The Latest from Iran (30 May): Pressure, Counter-Pressure, & a Letter from Majid Tavakoli

1800 GMT: Academic Corner. HRANA reports that 15 students at Shahid Beheshti University have been suspended for criticism of the Supreme Leader.

1755 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The sentence of Zia Nabavi, a member of the Right to Education Council, has been reduced to 10 years from 15 years on appeal.

1750 GMT: Economy Watch. Reformist member of Parliament Darius Ghanbari has warned that if disinvestment, excessive imports and loss of domestic production continue, Iran will have 60 million (out of a population of 75+ million) below the poverty line. MP Nasrullah Torabi has called on the Government to be "accountable" to the 40 million he says are already below that line.

NEW Iran Report: The Fight on the Cultural Front (Erdbrink)
Iran Document: Mousavi “Greens Will Not be Stopped by Arrests, Prisons, or Killing”
Iran: A Poem for Executed Teacher Farzad Kamangar
The Latest from Iran (29 May): Statements for 22 Khordad/12 June

1745 GMT: A Clerical Slapdown. Ayatollah Amini, the leader of Friday Prayers in Qom, asked yesterday, "How is it possible to administer for the underprivileged with temporary relief?"

Amini leveled the allegation at the Government that Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas were not considered by persons in charge. Noting that other underdeveloped countries have managed to overcome their difficulties within 30 years. he said an adequate plan should have been established to create work, to develop the cities, and to support universities.


1735 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch --- Inside Version (cont.). Human Rights Activists News Agency carries a story on the alleged aftermath of two videos, released by the agency earlier this week, with accounts of torture and rape by detainees who were in Rajaiee Shahr Prison.

On Saturday, two agents from the Intelligence Ministry transferred twenty prisoners to the Security Office in Rajaiee Shahr prison where they were interrogated and threatened. They also moved Mohsen Beikvand, the victim in one of the videos, to solitary confinement. Unknown men reportedly contacted Bahram Tasviri, the other victim from the videos, and told him that his image and reputation have been shattered outside of prison with the publication of these videos.

(Note: we have not posted the video, which is available in the HRANA story, because we feel it is vital to confirm the authenticity of the story given the serious allegations. Feedback from those who view the video is welcomed.)

1730 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch --- Inside Version. We return from a break to find a purported account of conditions at Evin Prison from detained journalist and filmmaker Mohammad Nourizad. The account includes Nourizad's meeting last week with Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Dowlatabadi, who allegedly promised Nourizad's release if the political prisoner and his family gave no statements to the media.

Nourizad, in the letter to the Supreme Leader, calls Evin "the second Kahrizak", a reference to the notorious facility that was closed by Ayatollah Khamenei after revelations of abuses and killings of detainees.

0855 GMT: Earthquake Alarm! Khabar Online reports that women have been seen taking off their hijab, allegedly for sporting activities, in several parks and public spaces in Tehran.

0850 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Bahram Chagini, a university student and a member of the Mousavi presidential campaign, was reportedly arrested by intelligence agents in Arak in mid-May.

0840 GMT: Another Political Prisoner List. Rah-e-Sabz has published another set of names and details of 100 political prisoners in Block 350 of Evin Prison. About 70% are students.

There is one additional name of a journalist, Khashayar Jahanzad Farrokhi, to add to our running total. We estimate that 93 journalists remain in detention or are under threat of heavy bails.

0835 GMT: And Another Cleric is Summoned. Rah-e-Sabz reports that Ahmad Montazeri, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, has been summoned to and interrogated in a special clerical court.

0830 GMT: Cleric Responds to "Lies". Ayatollah Sane'i has expressed his regret, "Five years ago I said lies were spreading, but I didn't know they were to become a culture."

0820 GMT: Reformist Responds to "Lies". We reported on Friday about  Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting's distortion of the words of reformist activist Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, turning her into a traitor declaring, "Do not accept Iran."

Haghighatjoo has now threatened to file a lawsuit against IRIB and the Supreme Leader, as the head of the broadcaster. She explained that the Green Movement, with its initial slogan "Where is My Vote?", did not want regime change; however, after killings and imprisonments, many doubted that reforms could occur within the system. Haghighatjoo concluded, "I believe that the Constitution must be replaced by a secular system."

0815 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Hashemi Rafsanjani's daughter Faezeh Hasemi has responded to the attack on her office with an unsubtle swipe at the Government. This was not carried by common thieves; it was like a "Mongols attack" to incite terror.

0805 GMT: Parliamentary Moves. Following this week's election of leaders in Parliament, with one Deputy Speaker (Sadr) seen as pro-Ahmadinejad and another (Bahonar) criticised by "hardliners" --- Speaker Ali Larijani and his allies are pushing the line of "Parliamentary unity".

Larijani, quoted by his supporting website Khabar Online, declared that political divisions are not compatible with the Supreme Leader's ideas. Elyas Naderan, a leading critic of the Ahmadinejad Government, predicted that the "political alignment" of pro-goverment and anti-government factions will not persist.

Not all proceeded smoothly for Larijani's move, however: his press conference started 20 minutes late, suffered a blackout, and was suddenly cut off.

0800 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The scholars of the Middle East Studies Association have written to the Supreme Leader, calling for the release of Majid Tavakoli (see 0645 GMT) and other political prisoners.

0700 GMT: The Cultural Front. We have posted, in a separate entry, a report from  Thomas Erdbrink, the Washington Post correspondent in Tehran, on cultural resistance to the Iranian regime.

0645 GMT: A Letter from Tavakoli? There was a lot of chatter yesterday about a purported message from Majid Tavakoli, the detained student leader.

The letter has not been translated into English, but an EA reader wanted to get a sense of Tavakoli's analysis and objectives. So, over to EA correspondent Ms Zahra:

Tavakoli's statement reads like a mix of [prominent Iranian expatriate opposition figure] Mohsen Sazegara's daily lessons about non-violent struggle, parts of Mousavi's statements (esteqamat, perseverance), and expatriate demands for an end to the Islamic Republic.

As I never heard more than short statements by him, no idea if he is the author. If it is not by him, it could be a collective text, written by a reformist theoretician in prison --- I doubt this, however, because in my opinion reformists would never give up the Islamic Republic. It could also be the result of discussions in prison about future strategies for the Green Movement. In any case the phrasing is coherent, i.e., written by a single person.

An excellent text, insisting on the positiveness of the leaders, necessity of positive criticism, unity, fundamental demands like individual freedom and pluralism (to prevent a new dictatorship), clearly defined goals, and strategies of non-violence, along the lines of those set out by the scholar Gene Sharp.

It could also be an implicit reminder to Mousavi and Karroubi to be more definitive in their demands, but it is only advice and does not condemn them.

0630 GMT: We return from a Saturday night break to assess this morning's political situation, five days before the anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and less than two weeks before the birthday of the 2009 election.

The regime made a big political move with the announcement that the Supreme Leader, introduced by President Ahmadinejad, will lead Tehran Friday Prayers from Khomeini's mausoleum. Can't be much clearer than this in a bid for legitimacy.

It's the first major regime rally since 22 Bahman (11 February), with Ayatollah Khamenei speaking at Friday Prayers for the first time since 19 June, when he reaffirmed Ahmadinejad's victory, warned the opposition not to challenge, and tried to keep Hashemi Rafsanjani in the fold.

So what were those various actors doing yesterday? Well, opposition figure Mir Hossein Mousavi had made another challenge with his statement to former political prisoners (again, can't get much more pointed in the symbolism than talking with those who had been unjustly detained under the Shah), and reformist groups and activists --- despite the Government's attempt to silence them --- continued to put out declarations of intent before 12 June.

Even more interesting,  however, were the manoeuvres around Rafsanjani. The former President's website issued its own response to the Government by re-issuing Rafsanjani's criticisms of President Ahmadinejad and the Iranian system, both in a letter to the Supreme Leader before the election and in Rafsanjani's 17 July Friday Prayer address (the last time he took the podium).

But the regime was putting out its own message for Rafsanjani this weekend: the office of his daughter Faezeh Hashemi was raided, soon after security forces moved upon the campus of Islamic Azad University --- established by the Rafsanjani Government and led until recently by Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi --- and seized computers and documents.

What does it all mean? Well, at this point I'll take the easy way out: too soon to tell....

Iran Analysis: Towards the Final Battle? (Zahra)

EA correspondent Ms Zahra takes a close look power and resistance in Iran:

Recent news from Iran gives an ambiguous impression. The regime carries out more arrests. It concentrates and extends its power: political (President Ahmadinejad's chief advisor Esfandiar Rahim Mashai now holds 18 additional offices), economic (the extensive sale of state-owned companies to Revolutionary Guard foundations), and military sphere (new Basiji headquarters in Tehran, heavy security measures for any of Ahmadinejad’s provincial visits).

Yet, at the same time, even a "cultural" step such as using hijab as a new cause for oppression attests to the weakness of this regime. Major political, economic, and social issues remain unsolved, with no attempt to deal with them on the horizon.


POLITICAL: The nuclear case is unresolved, and more sanctions loom. Corruption investigations of high-ranking officials such as 1st Vice-President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, have been postponed temporarily but could be pressed again by the Govenrment's "conservative" opponents. The tension over the ban on the last two reformist parties, Mosharekat (Islamic Iran Participation Front) and Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, lingers.

ECONOMIC: Ahmadinejad's subsidy cut plan has not been implemented two months after its approval by the Majlis. Disinvestment in the oil and gas sector, such as the South Pars and Assalouyeh fields, continues, oil sales are impeded by undeclared sanctions, and the general decline in production is not halted. Unemployment and inflation are growing, while the cases of unreturned loans (allegedly up to $50 millions) to state banks are pending.

SOCIAL: Eleven months after the disputed presidential elections, thousands of protesters are still imprisoned, and the cases of more than 100 demonstrators killed on the streets, raped in prisons, or tortured to death in facilities such as Kahrizak remain unsettled. Purges in universities and offices have not quieted protest.

Instead of addressing these crucial problems, Ahmadinejad’s government resorts to “moral” issues to discipline youth and women, the two groups of Iranian society who have constantly established their resistance against his backward social policies.

Meanwhile the opposition is closing ranks: even though the clergy in general has remained silent, high-ranking clerics such as Ayatollah Sane’i or Ayatollah Dastegheib, following the example of the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, have sharply condemned governmental violence against protesting citizens.

This year’s May Day was an opportunity to build relations between the Green Movement and labour unions, and last Friday four Islamic labour associations declared that they would merge. Executions of Kurdish citizens have led to an unprecedented wave of solidarity, addressing the relationship of Iran's majority society to its ethnic minorities. Peaceful protests in Kurdish areas attest to a tacit adoption of the Green Movement’s principle of non-violence.

Editorial staffs of Green websites have issued a joint statement on resistance. Women of all political currents celebrated their union in a moving Nowruz meeting of publishers, lawyers, and human rights activists (for example, Shahla Lahiji, Nasrin Sotudeh, and Minou Mortazi) with Zahra Rahnavard. Students organise rallies and fasts for their imprisoned professors and comrades, popular artists boycotted the state-owned Islamic Repbulic of Iran Broadcasting, and the international Fajr Film Festival. Authors and their associations issue statements against repression and dedicate poems to the executed.

One may ask why the embattled Presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi and the former President Mohammad Khatami have not yet formed a joint front of opposition. The probable answer is that diversity is likely to attract more supporters from different political camps. Conflicting concepts, which become apparent in their statements such as Karroubi's last letter, can reflect the pluralistic nature of this popular movement.

Recent developments point to a growing division of Iranian society into two camps. The economic and military power of the Government, backed by the Revolutionary Guard and Basiji faces a majority of unarmed and impoverished people.

But the appearance of power vs. the powerless is superficial. This government is incapable to solve fundamental economic issues, which will impede its efforts to concentrate its military power in the long run. As soon as the government is not able to pay its (para)-military forces sufficiently, its last stronghold will crumble. Infusing Basiji and other paramilitary forces with “revolutionary” ideology may stop this disintegration temporarily, but even these troops do not live in a social vacuum. Even the pretext of the preservation of Islam to oppress dissidents has much lost of its credibility since the historically unprecedented killings of unarmed protesters on the religious festival of Ashura (27 December).

The Islamic Republic's most radical, undemocratic and reactionary forces have declared war on Iranian civil society, which has proven during the past 11 months its commitment to a modern, pluralistic, and peaceful Islamic state. This may the last battle of those forces as they try to deny the social and political transition of an Islamic state towards a democratic society.

Iran Analysis: Four Perspectives on the Uranium-Sanctions Dance

Amidst the ongoing reaction on the uranium front, Dissected News offers a provocative reading, working through and around four partial viewpoints to argue:

The Obama administration was given the opportunity to eliminate the myths and start a new chapter in U.S. foreign policy. Instead, [the President] scrambled to defend the old policy.

Lack of change domestically [can] be blamed on predecessors or legislatures, but Obama owns his own foreign policy legacy.

Roger Cohen of The New York Times is even sharper in his criticism of Washington, calling for a negotiation between the caricatures of US-Iranian relations but concluding:

Last year, at the United Nations, Obama called for a new era of shared responsibilities. “Together we must build new coalitions that bridge old divides,” he declared. Turkey and Brazil responded — and got snubbed. Obama has just made his own enlightened words look empty.

EA's Ms Zahra offers a far different perspective:

The only language the Iranian system understands is power (zaban-e zoor). Accepting the Iran-Brazil-Turkey declaration as a first step would create another delay of several months. Rejecting it may appear as unwillingness to negotiate, but only from a very superficial perspective. The regime made this diversion on purpose, and Clinton replied, "Who do you think you're fooling?"

Well, let's see, if Tehran finally realises that it has crossed all red lines. If Turkey was really tacitly supported by the US, then it certainly was not for this mockup of treaty. I have the impression that [the Turkish and Brazilian leaders] Erdogan and Lula weren't able to push the Supreme Leader further.

Farideh Farhi, in a wide-ranging interview on the Iranian internal situation and US-Iranian relations, adds this incisive point:

It is very interesting to watch and see the different reactions to this nuclear agreement in the past few days and compare that to the kind of reaction that occurred when the previous agreement was announced last October. This time there is the sense to me that a very large sector of the Iranian elite are being called upon to support this deal. The kind of disagreement that manifested itself last time I do not see. There have been important voices that have objected to this deal, but, for example, 200 of the 290 members of the parliament say they support the agreement. And last year, for example, the Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani strongly opposed the deal. This time he told the
people to be united. Even some important individuals considered to be more reform-oriented have written editorials talking about these being very critical times for Iranian history. You get a real sense that a high-level decision has been made to push for an agreement and to try to resolve the nuclear issue.

Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)

Our newest correspondent, Ms Zahra, assesses the impact of yesterday's Iran-Brazil-Turkey uranium agreement on Iran's internal situation:

President Ahmadinejad has already declared himself as victorious, which is true, because he managed to convince his opponents within the Iranian system that an agreement --- even one allowing uranium to leave Tehran for a swap --- should be reached. Surely he will now present himself as the big saviour of Iran from more sanctions.

All of this occurring on a high-profile platform in Tehran is a bonus to mobilise the Ahmadinejad supporters. The photograph says it all:



However, there are also political talking points for the opposition. They can argue that Ahmadinejad has given in to superpowers, especially the US, and has had to accept their conditions, This is not a shining example of national sovereignty. Even worse, the Islamic Republic may become more vulnerable vis-a-vis Israel.

Ahmadinejad's critics can also claim that the agreement could have been signed six months ago. An unnecessary waste of time has led to more sanctions. Far from appearing strong in this crisis, the President has been weak and has failed to withstand foreign pressures.

But here's the internal dimension beyond the nuclear. If this agreement is still valid within a week, it will have far from the domestic impact that Ahmadinejad desires. Iranians are more concerned about high prices, lack of fuel and gas, unemployment, and the overall security atmosphere.

After one or two weeks of big noise --- ta da! --- the situation will be the same or even worse. The subsidy reduction plan is ill-prepared, hundreds of protesters are still imprisoned, investment is at its lowest level in years, shaky oil prices and a squeeze on oil exports may worsen the budget deficit, which will not be covered with revenues of the privatisation of state companies often diverting to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and its interests.

As for future developments, there are again two possible scenarios:

The Government will hope that the aversion of crisis and an impression of Iran's strengthened position in international affairs, accompanied by peace and harmony, will bolster public opinion. Human rights? That's just an internal issue.

The opposition will contest that the nuclear deal has only masked the country's real problems. Now that this problem is solved, Western states can put more pressure on Tehran over human rights, possible by setting this as a requirement for extended trade. This time around, big companies will find it difficult to reinvest because of activists accusing them of cooperation with murderers and abusers.

And it will note: if this Government will retreat under pressure in the secondary arena of the international, what might happen if it again faces that pressure on the primary stage of the domestic?