Iran Analysis: The Contest at Home Over (and Beyond) the Uranium Agreement (Zahra)

Our newest correspondent, Ms Zahra, assesses the impact of yesterday's Iran-Brazil-Turkey uranium agreement on Iran's internal situation:

President Ahmadinejad has already declared himself as victorious, which is true, because he managed to convince his opponents within the Iranian system that an agreement --- even one allowing uranium to leave Tehran for a swap --- should be reached. Surely he will now present himself as the big saviour of Iran from more sanctions.

All of this occurring on a high-profile platform in Tehran is a bonus to mobilise the Ahmadinejad supporters. The photograph says it all:



However, there are also political talking points for the opposition. They can argue that Ahmadinejad has given in to superpowers, especially the US, and has had to accept their conditions, This is not a shining example of national sovereignty. Even worse, the Islamic Republic may become more vulnerable vis-a-vis Israel.

Ahmadinejad's critics can also claim that the agreement could have been signed six months ago. An unnecessary waste of time has led to more sanctions. Far from appearing strong in this crisis, the President has been weak and has failed to withstand foreign pressures.

But here's the internal dimension beyond the nuclear. If this agreement is still valid within a week, it will have far from the domestic impact that Ahmadinejad desires. Iranians are more concerned about high prices, lack of fuel and gas, unemployment, and the overall security atmosphere.

After one or two weeks of big noise --- ta da! --- the situation will be the same or even worse. The subsidy reduction plan is ill-prepared, hundreds of protesters are still imprisoned, investment is at its lowest level in years, shaky oil prices and a squeeze on oil exports may worsen the budget deficit, which will not be covered with revenues of the privatisation of state companies often diverting to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and its interests.

As for future developments, there are again two possible scenarios:

The Government will hope that the aversion of crisis and an impression of Iran's strengthened position in international affairs, accompanied by peace and harmony, will bolster public opinion. Human rights? That's just an internal issue.

The opposition will contest that the nuclear deal has only masked the country's real problems. Now that this problem is solved, Western states can put more pressure on Tehran over human rights, possible by setting this as a requirement for extended trade. This time around, big companies will find it difficult to reinvest because of activists accusing them of cooperation with murderers and abusers.

And it will note: if this Government will retreat under pressure in the secondary arena of the international, what might happen if it again faces that pressure on the primary stage of the domestic?

Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)

Gary Sick, a former official in the Carter and Reagan Administrations and one of the top US-based analysts on Iran, offers an evaluation of today's agreement between Iran, Brazil, and Turkey on a procedure for the enrichment of Tehran's uranium stock:

What to make of the new nuclear agreement by Turkey and Brazil with Iran?

Perhaps the main point is to be reminded of the moral from the old folk tale: Be careful of what you wish for, since you just might get it. The United States took a rather righteous position that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the West had made Iran a remarkably generous offer, and when it was rejected they had no choice but to go all out for sanctions.

Iran Document: Text of Iran-Brazil-Turkey Agreement on Uranium Enrichment
Iran Urgent: The Deal on Uranium Enrichment

There are those in Washington (but also in Paris and London) who were fully committed to passing a strong sanctions resolution in the United Nations Security Council next month, and this is a blow to them and all the intense diplomatic work they have done in the past five or six months. Clearly, it will be immensely more difficult, if not impossible, to get a sanctions resolution if this deal is on the table.


According to preliminary information, the agreement provides that Iran will, within a month, ship 1240 kg of roughly 5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey where it will be held in escrow for up to a year until Iran is provided with 120 kg of fuel cells (uranium enriched to near 20 percent) to replace the nearly exhausted fuel of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) that makes medical isotopes. This represents more than half of the 2065 kg of LEU that Iran had produced as of February according to the IAEA, and it greatly reduces Iran’s capability to produce enough fissile material for a bomb.

We should all be reminded of the original purpose of the agreement. It was intended as a confidence-building measure that would open the way to more substantive discussions of other issues. The original offer that Iran provisionally accepted in October tacitly accepted Iran’s right to enrich uranium; in return Iran would give up control over a significant portion of its existing stash of LEU. Even low enriched uranium can be further enriched to create bomb-grade (roughly 90+ percent) highly enriched uranium (HEU) that is required for a bomb. The October agreement would have created an environment conducive to at least minimal mutual trust and the beginning of serious negotiations.

Note to negotiators: In the past six months, Iran has not used its LEU to build a bomb, even without an agreement.

Iran has set up a special line to enrich uranium to the 20 percent required for the TRR, but that line is small, separated from its other enrichment facilities, and under inspection of the IAEA. The move to enrich some uranium to 20 percent was obviously intended as a pressure tactic to drive the West back into negotiations, since Iran does not have the capability to manufacture fuel cells for the TRR.

We should also be reminded that Iran did not reject the original deal: they proposed amending it. Basically, when the Iranian negotiators came home with the proposed deal, they were attacked from all sides –-- including members of the Green Movement –-- for being suckers. Their opponents pointed out that they were going to rely on the word and goodwill of Russia (where the LEU would be enriched to 20 percent) and France (where the fuel cells would be fabricated). Iranians from left to right argued that both of these countries had repeatedly cheated Iran on nuclear issues: Russia by delaying endlessly the completion of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, and France by refusing to grant Iran rights to the Eurodif enrichment facility partially owned by Iran since the days of the shah. Why, they asked, should we believe that this agreement will be any different?

Instead, they proposed that the swap of LEU for the fuel cells should happen on Iranian soil, probably in stages and within a fixed period of time. That idea was rejected by the United States and its negotiating partners.

The new bargain appears to be a compromise in which the LEU would physically be removed from Iran and held in escrow in Turkey for up to a year, in which time the fuel cells would be manufactured and delivered to Iran. The new bargain also appears to go much further in formally recognizing the legitimacy of Iran’s independent enrichment program. That should not be a surprise given the fact that Brazil, one of the parties to the bargain, has its own enrichment facility similar to Iran’s and in fact concealed its details for some time.

So where does that leave us?

Essentially, it takes us back to last October. The one big difference is that Iran has more LEU now than it did then. But the reality is that Iran will keep producing LEU unless a new agreement is reached to persuade them to stop. If we wait another six months for negotiations, Iran will have still more LEU.

In short, this agreement is largely symbolic and limited in its practical effects. If the West accepts the deal as worked out by Brazil and Turkey, and if a new round of negotiations begins – on both the nuclear and other major issues – then this could be a breakthrough. If the West turns it down, or if the two sides do not use it to negotiate some of the major issues that separate them, then nothing much will have been accomplished.

The next step is up to the United States and its negotiating partners.

Although angst is high among the sanctions-at-all-costs crowd, this path to a nuclear swap deal was fully endorsed by the United States and was the centerpiece of the justification for sanctions. One way to respond at this point may just be to declare that our threat of sanctions worked: Iran has capitulated and we accept yes as an answer.

Hmmm…are we that smart?

The Latest from Iran (17 May): Let's Make a Deal (But Not with You, Mousavi)

2120 GMT: We close tonight with an analysis by Gary Sick, posted in a separate entry, of today's Tehran agreement on uranium enrichment.

2045 GMT:Political Prisoner Watch. Literary critic Abbas Khalili Dermaneh (also known as Khalil Dermaneki) has been released after almost five months in detention. Dermaneh was arrested during the Ashura demonstrations on 27 December.

Ahmad Yazdanfar, the head of Mir Hossein Mousavi's security detail, has been arrested.

NEW Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)
NEW Iran Document: Text of Iran-Brazil-Turkey Agreement on Uranium Enrichment
NEW Iran Document: Mehdi Karroubi “The Islamic Republic Depends Upon the People”
NEW Iran Document: The Prosecutor on the Executions, “Leaders of Sedition” (15 May)
NEW Iran Urgent: The Deal on Uranium Enrichment
Iran Blackout: Shutting Down the Movies
The Latest from Iran (16 May): Intimidation After the Executions

1800 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Writer and children's rights activist Reza Khandan was released last Wednesday. Peyke Iran claims that that international pressure contributed to the decision to free him.


1440 GMT: Karroubi's "Islamic Republic Depends on the People". We have posted the English translation of Mehdi Karroubi's latest rallying call for the Iranian people to defend the Republic.

1415 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Amir Kabir University student Mohammad Yousefi has been released after six months in detention.

1150 GMT: More "It's Still War!" MediaFail (see 1024 GMT). It's one thing for The New York Times to package this morning's Iran-Brazil-Turkey deal as, first and foremost, a complication for sanctions. Even if their "experts" are doing no more than speculating --- "The terms mirror a deal with the West last October which fell apart when Iran backtracked. This time, however, those same terms may be unacceptable to Washington and its partners because Iran has since increased its supply of nuclear fuel" --- at least there is the guise of analysis rather than Government spin.

Reuters, however, has no excuse. The agency ran the scare story last Friday from "Western diplomats" that Iran must be preparing for militarised nuclear capability because it was enriching uranium to 20 percent, rather than sending it abroad. So what happens when Iran does agree to send the uranium abroad?

Well, Reuters calls "Western diplomats" --- possibly the same ones who fed them their Friday article --- to get quotes:

"If they refuse to stop enriching to 20 percent and make this proposal for fuel, then why are they continuing the higher enrichment [with their own centrifuges]? There is no other peaceful justification," a Western diplomat said. [NOTE: The "peaceful justification" is that Iran may not get enriched uranium for up to a year, even if this morning's deal goes through with the US and other powers.]

"This would be a deal-breaker," another said.

1120 GMT: Nuclear Question of the Day/Week/Month. We're continuing special updates in a separate entry on today's Iran-Brazil-Turkey deal on uranium enrichment, and we have posted a copy of the agreement.

An EA correspondent, meanwhile, asks the key question about Iranian politics. We all know that President Ahmadinejad, seeking legitimacy, has pursued an agreement since last summer, but "why are the Supreme Leader and Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who opposed last October's deal, now supporting it?"

1030 GMT: Academic Corner. Four students from Elm-o-Sanat University in Tehran have been expelled for political opposition.

1024 GMT: CNN on Iran Nuclear Deal "It's Still War!" A hopeless display of journalism from CNN this morning....

Instead of trying to get to grips with the possible significance of the deal announced by Iran, Brazil, and Turkey, CNN's website goes back to the older scare story --- circulated by "Western diplomats" on Friday --- of Iran putting in a second cascade of centrifuges to provide 20-percent enriched uranium for its Tehran Research Reactor, producer of medical isotopes (see Saturday's updates).

True, Foreign ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast told the Islamic Republic News Agency this morning that Iran would continue this process but --- since arrangements for a swap of Iran's 3.5-percent uranium for 20-percent uranium in Turkey may not be completed until mid-2011 --- that would seem a logical step to keep the TRR going.

So here's CNN gambit: "20-percent enriched uranium is the threshold for uranium capable of setting off a nuclear reaction. And Western leaders have alleged that Iran is trying to create nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian energy program."

Umm... "Threshold for a nuclear reaction". Not threshold for even a single bomb, which is more than 90 percent.
0750 GMT: Karroubi Watch. Mehdi Karroubi, meeting academics, doctors, nurses, and families of martyrs, has asserted that the Islamic Republic was only born through people's votes; therefore, the Republic derives its meaning from the people.

0730 GMT: The Nuclear Deal. We will be providing updates on today's agreement between Brazil, Turkey, and Iran in a separate entry.

Meanwhile, the key (and probably unasked) question on the internal dimension: what legitimacy will the Ahmadinejad Government claim (and what legitimacy will it obtain) from the agreement? Not sure if anyone has noticed, but there seems to be an anniversary coming up on 12 June....

0720 GMT: Intimidation. Following the public threat to Mir Hossein Mousavi from the Tehran Prosecutor General and the letter by 175 members of Parliament calling for prosecution of Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi (see yesterday's updates),  Khabar Online offers a timeline of the warnings to Mousavi and Karroubi.

0620 GMT: We open this morning with updates on two important stories.

Media inside and outside Iran will likely be focused on news of agreement between Iran, Brazil, and Turkey on a procedure for a deal on enrichment of Tehran's uranium. We've got the latest developments and what to watch for today.

Inside Iran, however, the political story is the continued effort by the Government to defend the executions, now more than a week old, of 5 Iranians. We have a transcript of Saturday's lengthy statement by Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Dowlatabadi justifying the hangings.



However, just as significant in the statement --- despite Dowlatabadi's extended denial that the timing of the executions has any political significance --- is his high-profile warning to Mir Hossein Mousavi. The Tehran Prosecutor's references to Mousavi's position as Prime Minister in the 1980s, during a period when many Iranians were executed, should not be missed: you supported them then, so why trumpet public opposition now?

Then there is Dowlatabadi's pointed declaration to the "leaders of sedition": we've seen you denounce this execution of rightfully-condemned terrorists, we've noted it, and we will add it to the list of charges against you.

Absolutely no connection to the 12 June anniversary of the Presidential election, with the possibility of opposition demonstrations, whatsoever.

Iran Document: Text of Iran-Brazil-Turkey Agreement on Uranium Enrichment

JOINT DECLARATION BY IRAN, TURKEY AND BRAZIL
(17 May 2010)

Having met in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, the undersigned have agreed on the following Declaration:

1. We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in accordance with the related articles of the NPT, recall the right of all State Parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

UPDATED Iran Urgent: The Deal on Uranium Enrichment

2. We express our strong conviction that we have the opportunity now to begin a forward looking process that will create a positive, constructive, non-confrontational atmosphere leading to an era of interaction and cooperation.


3. We believe that the nuclear fuel exchange is instrumental in initiating cooperation in different areas, especially with regard to peaceful nuclear cooperation including nuclear power plant and research reactors construction.

4. Based on this point the nuclear fuel exchange is a starting point to begin cooperation and a positive constructive move forward among nations. Such a move should lead to positive interaction and cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities replacing and avoiding all kinds of confrontation through refraining from measures, actions and rhetorical statements that would jeopardize Iran’s rights and obligations under the NPT.

5. Based on the above, in order to facilitate the nuclear cooperation mentioned above, the Islamic Republic of Iran agrees to deposit 1200 kg LEU in Turkey. While in Turkey this LEU will continue to be the property of Iran. Iran and the IAEA may station observers to monitor the safekeeping of the LEU in Turkey.

6. Iran will notify the IAEA in writing through official channels of its agreement with the above within seven days following the date of this declaration. Upon the positive response of the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France and the IAEA) further details of the exchange will be elaborated through a written agreement and proper arrangement between Iran and the Vienna Group that specifically committed themselves to deliver 120 kg of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).

7. When the Vienna Group declares its commitment to this provision, then both parties would commit themselves to the implemention of the agreement mentioned in item 6. Islamic Republic of Iran expressed its readiness to deposit its LEU (1200 kg) within one month. On the basis of the same agreement the Vienna Group should deliver 120 kg fuel required for TRR in no later than one year.

8. In case the provisions of this Declaration are not respected Turkey, upon the request of Iran, will return swiftly and unconditionally Iran’s LEU to Iran.

The Latest from Iran (16 May): Intimidation After the Executions

2115 GMT: Nuclear Twist (cont.). According to Reuters, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is saying Iran, Turkey, and Brazil have reached agreement on procedure for a uranium swap deal. Details will follow on Monday.

1930 GMT: Nuclear Twist. Reuters is following Turkish television in reporting that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who on Friday had cancelled his trip to Tehran, has reversed his decision and is now in Iran.

The move is a signal that the Iranian talks with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva have put a deal on the table which involves Turkish mediation. Could there also be a role for Turkey as a broker in a uranium swap outside Iran?

NEW Iran Blackout: Shutting Down the Movies
Iran: Last Words of Executed Alamhouli “For God’s Sake, Let Me Hear My Mother’s Voice” (Ghazi)
The Latest from Iran (15 May): Executions, Detentions and a Cancellation

1835 GMT: Intimidation (cont.). In a letter to Sadegh Larijani, the head of Iran's judiciary, 175 members of Parliament have called for immediate action against opposition figures as "heads of sedition”.


In the letter, read out by conservative MP Hassan Ghafouri Fard in the Majlis, the legislators called for “accelerating” the investigation of complaints against Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mahdi Karroubi.

The MPs also state that the “heads of the sedition” have no regard for the judicial system in Iran and have attacked Karroubi and Mousavi for their recent remarks against the sudden and unjust execution of five political activists on charges of terrorism.

1630 GMT: The Brazil Dimension (cont.). The Associated Press has a different take on the Lula-Ahmadinejad talks from other reports (see `1600 GMT). While there was no reference to any discussions on uranium enrichment, there was a defense of Iran's nuclear programme:

Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva met with Iranian leaders on Sunday, and called the relationship between the two countries “strategic.”

Speaking in defense of Iran’s right to “independently navigate its course” to seek development and improvement, Silva stressed that a peaceful nuclear research program was within Iran’s sovereign rights.

1600 GMT: The Brazil Dimension. Iranian state media's presentation of today's meetings between President Ahmadinejad and Brazi's Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has featured the two leaders' talk of economic co-operation but said nothing about the nuclear issue. mbitions, an initial joint statement from the two leaders was silent on the subject.A joint statement focused on an increase of two-way trade.

Lula also said Brazil will finance 1 billion Euros of food exports to Iran over the next five years to make trade between the two countries less dependent on foreign banks.

1540 GMT: Sentencing Human Rights Activists (In Absentia). Iran has sentenced award-winning women's rights activist Shadi Sadr and fellow activist Mahbubeh Abbas-Gholizadeh to jail and lashes over a protest in 2007.

The lawyer for the two women, Mohammad Mostafai, said Sadr was sentenced to six years in jail and 74 lashes for acting against national security and harming public order. Abbas-Gholizadeh received two-and-a-half years in jail and 30 lashes on similar charges.

(Read Sadr's article, "Getting to the Point on Detentions and Human Rights", her speech at the UN on abuse, justice, and human rights, or her acceptance of the 2009 Human Rights Defenders Tulip award.)

Both women, who are now abroad, were arrested with 30 other protestors at a rally in March 2007 outside a Revolutionary Court where four fellow feminists were on trial.

1325 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. More on the arrest of Mohsen Armin, spokesman and senior member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party....

Armin's daughter said security officers, with a search warrant and arrest warrant, took away her father and confiscated his laptop, some documents, and identification cards. Iranian authorities tried to arrest Armin justafter the election and after the Ashura demonstration (27 December), but he was away from home on both occasions.

1200 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Hashemi Rafsanjani, former President and current head of the Expediency Council, has condemned censorship and fabrication of facts, describing policies behind these actions as "futile."

Rafsanjani said that, in today’s world, “[We must] coordinate actions with human principles....We must create an open space and fall into step with the rest of the world.”

1110 GMT: Spin of the Week? A reader kindly alerts us to a reference in the Iranian media to the claimed strike in Kurdistan.

Tabnak insists that any news and pictures of empty streets in Kurdistan's cities were just foreign propaganda and claims that thousands of Kurds marched in support of the "Kurdish Leadership Conference".

1100 GMT: No Connection. Move Along. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast has denied any link between Iran's released of French graduate student Clotilde Reiss, arrested last July, and a French court's acquittal of Iranian businessman Majid Kakavand on charges that he exported US military technology to Iran: "The two cases have absolutely no relation with each other."

1010 GMT:  Political Prisoner Watch. Mohsen Armin, spokesman and senior member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party, has been arrested.

0930 GMT: In the Universities. Rah-e-Sabz carries a report claiming that professors are now being appointed for their willingness to support the Government line rather than for their academic qualifications.

0900 GMT: Conservatives Defend the System (Against Hardliners). The interesting conflict between "Green Movement v. Government" continues with two statements within the establishment warning of "hardliner" challenges.

Mohammad Nabi Habibi, head of the Motalefeh Party has said, "Our discord is like a red carpet for reformists." Majid Ansari of the Combatant Clergy Association argues that the cooperation of "moderate hardliners" and reformists is not a current outside acceptable Iranian politics.

0855 GMT: Beating the Oil Squeeze? Whatever the outcome of Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's visit to Tehran on the nuclear front, it looks like Iran can claim a success over oil.

The head of Brazil's energy regulator, Haroldo Lima, has said that Lula and Iranian leaders are likely to sign a memorandum opening the way for Brazilian companies to participate in the modernization of Iran's oil sector: "We have equipment, the engineering and the parts for the oil sector that can help in their modernization."

Lima said that, in exchange, Iran could provide Brazil with drills to help in the exploration of deep-water oil: "In Brazil we have a great shortage of companies that have the capacity to do this exploration. They are making drills available."

0845 GMT: Intimidation (cont.). The Resalat newspaper has continued the threat against Mousavi, fed by regime officials like Gholam-Hossein-Elham of the Guardian Council and Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Dowlatabadi: the leaders of "fitna" (sedition) need to feel the iron fist of the law.

0800 GMT: Challenge. Mohammad Hashemi, a member of the Expediency Council and brother of Hashemi Rafsanjani, has declared that if the people do not want it, the Iranian system cannot exist.

0740 GMT: Film Corner. As director Jafar Panahi continues to sit in Evin Prison, we've posted a feature on the latest warning by Iranian authorities to actors and filmmakers: don't cooperate with foreigners without permission.

0730 GMT: Economy Watch. Minister of Welfare and Social Security Sadegh Mahsouli has said that the subsidy reduction plan will start this week in three Iranian provinces.

0715 GMT: That Dangerous Foreign Education. Mohammad Shahryari, a member of Parliament's National Security Committee, has confirmed that the committee is reviewing the situation of 400 Iranian students at British universities.

The 400 are the children of Iranian officials. Karim Abedi, another committee member, had said on Friday, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informed Iranian ambassadors abroad to take the actions necessary to prevent the children of Iranian officials from studying at foreign universities."

Shahryari said, "Though no final decision has been made on the return of these children to the country so far, it deems advisable for these people not to study at British universities."

0710 GMT: Speaking of Intimidation.... Member of Parliament Moussa Ghorbani, speaking with Fars News, claims that Sadegh Larijani, the head of Iran's judiciary, has said authorities will pursue those who create “anxiety” in society through text messages.

Ghorbani, who met Larijani on Saturday, said he was told that the judiciary will track down “destructive” text messages which lead to the “anxiety of public opinion”.

0640 GMT: And the Future? Dowlatabadi also gave a lengthy statement about the supposed resolution of 217 post-election cases, and there was further news from his office. Amongst the decisions were the confirmation of six death sentences and the commutation of four to jail terms (see yesterday's updates).

Defenders of the Iranian regime will argue that this establishes the due process and fairness of the judicial system. Those who are more critical may see a carrot-and-stick approach. While giving way on some of the "mohareb" (warriors against God) sentenced to hang, in part because of the reaction to last week's executions and claims that they are linked to political intimidation before 12 June, Tehran is also showing its determination that some protestors will sit on Death Row and could on short notice face the noose.

0620 GMT: A week ago, we were just getting the news of the sudden early-morning executions of 5 Iranians --- Farzad Kamangar, Mehdi Eslamian, Ali Heydarian, Farhad Vakili, and Shirin Alamhouli --- at Evin Prison. Today we begin with the latest attempt to defend the executions, the statement of Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Dowlatabadi as reported by Press TV:

[Dowlatabadi] said that three of the five people were arrested in 2006 for carrying five kilograms of explosives, adding that other weapons including 57 rockets and 600 shells were later confiscated from the terrorists.

He revealed that the five began their terrorist activities shortly after the formation of the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) and bombed the governor's office and a state building in the western province of Kermanshah.

“Fortunately they were arrested before carrying out a planned bombing in Tehran.”

Dolatabadi said that the five had been indicted in 2007 and were tried and found guilty in 2008. “They appealed the verdict but the Supreme Court upheld their convictions.”

The prosecutor said that four of the five terrorists were PJAK members and had been directly involved in the terrorist attacks carried out by the group. He added that the four had been convicted of moharebe (waging war on God) and acting against national security.

According to Dolatabadi, the only woman among the four terrorists was arrested in 2008 for an attempted bombing in an IRGC base. “She was tried and found guilty in 2008 and her conviction was upheld in 2010.”

The last of the five was a member of the counterrevolutionary Tondar group and was convicted for complicity in a deadly bombing in the city of Shiraz in 2008, the prosecutor added.

None of Dowlatabadi's assertions above, or in a longer version of the interview in Fars News, are backed up by evidence, thus leaving open the queries that remain over the case (see Thursday's updates).

Just as interesting, however, as Press TV still refuses to name the five executed is the timing of Dowlatabadi's high-profile interview. If the Iranian regime is so secure that these executions were acceptable, in law or in public opinion, why is it continuing to plead the case several days later?