An Israeli-Syrian Peace? Biden, US Give Conflicting Signals

Related Post: Benjamin Netanyahu to AIPAC Policy Conference – The Threat is Iran

Israeli Occupied Golan Heights

At  the annual meeting of the powerful pro-Israel lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) Policy Conference in Washington, DC, Vice President Joe Biden was on hand to deliver the concluding address to an estimated 6,500 people in attendance. His speech was filled with the same set of platitudes given by every high-ranking American official: the US would support Israel, protect Israel, and fight for Israel at all cost. Biden even reprised Obama’s 2008 AIPAC narrative of the “Zionist idea,” a homeland for all people (like the United States) or, more appropriate to Israel, a homeland for a tiny sectarian movement.

No surprises there, but Biden also used the speech to drop hints about, though he did not directly address, future US policy towards Israel and Syria.



The big hint came via an anecdote about Biden’s trip to the Golan Heights in 1973. He explained, “I stood on the Golan Heights and realized if you had a really good arm you could literally throw a grenade down in the territory that could do damage to Israelis.” Since Biden has a tendency toward the absurd in his comments, we’ll ignore the fact that said phantom terrorist with gargantuan biceps would have first to make it past miles of razor wire and illegal (according to the United Nations) land mines, Israel Defense Forces and paramilitary settler snipers. There are also the legions of Israeli attack helicopters and battle tanks which, apparently unbeknownst to Biden, are in fact capable of shooting farther than a man can throw a grenade.

But beyond that, Biden's signal was that the US is willing to accept Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position that Israel would not negotiate with Syria over the return of the Golan Heights, since this would come at the expense of “Israeli security.” Bloomberg reported the statement of Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon, “We would like to have assurances that at the end of the day the Syrians will stop supporting terror and also, no less importantly, the very radical regime in Tehran.” Ayalon added that any negotiations with Syria would be “ill-advised”.

Most analysts had predicted a nuanced battle between the US and Israel over peace talks with Syria. However, in the span of 24 hours, the Obama Administration went from demanding dual peace tracks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and between Israel and Syria to a simple acceptance of the Israeli line on Syrian control of the Golan Heights as a security threat.

Or maybe not.

Just as Biden’s speech was hitting the Internet, the Associated Press reported that two US envoys, the State Department’s Jeffrey Feltman and NSC’s Daniel Shapiro, had left Washington bound for Damascus. It’s no secret that Washington has been establishing diplomatic contacts in Syria, perhaps even opening a US Embassy in Damascus, but there is some circumstantial evidence that these particular envoys might have more on their agenda than selecting wallpaper palettes for the new embassy.

Both men have ample experience with Middle East policy. Feltman was previously US Ambassador to Lebanon, a hefty credential in dealing with Syria, and Shapiro was brought onto the Obama for America campaign in 2007 specifically to strengthen the candidate’s standing with Jewish and pro-Israeli voters.  Previously Shapiro had been an adviser to Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), a member of several Senate Select Committees including Intelligence, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations.

Could these men be in Damascus to “work backwards” on the Golan Heights, working out the finer details of the deal in order to force Israel to come to the table? It’s possible. On the other hand, elite Syria analyst Josh Landis writes, “The Golan issue is simple and most problems have already been worked out.”

While I was initially convinced Biden was completely eschewing a peace agreement between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights, I’m now much less certain. I’m anxious to see the Syrian response to Biden’s speech, as well as to the entire AIPAC conference, as they will likely shed light on the precise intentions of the US in Syria, or at least, the Syrian perception of those intentions.

So, at the moment, we're still trying to read Biden's comments on Syria.  We'd be grateful for any help you could give us in your comments below.

Iraq: The "Semi-Peace" Gets More Violent, the US Becomes Less Relevant

On Friday the Associated Press put the news, "April deadliest month for US in Iraq in 7 months", in numbers: 18 American troops died, compared to nine in March; 13 were killed in combat, compared to four the previous month.

Those numbers, however, didn't begin to tell the story. One might note, for example, that it's not just (or even primarily) an American issue: 371 Iraqs and 80 Iranian pilgrims were killed in violence, mainly in bombings, during the month, an increase from 335 Iraqis in March, 288 in February, and 242 in January. (The figures are certainly underestimates, given that other deaths go unreported.)

One could ponder not only the contest to control cities like Kirkuk, where Kurdish and Arab factions are in a political and paramilitary battle, and Mosul, where the US military (misleadingly) reduces the insurgent violence to "Al Qa'eda in Iraq". But you can add a new feature: members of the Awakening Councils, the Sunni militias backed by the US from 2006, are rejoining the insurgency after they were not allowed into Iraqi security forces by the Al-Maliki Government.

And then you might offer a conclusion to unsettle both "common wisdom" and American nerves: in this escalation of tension, the US is increasingly marginal.

That's not just in media coverage, although the treatment of recent deaths is illuminating: when three US troops were killed on Thursday in Anbar province, The Washington Post didn't even bother to print the news. The emerging signs of irrelancy are coming on the political front. As an analysis from Middle East Report Onlineon the Awakening Councils summarises, "The ability of the United States and its military forces to affect the trajectory of political accommodation and reconciliation has diminished."

An article in The New York Times by Sam Dagher on 25 April revealed how Al-Maliki "resists pleas by US to placate Ba'ath Party". Beyond that sensational headline was the most detailed and most serious account of how the Shia-led Iraqi Government was balking at any political reconciliation with military officials from the Saddam Hussein era. It is only a short step, however, from a refusal to accept  former Ba'athists to a holdout against any co-operation with local Sunni tribes and leadership.

Meanwhile, the manoeuvres for influence mean that former Shi'a foes of the US have become more than acceptable on the Iraqi and even international stage. Moqtada Sadr, the cleric who Washington tried to arrest and then kill in 2004 after he built up a political party and militia, was in Turkey last week meeting Prime Minister Reccip Tayip Erodgan and President Abdullah Gul as well as other leading Iraqi politicians. Sadr's trip points to his emphasis on political rather than paramilitary moves to power and also the place of other countries in that campaign: he ventured to Ankara after discussions in Tehran.

And back in Baghdad, the al-Maliki Government is not only talking tough against internal rivals but even against its American allies. The Prime Minister's spokesman wrote on Sunday, "The Iraqi government is committed to the agreed-upon withdrawal dates, whether it's the June 30 withdrawal of the U.S. troops from all cities and towns or the complete withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011."

Of course, no one in the Obama Administration is going to say that the upsurge in violence and the political discussions point to a Washington which is losing its ability to re-shape a "proper" Iraq. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates insisted on CNN this week, "Nothing ever gets done without American leadership, at the end of the day."

Indeed, April's instability points to a likely irony. Even though it indicates that the US military are bystanders and even "collateral damage", the surge in violence will probably be used by American commanders to postpone a withdrawal from some Iraqi cities (one which Al-Maliki, as he bolsters his position, will probably accept in Mosul. Administration officials will spin the tale that it's a few recalcitrant outsiders who are hindering progress and peace, as in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent identification of "rejectionists".

No matter. The paradox of importance is that, as the Al-Maliki Government --- distrusted but ultimately supported by Washington --- finally established its strength in spring 2008, it did not need to fall back on US forces. That was confirmed in the Government's ultimately successful campaign to get a US commitment to withdrawal under the Status of Forces Agreement. Even though some military aspects of that pullout may be delayed, it's the political withdrawal of the US that is significant.

So the pendulum swings. The US raises a heavier hand in its attempt to re-shape a Government in Islamabad but has no fist to shake in Baghdad. Instead, Nouri al-Maliki was shaking hands in London this week --- after all, investment in Iraq (an investment which is desperately needed as oil revenues decline) doesn't have to come from Washington.