The Latest from Iran (16 October): Rumours and Drama, Khamenei and Karroubi

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1945 GMT: The English-language website of Mowj-e-Sabz has a short summary of the Mousavi-Khatami meeting (1500 GMT).

1830 GMT: After a four-day absence, fueling speculation of a connection to the ill health of the Supreme Leader (0645 GMT), the newspaper Kayhan has reappeared today.

1515 GMT: The Battle Goes On. Yesterday Karroubi made clear his intention to stand firm against Government threats of arrests. So today the Government reiterated the warnings. The deputy head of Iran's judiciary, Ebrahim Raeesi, has repeated to the Islamic Republic News Agency that the consideration of charges is "very serious".

1500 GMT: Mousavi and Khatami Meet. Parleman News summarises a discussion between Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami, who asserted that the Iranian nation will not be diverted from its course by "force and pressure". The post-election movement had awakened Iran to the blessings of Islamic Revolution, especially its path toward justice, freedom, independence, and honour, and it would not deviate from its attachment to those ideals."

1345 GMT: Nice response to today's Friday Prayers on Twitter: "Hey Jannati, thanks for the free publicity! You told WAY more ppl about 13 Aban [4 November demonstrations] than the Greens could!"

1255 GMT: HomyLafayette has posted a summary of Ayatollah Jannati's Friday Prayers (see 1015 GMT):

"Jannati warned Greens against trying to exploit anniversary of the US Embassy takeover, 4 November [13 Aban]. He said that their schemes...will be neutralized. Some people who are tools of others want to show their American and Israeli natures on 4 November. If judiciary and security apparatus treat protesters with leniency, they are traitors to Islam and the Revolution."

1235 GMT: In the Midst of Uncertainty, Comedy. Fars News' fumbling attempt to turn the Khamenei health rumours into high evidence of the foreign-directed velvet revolution is book-ended by Michael Ledeen's latest entry onto the stage.

Ledeen's feigned modesty, "I have been given more credit than is absolutely necessary," is belied by his failure to acknowledge the true source of the rumour --- the Peiknet report of doctors at Khamenei's house --- and his surprise at the supposed outcome of his words, "It follows that I effectively shut down the Tehran Bazaar!"

What is most entertaining, however, if contributing nothing at all to knowledge are more Ledeen claims into the air --- "Not only was the Bazaar closed, but there seems to be a run on staples, as people stock up against the possibility of unsettled times" --- and this far-fetched explanation (from "Iranian friends") of the most prominent denial of the rumours so far: "The people at Tabnak believed I had it right, and they put it up in order to say “hey look at this! The Americans know our most secret secrets.”

1055 GMT: Khamenei's Health Rumours? Blame the Velvet Revolution. OK, we've got a long, convoluted denial of the health scare story, courtesy of Fars News. According to their "analyst", this is all part of the post-election scheme, similar to undermine the regime (the Government's bogeyman, financier George Soros, even makes an appearance). And the author is pointed in drawing a comparison with the rumours in 2007 of Khamenei's demise.

1015 GMT: Friday Prayer Update. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, using the analogy of Imam Sadegh, the 6th Imam, has declared that the issues of security in the Islamic Republic are due to "a lack of respect".

0900 GMT: Bad news for John Hannah, the former advisor to Dick Cheney who is trying to "help" Iran's people by crippling the economy (0845 GMT). China just made it clearer than clear that sanctions are not on the agenda. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, at a Thursday press conference his guest, Iran's First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, declared, "The Sino-Iranian relationship has witnessed rapid development, as the two countries' leaders have had frequent exchanges, and cooperation in trade and energy has widened and deepened."

0845 GMT: We've posted two special analyses this morning: our newest correspondent, Mohammad Khiabani, introduces readers to the issues in the Iranian economy, while Maryam from Keeping the Change takes on the former Bush Administration official who is advocating harsh economic sanctions "on behalf of Iran's people".

0645 GMT: At one point yesterday, caught up in the rumours of the Supreme Leader's illness or death, I was inappropriately reminded of a classic sketch from the US show Saturday Night Live, in which newscaster Chevy Chase would sombrely inform the audience, "Spain's Generalissimo Francisco Franco is still dead." (Trust me, I'm looking for the video clip.)

Well, Franco is still dead and Ayatollah Khamenei is still not dead, as far as we know. There are indications that something is amiss in Iran: the "hard-line" daily Kayhan has not published since Monday, the English-language Tehran Times has been silent since Tuesday. The Supreme Leader's official sites, leader.ir and khamenei.ir, have not denied the rumours. Leader.ir has been quiet for a week and khamenei.ir refers the reader to the one Iranian newspaper responding to the rumours: Tabnak denounces the US activist Michael Ledeen (who, just as a reminder, was not the original source for the current round of Khamenei rumours; that honour goes to Peiknet, a website associated with "left" Iranian exiles).

The one counter-indication is a note on the Facebook site run by Khamenei supporters, which claims the Supreme Leader was present Wednesday at the rites for Imam Sadegh. If that was true, however, one would expect to have seen the news elsewhere in the Iranian press. So here's our own position: we're on watch, but making no conclusions. If there is no official denial by the end of today, then we will begin thinking that there may be substance to the original Peiknet report.This is not that Khamenei has died, but that he is too ill to be in public.

Part of our caution on the Supreme Leader story is because it is obscuring political developments which are both 100% confirmed and 100% significant. The headline event yesterday was Mehdi Karroubi's defiant response to the Government threats to arrest him. He not only refused to withdraw his allegations of the system's abuses; he promised a doubling and re-doubling of evidence if he was charged.

The initial read is easy: Karroubi will not lie down. Just as in August, when he was threatened with court action, just as in September, when he was told by Ali Larijani to be quiet, the cleric has responded by making himself visible and heard. And this is being achieved despite the Government's 24/7 surveillance on Karroubi and his house.

The more difficult read is whether this marks another surge in the opposition movement. That, as we noted earlier this week, cannot rest on Karroubi alone. Hashemi Rafsanjani appears to be in a phase of fighting for his personal position, but Mir Hossein Mousavi joined Karroubi's most recent push, the meeting of last Saturday. Will he make an appearance this weekend, despite his own difficulties in moving (and even talking) under the regime's gaze? And what does the Green Wave take from yesterday's remarks of the man who some are calling "Obi-Wan Karroubi" (Yes, really.)?

The demonstrations of 13 Aban (4 November) are 19 days away.

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1915 GMT: The Internet is buzzing over the story that Narges Kalhor, the daughter of President Ahmadinejad's advisor for cultural and media affairs, has applied for asylum in Germany. Kalhor made the application after showing her film The Rake at the International Human Rights Film Festival in Nuremberg. The movie condemns the use of torture in Iranian prisons and the totalitarianism of Iran's authorities.

The filmmaker Hana Makhmalbaf has conducted a video interview with Kalhor.

1810 GMT: Everyone's piling in to mention the Iranian Government's threat to prosecute Mehdi Karroubi for "lies" about the abuse of detainees. Iran's Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie has added to the earlier warnings from his Tehran counterpart, Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi: "They [Clerical Court] have been tasked with hearing cases raised against the clergy and [you can] be sure that they will deal with this issue."

1700 GMT: We've posted a set of videos from today's protests by students at Tehran Azad University.

1625 GMT: Yes, A Rafsanjani Signal. EA's Mr Smith checks in to tell us that the interview with Hossein Mar'ashi of the Kargozaran party is even more significant than we thought (1000 GMT):

Mar'ashi is a close relative of Rafsanjani and served as his point man in the Khatami administration (1997-2005). The full text of the interview was published on the youth wing website of Kargozaran, and they explained that the interview had been previously published in censored form by the Etemaad daily due to "heavy pressures". One can surmise that it was Rafsanjani that gave the green light to the publication of the full text to send the message that he is aware of what's going on in the country.

The most significant snippet of the interview is the part in which Mar'ashi states that the regime wishes to have Hashemi "fall on his knees" and they want to make a "Jannati out of him", alluding to the puppet-like stance of the head of the Guardian Council [Ayatollah Jannati] vis-a-vis Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader. He also claimed that "senior leaders" of the IRGC want to arrest the reformist leaders.

1615 GMT: Fereshteh Ghazi has posted another set of information about the latest condition of detainees.

1600 GMT: Back from an afternoon of teaching with some most interesting inside information. An EA source with excellent links inside Iran tells us of President Ahmadinejad's trip to Shiraz yesterday.

The vast majority of students who turned out protested against the visit, in which Ahmadinejad reportedly arrived late and left early.

At the same time, Ayatollah Dastgheib, a vocal critic of the Government, gave an important speech to a small audience. The speech has not yet been published but, according to the source's information, Dastgheib went even further in his questioning of the legitimacy of Ahmadinejad's authority and also challenged the position of the Supreme Leader.

1145 GMT: No Worries About Corruption/Mismanagement Allegations? Really? This is the current lead story on the Islamic Republic News Agency website: "Not even one rial [Iranian currency] of oil revenue has been lost. The Ahmadinejad Government is a clean government." The claim comes from a "parliamentary deputy" on the Supreme Audit Court.

1100 GMT: Turning Up the Pressure. Here's the regime response to Mehdi Karroubi's recent renewal of his claims -- expressed through the letter sent by his son to the head of Iranian state broadcasting and his Saturday meeting with Mir Hossein Mousavi --- on abuses of detainees and, more broadly, flaws and injustices in the system. Tehran's Prosecutor-General, Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi, has said that a special clerical court is leading an enquiry into whether Karroubi broke the law when he accused security forces of rape and other abuses. (English-language summary available via the Los Angeles Times)

This is not yet a prosecution, more of a "final final warning". EA readers will recall last month when Ali Larijani was despatched, probably by the Supreme Leader, to tell Karroubi to maintain a low-profile silence and when the Government raided Karroubi's offices. Karroubi still joined the Qods Days marches, and his renewed statements have been matched by a restored Web presence.

So the ball is back in Karroubi's court but I fully expect him to play another shot. Game on.

1000 GMT: A Rafsanjani Signal? Hossein Mar'ashi, a high-level official in the Kargozaran party, has said: "Today I believe devoutly that this trueborn way which is presented by Mr. [Mir Hosssein] Mousavi as the "Green Path of Hope", implemented by the ...people in the framework of a movement. The power establishment cannot stand against it in the long-term neither structurally nor legally and has to accept the people's will sooner or later."

Kargozaran has been linked to Hashemi Rafsanjani since its formation in the 1990s, though it is a matter for discussion whether he is associated with this latest move. The Facebook site associated with Zahra Rahnavard, Mousavi's wife, is hopeful, calling the party "close to Rafsanjani".

0945 GMT: So What is This "Ground Resistance Force"? It's a genuine question, as we can't quite get our hands around the significance of this declaration by the head of Iran's armed forces, Major General Hassan Firouzabadi:

After two years of study we decided to change the IRGC [Islamic Revolution Guard Corps]’s structure, for the Basij to work in areas such as software work and the propagation of the Basiji culture in society, and to delegate the tasks, duties and mobilization of Basij units to a new called the IRGC Ground Resistance in order to increase expertise among the units.

The easy read is of a merger of the Basiji militia into the military organisation, but what does mean in terms of the control of those forces? Is this an effective IRGC expansion of authority, accompanying the possibility of its widening political influence? And, in the short term, what does this means for operations against the Green opposition and other demonstrators?

0615 GMT: Little breaking news out of Iran so far today. The New York Times runs instead a context article on "dozens of reporters, photographers and bloggers who have either fled Iran or are trying to flee in the aftermath of the disputed June presidential election", featuring interviews with two of the photographers, one who is still in the country. Mowj-e-Sabz looks forward to the 4 November demonstrations, "reminding the coup government that the issue of the elections is far from over".

Arguably, the most significant development on Monday was the Parliamentary passage of Government cuts in subsidies for energy and food. (Subscription required, but the full article can be accessed via Google Search using title and author.) Of course, the action risks public opposition, particularly as President Ahmadinejad has based his electoral appeal on helping the lower classes of Iran, but as the Minister of Economy told Parliament, "Under the current circumstances about a third of the country's income is directly or indirectly paid in subsidies," the cost of which has risen to $100 billion/year.

Is the Government on rocky economic ground that could cause political shifts? Far too soon to tell, of course, but a sign of nerves comes in Press TV's coverage. Ignoring the subsidy story this morning, its website prefers the reassurance of a natural gas deal between Switzerland and Iran.

EA readers have been paying attention to the economic aspects of the current crisis for several days, including a telling exchange last night, "Why people are taking it so much?" Iran specialists with whom I have been corresponding believe that the initial cuts in subsidies are manageable --- for example, households still get the full discount on purchases to fuel to a certian level, and then pay a "full price" which is amongst the cheapest in the world. However, there may be a cumulative effect. Add the Government measures to non-payment of wages in certain sectors and, in particular cases, strikes.

Despite the quiet, the situation is far from settled, and money and politics could be a combustible mix.

Iran: So Who Controls the Islamic Republic?

The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

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UPDATE 12 October 0845 GMT: EA's Mr Smith offers his reading of the Foreign Affairs analysis:

"I do not see what this adds to what we knew already. Besides making the silly mistake of identifying Mesbah Yazdi with Mohammad Yazdi, and stating that the former was head of Iran's judiciary (in reality his real influence and authority are, until proven otherwise, rather limited to "spiritual guidance" of Ahmadinejad), the rest are allegations that have been fed to him after having floated on the Web for months. The Taeb-Jalili-Khamenei trio was floated by Roger Cohen [of The New York Times] in one of his dispatches from Tehran.

The only tidbit that would be interesting, if verified, is the purge of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and the removal of pro-Mousavi Guardsmen before the elections. That would make sense, and it would be interesting to have real statistics on that.
--
Earlier this week Foreign Affairs published an article by Jerry Guo on "the rise of a new power elite" of "the Revolutionary Guard and its allies" in Iran. The article raised points which have been discussed by Enduring America readers for several weeks, considering politics, the military situation, and the battle for control of key sections of Iran's economy. In addition to Guo's attention to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, notice his inclusion of Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council, and the Supreme Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei, amongst the "coalition of power".

Letter from Tehran: Iran's New Hard-Liners

The headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are in a European-style palace, replete with Greek columns and a grand staircase, in the eastern suburbs of Tehran. From here, the IRGC orchestrated the crackdown that followed Iran's disputed presidential vote in June, beating protestors on the street and torturing those behind bars. More ominously, the IGRC and other extreme hard-liners have sidelined fellow conservatives in the Iranian government, carving out their own power base in a regime that is becoming increasingly insular, reactionary, and violent.

So far, much of the analysis of the emerging Iranian power struggle has focused on the clash between the country's conservatives and reformers, pitting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his patron, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, against Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, two thwarted presidential candidates, and Mohammad Khatami, a former president. (Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president and seasoned kingmaker has eased toward the reformists in the election's aftermath.)

The real struggle, however, is the conflict among the hard-liners themselves, many of whom operate behind the headlines in unseen corners of the state machinery. Although Iran's opposition movement has witnessed an unprecedented surge in public support, the election and its aftermath mark a radicalization of the system not seen since the early days of the Islamic revolution.

In the reformist era of Khatami, and to some extent during Ahmadinejad's first term, the country's conservative theocrats and technocrats -- such as Ali Larijani, the speaker of the parliament, and Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ejei, the ousted intelligence minister who criticized the state's use of forced confessions -- held much of the power over the executive and legislative branches. Although they were entrenched status quo forces, these pragmatists believed in the dual nature of the Islamic Republic's statehood -- a country with religious and political legitimacy.

But now such figures are losing their influence to a new breed of second-generation revolutionaries from Iran's security apparatus known as "the New Right." They are joined in the emerging power structure by ultraconservative clerics and organizations such as the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran. These neo-fundamentalists call for the "re-Islamization" of the theocracy, but their true agenda is to block further reform to the political system in terms of reconciling with both domestic opponents and the West.

This coalition includes Hassan Taeb, the commander of the Basij, the paramilitary branch of the IRGC; Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council and the country's chief nuclear negotiator; and Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader's second son, a man so feared that his name is not often uttered in public.

Hard-line figures such as the younger Khamenei and the IRGC leadership are granted religious legitimacy through the support of the most radical mullahs in the theocratic establishment: Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, the committee that certified the election tallies, and Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah Yazdi, a former head of the judiciary and Ahmadinejad's spiritual adviser. Yazdi is affiliated with an underground messianic sect called the Hojjatieh Society, which hopes to quicken the coming of the apocalypse. Democratic reforms, the Majlis (parliament), and elections are mere annoyances under this radical Islamic worldview.

It is not surprising, then, that Yazdi issued a fatwa shortly before June 12 that gave authorities tacit approval to fudge the vote. Indeed, the clerics seem to have gotten the intended result: after the election, a number of employees at Iran's Interior Ministry released an open letter stating that "the election supervisors, who had become happy and energetic for having obtained the religious fatwa to use any trick for changing the votes, began immediately to develop plans for it."

Yazdi's influence on Ahmadinejad became pronounced in the early days of the president's first term, when Ahmadinejad declared that the return of the apocalyptic 12th imam would come within two years. Now, his second term will likely be marked by even more radical behavior: in a meeting with Yazdi in June to discuss his domestic agenda, Ahmadinejad promised to Islamize the country's educational and cultural systems, declaring that Iranians had not yet witnessed "true Islam." Then, in August, amid calls to purge reformist professors, a presidential panel began investigating university humanities curricula deemed to be "un-Islamic." Several progressive students told me that they have been barred from returning to campus this semester, including a top law student at Tehran University. "I was going to continue the protests with my law degree in a more effective manner," he said. "But now I am just a simple pedestrian."

But ideology remains secondary in the struggle to maintain and consolidate control within the fractured regime. It is becoming increasingly clear that Ahmadinejad and his associated faction of neo-fundamentalists no longer aim to take on the mantle of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary ideals. As Khamenei's representative to the IRGC put it, "Some people are sticking to Imam Khomeini's ideas ... [but] the situation has changed." Accordingly, religion and revolutionary ideology have become convenient means to an end, but not the end themselves. Purges of un-Islamic faculty and students are meant to target the organizers of mass protests; the arrests and subsequent trials of political opponents, meanwhile, act to shield the financial interests of the IRGC and its hard-line partners.

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