You Make the Call: Leaked IAEA Report on Iran Nuclear Programme

The Latest from Iran (4 October): Waiting for Developments
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama’s Balance Wobbles

We were very critical this morning about The New York Times' exaggeration of extracts from an International Atomic Energy Agency report, assessed by the Institute for Science and International Security, on Iran's nuclear programme. Although the NYT article mentioned the ISIS study, posted Friday, it quoted only a few words, preferring to rely on the "interpretations" of Government officials.

This is the entire text of the ISIS study, with an analysis followed by extracts from the IAEA report:

Writing in the trade publication Nucleonics Week, Mark Hibbs describes a debate taking place within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the extent to which the Agency should publicize its findings regarding potential weaponization activities by Iran. This debate is also described in a September 17, 2009 article by Associated Press journalist George Jahn, which revealed excerpts from internal IAEA documents assessing the veracity of the allegations about Iran as well as the Agency‟s assessment on Iran‟s current capability to make nuclear weapons. This report contains further excerpts from what ISIS understands to be a working document and not necessarily a final report.

ISIS understands that IAEA experts, including one nuclear weapons specialist, prepared the document. Their objective was to summarize and assess the set of records from 2004 and earlier obtained by the IAEA about the possible military dimensions of Iran‟s nuclear program. The information analyzed included documents and data from electronic media procured inside Iran and obtained by the United States, information and documents from other member states about suspected nuclear weaponization activities inside Iran, and procurement data. This document also included the IAEA‟s expert assessments of the information. Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General for Safeguards, described some of this information in a technical briefing for member states in February 2008. The September 17 AP article contains extensive quotes about assessments by IAEA experts, possibly in consultation with nuclear weapon experts in member states. The information below is taken from one version of this IAEA assessment cited by the AP; it is a 67-page long report titled “Possible Military Dimensions of Iran‟s Nuclear Program.” ISIS is not certain of the date of this document but understands it was authored in the past 6 to 12 months.

Much of the IAEA‟s information, including test data, reports, diagrams, and videos, was reportedly contained on a laptop. This laptop has received considerable attention since its public revelation in 2005. ISIS now understands that the term “laptop” might refer to the method by which the United States shares sensitive data and not the form in which the data
were removed from Iran. ISIS has learned from intelligence officials with direct knowledge of the case that electronic media was smuggled out of Iran by the wife of an Iranian who was recruited by German intelligence. Iranian authorities had discovered his activities, and one of his last acts before arrest was the passing of the records to his wife. Intelligence officials told ISIS that they assume he is dead. His wife fled to Turkey and turned the electronic media over to U.S. authorities. Questions have arisen about the authenticity of these records, which are
inevitable given the sensitivity of this issue. For several years, ISIS has queried nuclear and other experts who have examined these data and documents. They have consistently told ISIS that the information appears authentic. One intelligence official who examined the information said that the electronic media contains extensive amounts of data obtained in
experiments, and noted that it would be extremely difficult to falsify such a large quantity of data.

It is also important to note that the IAEA has addressed this issue in its most recent safeguards report, stating that "the information contained in that documentation appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, appears to be generally consistent, and is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran with a view to removing the doubts which naturally arise, in light of all of the outstanding issues, about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran‟s nuclear programme."

In addition to the electronic media records, other member states have provided information relevant to this issue, which also forms the basis for the assessments contained in this internal IAEA document. Less controversy surrounds the authenticity of this information. ISIS
emphasizes that these excerpts appear to be from a working document that has been revised at least once. Its author is unknown. It is subject to revision both substantively and editorially.

Excerpts

The following texts are taken from the internal IAEA report; the headings are ISIS‟s own.

The Role of the Ministry of Defense in the Development of a Nuclear Payload for the Shahab 3 Missile

“The Agency has information, known as the Alleged Studies, that the Ministry of Defence of Iran has conducted and may still be conducting a comprehensive programme aimed at the development of a nuclear payload to be delivered using the Shahab 3 missile system.

The information, which originates from several Member States and the Agency's own investigations, points to a comprehensive project structure and hierarchy with clear responsibilities, timeline and deliverables. The information, which has been obtained from multiple sources, is detailed in content and appears to be generally consistent. The information refers to known Iranian persons and institutions under both the military and civil apparatuses, as well as to some degree to their confirmed procurement activities.”

Alleged Studies

“The Alleged Studies conducted by Iran refer, inter alia, to the development work performed to redesign the inner cone of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead. The Studies further describe the development and testing of high voltage detonator
firing equipment and multiple exploding bridge wire (EBW) detonators as well as an underground testing infrastructure and the probable testing of one full-scale hemispherical explosively driven shock system that could be applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device. Another aspect concerns the conversion of (UO2) to uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), also known as Green Salt.”

On Whether the Missile Re-entry Vehicle is Intended to be Nuclear

“From the documents presented by a number of Member States and the Agency‟s own activities, it is possible to assess that in early 2002 Iran formally declared the start of its warhead development programme, which very likely comprised at least two projects under the leadership and auspices of the Ministry of Defence – Project 111 and Project 110. Project 111 was to design the inner cone of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle and the production of an explosives operations control set (ECS). Project 110 was to produce the contents of the spherical warhead payload. The Agency assesses that the development work to design a suitable chamber
inside the re-entry vehicle is intended to accommodate a new warhead payload that is quite likely to be nuclear.”

Did Iran develop a high explosive implosion system small enough to fit inside the Shabah 3 missile re-entry vehicle?

“Information received from a Member State indicates a round, semi-round and semi-spherical shock generator system for which an EBW detonator is being developed. It is said that the shock generator was fired in field test conditions with one detonator using a firing cable. Without knowledge as to what exactly is being referred to under the term „shock generator
system,‟ the Agency assesses that it is highly likely to be some form of distributed explosive-filled channel system for initiating hemispherical high explosive charges.”

“The significance of the information is that Iran may have developed an effective high explosive implosion system, which could be contained within a payload container believed to be small enough to fit into the re-entry body chamber of the Shahab 3 missile.”

"In October 2005, the Agency was able to examine the 15-page uranium metal document amongst centrifuge-related material in Iran. Based on the information in the document, the Agency assesses that it is possible that Iran has knowledge regarding the contents of a nuclear package, including fissile components that would be inserted inside the high explosive
charge."

"The Agency suspects that this document belongs to a larger package that Iran may have obtained but which has not yet come to the Agency's attention. The Agency is concerned that Iran may have nuclear weapon design information which could be used in a specific nuclear package which would fit within the mass and volume constraints as seen in projects 110
and 111.”

Steady Progress on Nuclear Fuel Cycle

“The Agency assesses that Iran is steadily making progress in the development of its own indigenous nuclear programme. Iran has been reporting on a regular basis major achievements in mastering the various parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, which the Agency has been able to
verify.”

High Explosive Manufacturing Industry for Nuclear Weapons

“It is believed that Iran has developed exploding bridgewire detonators and associated electronic high voltage firing systems. The Agency assesses that Iran has managed to develop a high explosives industry capable of synthesizing and formulating the raw materials into explosive compositions and that could be used in a nuclear weapon. It is very likely that Iran
has the required engineering skills to machine explosives into the weapon components. It is assessed that Iran has succeeded in combining its detonator development work with other related studies to manufacture a relatively compact high explosives initiation system that has probably been tested with comprehensive diagnostic equipment.”

Sufficient Information to Design and Build a Crude Nuclear Weapon

“The Agency further assesses that Iran has sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device based upon HEU [highly-enriched uranium] as the fission fuel. The necessary information was most likely obtained from external sources and probably modified by Iran. The Agency believes that non-nuclear experiments conducted in Iran would give confidence that the implosion system would function correctly. The Agency
has evidence from which it is possible to assess that Iran has the ability to make a neutron initiator which may have been tested. Provided Iran has relevant detectors, it should be possible to diagnose whether any product made would function satisfactorily.”

On Finishing a Nuclear Warhead for the Shabab 3 Missile

“The Agency assesses that Iran has conducted studies relating to the aspects necessary to incorporate a device into a conventional delivery system such as the Shahab 3 missile. Further studies on payload integration are also accompanied by the electronic engineering studies to
produce an arming and fuzing system. From the evidence presented to the Agency it is possible to suggest that, for the Shahab 3 delivery system, Iran has conducted R&D into producing a prototype system. However, further work is necessary to manufacture a more robust unit capable of producing an airburst fuzing option that would function both safely and reliably.
Overall the Agency does not believe that Iran has yet achieved the means of integrating a nuclear payload into the Shahab 3 missile with any confidence that it would work. Nonetheless, with further effort it is likely that Iran will overcome problems and confidence will be built up.”

Iran's Nuclear Programme: Obama's Balance Wobbles

The Latest from Iran (3 October): Debating Mousavi’s Strategy
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Big Win for Tehran at Geneva Talks
Latest Iran Video: Nuclear Official Jalili on CNN (1 October)
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Remarks on Geneva Talks

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

It only took 24 hours for the Obama Administration, after the "substantial progress" of Thursday's Geneva talks on Iran's nuclear programme, to hit the choppy waters of Washington and Tehran politics.

On Friday morning, it was looking very good for the White House. Most of the US media were putting out the news of Iran's agreement to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect the Qom enrichment facility and to ship uranium to Russia to be enriched. They were adding the Administration's gloss that this was all made to a forceful American stance which had pushed the Iranians into concessions.

By Friday afternoon, the public-relations glue had come unstuck, as a State Department briefing turned into black comedy. (Watch the clip from the 8:44 mark.) The first wobble was over the "third-party enrichment" which had supposedly been established. Journalists challenged that Iranian officials were saying only that they had agreed to consider the proposal; the Department spokesman, unprepared for this information, could only warble about an "agreement in principle".

He came off even worse in the second exchange over Iran's invitation to inspect the Qom plant, after he said there was "no hard-and-fast deadline" for the inspections. Why then, journalists clamoured, had Barack Obama pointedly mentioned on Thursday night a "two-week deadline"? Caught between his opening line of flexibility and the inconvenience of the President's firm marker, the spokesman, umm, stammered.

This would all be good voyeuristic fun if it did not pont to the two larger problems for the Administration. The first is that the Iranian Government is not going to go gently into the diplomatic night playing its assigned role. Tehran, in our view, was already going to be conciliatory at the opening discussions in the hope of getting more discussions. It was not going to jump into any hard-and-fast deal.

The spin that the US Government "forced" Iran's concessions only adds to the dfficulty. Not wanting to appear to be forced into anything, Iranian officials "clarify" that firm measures have not been agreed but must be the subject of further talks, in this case, technical discussions in Vienna on 18 October and the next Iran meeting with the 5+1 powers, possibly at the end of this month.

The second and even greater challenge for the Obama Administration from within. There has always been a group of officials in the Executive who saw negotiations as a process that had to be endured before, with the Iranians inevitably breaking the talks and/or agreements, more pressure could be put on Tehran.

So, even as the "significantly positive" outcome of Geneva was being announced, they were tossing a bucket of red herrings to the media. There might be even more "secret" sites that Tehran had not declared. Iran still had enough uranium to make The Bomb. The Israelis were watching carefully. (Juan Cole points out how all these diversions made their way into Friday's New York Times.)

The loudest of these heckles was that, whatever happened at Geneva, The Iranians Weren't Really Serious. Yesterday morning The Wall Street Journal, which might as well declare that it is a propaganda sheet masquerading as news, declared in its opening paragraph, "Analysts cautioned that the Iranians merely may be seeking to defuse pressure for sanctions while continuing their nuclear program." (The two "analysts" were an Israeli reservist general and George W. Bush's "special envoy on nonproliferation issues".)

Lo and behold, this morning The New York Times headlines, "U.S. Wonders if Iran Is Playing for Time or Is Serious on Deal". Helene Cooper splashes about "administration officials" warning "the trick now for Mr. Obama...will be to avoid getting tripped up", which is actually only one "senior" official (Who is he/she? On the side of those pushing for a lasting agreement with the Iranians? On the side of those seeing no prospect of an agreement?) putting out the dampening comment, “That’s the big ‘if,’ isn’t it? Will they do it? No one wants to do a premature victory lap.”

Let's just put this basic comment out, already fearing that it will disappear in the media wash. The Iranian Government is playing this process "long". It is likely to allow an IAEA inspection of Qom, although even this will be subject to discussions on conditions, but other issues including third-party enrichment, will go into a set of committees. Any agreement will take months, rather than weeks, of contact.

From the start, the Obama Administration --- split between different factions --- have been locked into playing the process "short". A quick result had to be obtained, otherwise sanctions would have to be sought quickly. That is why all the fatuous talk of deadlines --- December? September? October? --- has loudly accompanied and even out-shouted the complexities of engagement.

The President has been unable to extricate himself from this unproductive dilemma. So once again, we will have a two-week cycle of domestic fury, even though the Administration has no stick to wield, before the technical talks in Vienna.

Iran's Nuclear Programme: Big Win for Tehran at Geneva Talks

LATEST Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama’s Balance Wobbles
Latest Iran Video: Nuclear Official Jalili on CNN (1 October)
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Remarks on Geneva Talks
The Latest from Iran (1 October): From Geneva to “Unity”?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

First Things First. We may have underestimated the significance of yesterday's discussions between Iran and the "5+1" power when we wrote (1640 GMT), "The Iranians have achieved their primary objective, which is to avoid an immediate condemnation and the threat of sanctions from a “breakdown” of today’s discussions."

The biggest signal of a breakthrough at the talks was not the declaration, from all sides, that Iran would invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to visit the second enrichment facility at Qom "in the next couple of weeks" (1715 GMT). That was always the likely Iranian concession to "the West": contrary to the exaggerations in the US and British media, Qom is not that significant a plant, serving at this point as potential back-up to the main enrichment site at Natanz. So Tehran can accept inspections, provided its sovereignty is also maintained in an agreement, with the assurance that there's nothing illegal to be seen at the second facility.

No, here was the white smoke of a larger deal: "the Western media continues to miss the announcement, enthusiastically proclaimed by Press TV, that officials from Iran and the “5+1″ powers will have technical talks on 18 October on 'third-party enrichment'" (1935 GMT). A couple of hours later, McClatchy News Service put out the news:

Iran agreed in principle at high-level talks here to ship most of its enriched uranium to Russia, where it would be refined for exclusively peaceful uses, in what Western diplomats called a significant, but interim measure, to ease concerns over its nuclear development.

Under the tentative deal reached here, Iran would ship what a U.S. official said was "most" of its approximately 3.300 pounds of low-enriched uranium to Russia where it would be further refined. French technicians would then fabricate it into fuel rods and return it to Tehran, to insert into a nuclear research reactor that is used to make isotopes for nuclear medicine.

This morning, The New York Times headlines, "Iran Agrees to Send Enriched Uranium to Russia", and The Washington Post also picks up on the development. Perhaps most importantly, President Obama slipped the news into his statement last night, "Taking the step of transferring its low-enriched uranium to a third country would be a step towards building confidence that Iran’s program is in fact peaceful."

Of course, this is far from a done deal. The head of Iran's delegation, Saeed Jalili, was cautious when he appeared on CNN last night, saying that the matter would not have to be discussed by the "experts" in the IAEA, rather than the 5+1 Powers. Press TV's website, in contrast to the network's excited declaration of the technical talks on 18 October, is now silent on the matter.

Yet make no mistake. At this point the outcome is a victory for the Ahmadinejad Government. A week ago, President Obama, flanked by the British and French leaders, was loudly declaring that the US would be punishing Iran economically if Tehran did not concede on the "secret nuclear plant". The White House scrambled last night to keep the stick on the table, with Obama putting out boilerplate warnings, Talk is not substitute for action. Pledges of cooperation must be fulfilled....Our patience is not unlimited." An official added the specific caution to The New York Times, "[This] would represent a major accomplishment for the West, reducing Iran’s ability to make a nuclear weapon quickly and buying more time for negotiations to bear fruit. If Iran has secret stockpiles of enriched uranium, however, the accomplishment would be hollow."

Now, however, that stick would have to be waved in the face of not one but two tracks of conversations. There are the technical talks, and there is the next meeting of the 5+1 powers with Iran, flagged up for the end of October. So, unless the US is prepared to pull the plug suddenly on both processes (or unless the Iranian Government is foolish enough to abandon the discussions), there is no pretext for further sanctions before the end of the year, even if Tehran draws out the talks with the IAEA over access to the second enrichment facility.

And even then, Washington's stick has been a limp one. Juan Cole enthuses this morning, "Barack Obama pwned Bush-Cheney in one day, and got more concessions from Iran in 7 1/2 hours than the former administration got in 8 years of saber-rattling," but the Obama Administration probably could have had the same result that it got yesterday had it kept its collective mouth shut last week. Instead, the President and his advisors raised the stakes with threats and then found, in the 72 hours leading up to Geneva, that they could not deliver if necessary: neither Russia nor China was on board, and the European Union as well as the IAEA signalled their preference for genuine discussions.

This alone would be excellent reward for Tehran, but President Ahmadinejad's victory --- and this will be the unnoticed side-effect of the discussions --- is even greater. For over the last week, the "Western" powers have given him the legitimacy for which he has struggled at home. Have no doubt: the President and his advisors will be proclaiming loudly that they have defended Iran's sovereignty, upheld the rights of other peoples with their insistence on discussion on wider political and economic issues, and forced the US, Britain, and France to back down. Last night Jalili was already denouncing the "media terrorism" which tried to humiliate Iran and refusing to acknowledge a question from an Israeli reporter.

In other words --- I doubt you can find many non-Iranian commentators who will note this, although The Guardian has noted somewhat clumsily, "An Islamic regime involved in rape...is more of an issue in Tehran than the nuclear one" --- the Geneva discussions were the second theatre for the Ahmadinejad Government. What it needed, even more than the disappearance of the sanctions threat and space for its nuclear programme, was the drama and spectacle of recognition to take back home.

The President and his advisors may have been playing to the Western galleries, but they recognise that the primary theatre is still at home. So now the question arises: can the regime use the nuclear talks to push aside the challenges to its authority or will other issues --- detentions, abuses, Constitutional manipulations --- now return to centre stage?

Latest Iran Video: Nuclear Official Jalili on CNN (1 October)

Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Remarks on Geneva Talks
The Latest from Iran (1 October): From Geneva to “Unity”?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Iran's Nuclear Programme: Obama Remarks on Geneva Talks

The Latest from Iran (1 October): From Geneva to “Unity”?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

OBAMA: Today in Geneva, the United States, along with our fellow permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, namely Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom, as well as Germany, held talks with the Islamic Republic of Iran. These meetings came after several months of intense diplomatic effort.

Upon taking office, I made it clear that the United States was prepared to join our P-5-plus-1 partners as a full participant in talks with Iran. I extended the offer of meaningful engagement to the Iranian government. I committed the United States to a comprehensive effort to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so that all nations have the right to peaceful nuclear power, provided that they live up to their international obligations.

And we have engaged in intensive bilateral and multilateral diplomacy with our P-5-plus-1 partners and with nations around the world to reinforce this point, including a historic U.N. Security Council resolution that was passed unanimously last week.

The result is clear. The P-5-plus-1 is united and we have an international community that has reaffirmed its commitment to nonproliferation and disarmament. That's why the Iranian government heard a clear and unified message from the international community in Geneva.

OBAMA: Iran must demonstrate through concrete steps that it will live up to its responsibilities with regard to its nuclear program.

In pursuit of that goal, today's meeting was a constructive beginning, but it must be followed with constructive action by the Iranian government.

First, Iran must demonstrate its commitment to transparency. Earlier this month we presented clear evidence that Iran has been building a covert nuclear facility in Qom. Since Iran has now agreed to cooperate fully and immediately with the International Atomic Energy Agency, it must grant unfettered access to IAEA inspectors within two weeks.

I've been in close touch with the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, who will be traveling to Tehran in the days ahead. He has my full support and the Iranian government must grant the IAEA full access to the site in Qom.

Second, Iran must take concrete steps to build confidence that its nuclear program will serve peaceful purposes, steps that meet Iran's obligations under multiple U.N. Security Council resolution. The IAEA proposal that was agreed to in principle today with regard to the Tehran research reactor is a confidence-building step that is consistent with that objective, provided that it transfers Iran's low- enriched uranium to a third country for fuel fabrication.

As I've said before, we support Iran's right to peaceful nuclear power. Taking the step of transferring its low-enriched uranium to a third country would be a step towards building confidence that Iran's program is in fact peaceful.

Going forward, we expect to see swift action. We're committed to serious and meaningful engagement, but we're not interested in talking for the sake of talking. If Iran does not take steps in the near future to live up to its obligations, then the United States will not continue to negotiate indefinitely, and we are prepared to move towards increased pressure.

If Iran takes concrete steps and lives up to its obligations, there is a path towards a better relationship with the United States, increased integration for Iran within the international community, and a better future for all Iranians.

So let me reiterate. This is a constructive beginning, but hard work lies ahead. We've entered a phase of intensive international negotiations. And talk is not substitute for action. Pledges of cooperation must be fulfilled.

We have made it clear that we will do our part to engage the Iranian government on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect, but our patience is not unlimited.

This is not about singling out Iran; this is not about creating double standards. This is about the global nonproliferation regime and Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy, just as all nations have it, but with that right comes responsibilities.

And the burden of meeting these responsibilities lies with the Iranian government, and they are now the ones that need to make that choice.

Thank you very much.