Israel-Palestine: Sacrificing the Goldstone Report to the War of Politics

UPDATED Palestine: Pressure on Abbas to Resign in Goldstone Report Furour
Saudi King Abdullah in Damascus: Where is Syria Heading?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

The Goldstone Report on the Gaza War is no longer a set of findings on possible crimes by both sides during the fighting. So, an enquiry that was supposed to cast bring light on the bombed rubbleis now  a political tool to be wielded against the "enemy". And that is not only the "enemy" in the Israel-Palestine conflict but also within Palestinian politics.

Yesterday the Palestinian UN Mission issued a press release saying asserting full support for the Libyan request for a meeting of the UN Security Council. However, Libya's proposal was rejected. Although the Council decided to move its next meeting from 20 October to 14 October, Washington's position was clear. US Deputy Ambassador Alejandro Wolff said that the Obama Administration would not approve any decision:

The report needs to be discussed by the Human Rights Council, and decisions on what next steps and what is the appropriate disposition of this report are decisions that will be taken in Geneva. So, for Washington, it is not the Report itself [but] the peace process [that] is more significant.

Meanwhile, Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas tried to repair his political position, damaged by the PA's initial support for deferral of a UN vote on the Report. An Abbas associate said, "If Israel does not soften its positions on the peace process, the Palestinian Authority will resume pushing to get the Goldstone report moved to the Security Council, and thence to the International Criminal Court." Chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat told the French media that the PA could reveal the names of all the countries who pressured Abbas to defer the UN vote and, instead, negotiate with Israel without preconditions.

Hamas is increasing its bargaining power with the claim that Abbas deferred the UN vote because Israel threatened to expose his support for its war on Gaza. Egypt had announced that Hamas and Fatah would sign an accord on October 25, but on Wednesday, some Hamas officials said on Wednesday hat this was not the appropriate time for a deal. Mahmoud Zahar, a senior Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, reportedly told Egyptians to either postpone or call off the planned intra-Palestinian conference in the wake of Abbas's "high treason".

Saudi King Abdullah in Damascus: Where is Syria Heading?

Israel-Palestine: Sacrificing the Goldstone Report to the War of Politics

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Returning Syrian President Bashar Assad's visit to Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah held talks with Assad in Damascus. Thetwo talked about the Middle East , exchanged national medals, and signed an agreement to regulate taxation. Buthaina Shaaban, an adviser to Assad, described the talks as productive, "strengthening the Arab Islamic position" in the face of Israeli intransigence.

Although Abdullah's visit, his first as King, is not expected to bring a fundamental change in the region, it is a positive sign of the continuation of "engagement" by the Obama Administration with Damascus. At the same time, Syria is not willing to sacrifice its "alliance" with Iran and will portray this meeting as a part of a solid front facing  Israel. As Shaaban said, "Syria's ties with Iran and Turkey, as well as Saudi Arabia, would help create an effective Islamic bloc."

Afghanistan: As US Increases Troops, Pentagon Aid Flows to Taliban

Analysis & Transcript: Clinton and Gates on “What to Do in Afghanistan-Pakistan?” (and Iran)

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

The writing of US military escalation in Afghanistan is on the wall: President Obama has told Congressmen (with his advisors ensuring that the message was featured) that there will be no troop reductions. With that floor in place, the question is now how high the ceiling for the increase in forces. Meanwhile, Obama officials like Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have all but given up on the message of non-military strategy: in the face of financial mismanagement, problems with logistics, and the ill-fated Presidential election, they emphasise Security, Security, Security.

This is the context for the latest article from Jean Mackenzie of Global Post on the complications of US strategy and programmes: "Are Pentagon contracts funding the Taliban?"

KABUL — It seemed like such a good idea at the time.

At a staff meeting in 2006, Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, who was then commander of Combined Forces Afghanistan, took a sip of bottled water.

Then he looked at the label of one of the Western companies that were being paid millions of dollars a year to ship bottled water by the container load into Afghanistan.

And Eikenberry, who is now the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, said, “There must be a way of producing bottled water in Afghanistan.”

Thus was born the concept of Afghan First, a policy of preferential treatment for Afghan-owned companies that steers military aid into the hands of Afghan vendors.

All local procurement from fuel delivery for the Afghan army to the production of winter socks for the Afghan police — everything short of weapons and ammunition — now comes from a variety of local contractors, who are being paid about $800 million per year from the U.S. military. The largesse comes out of the total $1.1 billion budget for local purchases that falls under the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, CSTC-A for short. It is the lead U.S. agency responsible for developing the Afghan army and police.

“We are building this country,” said Sgt. Edward Gyokeres, chief of the public affairs office at CSTC-A, explaining that the program is intended to use the American and coalition aid money in a way that helps construct a national economy in Afghanistan.

But, paradoxically, this well-intentioned policy may also benefit the insurgency, according to those inside the system, who contend that a significant portion of that money going to Afghan vendors trickles down into the hands of the very enemy the U.S. is battling in Afghanistan — the Taliban.

Precise numbers are impossible to obtain in the lawless fringes of rural Afghanistan where there is very little accounting for this money, but those knowledgeable about the process estimate that at least 10 percent, or about $80 million, has in the last year gone to the diverse groupings of Afghan insurgents whom the U.S. military has come to call the Taliban.

Some contractors say as much as 20 percent of the contracts go to paying off the insurgency, which would put the number closer to $160 million a year.

U.S. and Afghan officials tracking where the Taliban gets its funding estimate that the Taliban’s annual take of the poppy crop is about $100 million.

Over the last month, GlobalPost conducted a series of interviews with contractors, military personnel and others who work inside the system and confirmed that a flow of money goes from these local Afghan contractors to the Taliban for payoffs and protection in the widening areas of the country that are Taliban controlled.

In fact, GlobalPost found almost no one inside the military procurement and aid community who expressed surprise at the phenomenon, but very few who were willing to discuss the process on the record out of fear of losing their lucrative contracts, their jobs, or their lives.

Read rest of article...

Israel-Palestine: The US Mistake on the Goldstone Report

LATEST Palestine: Pressure on Abbas to Resign in Goldstone Report Furour
Israel-Palestine: More Clashes in Jerusalem
Israel-Palestine Inside Line: Hamas & Syria Criticise Abbas; Israel VP Cancels Britain Trip Over “War Crimes” Fears

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

As EA's Ali Yenidunya updates on the latest fall-out from the deferred UN vote on the Goldstone Report on the Gaza War, Marc Lynch, in his blog for Foreign Policy, raises questions about the Obama Administration's decision to block the report:

I'm still trying to figure out the thinking behind the Obama administration's rapid moves to block the Goldstone report on the Gaza war.  Without even getting into the moral issues involved or the accuracy of the report, the most likely tactical considerations behind the administration's decision seem short-sighted.  Its move likely responded to the intense public and private Israeli campaign against the report, and probably aimed at winning back some positive relations with the Israelis and maintaining momentum on the peace process.

But if the administration's hope was that killing the report would make the issue quietly go away while winning some political capital with the Israelis, it is likely to be disappointed.  Quite the contrary:  the report is becoming a major political issue in the Arab world, badly damaging the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority, while Obama seems to be getting little credit from Israeli public opinion or the Israeli government.

Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority are already paying a heavy price for succumbing to reported American pressure to drop the report.  It isn't just Hamas criticism, though there's plenty of that.  This has rapidly become a leading issue in the Palestinian and Arab media, and is shaping up into a profound setback for the already weak PA leadership.  Virtually every sector of Palestinian opinion -- from Hamas to Fatah, from Gaza to the West Bank -- has united in harsh criticism of the move.  Even Mohammed Dahlan -- Dahlan! -- is positioning himself in opposition, showing where he thinks the political points are to be scored.  The Economics Minister in Fayyad's government Bassem al-Khoury reportedly submitted his resignation in protest.   Given his key role in pushing the so-called "economic peace" that Israeli and American officials are so keen upon, perhaps that will get more attention than the massive, broad-based criticism across the rest of Palestinian society.

There seems to be little question that Abbas's decision to go along with American pressure will have a significant impact on the popularity and legitimacy of the PA.  He is already backpedaling in the face of the intense public backlash, announcing the formation of a committee to look into the "circumstances surrounding the issue" (gee, wonder what he'll find when he investigates his own decision?), but it's probably too late.  Whatever gains made by Fatah after its Bethlehem conference and by Fayyad with the announcement of his agenda for a Palestinian state are likely to be washed away in this deluge.  The credibility of the Hamas narrative about the PA's collaboration with Israel and unrepresentative nature will be strongly enhanced. And it will not help Salam Fayyad establish authority that he has been fingered by some sources as the person directly responsible for the decision.

Why was the PA leadership put in this untenable situation?  The Obama team has consistently identified building Palestinian Authority legitimacy and capacity as a key part of its strategy.  Did nobody consider the impact that such an important symbolic issue as the perceived suppression of the Goldstone report would have on this supposedly crucial dimension of the strategy?

At the wider Arab level, the American stance on the Goldstone report has galvanized doubts about the credibility of Obama's outreach to the Muslim world and claims to genuine change.  The skeptics who demanded deeds to match words are having a field day.  As much as the inability to prevail in the battle over the settlements hurt Obama's credibility with the Arab world, at least he got some credit for trying, for prioritizing the issue and paying some costs to keep at it.  But the Goldstone report decision looks to most of the Arab public as a straightforward capitulation to Israel and abdication of any claims to the moral high ground. It will further undermine the Cairo promises, which look ever more distant.

Meanwhile, I have searched in vain for signs that the Israeli public or hawkish commentariat have given the Obama administration any credit for its efforts.  Israeli commentators seem to have simply taken the American protection for granted, or grudgingly acknowledged it in passing, without revising their views of Obama. The scornful, dismissive tone of the hawks towards Obama continues, while doves largely ignore it or disagree.  If there's been a concerted effort to leverage the decision to improve his standing with the Israeli leadership or public, I haven't seen it.

I can understand the decision to sacrifice the Goldstone inquiry into the Gaza war to tactical or strategic considerations, whether or not I agree with the call.  It wouldn't be the first time.  But I would hope that such a decision would have seriously anticipated the implications for the legitimacy and efficacy of the Palestinian Authority, for Obama's credibility among Arab and Muslim audiences, or for how to leverage it into real gains with the Israeli public.

Iran's Nuclear Programme: Obama's Balance Wobbles

The Latest from Iran (3 October): Debating Mousavi’s Strategy
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Big Win for Tehran at Geneva Talks
Latest Iran Video: Nuclear Official Jalili on CNN (1 October)
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Remarks on Geneva Talks

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

It only took 24 hours for the Obama Administration, after the "substantial progress" of Thursday's Geneva talks on Iran's nuclear programme, to hit the choppy waters of Washington and Tehran politics.

On Friday morning, it was looking very good for the White House. Most of the US media were putting out the news of Iran's agreement to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect the Qom enrichment facility and to ship uranium to Russia to be enriched. They were adding the Administration's gloss that this was all made to a forceful American stance which had pushed the Iranians into concessions.

By Friday afternoon, the public-relations glue had come unstuck, as a State Department briefing turned into black comedy. (Watch the clip from the 8:44 mark.) The first wobble was over the "third-party enrichment" which had supposedly been established. Journalists challenged that Iranian officials were saying only that they had agreed to consider the proposal; the Department spokesman, unprepared for this information, could only warble about an "agreement in principle".

He came off even worse in the second exchange over Iran's invitation to inspect the Qom plant, after he said there was "no hard-and-fast deadline" for the inspections. Why then, journalists clamoured, had Barack Obama pointedly mentioned on Thursday night a "two-week deadline"? Caught between his opening line of flexibility and the inconvenience of the President's firm marker, the spokesman, umm, stammered.

This would all be good voyeuristic fun if it did not pont to the two larger problems for the Administration. The first is that the Iranian Government is not going to go gently into the diplomatic night playing its assigned role. Tehran, in our view, was already going to be conciliatory at the opening discussions in the hope of getting more discussions. It was not going to jump into any hard-and-fast deal.

The spin that the US Government "forced" Iran's concessions only adds to the dfficulty. Not wanting to appear to be forced into anything, Iranian officials "clarify" that firm measures have not been agreed but must be the subject of further talks, in this case, technical discussions in Vienna on 18 October and the next Iran meeting with the 5+1 powers, possibly at the end of this month.

The second and even greater challenge for the Obama Administration from within. There has always been a group of officials in the Executive who saw negotiations as a process that had to be endured before, with the Iranians inevitably breaking the talks and/or agreements, more pressure could be put on Tehran.

So, even as the "significantly positive" outcome of Geneva was being announced, they were tossing a bucket of red herrings to the media. There might be even more "secret" sites that Tehran had not declared. Iran still had enough uranium to make The Bomb. The Israelis were watching carefully. (Juan Cole points out how all these diversions made their way into Friday's New York Times.)

The loudest of these heckles was that, whatever happened at Geneva, The Iranians Weren't Really Serious. Yesterday morning The Wall Street Journal, which might as well declare that it is a propaganda sheet masquerading as news, declared in its opening paragraph, "Analysts cautioned that the Iranians merely may be seeking to defuse pressure for sanctions while continuing their nuclear program." (The two "analysts" were an Israeli reservist general and George W. Bush's "special envoy on nonproliferation issues".)

Lo and behold, this morning The New York Times headlines, "U.S. Wonders if Iran Is Playing for Time or Is Serious on Deal". Helene Cooper splashes about "administration officials" warning "the trick now for Mr. Obama...will be to avoid getting tripped up", which is actually only one "senior" official (Who is he/she? On the side of those pushing for a lasting agreement with the Iranians? On the side of those seeing no prospect of an agreement?) putting out the dampening comment, “That’s the big ‘if,’ isn’t it? Will they do it? No one wants to do a premature victory lap.”

Let's just put this basic comment out, already fearing that it will disappear in the media wash. The Iranian Government is playing this process "long". It is likely to allow an IAEA inspection of Qom, although even this will be subject to discussions on conditions, but other issues including third-party enrichment, will go into a set of committees. Any agreement will take months, rather than weeks, of contact.

From the start, the Obama Administration --- split between different factions --- have been locked into playing the process "short". A quick result had to be obtained, otherwise sanctions would have to be sought quickly. That is why all the fatuous talk of deadlines --- December? September? October? --- has loudly accompanied and even out-shouted the complexities of engagement.

The President has been unable to extricate himself from this unproductive dilemma. So once again, we will have a two-week cycle of domestic fury, even though the Administration has no stick to wield, before the technical talks in Vienna.