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Wednesday
Mar182009

From The Archives: Hit or Miss in Pakistan (18 September 2008)

First published on our partner website Libertas:

zardari2 [This] leaves only the Pakistani military, whichever way it chooses to play the hand with the Americans, as the only significant force in the country with a symbolic and real modicum of power. If Zardari protests this, the prospect of his overthrow emerges. If he accepts his emasculation, he is no more than an irrelevant figurehead. Either way, it’s an effective coup.

Last Thursday, I embarked on a new, challenging, and exciting project, working with postgraduate students at the Clinton Institute for American Studies in Dublin . Introducing a course on contemporary US foreign policy, I tried out the idea of dissecting that morning’s Page 1 story, whatever it might be, in The New York Times.

I punched in the URL and upon the large screen is the headline, “Bush Said to Give Orders Allowing Raids in Pakistan”.

The opening paragraph confirmed I had more than enough for discussion, “President Bush secretly approved orders in July that for the first time allow American Special Operations forces to carry out ground assaults inside Pakistan without the prior approval of the Pakistani government, according to senior American officials.”

Well, there you go. By chance rather than design I could open the course with perhaps the most significant development in US foreign policy this year. Significant because the US Government was making clear that it was taking the war against the Afghanistan insurgency across the border into Pakistan. Even more so because the US would be fighting not just with bombs from the air but special forces on the ground. Especially so because the US would do so without the overt co-operation of the Pakistani Government.

To be blunt: on Monday, Asif Zardari finally reached his goal of becoming Prime Minister of Pakistan, a country portrayed as a steadfast ally of the US in the “War on Terror”. By Thursday, Washington didn’t give, to use the academic term, “a rat’s ass” about the thoughts of Zardari. On Monday, Pakistan’s military was portrayed as side-by-side with American counterparts; by Thursday, there was the prospect of armed clashes between the two sets of troops.

With allies like these, who needs....? You fill in the blank.

The backdrop to this story is now well-known. On 11 September 2001, the Head of Pakistan’s intelligence services, Mahmood Ahmed, was in Washington discussing co-operation with US officials. Indeed, as the planes hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Ahmed was having breakfast with the chairmen of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Within 24 hours, discussions had become a showdown. Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage set out a seven-point ultimatum to Ahmed. When Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf confirmation to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the American conditions would be met, the essential alliance in the War on Terror had been established.

There were holdover tensions from Pakistan’s years of support for a liaison with the Taliban. In January 2002, Seymour Hersh of The New Yorker blew the whistle on the hundreds, maybe thousands, of Pakistanis who had fought on the wrong side and been captured by the Americans during fighting in Afghanistan . The detainees were shipped to Kunduz, from where Pakistani helicopters took them home. As US attentions turned to Iraq , the inconvenience that Osama bin Laden was also now sheltered in Pakistan ’s autonomous tribal areas as gradually accepted. Months turned into years, and President Musharraf’s attention (and that of his critics) turned to internal political/judicial matters and, eventually, the imposition of martial law.

So what has happened to re-make Pakistan from sturdy if arguably ineffectual partner of the US in regional politics and the War on Terror into obstacle to US operations? No doubt the forced handover from Musharraf to Zardari is a partial explanation; there is no sign of American faith in the reliability of the new President, who is likely to be focused on his battle with the judiciary rather than a showdown with Al Qa’eda.

The catalyst, however, is the Bush Administration’s last roll of the dice in Afghanistan. As I noted Monday, the President’s statement two weeks ago offered both victory without substance and a challenge without an answer. If the small number of US troops being pulled with Iraq belied a long-term occupation that is increasingly out of touch with political developments, the small number of US troops being sent to Afghanistan showed that the Administration has nothing but a small bandage to slap on its new Number One Emergency Case.

An extra 9000 boots on the ground won’t cover much of the problem area in Afghanistan. At most, it will allow the US to carry out well-publicised operations to clear the Taliban from villages which are likely to vulnerable during the next counter-attack of the insurgency. Put very bluntly, in the absence of effective political and economic reconstruction, Washington has to hope that local leaders and their militias are strong enough to keep the Taliban out. It’s notable, for example, that Herat in the western part of the country is relatively stable under a local regime on good terms with Iran, while Mazar-al-Sharif in the north is “secure” because of the local but forceful presence of General Dostum.

This doesn’t add up to long-term influence, however, for the Americans and it far from signals long-term authority for the Kabul Government of Hamid Karzai. So Washington gets the worst of both worlds: potential rivals reap the benefits from the areas that they control or influence while the US carries the can for instability in other regions.

Even if European governments and other allies in NATO and the International Security Assistance Force were willing to shift a token number of soldiers to the conflict zone in the south and centre of the country, that wouldn’t offer any resolution of the underlying problems. And it certainly wouldn’t address the emerging headache for the Americans and Kabul , the insurgent violence in the east along the Pakistan border.

So, if you haven’t got the troop numbers or a meaningful plan of reconstruction to bring villages into a secure nation, what do you do? Well, you resort to those limited but hopefully effectively targeted operations that “decapitate” the opposition. That means air power and that means special operations on the ground, special operations to assist with targeting of the airstrikes and special operations to liquidate the bad guys.

It is no coincidence that the “surge” in Iraq has included recently-hyped “fusion cells”, small units of specially-trained soldiers to capture and kill insurgents. And, given the incomplete if not false impression that this has made a long-term difference in Iraq the Americans will be trying to spread the model to the next battleground.

But even as this strategy covers up the problem of the lack of long-term troop numbers to “stabilise” Afghanistan, it ignores some fundamentals of special warfare. Even the Iraq example should be instructive: the “fusion cells” complement the cultivation of local leaders and their militias to secure a particular area. In Pakistan, where is that cultivation of leaders in the tribal areas going to take place? Well, given that the airstrikes and operations are alienating that leadership, their families, and their communities, the answer would be Nowhere. Tribal leaders have already responded by promising to raise forces to fight the US .

And here’s another lesson that it ignores. You can’t limit the effect of dropped bombs and elite forces trained to kill. Far more important than any ripples of stability you hope to get on the other side of the border are the waves of instability you set off in Pakistan. The warning of the Pakistani military leadership that it will opposed American ground incursions may be a bluff or even the Janus trick of giving a stern face of defending their people and sovereignty while privately giving another face of acceptance to the Americans. But, at a minimum, Zardari is exposed as a political leader with barely a shred of authority.

And, in Pakistan with its recent history, what do you think that means? I’m guessing that it leaves only the Pakistan military, whichever way it chooses to play the hand with the Americans, as the only significant force in the country with a symbolic and real modicum of power. If Zardari protests this, the prospect of his overthrow emerges. If he accepts his emasculation, he is no more than an irrelevant figurehead. Either way, it’s an effective coup.

I’ve only seen one commentator reach back for the historical parallel. In 1969/70 the Nixon Administration, frustrated at the mobility of the Vietnamese insurgency, starts the airborne demolition of Cambodia. Eventually that tearing apart of the Cambodian “sanctuary” took the ground from under the country’s leadership, and Prince Sihanouk was overthrown. The eventual victors who promised to restore sovereignty and dignity? The Khmer Rouge.

It’s not an exact replay of history, and Pakistan may not have to be reset to Year Zero. Neither, however, does the American strategy offer any advance. Seven years after promising that it would pursue the War on Terror to preserve the security and sovereignty of those were “with us”, Washington is now shredding that assurance.
Wednesday
Mar182009

The US and Pakistan: Bye Bye President Zardari, But Hello to Whom?

long-march1Just over 48 hours after the culmination of the Long March, with the Government's restoration of Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, and the story has dropped out of American newspapers. But, of course, this weekend's events were only the beginning of a new, important stage in Pakistani and regional politics.

For many, it is the beginning of hope. Perhaps, after the expression of popular protest, the legal system can be resurrected and placed above personal and party manipulation. Perhaps there can be a scrutiny which would produce a meaningful democracy rather than today's well-connected politician who ascends to the highest office through connections rather than ability and integrity.

In no way do I want to demean that hope, but it moves alongside, and arguably trails behind, more immediate negotiations and manoeuvres after the drama of the last week.

First and foremost, Asif Ali Zardari is effectively Dead President Walking. If this was a showdown for those marching for Chaudhry's restoration, the future of political parties such as the Pakistani Muslim League (N), or a general wish for an ethical politics, it was also Zardari's showdown against his rivals. Trying to maintain a careful balance between the isolation of Nawaz Sharif and the appearance of a Government upholding judicial and political authority, he was putting his case not only in Pakistan but in the US through outlets like The Wall Street Journal.

The problem for the Obama Administration is that Zardari put his battle against Sharif, and indeed Chaudhry, above the battle against insurgency in northwestern Pakistan. An article in The Washington Post, fed by Administration sources, put the case cogently yesterday:
Administration officials are putting the finishing touches on a plan to greatly increase economic and development assistance to Pakistan, and to expand a military partnership considered crucial to striking a mortal blow against al-Qaeda's leadership and breaking the Pakistani-based extremist networks that sustain the war in Afghanistan....But the weakness of Pakistan's elected government -- backed into a corner by weekend demonstrations that left its political opposition strengthened -- has called into question one of the basic pillars of that plan.

The President had thus become secondary to the military commander, General Ashfaq Parvez Kiani, as he met American counterparts and political leaders in Islamabad, Washington, and Kabul.

At the same time, the US had to move carefully. After all, Washington had been instrumental in supporting Zardari's rise to the Presidency when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated and when General Pervez Musharraf became a liability for American plans. Even if the Pakistani military had become the key link for US officials, the appearance of democracy had to be maintained.

The Long March, with all its good intentions, provided a mini-solution for the Obama Administration. Only 24 hours into the march, the US jumped in through talks with Nawaz Sharif and a blunt call to Zardari --- Washington did not want the President to force a showdown with Sharif. By Saturday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was telling both politicians, "If Pakistan is in such a state of internal political turmoil that U.S. aid can't be used effectively, that's going to limit what can be done and also how successful we are in Afghanistan."

Perhaps more importantly, the Americans appear to have been in close touch with the Pakistani military and security services during the crisis. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, spoke with General Kiani on Friday. The New York Times summarised, "One encouraging sign for Washington was the role played in the crisis by the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who let Mr. Zardari know that he could not rely on soldiers to confront the protesters who were threatening to descend on Islamabad."

We may never know exactly who, if anyone, gave orders to the security forces who let the convoy of Nawaz Sharif slip easily through the cordon of his house arrest, providing support to the growing demonstrations and forcing Zardari's hand. We may never know exactly what was said between the President, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani, and General Kiani at the Sunday morning meeting that conceded the restoration of Chaudhry.

Even murkier, however, is the next step in the relationship between Zardari, his political rivals, his military, and the American sponsors. Even if there is no way back for the President, there is no easy solution to fit Washington's plans. The accession of Nawaz Sharif to power is still an uncomfortable prospect for the US, which has long considered him too close to "conservative" (read that in a political and religious sense) forces in Pakistan and the region. Indeed, Saudi Arabia's backing of Sharif poses the prospect of a battle between Washington and Riyadh for influence over the next steps in both Islamabad and Kabul.

As US envoy Richard Holbrooke bluntly said Monday, the immediate resolution of the Long March "bodes better than the alternative outcome" of disorder and collapse of the Government but "the underlying problem still exists". Having failed to get "stability" with Musharraf, having failed with Zardari, it is not hope that moves Washington but this question:

Who or what can come next?
Wednesday
Mar182009

Linking to Wikileaks in Australia? The Fine is A$11,000

wikileaksFor those of us assessing US foreign and military policy, Wikileaks is an essential site. Amongst its scrutiny of governments, churches, and corporations, it posts American documents that offer insight into the past, present, and future of the Government's approach to international affairs. Only last month we featured Wikileaks' release of a NATO memorandum that laid out the propaganda line for the Afghanistan conflict, including the revelation:
”Opposing Militant Forces” is the correct term [for Afghan insurgents] but is not suitable for use with the media. Depending on the audience and the group being referred to, the phrases militants/insurgents/extremists/Taleban extremists/enemies of Afghanistan may be used.

Well, good thing we're coming out of Birmingham rather than Brisbane because a link to Wikileaks in Australia can be punished with a fine of $11,000 Australian ($7250 American). It has been added to a list of almost 1400 sites, mostly with pornographic content, that are blacklisted.

Ironically, Wikileaks earned its place in Australian censorship by revealing a secret Danish list of banned sites. And both appropriately and ironically, it was Wikileaks that revealed the news of its own banning, noting in Fight Club fashion, "The first rule of censorship is that you cannot talk about censorship."
Wednesday
Mar182009

Pakistan: Mr Obama's Air War Coming to the Cities?

quettaThe New York Times reports this morning:

According to senior administration officials, two of the high-level reports on Pakistan and Afghanistan that have been forwarded to the White House in recent weeks have called for broadening the target area to include a major insurgent sanctuary in and around the city of Quetta.

That might mean little for folks who have not heard of Quetta, which is the capital of the province of Baluchistan in northwestern Pakistan. The city was briefly prominent in Western media in the first days of the 2001 war in Afghanistan, when there were massive demonstrations against the American bombing and even talk of a local uprising against the central Government.

If this step is adopted, however, it may pose a double challenge to the US and the Pakistani Government. It could spread the insurgency in Pakistan, rather than stopping support for the insurgency in Afghanistan. And it could be the sign that Pakistani sovereignty (and thus the Zardari Government) is dispensable.

US bombings and missile strikes have been carried out for years in the Northwest Frontier Provinces, and they have increased under the Obama Administration. This proposal, however, would take the air war to an area controlled by the central Pakistan Government rather than local tribes. And Quetta is no small town: the 2005 population was more than 850,000.

Of course, President Obama has yet to decide on the proposal, but the story in the Times, fed by civilian and military officials, is a clear sign of pressure for its acceptance. The airstrike expansion is not only in the report of General David Petraeus, which has been treated with scepticism by the President; it is also in a study by Lieutenant General Douglas Lute which has been received with general approval.

And there's more: "[Advisors to Obama] are recommending preserving the option to conduct cross-border ground actions, using C.I.A. and Special Operations commandos." A "senior official" confirmed, "It is fair to say that there is wide agreement to sustain and continue these covert programs. One of the foundations on which the recommendations to the president will be based is that we’ve got to sustain the disruption of the safe havens."

It seems, however, that those "safe havens" are growing ever-bigger. And it seems that the Obama Administration is on the brink of decisions that will turn those havens into a new centre of battle, one with far more dangers than the intervention in Afghanistan.
Tuesday
Mar172009

The Latest from Israel-Palestine (17 March): Hopes of Prisoner Swap Recede

shalit4Evening Update (7 p.m. GMT): In a pointed indication that the talks over a prisoner swap are near break-down, Israel has played its most threatening card, short of military action. After Tuesday's Cabinet meeting, a spokesman emphasised, ""The crossings... are operating at a minimum to prevent a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. And they will remain so until [kidnapped soldier] Gilad Shalit (pictured) is released."

As the Israeli Cabinet meets on Tuesday afternoon to discuss negotiations with Hamas over an exchange of prisoners for kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, it appears that the chances of a deal have all but disappeared.

After the return of Israeli negotiators Yuval Diskin and Ofer Dekel from Cairo, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's office put out the pessimistic statement, "It became clear during the discussions that Hamas had hardened its position, reneged on understandings that had been formulated over the past year and raised extreme demands."