Why a US "Surge" Won't Work in Afghanistan

Speaking at the Royal Institute of International Affairs last Wednesday, Rory Stewart offered an incisive examination of the difficulties with a military-first approach to Afghanistan. The following extract is taken from The Times of London:

The situation in Afghanistan is somewhat aggravating and a little surreal. We have been there now for seven years - but I don't know if the British Government knows why. Do we have a policy? Or are we simply waiting to discover what the Obama Administration wishes to do and go along with it?

This year the US is expected to spend more than $50 billion on military and civilian aid. We are talking big sums but we don't have a clear account of what we are doing.

When the US invaded in 2001, its objective was to ensure that al-Qaeda could never again build training camps in Afghanistan. That was achieved with relative ease and with a limited number of special forces and intelligence operatives.

By 2002 we were beginning to talk about development. We launched national solidarity programmes, gave money to villages. But over the next two years it became fashionable in policymaking circles in Britain and the US to say that there was no point in focusing on Afghanistan as an arena for counter-terrorism or a recipient of charity - we should be building a state.

This was when Britain and Nato decided to deploy more troops. Britain has increased the numbers in Helmand province from 250 to 5,000. The belief then was that they were there to help state-building, not to fight the Taleban, which was why John Reid, the Defence Secretary, said to much mockery that he “hoped that the British troops would return without a shot fired”. There was little sign then of any overt Taleban presence, and it was relatively safe for Westerners to travel through Helmand.

I sat down in Kabul with a senior member of the British Embassy and the Number 2 of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in 2005 and asked: “Why are you deploying British troops to Helmand?”

They said: “To improve economic development, to improve governance and eliminate corruption, to improve road security and, in particular, to deal with the narcotics problem.”

I said: “You'll provoke an insurgency”. They replied: “No, you're traumatised by Iraq. Opinion polls show that in Helmand British and American troops are very popular.” I asked: “What type of timeframe are you looking at to see improvements?” They said six months.

I had just come from Iraq, where I had been an administrator of a province in the south and I said: “This is nonsense; will you write on a piece of paper that these are the kinds of improvements you're going to see, and if you don't see them, will you agree not to say: ‘We didn't have enough troops or enough helicopters' or ‘We are where we are, it is too humiliating to withdraw'. Will you accept that if these improvements don't come in six months the policy was wrong?” They agreed.

From that moment on, I have become increasingly frustrated. A Taleban insurgency has exploded but policymakers will not acknowledge that their original objectives have not been achieved. Instead, they blame implementation, the type of helicopters or previous commanders. Now policymakers have moved on from development, state-building and counter-insurgency to “preserving the credibility of Nato” and regional stability: “We are in Afghanistan to hold Pakistan together.”

Enter General Petraeus and his surge of 17,000 troops. There is good evidence that by deploying a further 30,000 troops “King David” turned the situation around in Iraq. I was in Baghdad this month, and walked streets I would not have been able to walk three years ago. I was not wearing a helmet, nobody was shooting or throwing rocks at me. So can General Petraeus conclude that by deploying more troops to Afghanistan he will be able to pull off the same thing?

There are two different accounts of what he hopes to do by deploying more troops in Afghanistan. One is straight from the counter-insurgency manual: clear/hold/build. Clear out the Taleban, secure populated areas and allow the forces of sustainable economic development to flourish, good governance to come and the Afghan police and security services to back us so we can go home.

The more cynical explanation is that the surge is an attempt to whack the Taleban round the head because they will not negotiate unless they are hurting. This is, broadly speaking, what Henry Kissinger believed of the Vietcong in 1968. The US increased troop numbers to drive them to the table to make concessions.
Neither approach will work. The Afghan groups do not resemble the Vietcong or the Sunni tribal groups in Iraq. The Shia-run Government in Baghdad could cut a deal with the Sunni groups because they are both relatively powerful and coherent factions backed by mass politics. Go to any southern Iraqi town and you will find a man in a buttoned-up shirt without a tie who says: “I am the head of this party” and who can mobilise thousands.

Go to a town in Afghanistan and ask who is in charge and you find six or seven figures with varying sorts of power - perhaps a tribal chief, maybe the police chief or sub-district commander. They do not have mass movements behind them. When we talk about driving the Taleban to the table, we forget that these groups are more insubstantial and fragmented than we acknowledge. The Kabul Government lacks political depth or legitimacy; the Taleban is elusive.

But I'm not a radical pessimist. Being realistic about our limitations does not mean that Britain must accept the status of a third-rate power. We can achieve many things in Afghanistan that are worthwhile for us and for the Afghans. We have made serious progress in education, health and rural development; Afghans are asking for simple things such as roads, electricity and irrigation and we have the skills to provide them. We should focus on the progressive, pro-Western centre and north, rather than pouring almost all our resources into the insurgency zones of the south and the east where schools are often destroyed as soon as they are built.

We need a much lighter military footprint. We cannot afford to keep 80,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan for a decade. US and European voters won't support it, it is an extravagant distraction from more important strategic priorities, including Pakistan and as long as we are seen as an occupying power, there will be Afghans who want to fight us.

We should plan now to reduce the size of our military commitment and decide what we can do with fewer troops. This does not mean abandoning Afghanistan entirely. The US and its allies should use special forces and intelligence operatives to ensure that al-Qaeda never again finds Afghanistan a safe and comfortable environment in which to establish training camps. Even a few thousand international troops and US air support would be a serious deterrent to civil war. But most importantly we must continue to provide generous long-term financial support to the Afghan Government and its military.

Policymakers are now more cautious about Afghanistan and say that their only objective is stability.
But even this is implausible. Pakistan is 20 years ahead of Afghanistan on almost every indicator and is yet to achieve the kind of stability we dream of in Afghanistan. Instead, we must think in terms of containing and managing a difficult, poor and unstable country without sinking too much into this difficult task. We must husband our resources for the many other crises already erupting - from the British banking sector to Pakistan.

There are many small simple things we can do to help Afghan society. All require us to forge a long-term engagement with the country. But such a policy is only possible if we reduce our investment in money and troops and develop a lighter, more affordable and ultimately more sustainable relationship with Afghanistan.

The Bush-Cheney Legacy and Iraq

On Sunday former Vice President Dick Cheney continued his mission both to denigrate the Obama Administration as unworthy and unsafe and to re-write history with an extended interview on CNN. After answering a damning indictment of the Bush economic record with the cure-all, "Eight months after we arrived, we had 9/11," Cheney turned to Iraq: "We've accomplished nearly everything we set out to do."

Juan Cole sets out those accomplishments:

*An estimated 4 million Iraqis, out of 27 million, have been displaced from their homes, that is, made homeless. Some 2.7 million are internally displaced inside Iraq. A couple hundred thousand are cooling their heels in Jordan. And perhaps a million are quickly running out of money and often living in squalid conditions in Syria. Cheney's war has left about 15% of Iraqis homeless inside the country or abroad. That would be like 45 million American thrown out of their homes.

It is controversial how many Iraqis died as a result of the 2003 invasion and its aftermath. But it seems to me that a million extra dead, beyond what you would have expected from a year 2000 baseline, is entirely plausible. The toll is certainly in the hundreds of thousands. Cheney did not kill them all. The Lancet study suggested that the US was directly responsible for a third of all violent deaths since 2003. That would be as much as 300,000 that we killed. The rest, we only set in train their deaths by our invasion.

Baghdad has been turned from a mixed city, about half of its population Shiite and the other half Sunni in 2003, into a Shiite city where the Sunni population may be as little as ten to fifteen percent. From a Sunni point of view, Cheney's war has resulted in a Shiite (and Iranian) take-over of the Iraqi capital, long a symbol of pan-Arabism and anti-imperialism.

In the Iraqi elections, Shiite fundamentalist parties closely allied with Iran came to power. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the leading party in parliament, was formed by Iraqi expatriates at the behest of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1982 in Tehran. The Islamic Mission (Da'wa) Party is the oldest ideological Shiite party working for an Islamic state. It helped form Hizbullah in Beirut in the early 1980s. It has supplied both prime ministers elected since 2005. Fundamentalist Shiites shaped the constitution, which forbids the civil legislature to pass legislation that contravenes Islamic law. Dissidents have accused the new Iraqi government of being an Iranian puppet.

Arab-Kurdish violence is spiking in the north, endangering the Obama withdrawal plan and, indeed, the whole of Iraq, not to mention Syria, Turkey and Iran.

Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi women have been widowed by the war and its effects, leaving most without a means of support. Iraqi widows often lack access to clean water and electricity.

$32 billion were wasted on Iraq reconstruction, and most of it cannot even be traced. I repeat, Cheney gave away $32 bn. to anonymous cronies in such a way that we can't even be sure who stole it, exactly. And you are angry at AIG about $400 mn. in bonuses! We are talking about $32 billion given out in brown paper bags.

Political power is being fragmented in Iraq with big spikes in the murder rate in some provinces that may reflect faction-fighting and vendettas in which the Iraqi military is loathe to get involved.

The Iraqi economy is devastated, and the new government's bureaucracy and infighting have made it difficult to attract investors.

The Bush-Cheney invasion helped further destabilize the Eastern Mediterranean, setting in play Kurdish nationalism and terrifying Turkey.

Cheney avoids mentioning all the human suffering he has caused, on a cosmic scale, and focuses on procedural matters like elections (which he confuses with democracy-- given 2000 in this country, you can understand why). Or he lies, as when he says that Iran's influence in Iraq has been blocked. Another lie is that there was that the US was fighting "al-Qaeda" in Iraq as opposed to just Iraqis. He and Bush even claim that they made Iraqi womens' lives better.

The real question is whether anyone will have the gumption to put Cheney on trial for treason and crimes against humanity.

Quick Quiz: What's Missing from George W. Bush's Official Biography?

The George W. Bush Presidential Center has launched its website with a biography of the 43rd President of the United States, who "took unprecedented steps to protect our homeland and create a world free from terror". It seems, however, that some information has been lost in posting. Can you help repair the website?

Quick Clue 1: Four letters, starts with "I".
Quick Clue 2: Seven letters, starts with "K".
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George W. Bush served as the 43rd President of the United States. He was sworn into office on January 20, 2001, re-elected on November 2, 2004, and sworn in for a second term on January 20, 2005. Prior to his Presidency, President Bush served for 6 years as the 46th Governor of the State of Texas, where he earned a reputation for bipartisanship and as a compassionate conservative who shaped public policy based on the principles of limited government, personal responsibility, strong families, and local control.

President Bush was born on July 6, 1946, in New Haven, Connecticut, and grew up in Midland and Houston, Texas. He received a bachelor’s degree in history from Yale University in 1968, and then served as an F-102 fighter pilot in the Texas Air National Guard. President Bush received a Master of Business Administration from Harvard Business School in 1975. Following graduation, he moved back to Midland and began a career in the energy business. After working on his father’s successful 1988 Presidential campaign, President Bush assembled the group of partners who purchased the Texas Rangers baseball franchise in 1989. On November 8, 1994, President Bush was elected Governor of Texas. He became the first Governor in Texas history to be elected to consecutive 4-year terms when he was re-elected on November 3, 1998.

As President of the United States, President Bush has worked with the Congress to create an ownership society and build a future of security, prosperity, and opportunity for all Americans. He signed into law tax relief that helps workers keep more of their hard-earned money, as well as the most comprehensive education reforms in a generation, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. This legislation ushered in a new era of accountability, flexibility, local control, and more choices for parents, affirming our Nation’s fundamental belief in the promise of every child. President Bush also worked to improve healthcare and modernize Medicare, providing the first-ever prescription drug benefit for seniors; increase homeownership, especially among minorities; conserve our environment; and increase military strength, pay, and benefits. Because President Bush believes the strength of America lies in the hearts and souls of our citizens, he supported programs that encouraged individuals to help their neighbors in need.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked our Nation. President Bush took unprecedented steps to protect our homeland and create a world free from terror. He is grateful for the service and sacrifice of our brave men and women in uniform and their families. The President remains confident that by helping build free and prosperous societies, our Nation and our friends and allies will succeed in making America more secure and the world more peaceful.

President Bush is married to Laura Welch Bush, a former teacher and librarian, and they have twin daughters, Barbara and Jenna. The Bush family also includes two dogs, Barney and Miss Beazley.

Iran's Presidential Election: Khatami Stands Down, Moussavi Stands Up

Yesterday's news that former President Mohammad Khatami would not challenge President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has prompted responses such as that of Time Magazine, "Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has reason to smile: His opponents in this June's presidential election appear to be in some disarray."

Chris Emery, Enduring America's observer of Iranian politics, gets behind the superficial headlines to offer an in-depth analysis:

Former President Mohammad Khatami’s decision to drop out of the upcoming Iranian presidential elections seems to be based on the long-standing assumption that splitting the “reformist” vote would be electoral suicide. His decision also confirmed what Khatami had maintained all along: if former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Moussavi (pictured) joined the race, which he did several days ago, Khatami would drop out and offer him his support.

Whilst it now appears that Khatami was never enthusiastic in his bid, the timing of his decision begs questions on the strategies the reformists are pursuing and with what degree of coordination.

Until yesterday, the following ‘Grand Strategy’ was presented as a possible hypothesis. Moussavi and Khatami, and possibly even veteran politician Mehdi Karroubi, were working in coordination to keep the “conservatives” guessing as to who would be the eventual reformist candidate. This would prevent their conservative opponents from uniting, politically and strategically, whilst maximising media coverage in a campaign in which a high voter turnout is a prerequisite for a reformist victory. Such a deliberately vague strategy would also have given the "principlists" (or "pragmatic conservatives"), who may be deciding between Ahmadinejad and Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a severe headache as they tried to predict who would be the ultimate "reform" candidate.

This analysis supposed that when the reformist base had been optimally galvanised by their two biggest hitters, perhaps after a month or so, the reformists would look at the polls and public sentiment and then unite behind the appropriate candidate.

Yesterday’s developments suggest that what we are seeing is, at best, a working plan amended to suit a rapidly changing political environment. The decision making of both Khatami and Moussavi is defined not by a nuanced strategy of smoke and mirrors but by personal wranglings with what could be defining decisions in their public life. Yet the opportunity for political and tactical intrigue, in a highly fluid political situation, should not be discounted. All these factors make deciphering political motives and manoeuvrings hugely difficult; even more so to the western observer.

Generally speaking, however, this unpredictability must be a good thing for Iranian democracy. Three questions are pertinent. Firstly, why did Khatami stand in the first place? Secondly, what prompted his decision to stand down (perhaps put another way, what prompted Moussavi’s decision to run)? Thirdly, behind whom will the broad conservative base now unite?

Answering the first two questions, the strongest case is that Moussavi overcame his initial reticence. This was a big decision for him, given his previous well-documented differences with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The two clashed often on domestic and foreign policy in the 1980s when Khamanei was President and Moussavi Prime Minister. (This was before the office of prime minister was abolished in favour of a much more powerful president.)

Though accounts differ, some believe that Hashemi Rafsanjani, perhaps the most effective politician in modern Iranian politics, persuaded an increasingly frail Ayatollah Khomeini to create an enhanced presidency in the belief that he would be next in line. Moussavi interpreted this move as a personal attempt to sideline him and was not too subtle about displaying his opposition. With mutual enmity still strong and Khameini succeeding Ayatollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader, Moussavi decided to quit politics for 20 years.

Mousavi retreated back into his work as an architect, and it appears only very recently felt willing or able to return to mainstream politics. When he was asked four years ago, he alluded to "difficulties on the road", which was interpreted that Khameini would oppose his candidacy. In this sense, his decision to run in 2009 is all the more fascinating in what it may say about the Supreme Leader’s presence in electoral politics.

Khatami had served under Moussavi in the 1980s and the two enjoy relatively good relations. The two met shortly before Khatami chose to announce his candidacy, and it appears likely that Khatami probably wanted a decision from Moussavi. Moussavi remained hesitant, and thus Khatami put his hat in the ring to end continuing speculation and test the electoral water. Had Moussavi been more definitive at this stage, it seems likely that Khatami would not have stood.

It is of course also possible that Moussavi was never keen to be closely associated with Khatami in any plan and that his supporters urged Khatami to clear the way as soon as Moussavi’s mind was made up about standing. In any case, it seems clear that Khatami was never enthusiastic about entering the fray.

Khatami did not perhaps receive the kind of reception for which he had hoped; one city refused to allow him to campaign, obscurely citing traffic issues. He also found himself almost assaulted by a mob of hardliners chanting “Death to America”. Doubts may also have crept in as to Khatami’s suitability, certainly compared to Moussavi, to fight an election that will be based on economic competency and social justice.

Perhaps most significantly, Khatami observed that the very broad ‘conservative’ base actually relished a contest between him and Ahmadinejad. There were, indeed, signs that the hardliners were uniting. Amir Mohebian, political editor of the conservative Resalat newspaper but far from a staunch supporter of the President, recently stated that if Ahmadinejad could “display an appropriate element of flexibility, and his flexibility were not seen as an election [ploy], he would make a very good choice”.

It appears that Ahmadinejad was galvanised by the reformists’ moves, embarking on a charm offensive and confident of being backed by the principlists if Khatami emerged,as the leading reformist candidate. There was even talk of Tehran Mayor Ghalibaf being quietly urged to give up his ambitions until 2013, when he will still be 51.

Moussavi’s entry and Khatami’s exit thus provides a considerable headache for conservatives. Ahmadinejad may be more vulnerable to Moussavi with the lower middle class and working class vote, which helped carry him to victory in 2005. Moussavi’s emphasis on social justice echoes that of Ahmadinejad and could conceivably challenge Ahmadinejad for the rural vote.

On the other hand, this is still Ahmadinejad’s core vote, and it would take a lot to shift many people. Those within groups close to the Basij will also likely vote for the current president in any circumstance.

Ahmadinejad still faces questions other than Mousavi's candidacy. If Ghalibaf stands, he will certainly be effective in Tehran and has a broader, if not deeper, base of support amongst the various factions of conservatives and principlists. Observers should watch carefully whether the popular mayor of Tehran, will enter the race in the coming days.

The principle issue of this election, as it was in America, remains the economy. Moussavi will rely on his economic record whilst glossing over fundamental changes that have occurred since he was in charge 20 years ago. He will also emphasise his close links with the Ayatollah Khomeini, who was his principle political sponsor. He also has the face recognition factor amongst the middle-aged and may even find substantial support amongst moderate conservatives. The extent that Khatami can help deliver him the younger vote, who must be mobilised in large numbers, is difficult to say, but it will be a decisive factor. To challenge Ahmadinejad he must, and will, run on a platform of social justice.

The final fly in the ointment could be the reformist Karroubi. He could either be the next to drop out or, as he has repeatedly stated, remain firmly committed to his candidacy. The question would then be, could he succeed in splitting the reformist vote to the point where Ahmadinejad would win outright without a run-off. This would seem unlikely. However, if Ghalibaf is a candidate, it could keep the President out of a run-off with Moussavi and a “united” reformist bloc.

The Latest from Israel-Palestine (16 March): Israel Coalition, Palestinian Reconciliation

Late Afternoon Update (5 p.m. GMT): Palestinian sources say that agreement has been reached in Cairo amongst factions on the holding of Presidential and legislative elections by January 2010.

In Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud Party and the Israel-Beitenu Party of Avigdor Lieberman have signed a coalition agreement. Lieberman would be the Foreign Minister and Israel-Beitenu would also have the ministerial portfolios of internal security, infrastructure, tourism, and integration of new immigrants.

Morning Update (10 a.m. GMT): Interesting news out of Tel Aviv. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (pictured) has postponed for 24 hours Monday's Cabinet meeting, which was to discuss the possibility of a prisoner exchange with Hamas for kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit.

"It should be emphasized that as of yet, there is no sign that indicates a result in any particular direction in the negotiations," the Prime Minister's Office said.

It appears that the two Israeli negotiators in Cairo, Yuval Diskin, the head of domestic intelligence service Shin Bet, and Olmert's envoy Ofer Dekel have stayed an extra day. It is also being reported that Hamas military commander Ahmad Jabari has been in Egypt since Thursday to head Hamas' delegation on the prisoner issue.

Olmert's office is still being cautious, saying, "It should be emphasized that as of yet, there is no sign that indicates a result in any particular direction in the negotiations."