Mr Obama's War: The Fantasy of the Pakistan Sanctuaries
I think it’s the safe havens on the Pakistani side of the border not just for Al Qaida, but for the Taliban, for the Haqqani network, for Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and these other affiliated groups that are all working together. They’re into -- they’re separate groups, but they’re all working together.
And I think as long as they have a safe haven to operate there, it’s going to be a problem for us in Afghanistan. After all, 20 years ago I was on the other side of that border as deputy director of CIA fighting the Soviets, and we had the safe haven in Pakistan. And let me tell you, it c.
Consider that for a moment: yesterday's mujihadeen, good guys supported by the US from the Pakistan "sanctuary", are simply reconfigured today's "Taliban" bad guys, supported by other bad guys in the Pakistan "sanctuary".
But, more importantly, consider Gates' fantasy construction: the US can eliminate that sanctuary, purely as a supporting element in the fight in Afghanistan --- there are no consequences whatsoever for the internal Pakistani situation. When Gregory asked, "the trouble and consequences of jihadists making significant gains in either Afghanistan or Pakistan is perhaps more acute in Pakistan given its nuclear potential. True?", Gates ran away from the Pakistani side of the question:
Well, as long as we’re in Afghanistan and as long as the Afghan government has the support of dozens and dozens of countries who are providing military support, civilian support in addition to us, we are providing a level of stability in Afghanistan that at least prevents it from being a safe haven from which plots against the United States and the Europeans and others can be, can be put together.
This isn't a wordgame. The longer the US maintains the missile-supported myth that it can intervene in northwestern Pakistan merely as part of military strategy in Afghanistan, the more local events will overtake the Americans, presenting them with new political challenges.
Al Jazeera reported yesterday, "Sufi Muhammad, the Muslim cleric acting as a peacemaker in northwestern Pakistan's restive Swat valley, has threatened to launch fresh protests unless Islamic courts are established in the region within two weeks." Insurgents in Swat abducted a district commander of the paramilitary Frontier Corps and four of his troops and attacked a military vehicle transporting sick troops.
On this site last week, Josh Mull posted an excellent analysis on the intricacies of the insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and the links between the two situations. He concluded, "What we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan."
Gates proved Mull right yesterday. But, beyond the US manoeuvres, northwestern Pakistan isn't just a "sanctuary". It is part of a country in which, right now, there is a complex political struggle taking place. Reducing local elements in that struggle to Taliban-supporting pawns is just as dangerous as reducing them to mujahideen-supporting pawns in the 1980s.
Consider for a moment, because Robert Gates didn't yesterday: after "the big difference" of the safe haven which helped eject the Soviets from Afghanistan...
What came next?