, however neither the Pentagon nor the NATO have any clear strategy to pull out of this fatal war. This is under conditions that the war in Afghanistan and the show of power by the Taliban has triggered riots in Pakistan as well. In the meantime, the Obama administration which is faced with a crisis of loss of credit, has urged its Afghan and Pakistani partners to put an immediate end to the war.

For the same reason, eyes are fixed on Iran and Russia as two powerful neighbors in the region. The invitation to Iran to attend the Hague conference was extended in this very line. It is also precisely due to Tehran’s influential role that Bernd Mutzelberg, the special envoy of Europe on Afghanistan and Pakistan will be traveling to Iran soon.

One reason that the West has turned to Iran as a key to solve the crisis goes back to a decade ago. Eight years ago, Iran was one of the countries which played a significant role in the overthrow of the Taliban. But this is not the only reason for the international community to tilt towards Tehran. In the Afghan crisis test, the Iranians refrained from ambitions and share demanding as other rivals did. This wisdom made the people and statesmen in Kabul and Islamabad to turn to Iranian diplomacy. The outcome of this change of outlook was the March conference in Pakistan where 32 countries reached initial agreement on regional security arrangements and war on terror.

Undoubtedly, the main axis of the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan summit in Tehran was war on terror but not the kind of war drawn up by George Bush and his secretary of state Condoleezza Rice.

Iran is after offering a solution which could minimize the presence of foreign troops in the region. Iran’s political logic is that Bush’s strategic mistakes were the cause of revival of Talibanism. Now again, the US missile attacks on the Pakistani territory has left impacts similar to what is happening in Afghanistan.

One of Iran’s strategic solutions in this respect is training skilled military troops in Afghanistan. Tehran believes that if the Afghan government succeeds in raising its defense and combat capabilities it would be able to fight against the Taliban without relying on foreign forces. For Iran, elimination of Talibanism in Afghanistan and Pakistan has significance beyond security issues. Taliban are now involved in producing a big portion of narcotic drugs and the Taliban insurgents are providing the cost of their dirty war from unending puppy cultivation and narcotic drugs. Therefore, one of Iran’s unchanging policies has been to check transit of narcotic drugs. For the same reason, Iran hopes that a rooted campaign against narcotic drugs would be launched in Afghanistan through extermination of the Taliban.

According to evidences, the terrorist networks would recruit their soldiers from among the poor. Therefore, providing welfare to the people and reconstruction of Afghanistan could prevent further influence of the Taliban among the vulnerable classes in the country. The Tehran summit would certainly discuss and present practical solutions in aiding Afghanistan in this connection.

For Iran, fighting against the Pakistani Taliban enjoys the same significance as countering their followers in Afghanistan.

Iran has been working on its gas pipeline project with Pakistan for years now. The security of Pakistan and its stability depends on containing Talibanism. As long as Pakistan lacks political and economic instability due to terrorism the implementation of the gas pipeline would not be possible. For the same reason, during the Tokyo conference, Tehran voluntarily extended an aid of 330 million dollars to the Islamabad government so that its fight against the Taliban would become more tangible.

In the opinion of observers, under the present conditions that the Pakistani army is engaged in heavy fighting with the Taliban, Iran enjoys potentials whereby to mobilize financial and moral supports for Islamabad.

Pakistan's War in the Swat Valley: A First-Hand Reflection

Editor's Note: We have been following with great concern the developments in northwest Pakistan, where Government forces are carrying out an offensive against insurgents and more than two million people have been placed. Karina Bracken, a colleague at our partner the Clinton Institute for American Studies in Dublin, met a Pakistani man whose family are in the Swat Valley. "Salman Ashraf" is a pseudonym, to protect the identity of his relatives.

It is in a cafe in Dublin that I meet Salman Ashraf, far from his native Swat Valley in Pakistan. He is gently spoken but speaks with sincerity and conviction about the recent events in his hometown of Mingora.

Many people have been watching the recent situation in Pakistan with concern for the state’s stability and the possible threat to international security if the region should fall completely to the Taliban. Ashraf’s fears are more personal and immediate: he is anxious for the safety and welfare of his family who live in the largest town in the valley. Speaking in our comfortable surroundings, he confides, “I was very worried last week. There had been a curfew imposed and my sister was still there. I heard on Friday that she had gotten out with her family. I was so relieved.”

From the beginning of our interview, Ashraf was careful to offer a context, going back more than 60 years, for the conflict:

In 1947 when Pakistan and India were divided, Swat Valley was left to rule itself. The ruler at the time was well-educated; he built schools, hospitals and roads. In 1969 Swat Valley eventually came under Pakistani rule. Under the previous ruler, the system of law was close to that of Islam. Justice was fair and swift. After the merge with Pakistan, justice was slow, disputes took years to resolve and the people became fed up with the system. Therefore, they welcomed the revolt in 1993 that brought sharia law to the region. Islamic rule was introduced into the courts system... but it didn’t work very well.

Meanwhile the Pakistani government tended to ignore rural places like Swat and instead focused on development of the big cities such as Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore. Therefore in 1999 another group rose up against the government in an armed movement, fighting for the introduction of sharia law – or rather their own interpretation of sharia. These people were professional fighters; militants who had fought in the Afghan-Russian war and today reside in the mountains. Some of the fighters are local, others have come from Afghanistan and some reports even suggest Chechnya. My personal view is that these are professional fighters looking for hotspots. They want to destabilise the region and the country. They are very well equipped, organised and modern; they are on a level similar to the Pakistani army.

Ashraf explained that the fighters initially "had some support from the general population of Swat":

You see, people were frustrated with the ineffectual justice system in place. However when the government agreed to the militants’ terms and the ceasefire was signed; they would not give up their weapons. “These Kalashnikovs are a part of our culture”, they would say. The local people finally realised that the fighters did not really want sharia, they just wanted to rule. That has been the case ever since.”

Ashraf explains that he is not against the introduction of sharia law, but he firmly believes that under the Taliban it would be bad for the Pakistani people:

Sharia law is actually very fair. These militants have no religious education. What they want to implement is their own incorrect interpretation of sharia. For example, look at Mullah Fazlullah who has attracted attention for his daily incitements to violence. Fazlullah used to be a chair lift operator, and he now broadcasts on FM radio to encourage the fighters. His father-in-law is a religious leader who also wants sharia law, but the difference is that he does not want to rule. Unlike Fazlullah he believes in a peaceful demonstration to achieve sharia.

Ashraf still has questions about the relationship between the Pakistani Government and its supposed enemies, "I have found it very strange that the Pakistani army have not been able to find Fazlullah and his supporters. Nearly every one who lives in the area knows where he is. It does beg questions about the organisation and overall aims of the Pakistani army.” However, he adds that, where before the recent offensive against the militants, there was not much support for President Zardari, now a large majority of Pakistanis are behind the government’s actions in Swat.

During the fighting Ashraf has been able to obtain little news beyond reports of the destruction of schools and the murder of policemen, whose bodies are often left in the town square. These actions, among others, were the Taliban’s attempts to intimidate the locals:

Now that people have left the region they can speak out, but in previous weeks they could not criticise for fear of their safety and that of their families. The Taliban have terrorised them. There is no one there to protect them.

One day I phoned my brother and he was very upset. I asked him why he was at home and not at work. He was saying that every morning there is a dead body in the local square. Even though there is usually a crowd, he does not want to go near it. But that morning he could not help seeing one of them. He said he had to come home as he could not stay in work. I am worried about how his will affect him, but particularly his young children. It is such inhumanity for them to witness. It is an un-Islamic thing to do.

In terms of fiscal support, the Taliban generally do not look for money off small businesses in Swat. Instead they look for big sums of money off the wealthiest. However, I have heard stories of them going to people’s houses and demanding that one member of their family must join them.

So, amidst this suffering, do the population support the militants? Ashraf answers with conviction:

It is simple. The large scale migration shows that they do not. When the fighting began, many fled the area. Everyone is now counting on the Pakistani army. The people say “We do not care about our houses, our businesses. Just get rid of these fighters and give us our Valley, our home, back.”

Apart from one brother living in Britain, Ashraf’s family are all still living in Pakistan. They have been directly affected by the violence, unable to sustain themselves and eventually having to leave. Despite or, rather, because of that displacement, Ashraf is visibly relieved, speaking to his family both morning and night. However, he looks beyond his family with concern:

They are staying with friends and relatives. Those in the refugee camps have not been so lucky. It is against our way of life to live in a tent. I don’t think that the Pakistani government will be able to deal with this humanitarian crisis on their own. They will need international help and aid.

But what does "help" entail? Ashraf carefully negotiates the issue of American involvement:

The U.S. should support the Pakistani government, but they must do it behind closed doors. If the U.S. interrupted it would just enflame the anti-American rhetoric of the militants and they could exploit the general weariness that the population already has against America. I can understand the feelings of the Pakistani people, but my opinions are different. After all, the only reason I was able to afford a university education in Pakistan was because I received a scholarship from the U.S. due to the disturbance caused by the earlier war in Afghanistan.

Before he said good-bye, I asked Ashraf if he believed that the situation in Swat could be resolved. His answer was very personal and very uncertain:

We have to wait and see what happens now. I hope someday to go back to Mingora and Swat. I want to go back to see my family. I want my kids to see where their family is from. However, I don’t know if I will ever be able to return.

Video: Obama Interview with BBC (1 June)

Related Post: Audio of Obama Interview with National Public Radio (1 June)

Before setting off for the Middle East and Europe, President Obama gave the British Broadcasting Corporation's Justin Webb 15 minutes on Monday. Webb's questions were surprisingly challenging, but Obama was able to speak in general platitudes about the need for a US explanation about its "hunt for extremists" to the Muslim world, for a two-state Israel-Palestine solution, and "for Iran to set aside ambitions for a nuclear weapon". Still, there was one significant passage --- which we'll analyse in a separate post --- where Obama called on Arab States to make concessions so Israel would engage in negotiations with the Palestinian Authority and other countries.