Iran's Uranium: Washington "Can't Afford to Look Ridiculous", Makes Ridiculous Move (Emery)

EA's Chris Emery analyses:

The US response reminds me of the scene in The Godfather where the Don’s advisor asks the studio boss to drop his objection to using Jonny Fontaine in his next film. The studio boss admits that, although Jonny would be perfect for the role, he is committed to ruining Fontaine's career. Fontaine had made him look ridiculous, and the studio boss explains, "A man in my position can’t afford to look ridiculous."

NEW Iran’s Uranium: Why Can’t the US Take Yes for an Answer? (Parsi)
Iran’s Uranium: US Shows a Middle Finger to Tehran…and Turkey and Brazil and… (Gary Sick)

The Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement was a good deal, but the US perceived that it would make them look ridiculous. Not just because it undercuts American diplomacy with China and Russia but because the deal resonates of a change in the international system ---- a change that is also a challenge. The US saw the IBT  deal not just as one unlikely to work; they saw it as a threat.


Technically, the deal does not address some concerns stated by the US: it does not include cessation of enrichment and leaves about 600-700 kilogrammes of low-enriched uranium inside Iran. Symbolically, however, this was Tehran saying that it wants a way out. At some point down the line, Iran could have found some handy technical reason for temporarily ending enrichment and decided that it was "cost-effective" to send most of its LEU abroad or to buy in medical isotopes.

But now, through its response, the US has reinforced the cyclical politics of confrontation and capitulation that have driven the crisis in US-Iranian relations for 30 years. Washington needs to recognise that breaking this dynamic is the only starting point for the eventual satisfaction of all its technical and geo-political security concerns.

The sanctions route through the United Nations is actually the worst-case scenario because, although there was not enough in the IBT agreement to get the Chinese and Russians off the hook, there is enough for them to substantially water down sanctions. The outcome will achieve nothing except to anger China, Russia, and all the non-permanent members of the Security Council while bolstering President Ahmadinejad at home and to some extent abroad.

Iran's Uranium: US Shows a Middle Finger to Tehran...and Turkey and Brazil and... (Gary Sick)

Gary Sick assesses Washington's response to the Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement:

Well, that didn’t take long.

Yesterday I wondered if we were smart enough to declare victory and take yes as an answer from Tehran. Today, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced that a new package of sanctions against Iran had been approved by the major powers and would be sent to the UN Security Council later in the day.

Iran’s Uranium: Why Can’t the US Take Yes for an Answer? (Parsi)
Iran’s Uranium: Washington “Can’t Afford to Look Ridiculous”, Makes Ridiculous Move (Emery)

In case anyone overlooked the significance of this action, which followed by one day the announcement by Brazil and Turkey of the successful conclusion of their negotiations with Iran, she added: “I think this announcement is as convincing an answer to the efforts undertaken in Tehran over the last few days as any we could provide.”


Take that, Tehran! But it turns out that this lifted middle finger was not limited to Iran. Only hours before Clinton’s announcement, the foreign minister of Turkey held his own press conference. Obviously unaware of what was about to happen, he described in some detail not only the tortuous negotiation process with Iran, but his perception that he was acting directly on behalf of the United States.

According to Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, he had been in “constant contact” with Clinton herself and with national security adviser James Jones, while his prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had face-to-face encouragement from President Obama in December and April.

The objective of Turkey and Brazil was to persuade Iran to accept the terms of an agreement the United States had itself promoted only six months ago as a confidence-building measure and the precursor to more substantive talks. There were twelve visits back and forth between the Turk and his Iranian counterpart, some 40 phone conversations, and eighteen grueling hours of personal negotiations leading up to the presentation of the signed agreement on Monday.

“What they wanted us to do was give the confidence to Iran to do the swap We have done our duty,” said Davutoglu, calling the deal an important step for regional and global peace. “We were told that if Iran gives 1,200 kg without conditions, then the required atmosphere of trust would be created [to avoid sanctions]. So if we do all these things, and they still talk about sanctions … [it] will damage the psychological trust that has been created.”

The Turks and Brazilians, who felt they had “delivered” Iran on the terms demanded by the United States, were surprised and disappointed at the negative reactions from Washington. Little did they know that their success in Tehran, which had been given a 0-30 percent chance just days earlier, came just as the Americans were putting the final touches on a package of sanctions to be presented to the UN Security Council. The Tehran agreement was as welcome as a pothole in the fast lane, and the Americans were not reluctant to let their displeasure be known.

The five major powers had made up their minds (without consulting other members of the Security Council that currently includes both Turkey and Brazil), and these two mid-level powers were told in so many words to get out of the way.

The gratuitous insult aside, which approach do you believe would most likely result in real progress in slowing or halting Iran’s nuclear program? We have been imposing ever-greater sanctions on Iran for more than fifteen years. When we started they had zero centrifuges; today they have in excess of 9,000. To those who believe that one more package of sanctions will do what no other sanctions have done so far, I can only say I admire your unquenchable optimism.

More likely the Turkish ambassador to the UN had it about right when he said quite plainly about sanctions, “They don’t work.”

Would a negotiating track do better, perhaps mediated by two middle-level powers who have built up some credibility with Iran, like Algeria when it finally engineered the end to the US-Iran hostage crisis in 1980-81?  We’ll never know. Tonight the hardliners in Iran (and their American counterparts) are celebrating.

The Iranian hardliners had already begun asking questions about the deal, fearful that Iran had given away too much. Now they don’t have to worry since everyone knows that Iran will never be willing or able to negotiate under the threat of sanctions.

For the Revolutionary Guards it is a huge bonus. As foreign companies are driven away, the Guards progressively take over more and more of the economy. And as restrictions on trade grow, so do their opportunities to manage the immensely profitable smuggling routes. Like their American counterparts, but for different reasons, they thrive on an environment of threat and isolation.

The presidents of Turkey and Brazil have been humiliated. But the Great Powers are confident that their lesser cousins know their place and will show deference when the chips are down. They’ll do what they have to do. They always do.

Don’t they… ?

LATEST Iran Urgent: The Deal on Uranium Enrichment (and US Response)

UPDATE 18 MAY, 1445 GMT: Ahh, so here's the apparent response of the Obama Administration, or at least Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: reduce the Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement to "a number of unanswered questions" and push forward with the high-profile sanctions drive in the United Nations. Clinton's statement, just made to a Senate committee:

“We have reached agreement on a strong draft with the cooperation of both Russia and China. We plan to circulate that draft resolution to the entire Security Council today. And let me say, Mr. Chairman, I think this announcement is as convincing an answer to the efforts undertaken in Tehran over the last few days as any we could provide.”

Iran Document: Text of Iran-Brazil-Turkey Agreement on Uranium Enrichment

UPDATE 1745 GMT: The US Government has now made its formal response to the Tehran agreement. It's little more than a "hold the line" statement, issued by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs. It gives no clue as to whether Washington was supportive of the Brazilian-Turkish mediation; instead it sets the next challenge: let's see the proposal go to the International Atomic Energy Agency and, possibly, let's see Iran suspend its unilateral push for 20-percent uranium:

We acknowledge the efforts that have been made by Turkey and Brazil. The proposal announced in Tehran must now be conveyed clearly and authoritatively to the IAEA before it can be considered by the international community. Given Iran’s repeated failure to live up to its own commitments, and the need to address fundamental issues related to Iran’s nuclear program, the United States and international community continue to have serious concerns. While it would be a positive step for Iran to transfer low-enriched uranium off of its soil as it agreed to do last October, Iran said today that it would continue its 20% enrichment, which is a direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions and which the Iranian government originally justified by pointing to the need for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. Furthermore, the Joint Declaration issued in Tehran is vague about Iran’s willingness to meet with the P5+1 countries to address international concerns about its nuclear program, as it also agreed to do last October.

The United States will continue to work with our international partners, and through the United Nations Security Council, to make it clear to the Iranian government that it must demonstrate through deeds –-- and not simply words –-- its willingness to live up to international obligations or face consequences, including sanctions. Iran must take the steps necessary to assure the international community that its nuclear program is intended exclusively for peaceful purposes, including by complying with U.N. Security Council resolutions and cooperating fully with the IAEA. We remain committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear program, as part of the P5+1 dual track approach, and will be consulting closely with our partners on these developments going forward.

The European Union and Britain have put out similar statements.

UPDATE 1245 GMT: A group of Iranian political activists have declared that today’s uranium agreement, from a “political and economic” stance, is in the interest of the Iranian nation.

Mohammad Bastehnegar, Ezzatollah Sahabi, Taghii Rahmani, Hosein Rafii, Reza Raistoosi, Hossein ShahHosseini, Azam Taleghani, Reza Alijani, and Nezameddin Ghahari asserted that the agreement could end economic sanctions against Iran and lead to “transparency” in Iran’s relationship with the world.

The statement calls for collaboration of both conservative and reformist political activists in supporting this government initiative.

UPDATE 1110 GMT: Trita Parsi gets to the heart of why this arrangement was struck when last October's very similar deal, which reached top-table discussions in Geneva between Iran, the US, and other powers, collapsed. He notes talks between Brazil's Lula and the Supreme Leader: "This is no longer Ahmadinejad's nuclear deal, this is Khamenei's nuclear deal."

UPDATE 1015 GMT: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has offered more details of the proposed uranium swap at a press conference. From Press TV:

Iran will ask the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to station its personnel in Turkey to monitor the safe-keeping of the dispatched LEU [Tehran's 1200 kilogrammes low-enriched uranium]....The top diplomat underlined Iran will inform the IAEA of its decision "through official channels" within no more than seven days from the Monday meeting.
"Upon the positive response of the Vienna Group --- which includes Russia, France, the United States and the IAEA --- further details of the exchange will be elaborated through a written agreement and proper arrangement between Iran and the Vienna group that specifically committed themselves to deliver 120 cages of fuel needed for the Tehran research reactor (TRR)," noted Mottaki.

If the Vienna Group accepts Iran's terms and conditions, Mottaki said, both parties will "commit themselves to the implementation" of the deal, which requires Iran to deposit its LEU in Turkey within one month, and in return, the Vienna group will deliver 120 kg of fuel required for the Tehran reactor in no later than one year.

UPDATE 0755 GMT: How big is this story for Iranian state media? Islamic Republic News Agency, noting that "Ahmadinejad raised his hands in victory", devotes 6 of its top 9 stories to the agreement. (Fars, on the other hand, has not stepped into line: its top story is on British Foreign Secretary William Hague speaking about the assassination of a Hamas official in Dubai.)

UPDATE 0645 GMT: The Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement is for a swap of uranium outside Iran, and just as signficant, it involves the 1200 kilogrammes of Tehran's stock that the US and "Western" countries were seeking last autumn.

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said Monday that the Tehran government has agreed to a draft proposal whereby Iran will send some 1200 kg of its 3.5 percent enriched uranium over to Turkey in exchange for a total of 120 kg 20 percent....

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will officially receive a letter with regards to the swap deal "within a week".

According to a Press TV correspondent, the swap will take place nearly a month after receiving official approval from the Vienna Group, which consists of representatives from Iran, France, Russia and the US and the IAEA.

Now watch carefully for the reaction from Washington. If it is favourable, even cautiously favourable, we've got a major breakthrough.

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The dominant story in both Iranian and non-Iranian media today is likely to be the announcement between Iran, Brazil, and Turkey of an agreed procedure for a deal on enrichment of Iran's uranium.

No details will be available until later today, so significant questions remain. It is not clear whether Tehran has given any way to the essential demand of the US and other members of the "5+1" (UK, France, Germany, Russia, China) for a swap of uranium outside Iran. Politically, Washington's position --- has it privately supported the Brazilian and Turkish discussions? --- is murky.

The seriousness of the talks, however, is indicated not only by their 17-hour duration on Sunday but also by the level of involvement. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's postponement on Friday of his trip to Iran did not, in the end, mean that Turkey had withdrawn altogether. Rather, this seems to have been a case of wait-and-see: Turkish "ministers" were involved throughout Sunday: once it was clear that an agreement was possible, Erdogan reversed his position and flew to Tehran, joining Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.

The core issue is how Iran's 3.5-percent uranium will be exchanged for 20-percent uranium, needed for the Tehran Research Reactor producing medical isotopes.

Iran Analysis: Washington and the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Parsi)

Trita Parsi, writing for Foreign Policy, evaluates Monday's Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement on procedure for an uranium enrichment deal and Washington's reaction. His analysis complements that of Gary Sick and EA's Ms Zahra:

The Brazilian-Turkish diplomatic breakthrough with Iran has taken Washington by surprise. Clearly, the geopolitical center of gravity has shifted-five years of EU-led negotiations led nowhere while the new emerging powers Brazil and Turkey only needed a few months to produce a breakthrough. Now, the West needs to pull off some political acrobatics to avoid being on the diplomatic defensive.

Before Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's trip to Iran this past weekend, few among the permanent members of the UN Security Council were optimistic about his chances of success. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was charitable when he put Lula's odds at 30 percent. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly called her Brazilian counterpart to discourage Brazil from undertaking the diplomatic mission. And few in Washington seemed to have been prepared for a diplomatic breakthrough.

Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)
Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)
The Latest from Iran (18 May): Getting Beyond the Uranium Agreement

But against all odds, Turkey and Brazil seem to have succeeded in resolving the most critical obstacle in the Iranian nuclear stand-off: the issue of trust. Both through the modalities of the new deal as well as by virtue of who they are, Turkey and Brazil have succeeded in filling the trust gap.


For the Iranians --- beyond their political paralysis of last year --- the issue of trust was the primary flaw of the October 2009 proposal. As the Iranians saw it, the deal would have required that Iran place disproportionate trust in the Western powers by agreeing to give up its low-enriched uranium stockpile in one shipment, only to receive fuel rods for Iran's research reactor nine to twelve months later. This would have required a significant leap of faith on their behalf.

Iran's relations with most permanent Security Council states (P5) are fraught with tension and mistrust. This includes its relations with Russia. The European power's past support for Saddam Hussein --- including providing him with high-tech weaponry and components for chemical weapons --- has not been forgotten in Tehran, particularly not by those in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's circles.

Iran's relations with Turkey and Brazil are different, however. Though tensions and rivalry with Turkey have historic roots, relations have improved significantly under the Erdogan government. Though some skepticism remains, Iran has nevertheless noted Turkey's increased independence from --- and at times, defiance of --- the United States. In particular, Turkey's position on the Iraq war as well as its campaign to prevent a new round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran must have impressed Tehran.

Moreover, unlike with the P5 states, Iran does not only have some trust in Turkey, it also senses that it has some leverage over its Western neighbor. In 2009, Iranian-Turkish trade stood at around $11 billion, with Iran providing a significant portion of Turkey's gas needs. The combination of trust and leverage seems to have been critical in getting the Iranians to agree to put their stockpiles in Turkish territory.

In Brazil, Iran has found an unlikely but much needed ally. Brazil is a rising global power, with a legitimate claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council. It's a state with a long history of sympathizing and identifying with the Iranian position on nuclear matters. If the reprocessing takes place in Brazil, as opposed to Russia, it would be a political victory for Iran to have it occur in an emerging power who for long has endorsed Iran's right to enrichment and who itself achieved recognition of its enrichment right in spite of international pressure.

While Iran has been suspicious of European and American maneuvers and proposals, out of a fear that the ultimate objective of the West is to eliminate Iran's enrichment program, that suspicion is unlikely to arise in a Brazilian-sponsored deal due to Brazil's own nuclear program and self-interest in ensuring that Iran's nuclear rights aren't inhibited and turned into a legally binding precedent.

In fact, the Turkish-Brazilian-Iranian agreement explicitly endorses Iran's right to enrichment, a position the US has refused to officially accept.

Beyond economic interests, international prestige and the opportunity for Brazil and Turkey to become indispensible global actors, it should not be forgotten than both states have viewed war and confrontation as the likely alternative to their diplomacy. In particular, there has been a fear that the current Security Council draft resolution, while not providing an explicit justification for military action, would nevertheless provide regional states outside of the Security Council with a legal basis to take military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.

Washington's reaction has thus far been muted. Though details of the agreement remain unknown, two potential points of objection have emerged.

First, the amount of low-enriched uranium (LEU) that will be shipped to Turkey, 1200 kilograms, constituted approximately 75 percent of Iran's entire stockpile back in October. Though that percentage has shrunk, it will still leave Iran with less LEU than it would need for a bomb. Still, even though Washington insisted that the deal from October remains on the table and that it is non-negotiable, it may be the US itself that ends up seeking to renegotiate the terms. Second, Iran has expanded its enrichment activities and is currently enriching uranium to 19.75 percent. The US insists that this activity must be suspended.

In spite of these potential sticking points, it is important to note that both Brazilian and Turkish decision-makers have intimate knowledge of the American position. America's red lines are crystal clear to both. And even though both have shown significant independence from the US, it is unlikely that they would announce a deal with Iran that wouldn't meet America's requirements.

Rather, the Obama administration's problem with domestic actors may be a greater challenge. Both the House and the Senate have prepared broad sanctions bills, which they intend to send to the President in the next few days. Even if the deal meets American security requirements, Congress may still push forward its extraterritorial sanctions bill, citing other concerns with Iranian behavior.

With the November elections only months away, President Obama may face some stiff opposition from Congress, even over a deal that meets America's red lines on the nuclear issue.

The Latest from Iran (18 May): Getting Beyond the Uranium Agreement

2000 GMT: Bring the Kids Home. More than 200 children of Iranian diplomats have returned home to pursue education at local universities, Ministry of Science official Hassan Moslehi announced on Tuesday.

Moslehi said that all Iranian diplomats should transfer their children's education to Iran once they have fulfilled their mission abroad.

Last week member of Parliament Mohammad Shahryari had complained that around 400 children of senior Iranian officials were studying at universities in Britain.

NEW Iran Analysis: Washington and the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Parsi)
NEW Iran Alert: Filmmaker Firouz Faces Deportation From UK
NEW Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)
NEW Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)
Iran Document: Text of Iran-Brazil-Turkey Agreement on Uranium Enrichment
Iran Document: Mehdi Karroubi “The Islamic Republic Depends Upon the People”
Iran Document: The Prosecutor on the Executions, “Leaders of Sedition” (15 May)
Iran Urgent: The Deal on Uranium Enrichment
The Latest from Iran (17 May): Let’s Make a Deal (But Not with You, Mousavi)

1905 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Amir Khosro Dalirsani of the National Religious Front has been sentenced to four years in prison.


1855 GMT: Hmm, You Might Want to Think About This One. Saber Feizi, the head of the Telecommunications Company of Iran, has said, “The reason for the low internet speed in the country is that users mainly consult websites outside the country for obtaining information."

Launching 115 telecommunications projects in the holy city of Qom on Tuesday, Feizi said that issues with infrastructure were not to blame for slow internet access. He admitted that “lack of content” on Iranian pages pushed users to visit foreign websites.

1845 GMT: A Far-from-Academic Protest. Daneshjoo News claims that students at Khaje Nasir University of Technology in Tehran staged a spontaneous protest against the presence of the commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering.

Green Movement supporters distributed leaflets and reportedly spilled paint over the car of the IRGC commander. The protest occurred despite the presence of armed security and military forces and at least four cameramen from university security.

1335 GMT: Defending His Judiciary. The head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, under pressure on several fronts, has issued a "hold the line" (and don't blame me) statement.

To the 175 members of Parliament who submitted a public letter calling for prosecution of opposition figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, Larijani said the judiciary “is always in step with the greater policies of the Islamic Republic” and has not delayed in its confrontiation of “seditious elements”: “We are very good at our job and are not prone to procrastination as these gentlemen would like to believe. We have no fear of confronting the heads of sedition.”

As for claims that the judiciary has not pursued corruption allegations against public officials, including First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, Larijani claimed, “The Supreme Leader has repeatedly stressed on direct confrontation of corruption cases provided that they do not weaken the system.”

1145 GMT: We've added another analysis on the Iran-Brazil-Turkey uranium deal: Trita Parsi assesses its signficance and Washington's possible reaction.

1030 GMT: Cracking Down on Mousavi. More on the arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi's lead bodyguard, Ahmad Yazdanfar (see final updates yesterday)....

There is still no official reason for the detention of Yazdanfar, who has accompanied Mousavi for the past seven years. Following the arrest, Mousavi has asked his office staff not to appear at work until further notice.

0739 GMT: Rights and Repression. Rooz Online features a lengthy interview with Kurdish activist Mahmud Saeedzadeh, "The Judiciary is a Repressive Tool".

0735 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. RAHANA has published a list --- still incomplete --- of 472 political prisoners, their prisons, and their professions in both Persian and English.

0725 GMT: Subsidy Front. Subsidies: Gholamreza Mesbahi Moghaddam, a vocal Parliamentary critic of the Government on economic issues, has charged that the delay in implementation of subsidy cuts to September means the Government is obtaining $20 million of revenue illegally.

0720 GMT: Sacrificing Iran. An interesting statement from Dr Alireza Marandi, former Minister of Health and prominent medical professor: he says that the "development of the country has been sacrificed for politics".

Marandi is the father of the academic Seyed Mohammad Marandi, a high-profile post-election defender of Iran's Government.

0650 GMT: Domestic Politics and the Uranium Agreement. EA's newest correspondent, Ms Zahra, offers a sharp analysis of the internal manoeuvres over yesterday's nuclear news, noting the possibilities and pitfalls for both President Ahmadinejad and the opposition.

What is clear this morning is that Ahmadinejad's "opposition" is not limited to the Green Movement and reformists. The most striking comment in Rah-e-Sabz's overview of the deal and reactions is that of "conservative" member of Parliament Ahmad Tavakoli, who complains that "Iran has lost its most important ace" in high-stakes international card games. Tavakoli added to Fars News that the Tehran agreement is not an "treaty" but an "obligation" upon Iran.

There's more: Tavakoli is a firm ally of Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani. And Khabar Online, also linked to Larijani, features Tavakoli's remarks that "Ahmadinejad must come to the Majlis [Parliament] and explain this strange statement".

Jomhouri Eslami piles on, asserting that the treaty is "a complete drawback".

0600 GMT: Monday's Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement on procedure over uranium enrichment resonates through politics and the media this morning. Our key question remains unanswered: did the US quietly support the Brazilian-Turkish initiative or was it taken by surprise?

So far Washington has limited itself to a "hold the line" statement, which sets out a further lines for Tehran to cross: let's see the agreement when it has been presented to the International Atomic Energy Agency and let's see Tehran pull back from its unilateral attempt at 20-percent enriched uranium. (The latter, I think, is a red herring; more important will be the response to the former.)

We've posted an analysis by top US-based analyst Gary Sick, and the newest EA correspondent will be offering thoughts later this morning.

As always, however, we will be ensuring that the nuclear news does not wipe Iran's internal situation from sight. An agreement on uranium enrichment does not stop the advance towards 12 June, the anniversary of the election, or the Government's arrests and intimidations. In what may be a most pointed signal, the head of Mir Hossein Mousavi's security detail was arrested yesterday.

And we have a special post this morning on Iranian filmmaker  and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights activist Kiana Firouz, who faces deportation from Britain.