Iraq: The "Semi-Peace" Gets More Violent, the US Becomes Less Relevant

On Friday the Associated Press put the news, "April deadliest month for US in Iraq in 7 months", in numbers: 18 American troops died, compared to nine in March; 13 were killed in combat, compared to four the previous month.

Those numbers, however, didn't begin to tell the story. One might note, for example, that it's not just (or even primarily) an American issue: 371 Iraqs and 80 Iranian pilgrims were killed in violence, mainly in bombings, during the month, an increase from 335 Iraqis in March, 288 in February, and 242 in January. (The figures are certainly underestimates, given that other deaths go unreported.)

One could ponder not only the contest to control cities like Kirkuk, where Kurdish and Arab factions are in a political and paramilitary battle, and Mosul, where the US military (misleadingly) reduces the insurgent violence to "Al Qa'eda in Iraq". But you can add a new feature: members of the Awakening Councils, the Sunni militias backed by the US from 2006, are rejoining the insurgency after they were not allowed into Iraqi security forces by the Al-Maliki Government.

And then you might offer a conclusion to unsettle both "common wisdom" and American nerves: in this escalation of tension, the US is increasingly marginal.

That's not just in media coverage, although the treatment of recent deaths is illuminating: when three US troops were killed on Thursday in Anbar province, The Washington Post didn't even bother to print the news. The emerging signs of irrelancy are coming on the political front. As an analysis from Middle East Report Onlineon the Awakening Councils summarises, "The ability of the United States and its military forces to affect the trajectory of political accommodation and reconciliation has diminished."

An article in The New York Times by Sam Dagher on 25 April revealed how Al-Maliki "resists pleas by US to placate Ba'ath Party". Beyond that sensational headline was the most detailed and most serious account of how the Shia-led Iraqi Government was balking at any political reconciliation with military officials from the Saddam Hussein era. It is only a short step, however, from a refusal to accept  former Ba'athists to a holdout against any co-operation with local Sunni tribes and leadership.

Meanwhile, the manoeuvres for influence mean that former Shi'a foes of the US have become more than acceptable on the Iraqi and even international stage. Moqtada Sadr, the cleric who Washington tried to arrest and then kill in 2004 after he built up a political party and militia, was in Turkey last week meeting Prime Minister Reccip Tayip Erodgan and President Abdullah Gul as well as other leading Iraqi politicians. Sadr's trip points to his emphasis on political rather than paramilitary moves to power and also the place of other countries in that campaign: he ventured to Ankara after discussions in Tehran.

And back in Baghdad, the al-Maliki Government is not only talking tough against internal rivals but even against its American allies. The Prime Minister's spokesman wrote on Sunday, "The Iraqi government is committed to the agreed-upon withdrawal dates, whether it's the June 30 withdrawal of the U.S. troops from all cities and towns or the complete withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011."

Of course, no one in the Obama Administration is going to say that the upsurge in violence and the political discussions point to a Washington which is losing its ability to re-shape a "proper" Iraq. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates insisted on CNN this week, "Nothing ever gets done without American leadership, at the end of the day."

Indeed, April's instability points to a likely irony. Even though it indicates that the US military are bystanders and even "collateral damage", the surge in violence will probably be used by American commanders to postpone a withdrawal from some Iraqi cities (one which Al-Maliki, as he bolsters his position, will probably accept in Mosul. Administration officials will spin the tale that it's a few recalcitrant outsiders who are hindering progress and peace, as in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent identification of "rejectionists".

No matter. The paradox of importance is that, as the Al-Maliki Government --- distrusted but ultimately supported by Washington --- finally established its strength in spring 2008, it did not need to fall back on US forces. That was confirmed in the Government's ultimately successful campaign to get a US commitment to withdrawal under the Status of Forces Agreement. Even though some military aspects of that pullout may be delayed, it's the political withdrawal of the US that is significant.

So the pendulum swings. The US raises a heavier hand in its attempt to re-shape a Government in Islamabad but has no fist to shake in Baghdad. Instead, Nouri al-Maliki was shaking hands in London this week --- after all, investment in Iraq (an investment which is desperately needed as oil revenues decline) doesn't have to come from Washington.