Iraq: What Do Latest Post-Election Power Plays Indicate? (Cole)

Juan Cole cuts through the confusion to offer the latest developments in the post-election struggle to lead Iraq. Many useful points here, including:

1. No individual, party, or list "won" the 7 March election, since no one has even one-third of the Parliamentary seats. The battle is now to form a working coalition amongst the various parties.

2. While these maneovures include meetings between Iraqi political actors in Tehran, this does not mean that Tehran will control or dominate any emerging Iraqi Government.

3. And a point made through absence in this account: although the US has an interest in this contest, there is little sign of the Americans in these latest moves.

The Justice and Accountability Commission (formerly the Debaathification Commission), headed by Ahmad Chalabi, is moving to disqualify 6 elected candidates in the 7 March election for their ties to the banned Baath Party of Saddam Hussein. Three of those to be banned are from the Iraqiya list of [former Prime Minister] Iyad Allawi, which would reduce his seat total from 91 to 88, making his list second in number of seats after Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition, which has 89 seats.



The move, by commission head Ahmad Chalabi (himself an elected MP on the fundamentalist Shiite list, the Iraqi National Alliance), will cause a lot of anger among Sunni Arabs, the main backers of Allawi's list, along with secular middle class urban Shiites.

Al-Hayat writing in Arabic reports that commission official Ali al-Lami let it slip that one of those to be disqualified is Hamdi Najm, leader of the National Dialogue Front in Diyala Province, who is currently in prison on terrorism charges. His party forms part of the Iraqiya list of Iyad Allawi. The disqualifications will be taken to court. However, the courts sided with the Justice and Accountability Commission when it excluded candidates on these grounds in the lead-up to the election, so that avenue does not appear very promising.

But the move is not decisive in deciding the next prime minister, because who can form a government depends not on who has a plurality but on who can put together a governing coalition. It is true that the constitution requires the president to ask the leader of the single largest bloc to form a government. But if that person cannot, then another party leader would get the chance. The best analogy for Iraqi politics at the moment is Israel or Lebanon. In the 2009 parliamentary elections in Israel, Tzipi Livni's Kadima gained 28 seats and Binyamin Netanyahu's Likud only got 27. But you will note that Netanyahu is prime minister, because Shas, Yisrael Beitenu and others preferred to ally with him rather than with Ms. Livni.

I admit to a good deal of frustration with the corporate media in the United States that keeps talking about Iyad Allawi "winning" the Iraqi parliamentary elections. It just is not true. Apparently even some well informed and intelligence Americans can't understand the difference between achieving a slight plurality and winning a parliamentary election.

You need 163 seats to have a majority in the 325-member Iraqi parliament, so neither 91 nor 89 is a "win." Rather, 163 is a win. Allawi did not win and has not won and probably won't win.

The reason is that it is difficult to see how he gets to 163. He needs 72 more seats (or maybe 75 if the disqualifications go through). It is easier for al-Maliki's list, if not al-Maliki himself, to get to 163 seats than it is for Allawi, since the fundamentalist Shiites have 70 seats and they under normal circumstances will find it easier to ally with Maliki's Islamic Mission Party (Da'wa) than with the secular Arab nationalists and Sunnis that back Allawi.

Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that 'informed sources' told its reporters that Ali al-Adib, a leader of al-Maliki's State of Law coalition, recently met Muqtada al-Sadr in Qom, Iran, though they have not yet closed a deal. Al-Sadr has 38 seats in parliament and his bloc is the largest single group of seats in the Shiite fundamentalist Iraqi National Alliance, which has 70 seats. Then, al-Maliki is said to have returned to Baghdad from Tehran, accompanied by al-Adib and Abdul Hamid al-Zuhairi (both from the State of Law list) and Jalal al-Din al-Saghir and Hadi al-Amiri of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.

Al-Maliki is said to have been among a big party of Iraqi officials in Tehran the day before yesterday. They went there, al-Hayat said, because there was too much danger of being listened in on in Iraq. Presumably what is actually being asserted here is that the US has sophisticated signals intelligence and has widely tapped phones, so that in Baghdad any attempt at coalition-formation would be immediately picked up by US intelligence. Since the US is widely thought to be backing Allawi's secular Iraqiya list, it would be undesirable from al-Maliki's point of view for them to overhear his negotiations with other lists. Thus, they went off to Iran.

Al-Hayat's source says that Muqtada al-Sadr demonstrated flexibility, and demanded in return for dropping his objection to al-Maliki the release of all prisoners from his movement, and undertakings that al-Maliki would not attempt to rule single-handedly. He also wanted an agreement that al-Maliki would be fired if he attempted to overstep the decided-up course of action of the party. A Sadrist leader, Qusay Suhail, refused to comment on the Iran story, but did allow as how the Sadrists had met with representatives of al-Maliki's State of Law. The source said that so far in the negotiations the Kurdistan Alliance and the Sadr Movement have declined to put forward an alternative candidate for prime minister. So far al-Maliki is the only candidate from the Shiite parties, "and we did not sense any opposition to him." In contrast, cleric Jalal al-Din Saghir of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq insisted that ISCI would definitely put forward a prime ministerial candidate. (ISCI is actually too small to follow through on Saghir's bluster.)

Israel-US Analysis: After Washington, What Will Netanyahu Do?

It's not only the high-level US-Israel meetings in Washington that were divisive. The follow-up statements also clash.

On Thursday, President Obama’s spokesman Robert Gibbs said: “I think we’re making progress on important issues. But nothing more on substance to report than that.”

Israel: So What is This Government Crisis? (Carlstrom)

In contrast, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu returned to Israel, his spokesman Nir Hefez told Army Radio that Netanyahu had reached a “list of understandings” on policy toward Palestinians, albeit "with additional points still in disagreement between the sides” in Washington. Hafez added:

There are several steps that the Americans would like to see Israel take in order to restart the peace process. We returned from the US with the understanding that on one hand, the construction policy in Jerusalem will remain unchanged, and on the other hand, Israel is prepared to make gestures in order to resume the peace process.

Despite the fact that Netanyahu gave no concessions on Jerusalem, Obama's timeline seems to be explicit: Washington wants tangible change to bring to the Arab League meeting on Saturday.

What are these "demands"? According to The Jerusalem Post, the Obama Administration asked Israel to commit to some limits on building in east Jerusalem; to show a willingness to deal with the so-called "core" issues of borders, refugees, and Jerusalem in the indirect talks; and to agree to a number of confidence-building measures, including the release of hundreds of Fatah prisoners. It is also reported that the administration asked for a commitment to extend the moratorium on housing starts in the West Bank settlements beyond the 10 months originally declared by Netanyahu.

In response, the Israeli Prime Minister asked for extra time to convene his seven-member inner cabinet ministers on Friday to discuss the US demands. According to Israeli senior officials, Netanyahu did not commit himself to a prisoner release and was bringing the matter to the security establishment in Israel for their consideration.

Netanyahu said that he is supporting construction in Jerusalem on his own accord and not because coalition partners are pressuring him to do so: "I do not need coalition partners to pressure me into continuing to build in Jerusalem. I, myself, plan to continue building in Jerusalem as all previous prime ministers did before me."

Sources close to the Prime Minister say that Netanyahu will intensify efforts to draw Kadima members of the Knesset into his Government. In response to this, senior sources in Kadima told Haaretz:

If Benjamin Netanyahu wants us in the coalition, he needs to alter its makeup, break up his extremist government, rebuild it with us. We will not enter a right-wing government and we will not join without an orderly political [peace negotiations] program.

So, what is Netanyahu's position now?

It appears that the Prime Minister is trying to convince his coalition members of additional "concessions" --- extending the moratorium on West Bank construction, delaying some settlements in East Jerusalem until the end of proximity talks, releasing hundreds of Fatah members, and transferring control of some areas in the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority --- in return for continuing other settlement constructions in East Jerusalem.

If Netanyahu succeeds, then his government will be able to claim "no more concessions" to Palestinian demands. If not, then he will have exhausted all efforts with his coalition members, setting the conditions to blame his partners and accepting Kadima's demand for a reconfigured Government.

But for all these calculations, Netanyahu still faces a cold reality: the man who couldn't get an answer in Washington, needs an answer in Israel from someone who will work with him.

Israel-Palestine-Hamas Mystery: Questions & A Response

The question: what did the secret internal Foreign Ministry report distributed to Israeli diplomatic missions abroad mean? The document declares that the US administration will not put much effort into the upcoming indirect negotiations, opting instead to focus on November’s Congressional elections.

Why was this released in the wake of the visit of Vice President Joe Biden to Israel? Was this a message to Washington over the previous "unwanted" Ametrican statements on settlements in East Jerusalem and West Bank or was it just an example of Israel trying to box in the Obama Administration by revealing, through a well-timed leak, the supposed US policy?

Israel-Palestine: “Proximity Talks” and US Vice President Biden

Then there's the Hamas question: on Sunday Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pointed to Hamas to argue that an early deal for a Palestinian state is unlikely, given the strength of the organisation in the Gaza Strip.



David Zonseine,  joint founder of an initiative seeking direct and open talks with Hamas, gave a blunt answer to the Prime Minister:

Israel must talk to Hamas. Not secretly. Not indirectly. Not for a politician to rehabilitate himself on the way to taking over the leadership of a party, as Kadima's Shaul Mofaz tried to do, but openly and seriously. Just as the United States regularly talks to the Israeli opposition, Israel should maintain a dialogue with the Palestinian opposition. The dialogue should cover all core issues including a final settlement.

It's not a simple matter, of course. There is agreement across the political spectrum to reduce the debate to a demonization of Hamas, dwelling on the organization's external attributes as perceived by Israel - religious, extremist and desiring all the territory between the river and the sea. This debate does not focus on the Israeli interest. We should be asking ourselves the following questions: Is it worthwhile to speak with Hamas? What are our reasons for not talking to them? Is boycotting them linked to an erroneous preconception?

Israel rigorously insists that Hamas is not a partner and that our partner is Fatah, headed by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. But negotiations with Fatah have been going on for nearly two decades, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's declaration that he accepts the principle of two states for two peoples looks like just another trick to postpone the demise of the current negotiation process.

In 2004, the Israeli government decided that Yasser Arafat was not relevant. Abbas, Israel's leaders have said, is weak. At the same time, Israel has for years been doing all it can to weaken the Palestinian Authority. That way, it will be possible to prove yet again that although "we have to talk, there's no one you can close a deal with." Even if an agreement is signed under American pressure, the PA will not be able to implement it because more than half the Palestinians don't accept its authority. This is why the refusal to speak with Hamas is pointless. It is no more than a continuation of avoiding talking to the Palestinians by other means.

Hamas' rule in Gaza is the outcome of despair with the Fatah leadership. The deterioration of the situation in Gaza after the ongoing failure of negotiations and the total dependence on Israel for receiving basic needs intensify the despair and extremism. (And no one is talking about the right to free movement, to go abroad to study.) Even today, there are groups resisting Hamas that resemble Al-Qaida. We can drag things out as much as we want, but we have to admit that the notion that time is on our side is baseless. The people who led Abbas to consider resigning and who refuse to talk to Hamas will find themselves in five years with a partner who reports to Osama bin Laden.

Nothing is possible without Gilad Shalit. People may say that the fate of a country cannot be dependent on what happens to one abducted soldier. There is no greater mistake. The abandonment of Shalit is symptomatic of Zionism's failure, the elevation of pride over wisdom and tactics over strategy. It's the denial of the sanctity of life and redeeming prisoners, values that are at the heart and soul of the nation.

Precisely here, the soft underbelly of public opinion, it would be possible to makes progress on the delicate matter of contacts with Hamas. More than 7,000 Palestinians are being held prisoner in Israel. There is one Israeli prisoner in Palestine. The suffering of both sides, and with it the tremendous joy that a prisoner exchange would produce, can and should be the lever for a stepped-up conciliation process.

For years Israel and its citizens have been paying the price of choosing solutions that were appropriate for the last war. Hiding our head in the sand at such a critical stage is dangerous. We have to declare our readiness to speak with the Palestinian opposition, immediately.