Iran Nuke Analysis: Reading the US-Turkey Discussions

A bit of background to Monday's agreement between Iran, Turkey, and Brazil on procedure for an uranium enrichment deal....

Four days before the announcement, on 13 May, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu had a telephone conversation with his counterpart Hillary Clinton. Two days after that, on Saturday, they met, just before Davutoglu went to Tehran.

Hours later, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan --- who had cancelled his own trip to Iran on the Friday --- reversed course. He set aside a visit to Azerbaijan and flew to Tehran.

So what happened in the high-letter US-Turkey encounters just before the IBT agreement? According to the State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley:

During the call [on 13 May], the Secretary stressed that, in our view, Iran’s recent diplomacy was an attempt to stop Security Council action without actually taking steps to address international concerns about its nuclear program.

There’s nothing new and nothing encouraging in Iran’s recent statements. It has failed to demonstrate good faith and build confidence with the international community, which was the original intent of the Tehran research reactor proposal. It has yet to formally respond to the IAEA.

She [Clinton] stressed that the burden is with Iran and its lack of seriousness about engagement requires us to intensify efforts to apply greater pressure on Iran. Now, that was the primary purpose of the conversation. They briefly touched on other subjects, including Middle East peace and the relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Throughout the question-and-answer session, Crowley was giving the message: Iran was not going to give up its own enrichment of 20-percent uranium and so there was still the "urgent" need for sanctions as a result of the dual policy towards Iran. Translated, Washington said that there would be no unclenched fist extended to Iran as long as Israel's protests  over Tehran's nuclear programme and the regional contest for influence continued.

Crowley continued:

Iran has been very busy in recent weeks having conversations with a range of countries. Part of that conversation did occur last week in the dinner in New York. And not only – during the conversation in New York, not only did Iran not offer any new, Foreign Minister Mottaki indicated during the dinner that notwithstanding any potential agreement on the Tehran research reactor, they would continue to enrich uranium to 20 percent, which we –-- which is of great concern to us and violates their obligations under the IAEA.

So they had initially, when they announced they were going to enrich uranium to 20 percent, they claimed at the time that it was for the Tehran research reactor, but it’s obviously part of a broader agenda. And that’s what we are concerned about. That’s why we continue to pursue the sanctions resolution as part of our pressure track.

When asked whether Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's expected visit to Tehran was a "last opportunity", Crowley said:

Well, I mean, we are –-- we continue to move forward on a sanctions resolution, and we have a sense of urgency about this. We want to get this done as quickly as possible. But our view remains that we are doubtful that Iran is going to change course absent the kind of significant pressure that comes with a resolution and the consequences that come with them.

Then, when he was asked whether the State Department gave Davutoglu any red lines that Turkey should not cross, Crowley replied:

Regarding the TRR [the Tehran Research Reactor], it [a proposal for "third country enrichment"] was put on the table last fall to build confidence with the international community about the true intentions of Iran’s nuclear program. We have drawn conclusions from Iran’s failure to even respond –-- much less engage constructively –-- even respond to the proposal formally to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

[Clinton] stressed to Foreign Minister Davutoglu again today that it’s not about the public statements that Iran makes. If Iran wishes to engage in –-- regarding the TRR, come up with alternatives that meet the fundamental intent of the proposal, then they can pick up the phone and call the IAEA, which is something they have failed to do.

Following the announcement of the IBT agreement, Crowley restated the reasons for an "urgent" sanctions draft:

In the statement, the White House acknowledged the efforts made by Turkey and Brazil and now called upon the IAEA to clearly and authoritatively convey the results of this arrangement to the IAEA. That said, the United States continues to have concerns about the arrangement. The joint declaration does not address the core concerns of the international community.

Iran remains in defiance of five UN Security Council resolutions, including its unwillingness to suspend enrichment operations. In fact, today Iran reaffirmed that it plans to continue to enrich uranium to 20 percent despite the fact that it previously justified this increased enrichment as for the Tehran research reactor. So public statements today suggest that the TRR deal is unrelated to it ongoing enrichment activity. In fact, they are integrally linked.

And then Crowley became very coy and even deceptive about how much Washington knew of the Turkish and Brazilian efforts:

I think we had conversations with Foreign Minister Amorim and Foreign Minister Davutoglu prior to their arrival in Tehran. I’m not aware of any specific contacts with them over the weekend.

But, setting aside Crowley's public spin, did the US know in advance of Erdogan's sudden decision to go to Iran? Most likely, Washington did not anticipate that the diplomatic efforts were moving towards an agreement, leading to the Turkish Prime Minister's change of plans. Ankara had made a decision: the benefits of a joint proposal with Iran and Brazil meant that it would exert autonomy and risk the US reaction.

Now the question is "What will Turkey will do in the UN?" This week, Erdogan wrote a letter to President Obama, saying that Ankara had opened the door slightly for a resolutio. Now the ball was in Washington's court.

In other words: "We did our part (and gained diplomatic and political advantage from doing so). You want to mess up this agreement with sanctions, so be it --- although don't expect us to vote for the resolution in the Security Council.

"We've got our ties with the US, which we value. But we also have our economic and political ties with Tehran."

Iran Analysis: Four Perspectives on the Uranium-Sanctions Dance

Amidst the ongoing reaction on the uranium front, Dissected News offers a provocative reading, working through and around four partial viewpoints to argue:

The Obama administration was given the opportunity to eliminate the myths and start a new chapter in U.S. foreign policy. Instead, [the President] scrambled to defend the old policy.

Lack of change domestically [can] be blamed on predecessors or legislatures, but Obama owns his own foreign policy legacy.

Roger Cohen of The New York Times is even sharper in his criticism of Washington, calling for a negotiation between the caricatures of US-Iranian relations but concluding:

Last year, at the United Nations, Obama called for a new era of shared responsibilities. “Together we must build new coalitions that bridge old divides,” he declared. Turkey and Brazil responded — and got snubbed. Obama has just made his own enlightened words look empty.

EA's Ms Zahra offers a far different perspective:

The only language the Iranian system understands is power (zaban-e zoor). Accepting the Iran-Brazil-Turkey declaration as a first step would create another delay of several months. Rejecting it may appear as unwillingness to negotiate, but only from a very superficial perspective. The regime made this diversion on purpose, and Clinton replied, "Who do you think you're fooling?"

Well, let's see, if Tehran finally realises that it has crossed all red lines. If Turkey was really tacitly supported by the US, then it certainly was not for this mockup of treaty. I have the impression that [the Turkish and Brazilian leaders] Erdogan and Lula weren't able to push the Supreme Leader further.

Farideh Farhi, in a wide-ranging interview on the Iranian internal situation and US-Iranian relations, adds this incisive point:

It is very interesting to watch and see the different reactions to this nuclear agreement in the past few days and compare that to the kind of reaction that occurred when the previous agreement was announced last October. This time there is the sense to me that a very large sector of the Iranian elite are being called upon to support this deal. The kind of disagreement that manifested itself last time I do not see. There have been important voices that have objected to this deal, but, for example, 200 of the 290 members of the parliament say they support the agreement. And last year, for example, the Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani strongly opposed the deal. This time he told the
people to be united. Even some important individuals considered to be more reform-oriented have written editorials talking about these being very critical times for Iranian history. You get a real sense that a high-level decision has been made to push for an agreement and to try to resolve the nuclear issue.

The Latest from Iran (19 May): Fallout

2035 GMT: The Uranium Sideshow. President Obama issued a boiler-plate, stay-the-course statement at a press conference alongside President Felipe Calderon of Mexico (which happens to have a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council):

"[We agree] on the need for Iran to uphold its international obligations or face increased sanctions and pressure, including UN sanctions. And I'm pleased that we've reached an agreement with our P5-plus-1 partners on a strong resolution that we now have shared with our Security Council partners.

Obama did not mention, for he was not asked, why he had encouraged Turkey to pursue talks with Iran leading to the uranium swap agreement in Tehran on Monday.

1845 GMT:Political Prisoner Watch. Housewife Masoumeh Yavari has been given a seven-year jail term at Rajai-Shahr Prison in Karaj. Yavari had been accused of "mohareb" (war against God), and the prosecutor had asked for the death penalty.

Zahra Jabbari, married and the mother of one child, has been sentenced to 4 years in prison. Jabbari was arrested during Qods Day protests on 18 September.

Student Activist Mohammad Yousef Rashidi has been handed a one-year jail term.

NEW Iran’s Uranium: Why Can’t the US Take Yes for an Answer? (Parsi)
NEW Iran’s Uranium: Washington “Can’t Afford to Look Ridiculous”, Makes Ridiculous Move (Emery)
NEW Iran’s Uranium: US Shows a Middle Finger to Tehran…and Turkey and Brazil and… (Gary Sick)
NEW Iran Document: Iranian Labour Unions “This is Not 1979″
Iran Analysis: Washington and the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Parsi)
Iran Alert: Filmmaker Firouz Faces Deportation From UK
Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)
Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)
The Latest from Iran (18 May): Getting Beyond the Uranium Agreement

1700 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The Revolutionary Court in Tehran has sentenced student and women's rights activist Bahareh Hedayat to 9 ½ years in prison: six months for insulting the president, two years for insulting the Leader, five years for anti-state and anti-national security actions, and two years, previously suspended, for organizing a gathering in June 2006.


Milad Asadi, another senior member of the alumni organisation Advar-e Tahkim Vahdat, has been sentenced to 7 years in prison.

Bahareh Hedayat's statement for Iran's National Student Day in December 2009:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EtUvxtH00Lc[/youtube]

1200 GMT: The Uranium Battle. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's atomic energy agency, has issued the highest-level reaction to the US pursuit of a sanctions resolution at the United Nations, "They won't prevail and by pursuing the passing of a new resolution they are discrediting themselves in public opinion."

0940 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Masoud Heidari, the former head of the Iranian Labour News Agency,was released from prison on Tuesday. On Sunday, Heidari had begun serving a three-month prison sentence.

0840 GMT: Alice-in-Wonderland Media Statement of Day. I guess the editors of The New York Times have not paid any attention to the events of the last 72 hours:

Brazil and Turkey should join the other major players and vote for the Security Council resolution. Even before that, they should go back to Tehran and press the mullahs to make a credible compromise and begin serious negotiations.

0830 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Tahereh Saeedi, the wife of detained film director Jafar Panahi, has told Rah-e-Sabz that her husband has been on hunger strike since Sunday.

Panahi has demanded access to his lawyer, visits by his family, and an unconditional release until a court hearing is held.

Six journalists and cultural activists --- Mahnaz Karimi, Hafez Sardarpour, Mehdi Zeynali, Nader Azizi, Mustafa Jamshidi, and Ramin Jabbari --- were arrested on Monday in Iranian Azerbaijan.

0820 GMT: Shutting Down the Inquiry. Parleman News writes that a reformist proposal to investigate Iran's prisons has been rejected by the Parliament. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani insists that the Majlis continues to observe prisons and has forwarded a report to the National Security Council.

0815 GMT: Claim of Day (No, It's Not about Uranium). Rah-e-Sabz claims new accusations of impropriety against Mohammad Javad Larijani, a high-ranking official in the judiciary. The website asserts that a deal has been struck: Ahmadinejad will not press a corruption case against Larijani, while the official and his powerful brothers will drop charges against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi.

0810 GMT: And There's Always a "Terrorism" Story. Press TV features a summary of its interview with Abdolmalek Rigi, the captured leader of the Baluch insurgent group Jundullah: "While in Morocco, suspected Israeli or US agents had given him a list of people to assassinate in Tehran."

0755 GMT: Evaluating the Uranium/Sanctions Story. We have three analyses of the US response to the Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement: Trita Parsi asks why Washington cannot take Yes for an answer, Chris Emery suggests it is because the US feels it "cannot afford to look  ridiculous", and Gary Sick thinks Washington just showed the middle finger not only to Tehran but to Turkey, Brazil, and a lot of other countries.

The Washington Post has posted a copy of the sanctions resolution introduced by the US into the United Nations Security Council.

0635 GMT: Nuclear Spin of Day. Peyke Iran tries an different angle to attack the Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement. The website claims that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip is angry about his reception in Tehran: he and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva were offered an Iranian breakfast of sangak bread, Bulgarian white cheese, walnuts, and inferior dried fruit.

0630 GMT: Mousavi's Bodyguard. More manoeuvring over Monday's arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi's head of security, Ahmad Yazdanfar. Khabar Online claims that Yazdanfar "withdrew" from his position, and the story that he was detained is a fiction of the "leaders of sedition" and foreign media.

Opposition outlets have responded that Yazdanfar is not "political" at all but a simple security officer. Through his arrest and the kidnapping, terror, and torture of others, the Government is slowly becoming a terrorist group.

0615 GMT: Iran's Debate on the Tehran Deal. The Government is still facing some opposition to the Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement. From the conservative wing, Ahmad Tavakoli (and possibly, through indirect means, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani) made challenges on Tuesday. On the reformist side, Darius Ghanbari asked why Iran had waited seven months and expended so much capital in its foreign policy, only to move towards an agreement it could have had in October.

The response of pro-Government politicians is that this is only a "declaration", not a "treaty", so Tehran has not entered any binding commitments. Or, as Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said, "If the Vienna Group (US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, China) accepts Iran’s terms and conditions...both parties commit themselves to the implementation” of the deal."

(Which means that Washington's response --- throwing out any consideration of the agreement in favour of a sanctions-first approach --- has sheltered the Ahmadinejad Government against its internal opponents.)

0530 GMT: For many observers, the nuclear sideshow will remain the main event today. The Obama Administration pretty much guaranteed that when, despite the Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement on a procedure for a uranium enrichment deal (and despite the small fact that President Obama appears to have encouraged the Turks to pursue the deal --- more on that later), Secretary of State Hillary Clinton loudly and not very politely announced that the US was proceeding with a sanctions resolution in the United Nations.

The resolution was submitted in the late afternoon, so now we will be treated to a lot of posturing on all sides, possibly obscuring this bottom-line assessment, courtesy of the National Iranian American Council: "This is an unbelievably stupid move on the part of the Obama administration. Not only are we rejecting our own terms of the agreement, but we are doing so in as tactless and diplomatically insulting way possible."

Meanwhile, on the centre stage of Iranian politics....

Containing Mousavi

Muhammad Sahimi offers a concise summary of the latest steps by the Government to intimidate Mir Hossein Mousavi ahead of the election anniversary on 12 June, including the arrest of Mousavi's top bodyguard.

The Labour Front

We have posted, in a separate entry, the statement of the Network of Iranian Labor Unions setting out its view of opposition to the Government, "This is Not 1979".

Iran Labor Report posts an overview of recent workers' protests.

LATEST Iran Urgent: The Deal on Uranium Enrichment (and US Response)

UPDATE 18 MAY, 1445 GMT: Ahh, so here's the apparent response of the Obama Administration, or at least Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: reduce the Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement to "a number of unanswered questions" and push forward with the high-profile sanctions drive in the United Nations. Clinton's statement, just made to a Senate committee:

“We have reached agreement on a strong draft with the cooperation of both Russia and China. We plan to circulate that draft resolution to the entire Security Council today. And let me say, Mr. Chairman, I think this announcement is as convincing an answer to the efforts undertaken in Tehran over the last few days as any we could provide.”

Iran Document: Text of Iran-Brazil-Turkey Agreement on Uranium Enrichment

UPDATE 1745 GMT: The US Government has now made its formal response to the Tehran agreement. It's little more than a "hold the line" statement, issued by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs. It gives no clue as to whether Washington was supportive of the Brazilian-Turkish mediation; instead it sets the next challenge: let's see the proposal go to the International Atomic Energy Agency and, possibly, let's see Iran suspend its unilateral push for 20-percent uranium:

We acknowledge the efforts that have been made by Turkey and Brazil. The proposal announced in Tehran must now be conveyed clearly and authoritatively to the IAEA before it can be considered by the international community. Given Iran’s repeated failure to live up to its own commitments, and the need to address fundamental issues related to Iran’s nuclear program, the United States and international community continue to have serious concerns. While it would be a positive step for Iran to transfer low-enriched uranium off of its soil as it agreed to do last October, Iran said today that it would continue its 20% enrichment, which is a direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions and which the Iranian government originally justified by pointing to the need for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. Furthermore, the Joint Declaration issued in Tehran is vague about Iran’s willingness to meet with the P5+1 countries to address international concerns about its nuclear program, as it also agreed to do last October.

The United States will continue to work with our international partners, and through the United Nations Security Council, to make it clear to the Iranian government that it must demonstrate through deeds –-- and not simply words –-- its willingness to live up to international obligations or face consequences, including sanctions. Iran must take the steps necessary to assure the international community that its nuclear program is intended exclusively for peaceful purposes, including by complying with U.N. Security Council resolutions and cooperating fully with the IAEA. We remain committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear program, as part of the P5+1 dual track approach, and will be consulting closely with our partners on these developments going forward.

The European Union and Britain have put out similar statements.

UPDATE 1245 GMT: A group of Iranian political activists have declared that today’s uranium agreement, from a “political and economic” stance, is in the interest of the Iranian nation.

Mohammad Bastehnegar, Ezzatollah Sahabi, Taghii Rahmani, Hosein Rafii, Reza Raistoosi, Hossein ShahHosseini, Azam Taleghani, Reza Alijani, and Nezameddin Ghahari asserted that the agreement could end economic sanctions against Iran and lead to “transparency” in Iran’s relationship with the world.

The statement calls for collaboration of both conservative and reformist political activists in supporting this government initiative.

UPDATE 1110 GMT: Trita Parsi gets to the heart of why this arrangement was struck when last October's very similar deal, which reached top-table discussions in Geneva between Iran, the US, and other powers, collapsed. He notes talks between Brazil's Lula and the Supreme Leader: "This is no longer Ahmadinejad's nuclear deal, this is Khamenei's nuclear deal."

UPDATE 1015 GMT: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has offered more details of the proposed uranium swap at a press conference. From Press TV:

Iran will ask the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to station its personnel in Turkey to monitor the safe-keeping of the dispatched LEU [Tehran's 1200 kilogrammes low-enriched uranium]....The top diplomat underlined Iran will inform the IAEA of its decision "through official channels" within no more than seven days from the Monday meeting.
"Upon the positive response of the Vienna Group --- which includes Russia, France, the United States and the IAEA --- further details of the exchange will be elaborated through a written agreement and proper arrangement between Iran and the Vienna group that specifically committed themselves to deliver 120 cages of fuel needed for the Tehran research reactor (TRR)," noted Mottaki.

If the Vienna Group accepts Iran's terms and conditions, Mottaki said, both parties will "commit themselves to the implementation" of the deal, which requires Iran to deposit its LEU in Turkey within one month, and in return, the Vienna group will deliver 120 kg of fuel required for the Tehran reactor in no later than one year.

UPDATE 0755 GMT: How big is this story for Iranian state media? Islamic Republic News Agency, noting that "Ahmadinejad raised his hands in victory", devotes 6 of its top 9 stories to the agreement. (Fars, on the other hand, has not stepped into line: its top story is on British Foreign Secretary William Hague speaking about the assassination of a Hamas official in Dubai.)

UPDATE 0645 GMT: The Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement is for a swap of uranium outside Iran, and just as signficant, it involves the 1200 kilogrammes of Tehran's stock that the US and "Western" countries were seeking last autumn.

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said Monday that the Tehran government has agreed to a draft proposal whereby Iran will send some 1200 kg of its 3.5 percent enriched uranium over to Turkey in exchange for a total of 120 kg 20 percent....

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will officially receive a letter with regards to the swap deal "within a week".

According to a Press TV correspondent, the swap will take place nearly a month after receiving official approval from the Vienna Group, which consists of representatives from Iran, France, Russia and the US and the IAEA.

Now watch carefully for the reaction from Washington. If it is favourable, even cautiously favourable, we've got a major breakthrough.

---
The dominant story in both Iranian and non-Iranian media today is likely to be the announcement between Iran, Brazil, and Turkey of an agreed procedure for a deal on enrichment of Iran's uranium.

No details will be available until later today, so significant questions remain. It is not clear whether Tehran has given any way to the essential demand of the US and other members of the "5+1" (UK, France, Germany, Russia, China) for a swap of uranium outside Iran. Politically, Washington's position --- has it privately supported the Brazilian and Turkish discussions? --- is murky.

The seriousness of the talks, however, is indicated not only by their 17-hour duration on Sunday but also by the level of involvement. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's postponement on Friday of his trip to Iran did not, in the end, mean that Turkey had withdrawn altogether. Rather, this seems to have been a case of wait-and-see: Turkish "ministers" were involved throughout Sunday: once it was clear that an agreement was possible, Erdogan reversed his position and flew to Tehran, joining Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.

The core issue is how Iran's 3.5-percent uranium will be exchanged for 20-percent uranium, needed for the Tehran Research Reactor producing medical isotopes.

Iran Analysis: Washington and the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Parsi)

Trita Parsi, writing for Foreign Policy, evaluates Monday's Iran-Brazil-Turkey agreement on procedure for an uranium enrichment deal and Washington's reaction. His analysis complements that of Gary Sick and EA's Ms Zahra:

The Brazilian-Turkish diplomatic breakthrough with Iran has taken Washington by surprise. Clearly, the geopolitical center of gravity has shifted-five years of EU-led negotiations led nowhere while the new emerging powers Brazil and Turkey only needed a few months to produce a breakthrough. Now, the West needs to pull off some political acrobatics to avoid being on the diplomatic defensive.

Before Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's trip to Iran this past weekend, few among the permanent members of the UN Security Council were optimistic about his chances of success. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was charitable when he put Lula's odds at 30 percent. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly called her Brazilian counterpart to discourage Brazil from undertaking the diplomatic mission. And few in Washington seemed to have been prepared for a diplomatic breakthrough.

Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)
Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)
The Latest from Iran (18 May): Getting Beyond the Uranium Agreement

But against all odds, Turkey and Brazil seem to have succeeded in resolving the most critical obstacle in the Iranian nuclear stand-off: the issue of trust. Both through the modalities of the new deal as well as by virtue of who they are, Turkey and Brazil have succeeded in filling the trust gap.


For the Iranians --- beyond their political paralysis of last year --- the issue of trust was the primary flaw of the October 2009 proposal. As the Iranians saw it, the deal would have required that Iran place disproportionate trust in the Western powers by agreeing to give up its low-enriched uranium stockpile in one shipment, only to receive fuel rods for Iran's research reactor nine to twelve months later. This would have required a significant leap of faith on their behalf.

Iran's relations with most permanent Security Council states (P5) are fraught with tension and mistrust. This includes its relations with Russia. The European power's past support for Saddam Hussein --- including providing him with high-tech weaponry and components for chemical weapons --- has not been forgotten in Tehran, particularly not by those in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's circles.

Iran's relations with Turkey and Brazil are different, however. Though tensions and rivalry with Turkey have historic roots, relations have improved significantly under the Erdogan government. Though some skepticism remains, Iran has nevertheless noted Turkey's increased independence from --- and at times, defiance of --- the United States. In particular, Turkey's position on the Iraq war as well as its campaign to prevent a new round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran must have impressed Tehran.

Moreover, unlike with the P5 states, Iran does not only have some trust in Turkey, it also senses that it has some leverage over its Western neighbor. In 2009, Iranian-Turkish trade stood at around $11 billion, with Iran providing a significant portion of Turkey's gas needs. The combination of trust and leverage seems to have been critical in getting the Iranians to agree to put their stockpiles in Turkish territory.

In Brazil, Iran has found an unlikely but much needed ally. Brazil is a rising global power, with a legitimate claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council. It's a state with a long history of sympathizing and identifying with the Iranian position on nuclear matters. If the reprocessing takes place in Brazil, as opposed to Russia, it would be a political victory for Iran to have it occur in an emerging power who for long has endorsed Iran's right to enrichment and who itself achieved recognition of its enrichment right in spite of international pressure.

While Iran has been suspicious of European and American maneuvers and proposals, out of a fear that the ultimate objective of the West is to eliminate Iran's enrichment program, that suspicion is unlikely to arise in a Brazilian-sponsored deal due to Brazil's own nuclear program and self-interest in ensuring that Iran's nuclear rights aren't inhibited and turned into a legally binding precedent.

In fact, the Turkish-Brazilian-Iranian agreement explicitly endorses Iran's right to enrichment, a position the US has refused to officially accept.

Beyond economic interests, international prestige and the opportunity for Brazil and Turkey to become indispensible global actors, it should not be forgotten than both states have viewed war and confrontation as the likely alternative to their diplomacy. In particular, there has been a fear that the current Security Council draft resolution, while not providing an explicit justification for military action, would nevertheless provide regional states outside of the Security Council with a legal basis to take military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.

Washington's reaction has thus far been muted. Though details of the agreement remain unknown, two potential points of objection have emerged.

First, the amount of low-enriched uranium (LEU) that will be shipped to Turkey, 1200 kilograms, constituted approximately 75 percent of Iran's entire stockpile back in October. Though that percentage has shrunk, it will still leave Iran with less LEU than it would need for a bomb. Still, even though Washington insisted that the deal from October remains on the table and that it is non-negotiable, it may be the US itself that ends up seeking to renegotiate the terms. Second, Iran has expanded its enrichment activities and is currently enriching uranium to 19.75 percent. The US insists that this activity must be suspended.

In spite of these potential sticking points, it is important to note that both Brazilian and Turkish decision-makers have intimate knowledge of the American position. America's red lines are crystal clear to both. And even though both have shown significant independence from the US, it is unlikely that they would announce a deal with Iran that wouldn't meet America's requirements.

Rather, the Obama administration's problem with domestic actors may be a greater challenge. Both the House and the Senate have prepared broad sanctions bills, which they intend to send to the President in the next few days. Even if the deal meets American security requirements, Congress may still push forward its extraterritorial sanctions bill, citing other concerns with Iranian behavior.

With the November elections only months away, President Obama may face some stiff opposition from Congress, even over a deal that meets America's red lines on the nuclear issue.