The Latest from Iran (1 September): The Ripples of Debate Continue

UPDATED Iran: Law & Politics – Misinterpreting Mortazavi
NEW Iran Special: Taking Apart the Regime’s Defenses (Shahryar v. Afrasiabi)
The Latest from Iran (31 August): The Debate over the Cabinet

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2010 GMT: On a relatively quiet evening, the Comedy Moment of the Day comes in. The Supreme Leader's representative to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Hojatoleslam Ali Saeedi, explained that the reason for the "quick confessions" of political detainees was the “humane and Islamic” behaviour of the Revolutionary Guard.

1810 GMT: Scoop of the Day. The Times of London "Terror suspect Saeed Jalili set to become Ahmadinejad's Defence Minister". (Saeed Jalili is the secretary of the National Security Council. The nominee for Defence Minister is Ahmad Vahidi, who is wanted by Interpol for alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish centre in Argentina.)

1720 GMT: During this lull before tomorrow's votes of confidence, here's one story, originally in Farda News, to make you go Hmmm.....

Mohsen Kouhkan, a spokesman for the Majlis governing body, said lawmakers were asked to turn down any dinner invitation other than those coming from parliament or the presidential office until after the vote-of-confidence session for the 10th cabinet has taken place.

“As minister designates and lawmakers may be invited to Iftar [breaking of the daily Ramadan fast] parties held outside Parliament, the Majlis governing body has sent a text message to all lawmakers asking them to refrain from participating in any dinner parties outside of parliament and the presidential office,” he said.

1705 GMT: The office of Mehdi Karroubi has published an open letter declaring that Saeed Mortazavi, then Tehran Chief Prosecutor and now Iran's Deputy Prosecutor General, is responsible for any suffering of abused detainees or their families. Karroubi has written the director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting asking for airtime for his representative to present evidence of abuse.

1655 GMT: One disturbing story to note. As Iranian universities prepare for the start of the academic year, Gooya reports that dozens of Tehran University students have been summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence for questioning.

1630 GMT: We're back after an afternoon break for an EA staffer's birthday but, to be honest, there's very little to update on the domestic front, since the votes of confidence on Cabinet appointments will be tomorrow rather than today. Instead, the two stories causing chatter amongst "mainstream" media are on the international front: the Iran Government's announcement that President Ahmadinejad will attend this month's United Nations General Assembly (which isn't news at all, since he was always intending to go) and the declaration by the Government that it has "prepared an updated nuclear package" for Wednesday's meeting of the "5+1" countries (US, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany) in Frankfurt on Wednesday.

And to be honest, while the nuclear proposal will dominate media headlines over the next 24 hours (since US media, in particular, find the script easier with the Nuclear Threat story than with the complex politics inside Iran), it isn't news either. The Iranian Government has been sending out signals for a few weeks that it might like to sit down and chat about the nuclear programme, not as much as a response to Western threats of sanctions as much as a diversion from internal conflict.

1040 GMT: The BBC reports, "[Nominee for Minister of Defence] Ahmad Vahidi faced no opposition from MPs on the third day of a debate on President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's choices for his new cabinet."

1030 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has met with the three-member panel appointed by the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, to discuss his evidence of detainee abuse. The Judiciary First Deputy Chief Ebrahim Raeesi, in a subsequent interview, assured that Larijani had ordered all laws and judiciary regualtions upheld" in a full investigation which ensured the rights of detainees.

0930 GMT: Reports are emerging of secret meetings last week between Ahmadinejad's office, pro-Government senior clerics, and "principlist" MPs. Allegations are being made that the President's camp has been using bribery to assure votes of confidence in his Cabinet nominations.

0900 GMT: An Urgent Correction. Press TV's report (see 0640 GMT) is wrong: Marziyeh Vahid-Dastjerdi did NOT get a vote of confidence as Minister of Health. All voting will take place tomorrow.

0830 GMT: In addition to the Ruholamini death-in-detention story (see 0535 GMT), featured from The New York Times to CNN, international media are featuring the testimony of a woman ("Minoo") about rape in prison. France 24 carries the story and video.

0640 GMT: Press TV reports that Marziyeh Vahid-Dastjerdi has been given a vote of confidence as Minister of Health. The approval came despite reports of widespread opposition to all of Ahmadinejad's three female nominees. Fars News also concentrates on the remarks of Vahid-Dastjerdi to the Majlis.

0535 GMT: We are now caught in a period, with displays of mass opposition constrained during Ramadan, of trying to look below the ripples on the surface of the regime. Once again, today's first place of observation will be the Parliament, where discussions of individual Cabinet nominees are due to end in votes of confidence. However, as the complications of the appointment of Saeed Mortazavi and the speculation over the statements and initial actions of Sadegh Larijani have illustrated (see separate entry and yesterday's updates), significant (if still inconclusive) changes are occurring in locations like the judiciary.

There were actually signs of a reconciliation yesterday between the Supreme Leader and the President, through the rhetoric of a war against "soft power". The nominee for Minister of Intelligence, Heydar Moslehi, put the case for a new strategy and instruments to the Parliament yesterday. As long as this does not descend into renewed, specific arrests against supposed planners of "velvet revolution" --- measures that the Supreme Leader warned against last week --- but remains at the level of vigilance against opposition, there may be an emerging compromise between Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad.

Do not mistake this, however, for a resolution. Detentions, confessions, and abuses are still the political Achilles heel of this regime. Many in the media this morning are headlining yesterday's leaked confirmation that Mohsen Ruholamini (pictured), the son of a key "conservative" advisor to the Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, died from beatings in detention rather than "meningitis". Behind those headlines are a much more significant story: Ruholamini's death galvanised opposition to Ahmadinejad from within the Establishment. Further revelations or even suspicions may ensure that the President can never be secure in his claim of authority.

UPDATED Iran: Law & Politics - Misinterpreting Mortazavi

The Latest from Iran (31 August): The Debate over the Cabinet

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UPDATED 1 September: Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Prize Laureate and human rights lawyer, offers an interpretation in support of the Mostaghim-Daragahi analysis: "The setting aside of Mortazavi from his position of Tehran's chief prosecutor and his installment as [one of the] deputy general prosecutors of Iran must not to be considered as a promotion....The latitude and power of Mortazavi in his new position is much less and this new position has made him more vulnerable to prosecutions."

An EA correspondent adds, "I suspect that Larijani's Mortazavi promotion/demotion was a stroke of diabolical cunning. First of all, a powerful official, accustomed to act independently (and, more importantly, from a political faction that is rather hostile towards the head of the judiciary, Sadegh Larijani) is removed from a sensitive post, placed under supervision, and therefore prevented from causing trouble for the Larijanis. Secondly, since this removal is "a promotion", Mortazavi and his cronies, however upset by the loss of power, cannot make a noise. Thirdly, placing Mortazavi in a higher position that at the same time is vulnerable to prosecution allows the Larijani-headed judiciary to control him. When Mortazavi was Tehran's prosecutor he could use his influence to block and stonewall all charges made against him, but in his new position this power has been taken away from him.

Yesterday, in a graphic illustration of the twists and turns of Iranian politics, Saeed Mortazavi went from being "fired" in the morning as Tehran's Chief Prosecutor to being "promoted" in the afternoon as Iran's Deputy Prosecutor General. The sudden shift led to some misleading headlines --- the New York Post is still crowing about the sacking of the "Butcher of Tehran" --- and a lot of uncertainty. What did Mortazavi's fortunes say about the intra-Establishment battle for power as well as the future of detentions and trials of post-election political prisoners?

A couple of Enduring America correspondents cautiously navigated the possibilities yesterday before concluding "wait and see". Others, however, have not been as cautious and, I fear, as shrewd.

Ramin Mostaghim and Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times are about as good as you get in reporting on Iran for US media (Mostaghim is based in Tehran, persisting despite the Iran Government's restrictions, and Daragahi is in Beirut), but they may have mis-stepped by jumping to the conclusion that Mortazavi now has "a fancy title" that "strips him of his power to pursue his hardline political agenda".

This is a favoured theory of some Iranian activists who are pushing the idea of a political overthrow of the President by the Larijani brothers, one of whom is the new head of judiciary, and Hashemi Rafsanjani. In this case, the LA Times reporters rely on two Iranian trial lawyers who claim that Mortazavi's" authority and power have been diminished almost to zero, nothing ... because he cannot make any judiciary decision".

That's a comforting thought for those who hope that Mortazavi,  with his hard-line approach to detention and trials (and alleged abuses of prisoners), will no longer have influence. It ignores, however, the reality that his new role is as much a political matter as a judicial one.

The truth is that we simply don't know what impact Mortazavi will have until his relationship with his superior, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, and judiciary head Sadegh Larijani emerges.