Iran: So Who Controls the Islamic Republic?

The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

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UPDATE 12 October 0845 GMT: EA's Mr Smith offers his reading of the Foreign Affairs analysis:

"I do not see what this adds to what we knew already. Besides making the silly mistake of identifying Mesbah Yazdi with Mohammad Yazdi, and stating that the former was head of Iran's judiciary (in reality his real influence and authority are, until proven otherwise, rather limited to "spiritual guidance" of Ahmadinejad), the rest are allegations that have been fed to him after having floated on the Web for months. The Taeb-Jalili-Khamenei trio was floated by Roger Cohen [of The New York Times] in one of his dispatches from Tehran.

The only tidbit that would be interesting, if verified, is the purge of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and the removal of pro-Mousavi Guardsmen before the elections. That would make sense, and it would be interesting to have real statistics on that.
--
Earlier this week Foreign Affairs published an article by Jerry Guo on "the rise of a new power elite" of "the Revolutionary Guard and its allies" in Iran. The article raised points which have been discussed by Enduring America readers for several weeks, considering politics, the military situation, and the battle for control of key sections of Iran's economy. In addition to Guo's attention to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, notice his inclusion of Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council, and the Supreme Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei, amongst the "coalition of power".

Letter from Tehran: Iran's New Hard-Liners

The headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are in a European-style palace, replete with Greek columns and a grand staircase, in the eastern suburbs of Tehran. From here, the IRGC orchestrated the crackdown that followed Iran's disputed presidential vote in June, beating protestors on the street and torturing those behind bars. More ominously, the IGRC and other extreme hard-liners have sidelined fellow conservatives in the Iranian government, carving out their own power base in a regime that is becoming increasingly insular, reactionary, and violent.

So far, much of the analysis of the emerging Iranian power struggle has focused on the clash between the country's conservatives and reformers, pitting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his patron, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, against Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, two thwarted presidential candidates, and Mohammad Khatami, a former president. (Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president and seasoned kingmaker has eased toward the reformists in the election's aftermath.)

The real struggle, however, is the conflict among the hard-liners themselves, many of whom operate behind the headlines in unseen corners of the state machinery. Although Iran's opposition movement has witnessed an unprecedented surge in public support, the election and its aftermath mark a radicalization of the system not seen since the early days of the Islamic revolution.

In the reformist era of Khatami, and to some extent during Ahmadinejad's first term, the country's conservative theocrats and technocrats -- such as Ali Larijani, the speaker of the parliament, and Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ejei, the ousted intelligence minister who criticized the state's use of forced confessions -- held much of the power over the executive and legislative branches. Although they were entrenched status quo forces, these pragmatists believed in the dual nature of the Islamic Republic's statehood -- a country with religious and political legitimacy.

But now such figures are losing their influence to a new breed of second-generation revolutionaries from Iran's security apparatus known as "the New Right." They are joined in the emerging power structure by ultraconservative clerics and organizations such as the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran. These neo-fundamentalists call for the "re-Islamization" of the theocracy, but their true agenda is to block further reform to the political system in terms of reconciling with both domestic opponents and the West.

This coalition includes Hassan Taeb, the commander of the Basij, the paramilitary branch of the IRGC; Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council and the country's chief nuclear negotiator; and Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader's second son, a man so feared that his name is not often uttered in public.

Hard-line figures such as the younger Khamenei and the IRGC leadership are granted religious legitimacy through the support of the most radical mullahs in the theocratic establishment: Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, the committee that certified the election tallies, and Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah Yazdi, a former head of the judiciary and Ahmadinejad's spiritual adviser. Yazdi is affiliated with an underground messianic sect called the Hojjatieh Society, which hopes to quicken the coming of the apocalypse. Democratic reforms, the Majlis (parliament), and elections are mere annoyances under this radical Islamic worldview.

It is not surprising, then, that Yazdi issued a fatwa shortly before June 12 that gave authorities tacit approval to fudge the vote. Indeed, the clerics seem to have gotten the intended result: after the election, a number of employees at Iran's Interior Ministry released an open letter stating that "the election supervisors, who had become happy and energetic for having obtained the religious fatwa to use any trick for changing the votes, began immediately to develop plans for it."

Yazdi's influence on Ahmadinejad became pronounced in the early days of the president's first term, when Ahmadinejad declared that the return of the apocalyptic 12th imam would come within two years. Now, his second term will likely be marked by even more radical behavior: in a meeting with Yazdi in June to discuss his domestic agenda, Ahmadinejad promised to Islamize the country's educational and cultural systems, declaring that Iranians had not yet witnessed "true Islam." Then, in August, amid calls to purge reformist professors, a presidential panel began investigating university humanities curricula deemed to be "un-Islamic." Several progressive students told me that they have been barred from returning to campus this semester, including a top law student at Tehran University. "I was going to continue the protests with my law degree in a more effective manner," he said. "But now I am just a simple pedestrian."

But ideology remains secondary in the struggle to maintain and consolidate control within the fractured regime. It is becoming increasingly clear that Ahmadinejad and his associated faction of neo-fundamentalists no longer aim to take on the mantle of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary ideals. As Khamenei's representative to the IRGC put it, "Some people are sticking to Imam Khomeini's ideas ... [but] the situation has changed." Accordingly, religion and revolutionary ideology have become convenient means to an end, but not the end themselves. Purges of un-Islamic faculty and students are meant to target the organizers of mass protests; the arrests and subsequent trials of political opponents, meanwhile, act to shield the financial interests of the IRGC and its hard-line partners.

Read rest of article...

Iran: Talks and Legitimacy - Takeyh and Marandi on CNN

The Latest from Iran (6 October): Loud Noises, Quiet Manoeuvres

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On Sunday, CNN's Christiane Amanpour followed up her interview with chief Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili with a discussion with Dr Seyed Mohammad Marandi of the University of Tehran and Dr Ray Takeyh, formerly of the US State Department and now with the Council on Foreign Relations.

There is little here in the way of new analysis on the nuclear talks: Marandi is now CNN's "go-to" academic for a view supporting the Iranian Government, and Takeyh will be generally supportive of an Obama strategy of engagement.

The key paragraph instead is on Iran's internal situation. Note how Marandi links Iran's sovereignty to the question of Ahmadinejad's legitimacy, citing two very suspect opinion polls to put his central point. Accept the President and life will be a lot easier:

Iran is quite stable, and unlike what one often hears in the western media, I don't think that the country is in any serious problem.

I think that it's important for the American government to recognize that and to deal with the reality on the ground in Iran. If you'll recall, Terror Free Tomorrow, they had a poll before the elections that showed that Mr. Ahmadinejad was well ahead. And then the more recent University of Maryland poll also showed that he won the elections, or he was far more popular than Mr. Mousavi.

This doesn't go down well in the United States, I know. But I think that the United States, in order to be able to move towards rapprochement, and to be able to deal with Iran, they have to finally come to understand that Iran is not going to go away and the Islamic Republic of Iran is not going to collapse. If they do come to that recognition and they do come to respect the country, then I think that rapprochement would become much more easy, and I think that the Iranians are quite willing to move in that direction.

AMANPOUR: The Iranian government has invited hundreds of journalists, as well as six ambassadors from the so-called Non-Aligned Movement. There are no western countries represented here. Nonetheless, the Iranian government is saying that this is a transparency visit designed to show the world what it claims to be its peaceful nuclear program.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR: That was early 2007, at another of Iran's nuclear facilities near the city of Esfahan. So, nearly three years later, will the Geneva talks between Iran and the U.S. lead to a new era of dialogue?

We turn to Mohammad Marandi, a professor at Tehran University, and to Ray Takeyh, a former adviser to the Obama administration on Iran.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

AMANPOUR: Mr. Marandi, if I could go to you first, what is the mood in Iran around these talks? What are people hoping for?

MOHAMMAD MARANDI, PROFESSOR, TEHRAN UNIVERSITY: Well, I think people are mostly hoping that the United States and its allies will change their attitude towards the country. The tone, of course, did change a bit after Obama came to power, but there hasn't been any substantial change in the eyes of the Iranian people with regards to policy towards the country. And this is an appropriate time for the United States to make that change if they're really serious about dialogue, meaningful dialogue with Iran.

AMANPOUR: OK. Stand by for one second.

And Mr. Takeyh, what does the United States expect to get out of this meeting?

RAY TAKEYH, FMR. ADVISER TO OBAMA ADMINISTRATION ON IRAN: More focus on Iran's nuclear program, particularly the second site that has been -- the clandestine site that was revealed this week, having access to it and having it safeguarded by international inspectors; having Iran essentially accept confidence-building measures in this overall nuclear program; getting some of Iran's accumulated low-enriched uranium out of the country for reprocessing; and establishing a mechanism whereby the dialogue between the two countries can be more systematic, as opposed to episodic that it's been in the past.

AMANPOUR: So, therefore, it should be good news after today, because there has at least, according to all sides, been a development on the inspectors, the IAEA inspectors going, they say.

TAKEYH: Right. That's going to be worked out. And to be fair, the inspectors were going to go in there. After Iran itself declared this facility to the IAEA, it did so with a purpose of actually inviting them to inspect the facilities. So, that might have been the easier part. Getting the overall Iranian nuclear program into some degree of regulation and restraint, that might be tougher.

AMANPOUR: Mr. Marandi, in Tehran, do you think and do you believe the government wants broader relations or a different relationship with the United States beyond just these specific talks?

MARANDI: Yes. I think that if the Iranians feel that the Americans are truly serious, then there is indeed a possibility for rapprochement.

Both countries have serious issues in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in Pakistan, that need to be resolved. And in some ways, they do have similar interests.

The problem is that the Iranians, in the past, on a number of occasions, did step forward for rapprochement, and the Americans gave a very negative response. For example, in the past, during the Clinton years, the Iranians allowed Conoco to come and develop oilfields in Iran, and then sanctions were imposed on Iran. And then, when Iran helped in Afghanistan, it was called a part of the access of evil.

So, this time around, I think the Iranians are going to wait to see what the Americans will be doing. They will probably not take the first step forward themselves.

AMANPOUR: Mr. Takeyh, in terms of what Mr. Marandi just raced, the issue of sanctions, what can the United States or should the United States do, or the international community, in terms of how to go forward? Incentives, would there be? And if they impose sanctions, if they chose to, do you think that would make any bit of difference?

TAKEYH: Well, I think for the next couple of months, everyone is going to wait to see how these negotiations evolve, and if you're going to make some sort of a progress, I think, by January. At that time, I think there are going to be serious discussions about a multilateral sanctions regime that may encompass China and Russia, particularly because at that time, you'd be making an assessment about how these talks work, whether Iran is genuine about coming to terms with the international community, with using these talks to stall and delay. That's when the sanctions issue is going to be revisited.

AMANPOUR: But Iran has said clearly that it hasn't worked in the past, it doesn't bow to those kinds of threats.

Another thing that the president of Iran has said -- he was quoted before these talks -- is that it was a way for them to gauge whether they would be treated with respect at these talks, whether there would be a different atmosphere in terms of interpersonal atmosphere across the table as a way forward.

Do you think that the atmospherics were also important today?

TAKEYH: Atmospherics is always important when you're talking about Iran, because as a country, (INAUDIBLE) international respectability, even though its conduct doesn't always merit it. But these particular sessions seem to have been conducted in a civil, respectful tone by both parties.

There was a sidebar discussion between an American representative and an Iranian representative. I don't know what transpired there, but, essentially, there seemed to have been a better atmosphere than perhaps in the previous talks, and certainly in reference to the rhetoric coming out of both capitals during the past week.

AMANPOUR: Mr. Marandi, given the political dilemma in Iran today and the continued protests, the continued issues there, what is actually going on in terms of various different factions in Iran today?

MARANDI: Well, one interesting thing is that, with regards to the nuclear program, MPs from all the different factions and political parties in parliament, both the different reformists, as well as the different principalists or conservative factions, they all signed a joint statement supporting Iran's position in the negotiations, which is quite significant. But I think it's also important to note that Iran is quite stable, and unlike what one often hears in the western media, I don't think that the country is in any serious problem.

I think that it's important for the American government to recognize that and to deal with the reality on the ground in Iran. If you'll recall, Terror Free Tomorrow, they had a poll before the elections that showed that Mr. Ahmadinejad was well ahead. And then the more recent University of Maryland poll also showed that he won the elections, or he was far more popular than Mr. Mousavi.

This doesn't go down well in the United States, I know. But I think that the United States, in order to be able to move towards rapprochement, and to be able to deal with Iran, they have to finally come to understand that Iran is not going to go away and the Islamic Republic of Iran is not going to collapse. If they do come to that recognition and they do come to respect the country, then I think that rapprochement would become much more easy, and I think that the Iranians are quite willing to move in that direction.

AMANPOUR: Well, let me put that to Mr. Takeyh.

You were in the State Department, you were on the sort of Iran file. You're no longer there.

What is the possibility of rapprochement beyond just this issue?

TAKEYH: Well, it reflects Iran's conduct on a broad ranges of issues -- its entanglements in terrorism, and obviously the nuclear file being probably the most important issue. But it's contingent on Iran's behavior...

(CROSSTALK)

AMANPOUR: When President Obama came in, he came in with a different language towards Iran.

TAKEYH: That's right.

AMANPOUR: Does that still hold? Does he still want to have reset relations?

TAKEYH: I think so. I think that throughout the discussions that have taken place during the past week regarding some of Iran's conduct, the president and others have always insisted that the diplomatic path is still open and Iran has a possibility of walking through the door if it chooses to. But the door is not going to stay open forever.

AMANPOUR: Does the United States agree with several proposals such as that Iran does not ever react well under threat, that Iran wants to be treated as the power of the region, which it is, by all accounts, a major power in the region?

TAKEYH: I think there's a recognition that Iran is a major power in the region and can exercise its influence. But it's important for that influence to be exercised in a constructive manner.

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The Latest from Iran (2 October): Back to the Homefront

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2100 GMT: Just Back Away Slowly. Now this from the Iranian Government:

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran spokesman Ali Shirzadian said on Saturday that International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei’s two-day trip to Iran had previously been planned and is not linked to last Thursday’s talks between Iran and the 5+1 group.

2000 GMT: Rumour of the Day. No, it's not the one about Ahmadinejad being part-Jewish: the Daily Telegraph's "astonishing secret" is eight months old. Mehdi Khazali, the son of the late Ayatollah Khazali, posted the allegation eight months ago.

No, the more important loud whisper is that Major-General Hassan Firouzabadi, the head of Iran's armed forces, is being removed from his post. We held off reporting this, as there was no supporting evidence, but now his office has felt the story was serious enough to issue a denial.

1945 GMT: Mehdi Mirdamadi, the son of Mohsen Mirdamadi, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, has been released after 17 days in detention.

1635 GMT: Amidst all the confusion over the claimed drafts of National Unity Plans (see 1040 GMT), Pedestrian offers a thoughtful and pointed analysis. There are two drafts, one which would have be inclusive of opposition figures such as Mousavi and Karroubi and one put about by hard-liners who want to steal the limelight and quash an inclusive arrangement:

Now, the other side doesn’t want to be left behind and is trying to release a plan of their own. They don’t want the Mousavi camp to be the group to come up with “the” national unity plan. Which is just funny, since Mousavi and Rafsanjani after him were the ones who have been talking about a plan for months. RajaNews and FarsNews sound like a kid who suddenly decides to steal his classmate’s homework.

Sure, they could have waited for Mousavi’s and ignored it, but they know that it will be read by a whole lot of people, “national unity” is of utmost importance right now, and as much as they can yell and holler that nothing has happened, they know the cords it will strike and they want theirs to be front page news.

1616 GMT: Spinning Out the Game. First, it was the denial by Saeed Jalili's spokesman that Iran had agreed to "third-party enrichment". Now a member of the Iranian delegation from the Geneva talks says not only that no agreement was made on delivery of uranium to a country such as Russia but also that there was no deal on inspection of the second enrichment plant near Qom in the next two weeks: "In the Thursday talks, Iran elaborated on its package of proposals and how to implement them… and it was agreed that negotiations should continue on Iran’s package of proposals and the common points in this package and the package drawn up by the other side, and there was no other agreement.”

1610 GMT: International Atomic Energy Agency Mohammad El Baradei has arrived in Tehran to discuss arrangements for the inspection of Iran's second uranium enrichment facility.

1435 GMT: MediaCheck (EA v. CNN, Round 78) . Enduring America ($0/story), 2 October, 0700 GMT: "Big Win for Tehran at Geneva Talks".

CNN ($199/story), 3 October, 1320 GMT: "Iran is Winner in Nuclear Talks, At Least for Now"

1420 GMT: The reformist leader Saeed Hajjarian, detained for 100 days until he was bailed this week, has told the youth section of the Islamic Iran Participation Front of his stay in prison. He was totally cut off from the outside world and was unaware of events. He was held in solitary confinement in Evin Prison for a month and, after his transfer to another location, was only in contact with interrogators.

Hajjarian claimed that interrogators told him of many people killed in fighting and a big gap has been created between the authorities and the Iranian people, all due to his theories of reform. He added that he could hear people chanting “God is Great” outside Evin Prison, boosting his spirits.

1410 GMT: All 15 members of the Daftar-Tahkim-Vahdat (Unity Consolidation Bureau) reformist student group who were arrested on Friday morning have been released. One of the members told Deutsche Welle that these blind arrests are signs that the authorities are confused on how to deal with the protests.

1400 GMT: Press TV is now headlining the denial of the spokesman for Iran's National Security Council that Tehran "reached a deal with world powers to ship its enriched uranium abroad for further processing". The Secretary of the NSC, Saeed Jalili, is Iran's lead negotiator on the nuclear issue.

1200 GMT: Sir, It Was Not Me. Saeed Jalili, Iran's lead negotiator at the Geneva talks, has denied the widespread report that he and his US counterpart, William Burns, had a 30-minute 1-on-1 discussion during lunch. They "might have exchanged a few words during the lunch break with other delegations present". (See also our separate analysis.)

1050 GMT: Reports that some of the 15 or more student activists of Daftar-Takhim-Vadat, detained yesterday, have been released.

1040 GMT: The Plan (and A Breakthrough)? After 48 hours of quiet, some movement on the purported National Unity Plan.

Parleman News reports that the "Iran Conciliation Plan" is close to a final draft. Provisions include a release of post-election detainees, a change in the "attitude" of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, allowing both sides 2 voice their views, and an end to the "security atmosphere".

Mediators for the plan are named as Hassan Khomeini (Imam Khomeini's grandson), Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli, and a few other prominent senior clerics.

Mediators have approached Mir Hossein Mousavi in the past weeks. He has indicated that he approves the grand design and is discussing minor changes. And here's the big shift: for the first time since drafts of a plan surfaced, it is reported that Mehdi Karroubi is also being asked to approve the initiative.

"Informed sources" have said that prisoner release and a change in Government could occur within days, as well as the arrest and prosecution of some "rogue" officials and demotion of others.

Now for a caution: this is the second "draft" to have appeared; the first, published in Fars News, provoked much comment and criticism that it was not the "real" plan. So, while this latest news is imporant, we await other signs that this indeed is the working scheme for reconciliation.

0805 GMT: Wow. The editorial staff at The New York Times must have been taking multi-strength vitamins (or getting words in their ears from those in the Obama Administration who aren't thrilled about the talks with Iran):

This is no time for complacency or wishful thinking. The United States and its partners must push Iran to open all of its declared nuclear facilities and allow inspectors to interview any Iranian scientist they choose to — the only way to figure out what else Iran may be hiding. The leading powers must also be ready to impose tough sanctions if Iran resists or if negotiations go nowhere.

0750 GMT: Chief Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili has repeated: "Within the framework of the IAEA and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the nuclear watchdog will be allowed to inspect the [second] nuclear site as it has been the case with the Natanz nuclear facility."

0730 GMT: Leading Principlist MP Hamid-Reza Katouzian has raised questions about the Parliamentary commission that is supposedly investigating post-election abuses. He notes that its composition is not "diverse", "its legal status is unclear", and it has not yet met.

0725 GMT: The commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, has launched a pre-emptive strike against any plan for national unity, arguing that it is unnecessary given the legitimacy of the Presidential election and the strength of the Iranian system.

0700 GMT: Gary Sick, whose analysis on US-Iranian relations is always to be valued, yesterday put the "surprisingly productive" tag on the Geneva talks on Iran's nuclear programme. Juan Cole also held this view, adding, "Obama pwns Bush-Cheney on Iran", and this was soon picked up by other commentators such as Andrew Sulivan.

I share the hope that this is a breakthrough but, at the same, my concern (and that of EA colleagues) was that Geneva was being overplayed as a US victory "wringing concessions" out of the Iranians. The portrayal also obscured, even ignored, the tensions that continue within the Obama Administration.

So this morning "significant progress" has turned into "significant doubts" with the Obama Administration falling into confusion and squabbles over whether to welcome the engagement with Iran or to wag a finger of warning. We've got a separate analysis, "Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama’s Balance Wobbles".

0555 GMT: We're back after taking Friday night off to recharge.

Many thanks to our readers for a discussion which I think offers some of the best analysis of the internal politics, possibilities, and challenges. Where else on the Internet can you find a thorough discussion of Tehran Mayor Qalibaf, who may become a key figure in a plan for political resolution?

One of the questions which continues to occupy us is the strategy of Mir Hossein Mousavi. I have been sceptical of Mousavi's move "into the tent", setting aside a front of political opposition for a social network and apparent negotiation within the system, through a role on a committee for 2national unity. (My concern is not as much about Mousavi's decision as it is about the exclusion of Mehdi Karroubi from the process.) Our readers, however, have been considering the idea that Mousavi is fulfilling the long-term approach of the Green Wave; recognising that head-on confrontation will only lead to the crushing of the movement, he is seeking reform through some co-operation with the establishment's inquiries and re-evaluations. Still others don't trust Mousavi at all because of his past record, particularly as Prime Minister in the 1980s.

Very little movement on the internal front so far this morning, however, from Mousavi or anyone else.

Iran's Nuclear Programme: Big Win for Tehran at Geneva Talks

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First Things First. We may have underestimated the significance of yesterday's discussions between Iran and the "5+1" power when we wrote (1640 GMT), "The Iranians have achieved their primary objective, which is to avoid an immediate condemnation and the threat of sanctions from a “breakdown” of today’s discussions."

The biggest signal of a breakthrough at the talks was not the declaration, from all sides, that Iran would invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to visit the second enrichment facility at Qom "in the next couple of weeks" (1715 GMT). That was always the likely Iranian concession to "the West": contrary to the exaggerations in the US and British media, Qom is not that significant a plant, serving at this point as potential back-up to the main enrichment site at Natanz. So Tehran can accept inspections, provided its sovereignty is also maintained in an agreement, with the assurance that there's nothing illegal to be seen at the second facility.

No, here was the white smoke of a larger deal: "the Western media continues to miss the announcement, enthusiastically proclaimed by Press TV, that officials from Iran and the “5+1″ powers will have technical talks on 18 October on 'third-party enrichment'" (1935 GMT). A couple of hours later, McClatchy News Service put out the news:

Iran agreed in principle at high-level talks here to ship most of its enriched uranium to Russia, where it would be refined for exclusively peaceful uses, in what Western diplomats called a significant, but interim measure, to ease concerns over its nuclear development.

Under the tentative deal reached here, Iran would ship what a U.S. official said was "most" of its approximately 3.300 pounds of low-enriched uranium to Russia where it would be further refined. French technicians would then fabricate it into fuel rods and return it to Tehran, to insert into a nuclear research reactor that is used to make isotopes for nuclear medicine.

This morning, The New York Times headlines, "Iran Agrees to Send Enriched Uranium to Russia", and The Washington Post also picks up on the development. Perhaps most importantly, President Obama slipped the news into his statement last night, "Taking the step of transferring its low-enriched uranium to a third country would be a step towards building confidence that Iran’s program is in fact peaceful."

Of course, this is far from a done deal. The head of Iran's delegation, Saeed Jalili, was cautious when he appeared on CNN last night, saying that the matter would not have to be discussed by the "experts" in the IAEA, rather than the 5+1 Powers. Press TV's website, in contrast to the network's excited declaration of the technical talks on 18 October, is now silent on the matter.

Yet make no mistake. At this point the outcome is a victory for the Ahmadinejad Government. A week ago, President Obama, flanked by the British and French leaders, was loudly declaring that the US would be punishing Iran economically if Tehran did not concede on the "secret nuclear plant". The White House scrambled last night to keep the stick on the table, with Obama putting out boilerplate warnings, Talk is not substitute for action. Pledges of cooperation must be fulfilled....Our patience is not unlimited." An official added the specific caution to The New York Times, "[This] would represent a major accomplishment for the West, reducing Iran’s ability to make a nuclear weapon quickly and buying more time for negotiations to bear fruit. If Iran has secret stockpiles of enriched uranium, however, the accomplishment would be hollow."

Now, however, that stick would have to be waved in the face of not one but two tracks of conversations. There are the technical talks, and there is the next meeting of the 5+1 powers with Iran, flagged up for the end of October. So, unless the US is prepared to pull the plug suddenly on both processes (or unless the Iranian Government is foolish enough to abandon the discussions), there is no pretext for further sanctions before the end of the year, even if Tehran draws out the talks with the IAEA over access to the second enrichment facility.

And even then, Washington's stick has been a limp one. Juan Cole enthuses this morning, "Barack Obama pwned Bush-Cheney in one day, and got more concessions from Iran in 7 1/2 hours than the former administration got in 8 years of saber-rattling," but the Obama Administration probably could have had the same result that it got yesterday had it kept its collective mouth shut last week. Instead, the President and his advisors raised the stakes with threats and then found, in the 72 hours leading up to Geneva, that they could not deliver if necessary: neither Russia nor China was on board, and the European Union as well as the IAEA signalled their preference for genuine discussions.

This alone would be excellent reward for Tehran, but President Ahmadinejad's victory --- and this will be the unnoticed side-effect of the discussions --- is even greater. For over the last week, the "Western" powers have given him the legitimacy for which he has struggled at home. Have no doubt: the President and his advisors will be proclaiming loudly that they have defended Iran's sovereignty, upheld the rights of other peoples with their insistence on discussion on wider political and economic issues, and forced the US, Britain, and France to back down. Last night Jalili was already denouncing the "media terrorism" which tried to humiliate Iran and refusing to acknowledge a question from an Israeli reporter.

In other words --- I doubt you can find many non-Iranian commentators who will note this, although The Guardian has noted somewhat clumsily, "An Islamic regime involved in rape...is more of an issue in Tehran than the nuclear one" --- the Geneva discussions were the second theatre for the Ahmadinejad Government. What it needed, even more than the disappearance of the sanctions threat and space for its nuclear programme, was the drama and spectacle of recognition to take back home.

The President and his advisors may have been playing to the Western galleries, but they recognise that the primary theatre is still at home. So now the question arises: can the regime use the nuclear talks to push aside the challenges to its authority or will other issues --- detentions, abuses, Constitutional manipulations --- now return to centre stage?

Latest Iran Video: Nuclear Official Jalili on CNN (1 October)

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