Israel: Netanyahu and Barak Limit the Gaza Inquiry

Palestine: Is the Third Intifada Possible?

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Continuing the resistance to the commission of inquiry mandated by the UN approval of the Goldstone Report on the Gaza War, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Saturday, "The Israel Defense Forces operates on the battlefield in the most ethical way. It is an army that investigates and examines itself in the most thorough way, more than any other army in the world." At the same time, he held the line against any immediate move: "I have still not formed a stance and have not made a decision on this matter, and there is no change."

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak was initially unhappy with Netanyahu's statement, wanting a declaration rejecting any enquiry. The Ministry of Defense said, "The minister reiterates that he opposes any committee that would investigate the officers and soldiers of the IDF. There is no other army in the world that investigates itself the way the IDF does."

On Sunday, both leaders agreed on a common ground. They will appoint a small task force rather than a committee of enquiry to make recommendations. The task force's suggesitons will not be legally binding. Netanyahu added, "IDF soldiers and officers will not be subjected to investigation," while Barak declared:

We sent the fighters on the mission, and they deserve our full support....Israel is prepared to fight against the legitimacy of the Goldstone report. In addition, Israel will act to amend rules of war to adjust them to the battle against terrorists who fight from among civilians.

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Despite Hamas' objections and warnings, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said Tuesday that he will set 24 January as the date for presidential and legislative elections. At the time, appearing with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Abbas claimed, "Fatah completely supported the Egyptian proposal [for Palestinian reconciliation]...but then Hamas put down obstacles."

Abbas, who has faced difficulties not only with Hamas but also with Palestinians in the West Bank and with Israel, has now used his two cards: The threat of a third intifada and the a re-submitted proposal endorsing the Goldstone Report on the Gaza War. Now, it is Hamas' turn, as it ponders whether to warn Washington that the tension may increase in Palestine or to enter the electoral process in the expectation that it can defeat Abbas.

The question is: can Abbas, looking for an exit strategy from the pressure on many fronts, really make the declaration of elections come true, especially in the wake of the recent failed initiative for renewed talks between Israel and Palestine? Or is he bluffing?

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Under the terms of the Goldstone Report on the Gaza War, now approved by the UN Human Rights Council, Israel and Hamas are required to conduct internal enquiries into the conduct of their military forces.

Fat chance.

On Tuesday, Israel's President Shimon Peres told CNN that the Goldstone Report "one-sided" and "unfair".





Peres' statement was mere prelude to the full Israeli resistance. In fact, for resistance, insert "counter-attack". On Tuesday, the Israeli Cabinet and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, promising a lengthy battle to "delegitimize" the findings of the United Nations commission, established a committee to deal with the prospect of "legal proceedings abroad against the state of Israel or its citizens."

Even Defense Minister Ehud Barak, seen as the moderate amongst senior Israeli ministers, refused to discuss the possibility of a Governmental investigation: "There is no need for a committee of inquiry. The Israeli military knows to examine itself better than anyone else."

Meanwhile Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman chose a diversionary strategy of undermining the Israel-Palestine peace process. He told his European Union counterpart Javier Solana:

The policy of subversion carried out by the Palestinian Authority against the State of Israel, which follows decisions at the Fatah conference in August in which there were calls for the resumption of the armed struggle, raises serious questions about the real aims of the Palestinians. The question now is whether the Palestinians want to establish a state, or to destroy the state of Israel.

Turkey's Ambitions and US Plans: Obama Draws the Line on Israel

Israel-Turkey Crisis: Obama Intervenes

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In January, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan walked out of a session at the Davos Summit after telling off Israeli President Shimon Peres over Israel's invasion of Gaza. That was the most striking picture of Turkey’s so-called “strategic depth strategy”, developed by Ahmet Davutoglu, a personal advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan before he was appointed Foreign Minister in May.

Turkey’s initiative to consolidate its "relative autonomy" was far more than an effort to appear pro-Palestinian in the eyes of Middle Eastern people. It came as the United States was suffering from the complications of military occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan and from the tensions of its political conflict with Iran. The emerging financial crisis was bringing new troubles for Western powers, especially Washington. This, to be blunt, was a Turkish effort, led by Erdogan, to establish its independence of action at a conjunction of international and regional events.

Ironically, Turkey’s interest in strengthening its authority in its region, even though it was propelled by American weakness, was not unwelcome to the US. The Obama Administration was grateful for Ankara’s initiatives in mediating talks between Damascus and Tel Aviv, for its bridging role between the West and Iran, and for the willingness to host Israeli and Palestinian leaders. While Turkey was establishing independence, it was not being "revisionist" to the point where it  threatened Washington's position. The US would have reason to worry if Turkey's approach shifted from a stimulus for the peace process to pressure that would limit and gradually erode Israel's position.

Still, there were always the problems of symbolism.

The walkout in Davos was the first and most sensational image of a putdown for Tel Aviv. Obama was able to calm the situation when he spoke in Ankara in April:

In the Middle East, we share the goal of a lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors. The United States and Turkey can help the Palestinians and Israelis make this journey. Like the United States, Turkey has been a friend and partner in Israel’s quest for security. And like the United States, you seek a future of opportunity and statehood for the Palestinians.

However, Davos was not forgotten by the Netanyahu Government. That is why apparently minor "cultural" incidents, such as the broadcast of a Turkish series portraying Israeli soldiers as evil creatures shooting innocent children, as well as the political snub of cancelled military exercises has elevated tensions dramatically. And it is why Obama has had to make another intervention, this time through a phone call to Turkish President Abdullah Gul.

So why would Turkey, having made its point at Davos, risk a conflict with the US through renewed public animosity vis-a-vis Israel?Foreign Minister Davutoglu offered the answer in an interview with CNN. Just as Gaza War propelled Turkey's strategy for "strategic depth" because of the political advantage it offered in talks with Middle Eastern countries, so the renewal of the Gaza issue --- this time over the Goldstone Report and the continued Israeli obstacles to political and economic development in the area --- presented another opportunity:

We hope that the situation in Gaza will be improved, that the situation will be back to the diplomatic track. And that will create a new atmosphere in Turkish-Israeli relations as well. But in the existing situation, of course, we are criticizing this approach, [the] Israeli approach.

However, Turkey's decision to risk causing the US a bit of discomfort can be explained by other issues: the dialogue with Armenia and the Kurdish problem. Washington, long plagued by the complications of the two situations for Turkey's place in the "West", wanted resolutions. As long as Ankara moved toward settlements --- which it did with the signing of the Armenian protocols last week, then the US would be satisfied with the big victory and could ignore the lesser challenge regarding Israel.

The Israeli reaction to the Turkish series, however, was too much for the US to ignore, especially given Netanyahu's public criticism. The tension between Washington's two democracies in the region was now jeopardising the US vision of the peace process. Israeli decisionmakers were using the “anti-Semitic” atmosphere, particularly after the endorsement of the Goldstone Report by the UN Human Rights Council, to justify a halt to talks, and Turkey's activities were offering support for that pretext.

And it appears that the Obama phone call is already having the desired effect. While there is still tension with rumors that Israeli ministers will not attend Turkish Ambassador's 29 October celebration of Turkish’s foundation in 1923, Tel Aviv's also announced that it will buy water from Turkey amidst reports that Israeli reserves will soon be exhausted. Israeli Army Radio is also reporting that Ankara is sending a new ambassador to Israel to improve the diplomatic atmosphere.

Up to now, Washington has been content with Turkey’s non-revisionist expansion of its regional position, even if this was propped up by symbolic snubs of Israel. Ankara crossed a line, however, and had to be told so by the US President: Turkey's postures stop when they threaten the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Presumably, with that Obama reminder, Turkey can return to the proper strategic path in the Middle East, even if there are periodic objections from Benjamin Netanyahu.

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On Friday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu criticized the endorsement by the United Nations Human Rights Council of the Goldstone Report, which claimed both Israel and Hamas had committed war crimes during the Gaza War in December-January. Netanyahu warned the Israeli nation to be prepared for a protracted struggle. Declaring "the delegitimization [of Israel] must be delegitimized", he added, "The UN has returned to the dark days during which it equated Zionism with racism."

Netanyahu's statement is in line with his Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman's leaked memorandum calling for a “zero-tolerance” policy for anti-Semitic expression around the world. But does the Prime Minister also back Lieberman's strategy of a move from “lone dependence” on Washington to the "neglected" parts of the world?

The was the only Security Council member that voted against the Goldstone resolution in the UNHRC. Yet Ha'aretz correspondent Aluf Benn believes the Obama Administration will use the diplomatic arena to get more Israeli concessions on the expansion of settlements:

Operation Cast Lead in Gaza was perceived in Israel as a shining victory. Rocket fire from Gaza was brought to a halt almost completely. The Israel Defense Forces emerged from its failure during the Second Lebanon War and deployed ground forces with few casualties. "The world" let the operation continue and did not impose a cease-fire. A wonderful war.

Ten months later, it seems the victory was a Pyrrhic one. Israel did not realize that the rules have changed with Barack Obama's election as U.S. president. Prime minister Ehud Olmert timed Cast Lead to take place during the twilight period between the outgoing and incoming U.S. administrations, and rightly assumed that the incumbent, George W. Bush, would fully back Israel. However, in contrast to the Lebanon war of 2006, which ended with a cease-fire, the Gaza campaign continues being fought - in the diplomatic arena and in public opinion - and Israel must cope with its consequences in a less-friendly Obama era.

During the first, military round, Israel benefited from the decisive superiority of its firepower. However the Palestinians moved the war's current round to an arena more comfortable for them, and are benefiting from their advantage in UN institutions and in public opinion. The calls to boycott Israel are getting louder. Turkey is shirking off its strategic alliance with Israel and is presenting IDF soldiers as horrible murderers of children. Hamas is gradually winning recognition as a legitimate player, as it continues to amass a stock of rockets without hindrance. Meanwhile Israel's leaders are busy defending the country against the United Nations' Goldstone report (that accuses Israel and Hamas of perpetrating war crimes), and some even have to worry now about being the object of arrest warrants in Europe.

Even if the legal process that Goldstone initiated ends up being halted, and Israel is not put in the dock in The Hague, its hands have been tied. The world, led by Obama, will not let it initiate a Cast Lead II operation. Certainly not when a right-wing government is in power in Jerusalem led by Benjamin Netanyahu, whom the world loves to hate. Netanyahu's clumsy attempt, in his Knesset speech this week, to link the war in Gaza to opposition leader Tzipi Livni did not really succeed. He is in power and the world considers him responsible. The Americans and the Europeans are using the Goldstone report to punish Netanyahu for his refusal to freeze the settlements.

The same thing happened to the Palestinians between the two intifadas. When they hurled stones during the first intifada (1987-1993) and the confrontation was in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, the world cheered them on and forced Israel to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization and to let its leader Yasser Arafat establish his autonomy in the territories. The Palestinian violence at that time was perceived as appropriate resistance to occupation. During the second intifada, the Palestinians resorted to suicide attacks in Israeli cities. They succeeded in killing many more Israelis, but they lost in the diplomatic arena, especially after the September 11 attacks in the United States, when the rules changed. The world was fed up with terror attacks and it allowed then-prime minister Ariel Sharon to reoccupy the West Bank, lock Arafat in a cage (his headquarters in Ramallah) and eventually unload Gaza without a peace arrangement.

Operation Cast Lead was the most planned operation in the annals of Israel's wars. Its organizers filled out all the forms and checked off on all the procedural changes that had been recommended by the Winograd Committee after its investigation of the shortcomings of the Second Lebanon War. The campaign's goals were reasonable. The scenarios were rehearsed. The reservists were trained. Jurists anticipated the legality of every target and operational plan. The soldiers were properly outfitted with food, water and protective equipment. The local authorities in the Israeli rear functioned as they should have. The media obeyed. In short, the government and the IDF prepared exceptionally well for a Third Lebanon War. They only forgot that the conditions on the Palestinian front are different than in Lebanon.

Not everybody shared the euphoria. The defense minister, Ehud Barak, wanted to halt Cast Lead after two or three days, but was overruled by Olmert who wanted to keep the campaign going, and then going further. Columnists and commentators warned of Gaza becoming a quagmire.

And most interesting: The Winograd Committee anticipated the lurking legal danger to Israel, and in its final report had warned of "far-reaching consequences" resulting from the widening gap between the rules of warfare and the reality of fighting terror launched from civilian surroundings. The committee recommended pulling the legal experts out of the operation rooms, increasing and highlighting investigation of irregular activities, and working with friendly countries to amend the rules of warfare, a recommendation that is easy to make but difficult to implement. The Winograd report did not warn against going into the next war before the rules of warfare are changed. The legal recommendations, drafted with restraint out of fear they would be used for anti-Israeli propaganda, were lost in the sea of piquant items in the report.

Upon returning to power, Netanyahu hoped to leave the Palestinian issue on the side and focus on the Iranian threat and on economic reforms. Now his government will have to cope with the consequences of Cast Lead and do so under less than ideal conditions, heavy international pressure and fear of arrest warrants and charge sheets.