Text: Mousavi Statement to "Green Path of Hope" (5 September)

The Latest from Iran (6 September): The Reformists Speak
The Latest from Iran (5 September): A Quiet Phase

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Our deep gratitude to a fellow blogger who worked diligently to provide this:

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The honorable, free-spirited and vigilant people of Iran,

Nearly three months ago, when you participated in the tenth presidential election, you went to the polls with the belief that your votes would be protected against the power-hungry goals of a minority group. You had been promised this with the constant reassurance of officials and the hard work of civil institutions. But the systematic violations, fraud and the bitter events that ensued, created a great disappointment out of what should have been a triumph for our nation. With the mismanagement of the responsible officials, with the wave of propaganda propelled by state owned media, and with the attacks carried out by official and unofficial security forces on peaceful demonstrations, a problem that could have been resolved in a fair and impartial process, created ever greater fissures, uncertainty and deep, broad social divisions. The direct result of these events is nothing but a widening rift between the people and the ruling establishment.

A great number of social, political and cultural activists, the grand ayatollahs [marja] and the vigilant members of the [Qom] seminary reacted against the fabricated stories created by state media and also asked that such matters be investigated: the show trials which lack the least bit of religious or legal legitimacy, the long list of the victims, the inhumane treatment of the prisoners and the illegal detention centers. Anyone concerned for the Islamic Republic, the result of our people’s century-long struggle, and the manifestation of their efforts to achieve freedom, independence, justice and progress in the shadow of piety, is now worried.

What makes our efforts to find a solution out of this current quandary all the more necessary is the need to provide our territorial integrity, to guard our country against the voracious greed of foreign adversaries, and the need to defend the essence of the Islamic Republic. [We must commit to this] despite being fully aware that in the midst of our own state and quasi-state forces, there are individuals who know that the only way they can remain in power is by creating crises and catastrophes and keeping away from any attempt to solve the problems and quandaries in society – problems that they themselves have created. These individuals are still trying to hide and cover current crises with larger crises, and to take the level of their unwise actions to dangerous heights. To a point where after creating such levels of complexity in the affairs of the country, and without paying heed to the consequence of their actions, they are murmuring dangerous words and excuses, among them the murmurs about the great purge on free-spirited and devoted academicians.

Thus, it has become a crucial necessity to take a social approach (instead of only a political approach) to solving the current conflict. And this requires us to utilize the social capacities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

A different approach such as this one is a belief in the plurality and diversity of beliefs existent in the great, ancient and pious family which is Iran. This is the path of the divine prophets and their predecessors, and is reminiscent of divine tradition and [in such a tradition] guidance only means showing the path and the responsibility of those who claim to be religious is to create an atmosphere appropriate for growth and blossoming of humanity towards higher aims and progress. History has shown that whenever governments have aimed to abolish or dim the plurality and diversity that exists in society, they’ve had no choice but to resort to tyranny – tyranny which exists in all guises, but in essence is the same everywhere. Such solutions do not result in a homogeneous society, but rather only create hypocrisy and dichotomy in the lives of people. To carry on such acts forever is both impossible and inappropriate, according to the teachings of the Koran.

After the events which occurred in our country in such a short time, who can deny that the condition which exists in our society today is the result of the hegemony of such wrong mentality in the macro decision making process in our country? Actualizing such a public conscience is a great achievement, and sometimes centuries in the lives of civilizations and nations must pass before they achieve it, and pay a great price to do so. However, our people were able to achieve this great deed in little time, and with [relatively] little price. Our people have now realized, with every inch of their being, that the only way for the peaceful coexistence of tastes and attitudes, social layers, tribes, religions and beliefs that live in this great land, is to acknowledge this vast diversity in lifestyles and to gather around an ancient identity which links all of us. Although those who have weak or backward interpretations of religion do not understand that this statement does not mean that Islam is not the righteous religion, or the last religion or one that paves the way to the right path, rather it means:

“لا اکراه فی الدین قد تبین الرشد من الغی”

(Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error [Holy Koran])

We are stepping on path to enlightenment that has already rejuvenated the elderly and matured the youth. I ask for God’s help for myself and for you in our struggle and I hope that with the cooperation and companionship of all the sympathizers of the establishment and the revolution the goals of the nation will be fulfilled on every stage of this struggle.

That is why despite the regretful, bitter developments of recent days, people now have valuable, timeless convictions which are leagues more important that the election of one person. And this is what drives them to participate in the events of the aftermath of the election, and warms them to paying the ultimate price that they have paid.

In the months that ensued, great forces in our nation were set free, forces which have to be utilized to the best of our ability for the long-term prosperity of this nation. Our people know what they want. They were a witness to the portrait of their glorious will in the mirror which was recent events. They know they have the capital and ability to realize their wants and in this path, they have the encouragement and help of a mass of elites and capable individuals. Thus, we all now ask one another: what should be done? This question does not come out of helplessness and ignorance, but rather, what should be done with this great capital, with this renewed hope, and with these available resources?

Truly, what should be done? In answering this question, the first step is to know what we want so that this desire portrays the best and most of what we can want. If we err in finding an answer to this question, we have lost a great deal of this capital that has been obtained. There should be a great level of care taken in answering this question. The great force that our country has been able to gather has the ability to take the country to higher spiritual and material levels on one hand, or to plunge it deeply into a long, anarchistic decline. The results of our efforts greatly depend on our correct choice in this stage.

Contrary to what the state propaganda machines project, we are the ones that desire the return of trust and calm to society and we are the ones who abstain from any violent or extreme acts. We have very clear and reasonable demands. We want to preserve the Islamic Republic, we want to reinforce our national unity, and want to revive the ethical identity of the ruling system. A restoration of public trust is not possible without the acceptance of the right of the people to govern themselves, without obtaining their final approval of their ruling system, and without transparency in the affairs of the state. In the green movement that we have begun, we have no unusual or abrupt demands. What we want is to demand the lost rights of our nation.

Demand what rights? Firstly, the rights that the constitution has considered for the people, and our request for the full and complete execution of these rights. Indeed! There have been solutions proposed in the constitution to manage certain affairs which may one day not be the answer to the needs of the country and of the world. But the path to reforming [such quandaries] has been predicted in this same constitution. In our national covenant, the legitimacy of all the pillars of the ruling system is based on the trust and vote of the people. To a point where if you look closely, even a supervisory body like the Guardian Council is not far from the auspices of the people. Yes! In the constitution, the Guardian Council has been burdened with heavy responsibilities, such as overseeing the elections – [the Guardian Council is composed of] fallible humans who might fall into the trap of sin and wrongdoing and might be tempted by power. But in this same constitution, it clearly says that people are free to hold peaceful gatherings. If only this principle from our national covenant is enacted, be certain that no one in the ruling establishment will have the opportunity to misuse their power.

Our constitution is ripe with capacities that have not been met. Our officials sometimes act as if they are free to use the extra capacities of the constitution [to their advantage]. No! It will never be so. They are responsible for realizing these capacities, all of these capacities. The constitution is a monolithic whole, and they cannot stress or exaggerate those parts which are in line with the interests of certain people or of a certain group and to ignore or to only partly carry out those parts which stress the rights of the people. After thirty years, there are still parts to this national covenant [the constitution] that provoke the anger of officials as if the person speaking of them has spoken out against the Islamic Republic itself. Providing political and social rights, eliminating discrimination, legal immunity and equality before the law, the inseparability of the freedom, independence and the territorial integrity of the country from one another, the immunity of dignity, the life and property of people, the illegality of inquisition, the freedom of the press, the illegality of inspecting letters and wiretapping and spying on individuals, the freedom of political parties and people, the freedom to hold peaceful gatherings, concentration of government revenues in the treasury [as opposed to having them in various governmental and non-governmental treasuries], a [clear] definition for political crime and the presence of a jury in court, the freedom of expression and the right to be heard on state radio and television and the neutrality of this enterprise, …each of these has a specific article dedicated to it in our constitution. Principles which are easily and blatantly trampled and are carried out in ways which go directly against the spirit of this national covenant. This is carried on to a point where personal preference and tastes prevent the enactment of a simple article, like the right to teach local and native languages.

The same selective approach has been taken with the visions of the Islamic revolution. We want the restoration of those forgotten objectives and this great movement began in the hopes of their realization. There were mottos used during the revolution that using now makes some people [those who are against the green movement] unhappy as if they were slogans used by anti-revolutionaries. One of such slogans is freedom; freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom after expression, freedom to elect and to be elected, freedom with all its beautiful meanings that our people had in mind as one of their most important objectives, which made them call their victory after the revolution spring of freedom. This freedom has meant political freedom and the right to criticize the rulers with no fear.

More oppressed than the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic or the constitution is Islam itself – the religion of which much is spoken, but little is carried out. In most cases they screen religion, they forget whatever is not in their benefit, and they call their own [personal] tastes and expediency, Islamic Text. They go as far that lying becomes an inseparable attribute of State Media and the ugliest immoralities (torturing and killing prisoners and other shameful acts which the pen hesitates to write) are considered signs of commitment to the Prophet’s [Muhammad] religion. [The prophet] who was elected to enhance moral virtues.

If there is only one mission for a religious government, it is to prepare a background to allow people to live with faith. So why is it that our society grows more distant from faith day by day? This distance is not inherited from the revolution. There were many people who fasted for the first time in the hot summer of 1358 [1979] and they enjoyed this experience. That was what we inherited from the revolution. What we inherited from the revolution was the spirituality that we experienced during the holly war [with Iraq]. From the revolution we inherited great souls and the exceptional virtue. Our revolution showed that it is capable of providing the necessities that our society longed for. Let’s for once compare what we inherited from our Imam [Khomeyni] with what we have now in Iran: an ostentatious society where fundamentalism reigns; a society affected by fraud and deceit.

Taking a selective approach toward religion and aligning to our own tastes and profits, associating it with fundamentalism and superstition, substituting money and violence in place of wisdom and genuine advice, and bringing the clerics, this thousand year old tradition, under the government’s wing is not going to have any other result [than what has already happened]. When our imam [Khomeyni] was talking about the pure mohammadian Islam and putting it against the archaic Islam and American Islam, he was speaking of what is going on now. This backward interpretation might be named “Islam”, but is far from the real Islam. We want a return to the pure mohammadian Islam, this long, forgotten religion. And god has promised that he’s going to guide us to this celestial gift: “and those who make effort for us, we certainly will show them the way”.

Haven’t you seen that he [god] kept his promise in these past few months? Our lord didn’t ruin our faith and he is not going to do that, because he unlike those who make false claims is sympathetic and kind. “And god doesn’t ruin your faith. Of course god is sympathetic and kind toward people”2.

Our people have tasted bitterness due to the events that ensued [after the election], but who can underestimate what we have gained despite this bitterness? We feel the greatness of what we have achieved in this short period of time under our skin, in our flesh. What have we done to gain those achievements? The truth is that besides having faith in god’s word, we have not acted in accordance with much progress. Look at what has happened in recent days, each event has opened the ways of god to us, one after another. Look closely! If they close those paths too, the lord is not unable to open new ones in front of those who work towards his aims. Goals which are secure, smooth, aims which will, no doubt, directly carry us to our destination. “Why shouldn’t we trust god now that he has shown us our ways?” 3 With access to such paths, we have no need to disobey the law, to regret non-violence, to resort to destruction, or to enter any dead-ends.

And let’s look at the other side, at those who are opposed to the people [and see] how they are going astray. They throw the children of the revolution in prison to satisfy their illusions. What do they expect to achieve from this? They arrest the victim of a terrorist act and let the attacker go to enjoy his life. Did they expect to gain anything but to lose face? They left their wisdom in dead-end road as they were going downhill, and let those extremists take the reign, extremists who attack innocent students in the dorms in the middle of the night, extremists whose common vocabulary is only profanity.

Those followers of the path of god saw their hopes in god’s promises fulfilled. Have not those who went astray from the path too [referring to the recent hardliner currents] got what they were supposed to get? [We] Witness today the reservations [of those who have purposely kept quite] and the flatteries. [We] Smell the stench of greed, of avarice and of voracity of mouths of fawners. [We] Hear today how they [referring to the hardliners] are benefiting from a spokesman who abuses the holy medium of the Friday Prayer to encourage violence and takes pride in extraction of forced confessions. [We] Feel their fear, fear of loneliness, fear of the future, fear of their destinies, a fear that they hide by inducing fear in others.

The devoted People of Iran! There is an oath on the shoulders of descendants of the Islamic Revolution that they must not stop at anything to return the Islamic Revolution to its early fundamentals. This is an oath to your friends and companions [in the establishment] that in their struggle against liars and cheaters, they must not betray the trust of the social forces created recently. At the same time, we all have the duty to maintain our courage and not be afraid to rebuke if we view an action in the betterment of our country. According to these vows, I, Mir Hossein Mousavi, would not suggest anything but the continuation of the same green path that you have followed in recent months: The Green Path of Hope. You started this path before the election, and with your determined will you are still walking on it. A path that you keep maintaining with your prayers, with your voice [‘Voice’ is translated from ‘Neda’ which is also the name of one of the symbolic martyrs in recent events] with your God is Great cries, with your rallies, big or small, with your questions, endeavors, discussions, decentralized self-developing organizations.

We used the word ‘Path’ to allude to our movement so that we would not count our achievements in the way as an end. This would allow us to always look far for a greater perfection. In addition, in this path, we look for ways that the divine guidance would bring along to us. We think, and we seek solutions, but we also believe that practically the only ways that work out is the way that he [the divine] reveals to us.

On the path that God has revealed to us we have used the ‘Green’ symbol so that this may be a flag that shows our devotion to an Islam that had the kin of the prophet as its first educators – the same people who are also the kin of rationalism, kin of love and kin of enlightenment.

We chose "Hope" as our asset so that we can allude to our Iranian identity. This is the same Hope that has moved this nation through the most challenging corners of history, it is the same hope that that has ensured the survival of this land during its darkest hours; [The same hope that is now] the Green Path of Hope.

A while ago, when we started using this name to declare the features of your movement, some perceived it as a new party or committee. However, this path has nothing in common with, and it’s not an alternative to the official political organizations and does not deny our needs to such organizations. Instead, it is a broad social movement to repair and create some of the most fundamental political foundations that will influence all affairs of the country and provide the essential needs of various committees and parties for proper and fruitful activism. Certainly our society requires ethical and powerful parties to realize a stable political environment; and indeed, if a time comes when the contexts of an effective and beneficial political activism is realized then maybe I and some of your colleagues too may engage our efforts in the frameworks of a more orthodox organization. The "Green Path of Hope" however is not such an organization. Political Activism means that a group of like-minded people come together in a hierarchical organization. Furthermore, in a party the greatest emphasis is on compatibility of thoughts and coherency of opinions in the majority. Meanwhile, our path as a way that is supposed to lead to a renewal and strengthening of our national identity lays the emphasis on unity over minimal common interests; [Our organization is] a message-oriented one that is a collection of all the large and small civil organizations that have chosen a common goal on their path forward.

To continue and strengthen the current movement of the people, the actions we take appear like a dress that we as a tailor are sewing on its shoulders. The most elegant dresses would suit the movement only if it is cut in light of reality. The reality of the situation in our country has drastically changed from what it was before. Today, what plays the strongest role in our society is a strong and self-evolving social network that has stretched among a large group of people who are objecting to the violation of their rights. In our future decisions and solutions we must pay attention to this network’s unique features. As a response to questions like what do we do, what I suggest is the consolidation and enforcement of this social network.

The several-decade-long history of Iran that we have witnessed up close reveals to us that the collective movement of people has only become conclusive during the peak of the life, vivacity and fruitfulness of these cores [the social network.] When we talk about an active and alert society, and when we talk about a society that can effectively, willfully and creatively react to incidents and remove the possibilities of authoritarianism and irresponsibility in the constructs of power to act against its will [the society’s will], we are talking about a society that is composed of such a powerful network.

The responsibility we all have on our shoulders today, the responsibility which all groups, large and small groups, and even parties and political committees must carry is that we all must act as distinct cores to such a network.

Among the strengths of this network is the natural shape of its constituents. These units are composed of small but plural [diverse] groups of like-minded persons that know each other and trust each other because of their previous friendships, family or work relationship. It is impossible to disband these units because that would mean dissolving society. These entities have always existed but that is not sufficient to form an effective social network. Yet the first step in my proposed solution is that we Iranians, anywhere in the word we may be, should strengthen these social cores. We should build our homes facing each other. As the Koran says we should turn our homes into Qiblas [the direction that should be faced when a Muslim prays], in other words we should put our emphasis on these social cores that are foundational units of our society. We should become aware of their importance and more than ever turn our attention to them such that their concealed power is revealed to us. Turn your homes into Qiblas. If we used to meet one every two months, now we should gather twice a week. This is the real power of our social network.

Gather to do what? This is usually the first question we ask each other in this situation. We usually believe that what is important in these gatherings is the activities in which we engage. This is not a correct way to see it, but it is natural [to see it that way]. For this reason [the way people perceive it], these social cores are not productive if they are not turned into centers for effective action, like the fruits of a tree which are left to rot. Therefore they [these gatherings] should be subjects of religious, social, political, scientific, cultural, artistic, athletic, charitable and other civil activities, such that in the long run, and after the passing of these waves of emotion and chaos, they continue their history-making role as we would expect.

Family gatherings, neighbors, friends, Koran reading sessions, religious groups, cultural and literary centers, associations, parties, factions, unions, groups that attend athletic or artistic events, classmates, alumni groups, colleagues that have formed friendships, etc. Each of us is a member of a few of these societies that form a context for dialogue and communication between our social cores. The recent experiences have shown that the small media created out of these relationships can act more quickly and effectively than any other mass media only if the capacities of this network are realized through an agreement on a great vision.

We will succeed in forming effective relationships only if we voice a common ideal. [This common ideal can be] a profound and accurate slogan that is capable of catering to our needs. An important part of the capabilities that have been built into our social networks is because we have found this common ideal and vision. A golden balance is the important requirement of this ideal and vision. Such that adding to [this vision] might mean that some will not want or will not be able to join [this movement] and reducing from it will mean that certain layers [of society] will not be able to find their hopes within it. This is our biggest [social] capital and we should carefully attempt to protect and purify it.

The support of the majority would have been sufficient if we had merely participated in an election. But in an enormous social movement the majority achieves victory when it reaches consensus. And it will enjoy an unopposed legitimacy when it shows attention to the concerns and the rights of those people who might think differently from it now or in the future.

We cannot expect a society, where a considerable number of people are struggling with their basic needs to widely participate in the political process. Of course this relationship is two-sided. A society deprived of fundamental freedoms and knowledge is incapable of providing a living standard that [its constituents] deserve. And at times of legendary [oil] income [the government] not only advancing the agenda of a charity economy, but also, does not achieve anything more than conceding the market and the national economy to foreigners. It is our belief that freedom is sustainable only when it comes with equality. Equally important to restrictions for freedom of speech and freedom of assembly is the widespread existence of poverty, corruption and discrimination that darkens the prospects of reaching an ideal society based on the constitution. [This is] particularly [true] since the policies of recent years do not entail a clear remedy for this situation. The fundamental damage to the national production has made continuity of profitable economic activity only a wishful desire, and securing an appropriate occupation is the desperate concern of young population and their families.

The path of God is diverse. To oppose tyranny and dictatorship and to achieve a progressive Iran, we should not be confined to one [path] or only accompany our like-minded companions. We need a discipline in our relationships such that the abduction of our companions and the destruction of units of this social network by forces of tyranny and injustice do not damage its livelihood and dynamics. Hence, we can remain capable of distinguishing our future goals based on the collective wisdom at each stage, and march towards these goals in great leaps.

If a political faction whose delusion of power is founded on opposing the [will of] the public and their just rights has a desire to solve this crisis, the least they can do at this stage to achieve this [desire] is as follows:

We are stepping on path to enlightenment that has already rejuvenated the elderly and matured the youth. I ask for God’s help for myself and for you in our struggle and I hope that with the cooperation and companionship of all the sympathizers of the establishment and the revolution the goals of the nation will be fulfilled on every stage of this struggle.

1. Form a truth finding commission and arbitration that is acceptable to all stakeholders in the tenth presidential election and investigate the crimes and fraud that were carried out and punish all wrongdoers.
2. A revision of the election laws such that conditions are formed for fair and just elections which people can trust.
3. Identify and punish the parties involved in the atrocities that occurred in the aftermath of the election against the people in all police, military and media institutions.
4. Attend to those who have suffered in the aftermath of the election, and the families of the victims. The release of all political activists and people who were arrested over the election, and put an end to their trial, redeem their dignity and put an end to the threats and harassments that they are still subject to, [harassments like] coercing them into giving up their rights and take back their complaints.
5. Enforce article 168 of the constitution to define political crime, and try the political crimes in the presence of a jury.
6. Guarantee the freedom of press, changing the biased behavior of National TV, removing restrictions imposed on political parties and groups, allowing different perspectives to be presented in the media, especially national TV. Reforming the national TV constitution such that it can be held accountable for its illegal actions.
7. Put the created capacities to action in light of a reading from the 44th article of the constitution to create private television and radio.
8. Guarantee the fundamental rights of people, the freedom to assembly and rallies by enforcing the 27th article of the constitution.
9. Legislate a ban on the interference of military officials in political affairs and prevent intervention of military forces in economic activities.

We are stepping on path to enlightenment that has already rejuvenated the elderly and matured the youth. I ask for God’s help for myself and for you in our struggle and I hope that with the cooperation and companionship of all the sympathizers of the establishment and the revolution the goals of the nation will be fulfilled on every stage of this struggle.

The Latest from Iran (5 September): A Quiet Phase

The Latest from Iran (4 September): A Friday Pause?

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2200 GMT: Another Reformist Fightback. Nasrullah Torabi, a reformist member of Parliament, has condemned the "desperate act" of the regime in applying pressure on the family of Imam Khomeini to cancel former President Khatami’s speech on Qadr Night and eventually the entire ceremony in the Imam's shrine (the first cancellation in 20 years), saying that these kinds of behaviour will cause people greater concern and have negative consequences in society.

2010 GMT: Striking Back at the Revolutionary Guard. On Wednesday we noted the declaration of General Johammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, that former Khatami and other reformist leaders such as Mousavi Khoeniha, as well as Hashemi Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi, had tried "to pull down the leadership at any cost".

A reader points us to the story's sequel. The Association of Combatant Clerics condemned Jafari’s assertions and asked for a judicial response: “Is it inappropriate to ask the prosecutor general to appropriately respond to this slander and lies, and other similar remarks, which have incited public opinion and are the groundwork for dangerous plans, particularly as the head of the judiciary has stressed that any violator regardless of the office he holds has to be confronted?”

Mohammad Ali Tabesh, the Secretary General of the minority reformist faction in Parliament, went even further, “Those who gave the IRGC permission to intervene in the elections and those who gave the Pasdaran the warrants to arrest and extract forced confessions, must be prosecuted, rather than those who have demonstrated they allegiance to the regime.”

Tabesh added to his warning, "I advise them to let us keep quiet. We have so far refrained from talking about many issues in order to preserve the regime and the revolution, and not allow the enemies to misuse such expressions under these conditions and do not intend to talk about them. So I hope these gentlemen do not do something that will result in posturing when some truths and realities will be made which will damage the regime.”

1950 GMT: Grand Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib has condemned the post-election repression, asking how those who have been brutally confronting people can call themselves Muslims. He added that these vicious acts and crimes by coup agents have tainted the face of Islam in the world and made youth lose hope in Islam and convert to other religions.

1940 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has said that he will defend the values of the revolution and the nation's interests as long as he lives and will never give up on this effort. He emphasised that the continuation of the Government's post-election approach is dangerous for the fate and future of the country, destroying the “Republic”, and emphasised continuing the resistance.

1600 GMT: Ebrahim Raeesi, the deputy head of Iran's judiciary and one of the three-person panel appointed by Sadegh Larijani to investigate claims of abuse of detainees, has said that Mehdi Karroubi has yet to prove the allegations put forward in his letter of late July.

1545 GMT: Great Blogs Think Alive. The Los Angeles Times has also picked up on Abdollah Ramezanzadeh's revelations (see 1305 GMT) about his 80-day detention in Evin Prison.

1410 GMT: The Los Angeles Times has now offered their own summary of the Mousavi statement (see 1215 GMT), highlighting this extract: "We shouldn't leave any stone unturned and live up to our commitments in our struggle against cheaters and liars. In pursuing our cause we should brave all the accusations, and we shouldn't duck any act of courage or daring."

1400 GMT: An Iranian website is featuring an interview with a staff member of Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery, giving details of the alleged secret burials of 40 protestors killed in post-election conflict.

An Iranian activist has provided an English summary via Twitter.

1305 GMT: Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, the Presidential spokesman in the Khatami Government who was held for almost three months in Evin Prison, has been interviewed by a reporter after his appearance in an Iranian "media court" on other charges:

I was arrested 2 hours after the election on the street by soldiers and was treated very harshly. During the arrest, my young son and I both were beaten. I sustained a cracked skull and broken ribs. Despite the obvious injuries I had, in Evin they only provided me with tissue paper to cover my wounds.

After 80 days in detention I still don't know what I am being charged with. I have been interrogated many times, blind folded, the interrogator stood behind me the entire time. I have been in solitary the entire time and have only had one family visit.

1225 GMT: Parleman News is reporting that, in preparation for a meeting with the special committee of Parliament investigating detentions, a judiciary representative is indicating there should be no more arrests and a release of all those detained on minor charges.

1215 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi has released a statement, which reached us via his wife Zahra Rahnavard's Facebook page, declaring,

Contrary to what the propaganda machine of the coup [Government] is trying to imply, it is we who are demanding the return of trust and peace to society and it is we who are avoiding any radical and violent act.We have very clear and logical demands. We demand strengthening national unity, the recovery of the moral and ethical identity of the establishment, and rebuilding the public trust as the main component of the political power structure of the country, which is not possible except by accepting people’s rights and gaining their consent in the outcomes of governmental matters and transparency in all measures by the continuous flow of information.

A full English translation is promised soon.

1200 GMT: Such a slow day on the domestic front that we will note the nuclear programme story. The Iranian Government is playing a carrot-and-stick game with the "5+1" powers (US, UK, Germany, France, Russia, and China). On the one hand, the secretary of the National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, is saying that Tehran will deliver a proposal next week "for fresh talks". On the other hand, Iranian envoy Ali Asghar Soltanieh has delivered a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency, saying that the agency has not provided "genuine" documents on allegations of a possible nuclear weapons programme and the matter is "closed."

Iran's position, in contrast to the Agency's claim that it had seen "multiple documents from multiple countries", is that the allegations are based solely on American fabrication of an "Iranian laptop" with the material: "The government of the United States has not handed over original documents to the agency since it does not in fact have any authenticated document and all it has are forged documents."

0655 GMT: As I type, I am watching Press TV's feature "Iran Today". It is covering the current political situation, highlighting the Parliament approval of the Ahmadinejad Cabinet. However, it is also striking that it notes the post-election protests and "the opposition has not been appeased".

The conclusion? "The challenges during Ahmadinejad's 2nd term are many", including unemployment, the budget, inflation, poverty, subsidies, and oil experts, "but these could be turned into opportunities by his new Cabinet members".

0630 GMT: The political lull continues this morning, as all sides regroup and reassess after the week's events, dominated by the negotiations over the Ahmadinejad Cabinet. We could re-post both yesterday's introductory update and the analysis "Has Ahmadinejad Won?" (where there has been an outstanding debate amongst readers) with no changes.

State media will make great play today of a visit by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to Tehran and his declaration of support for the Iranian nuclear programme. The Islamic Republic News Agency declares, "A New Club is Born." It's the first appearance by a foreign leader in Iran after the election, apart from brief trips by the King of Oman and Syria's Bashir al-Assad.

Mr Obama's Afghanistan War: The Cut-Out-and-Keep Essay by Scott Lucas

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I was going to write a specific analysis of this week's development in US foreign policy on Afghanistan, including the confidential (but selectively leaked) report by the US commander, General Stanley McChrystal, the joint briefing by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, and the general march to war by the US media.

But then it occurred to me: Obama history is only repeating itself. Type in "Afghanistan" in the Enduring America search box and look at our coverage from 20 January, when Obama took office, to the end of March. There you will find military reports submitted to the White House, a period of intense debate with US commanders pushing for as big a troop increase as possible, and Obama's advisors spinning back to limit the escalation. There you will find the immediate culmination, with a "compromise" of an additional 30,000 American forces (complementing a rise in private "security" units and contractors). You will find it justified by the rhetoric that we must fight Al Qa'eda and extremists in Afghanistan so they will not terrorise us "here" and supported by the promise that this is a combination of non-military and military steps to bring stability and progress to the Afghan people.

In May, I wrote an essay for an electronic collection on the Obama Administration and its approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Assessing the current events, which will culminate in another "compromise" escalation of the US military presence --- irrespective of what happens with the internal post-election political battle --- I see no reason to alter it. (For easier formatting, I have not included the footnotes to the essay but am happy to provide them for anyone who wants to follow up.)

MR OBAMA'S WARS: PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN

The analysis was so much simpler with the Bush Administration and its ambitions in Iraq. From the first meeting of the first National Security Council, the President and his advisors identified a strategic goal, namely the extension and maintenance of an American predominance, supported by the demonstration case of regime change in Baghdad. While aspects of the plan would be refined between January 2001 and March 2003, moving toward the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by direct military action rather than covert support of an indigenous challenge, the general aspiration remained. The tragedy of 9-11 would be deployed through the move from Al Qa'eda to the Iraqi menace of weapons of mass destruction. Strategic doctrine, such as the proposal of an Unholy Trinity of terrorism, tyranny, and technology, would underpin the plans;2 intelligence and analysis would be framed to justify the removal of a dictator who posed an imminent threat to the US and its allies.

The strategic ambition collapsed quickly amidst Iraqi insurgency and the exposure of the deceptions that led to war, but it had a clarity that could not be asserted in the case of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Bush Administration, after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, achieved its immediate goals within four months with the toppling of the Taliban and the installation of a suitable Government in Kabul, but as early as March 2002, it had turned its sights to the Iraqi campaign. The Karzai regime maintained a limited authority, while the Pakistani leader, General Pervez Musharraf, could rely --- until the rise of domestic opposition finally forced him from power in August 2008 --- on billions of dollars of American aid. Violence continued in both countries, but both in symbolism and in cost, it was dwarfed for Washington by the chaos in Iraq.

As I write this in May 2009, however, Afghanistan and Pakistan are now the central crises for US foreign policy. The Taliban has expanded its area of influence, now operating in 75 percent of the country.3 The Obama Administration has fired the commander of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, with promises of a “new strategy and a new mission “ under his replacement, General Stanley McChrystal.4 Obama's promises of economic aid and civilian involvement, accompanying a doubling of US troops in the country, have already been eclipsed by the military dimension of counter-insurgency; more than 100 civilians died in a single attack by American aircraft in early May. President Karzai, whose removal was being sought by Washington only months ago, has out-manoeuvred Washington: making new domestic political alliances, he appears to have secured his re-election in August.

In Pakistan, the immediate Washington-supported replacement for President Musharraf, Asif Ali Zardari, has been reduced to a figurehead, as Obama's officials press for the abrogation of political agreements with local groups and a military offensive against the “Pakistani Taliban”, who have expanded their operations beyond the Northwest Frontier Provinces and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Missile attacks by American drone aircraft, and the casualties from them, have escalated. Obama's envoy, Richard Holbrooke, travels regularly to Islamabad for meetings without any apparent resolution. Zardari and Karzai visit the US for a summit that is more for the securing of financial aid and of domestic political advantage than for a unifying effort against “insurgents”.

Yet it is far from clear that Washington has a strategy, for Afghanistan, Pakistan, or for an “Af-Pak” combination. The Administration, from the President to General Petraeus, invoke the threat of Al Qa'eda and “extremists”, folding the opposition of local political groups into that formula or setting it aside. Schemes are launched to undermine and possibly even remove national leaders, without any apparent consideration of political alternatives, let alone long-term stability.
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In his Inaugural speech in January 2009, President Obama referred to only two countries outside the United States: “We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people, and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan.” The juxtaposition indicated that the new Administration would not only make the Afghan situation a priority; it would supplant Iraq as the priority for US foreign policy. The next day Obama's National Security Council took up the issue, and the day after that, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, a holdover from the Bush Administration, indicated that there would be a significant change in approach: the US Government would now pursue “very concrete things” such as establishing control in parts of the country, pursuing Al Qaeda, and delivering services and security for the Afghan people.

However, the statements did not herald a new, unifying strategy. For the next month, there was a protracted battle within the Executive Branch between Obama's White House staff and US military commanders, with Gates in the middle. The generals pressed for their request for 30,000 extra troops, raising the total American commitment to 68,000, to be met in full “as the foundation on whatever the president decides to develop in terms of a further strategy”. The President played for time, setting aside the military studies that had been prepared for his first day in office for an interagency review led by his envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, and former CIA operative Bruce Riedel.
Meanwhile some Obama advisors were considering a replacement for the Afghanistan President. A White House official told The New York Times, “Mr. Karzai is now seen as a potential impediment to American goals in Afghanistan, the officials said, because corruption has become rampant in his government, contributing to a flourishing drug trade and the resurgence of the Taliban.” Among those supposedly supporting a change were Vice President Joe Biden and Holbrooke.

Beyond these immediate battles, the question remained: what was the Obama Administration strategy to stabilise Afghanistan? The President's unease was evident in his first meeting with Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when he asked, “What's the endgame?” According to his staff, he “did not receive a convincing answer”, either from his advisors or from General David McKiernan, the commander of US forces in Afghanistan.11
Confusion was soon evident within the Administration. Obama's decision to appoint a special envoy, while checking the military push for quick decisions, had muddled lines of authority. Gates was still involved as a broker, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appeared to have an ill-defined, if any, role. While some officials were leaking to the media, “[We will] leave economic development and nation-building increasingly to European allies, so that American forces [can] focus on the fight against insurgents,” other White House staffers were jumping in, “There is no purely military solution to the challenge in Afghanistan so there will be a significant non-military component to anything that we seek to undertake.”

In mid-February, Obama offered a compromise on the military front, approving about 2/3 of the military's demands while holding the line that longer-term decision would await the completion of the Holbrooke-Riedel study.Yet even in this supposed resolutions, methods and specific objectives remained vague. General Petraeus's acolytes grumbled, ““You had people from the Department of Agriculture weighing in. There were too many cooks. The end result was lowest-common-denominator stuff. The usual Petraeus acuity wasn’t there.” Instead, the unifying rationale was in the rhetorical presentation of “Al Qa'eda” and “extremists”. The President's imagery merely reinforced the message put out by his staff within a week of the Inauguration, “What we’re trying to do is to focus on the Al Qaeda problem. That has to be our first priority.”

Instead of bringing strategic clarity, the significance of the invocation of a bin Laden-led threat lay beyond Afghanistan, for in that portrayal lay the expansion of crisis and thus US intervention in Pakistan. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the link at the start of February, “We cannot accept that [an] Al Qa'eda leadership which continues to plan against us every single day — and I mean us, here in America — to have [a] safe haven in Pakistan nor could resume one in Afghanistan.”

Initially the White House balked at Mullen's extension and tried to keep Afghanistan and Pakistan as separate issues, telling The Washington Post: “Senior administration officials described their approach to Pakistan — as a major U.S. partner under serious threat of internal collapse — as fundamentally different from the Bush administration’s focus on the country as a Taliban and al-Qaeda “platform” for attacks in Afghanistan and beyond.” Less than a week later, however, the President embraced the “Af-Pak” connection: “My bottom line is that we cannot allow al Qaeda to operate. We cannot have those safe havens in that region. And we’re going to have to work both smartly and effectively, but with consistency, in order to make sure that those safe havens don’t exist.”

Obama did not specify why he had suddenly connected the conflict in Afghanistan to “extremism” in Pakistan; one possibility is that he was increasingly influenced by the process led by Holbrooke and Riedel, who was setting out the notion of “an existential threat from within” in the latter country. The review, completed in late March, asserted:
Afghanistan pales in comparison to the problems in Pakistan. Our primary goal has to be to shut down the al-Qaeda and Taliban safe havens on the Pakistan side of the border. If that can be accomplished, then the insurgency in Afghanistan becomes manageable.
Secretary of Defense Gates and Obama reiterated the connection throughout March: “At the heart of a new Afghanistan policy is going to be a smarter Pakistan policy. As long as you’ve got safe havens in these border regions that the Pakistani government can’t control or reach, in effective ways, we’re going to continue to see vulnerability on the Afghan side of the border.” Despite public opposition from the Pakistani Government and military, the US expanded missile strikes from its secret base in northwest Pakistan. US special forces advised Pakistan units while Washington pressed for an offensive against local insurgents.

Thus, as he stepped to the podium on 27 March, announcing the Administration's conclusions from the Riedel review, President Obama was committing his Administration to two, linked (at least in the American conception) wars: “This is not simply an American problem: far from it. This is an international security challenge of the highest order. Terrorist attacks in London, in Bali were tied to Al Qa’eda and its allies in Pakistan as were attacks in North Africa and the Middle East and Islamabad and in Kabul. If there is a major attack on an Asian, European, or Africa, it too is likely to have ties to Al Qa’eda leadership in Pakistan.” Even as his Administration was declaring that it was putting away its predecessor's framework of the “War on Terror”, Obama was invoking it: “[This is] the same war that we initiated after 9/11 as a consequence of those attacks on 3,000 Americans, who were just going about their daily round.”

In the two conflicts, Pakistan had overtaken Afghanistan as the Administration's primary concern. Holbrooke told the press, “We have to deal with the western Pakistan problem….Our superiors would all freely admit that of all the dilemmas and challenges we face, that is going to be the most daunting…because it’s a sovereign country and there is a red line.” Yet the identification of crisis did not amount to a strategy. To the contrary, it seemed to undermine Obama's general proclamation of “a comprehensive strategy that doesn’t just rely on bullets or bombs, but also relies on agricultural specialists, on doctors, on engineers, to help create an environment in which people recognize that they have much more at stake...than giving in to some of these extremist ideologies”;50 the non-military promises would soon be overshadowed by the military tactics proposed for the immediate emergency

Moreover, the rhetoric about striking Al Qa'eda/extremist enemies and the shift to hitting the Pakistani safe havens obscured the “hole in the middle” of the US approach. Where was the political complement, and specificially the Afghan or Pakistani political partner, for this initiative?

Far from giving in to Washington's demands or accepting his overthrow, President Karzai fought back, both in the American media and in domestic politics. He publicly criticised US airstrikes, which were killing more and more Afghan civilians, and opened up secret discussions with Taliban representatives. While his effort to schedule Presidential elections in April was challenged by the US and blocked by local electoral officials, who postponed the vote to August, Karzai established new domestic alliances and bolstered old ones. Meanwhile, candidates favoured by the US have fallen far behind, undercut by political in-fighting, their weaknesses, or their too-close relationship with Washington.
US officials have continued to hint not-so-subtly that Afghans should remove their President in August. Both Clinton and Holbrooke said at the start of April, “We do think [corruption] is a cancer. President Karzai says publicly that he agrees with that. And now it’s up to his government to take action. But I would stress...that there is an election coming up on August 20th....And that election will be a chance for the people to vote on these issues.”

Pakistan offers the different dynamic of a weak President. Asif Ali Zardari's primary aim has been to maintain his domestic position, particularly in the face of public demonstrations demanding significant political and judicial and an escalating economic crisis. So he endorsed an agreement with local tribes in northwest Pakistan, accepting a sharia system in exchange for a cease-fire.

That step, in combination with Zardari's political weaknesses and history of corruption, put him beyond the acceptable for American steps in Pakistan. So Washington, on the political front, opened up talks with alternative leaders like the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. More importantly, the US sought a direct channel with the leader of Pakistan's armed forces, Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani. A senior Administration official said in early March: “We have to re-establish close personal relationships with the army. We have to be sure they’re on the same page as we are. Based on what I saw, they aren’t yet.”

Within days, the connection with Kiani set out that same page to limit any violence from public demonstrations in the Long March against Zardari's Government. The Washington Post, using Administration sources, then outlined, “The Administration is putting the finishing touches on a plan to greatly increase economic and development assistance to Pakistan, and to expand a military partnership considered crucial to striking a mortal blow against al-Qaeda’s leadership and breaking the Pakistani-based extremist networks that sustain the war in Afghanistan….But the weakness of Pakistan’s elected government — backed into a corner by weekend demonstrations that left its political opposition strengthened — has called into question one of the basic pillars of that plan.”

Those “holes in the middle” in turn point to the superficial nature, and ultimately the weakness, of the Obama plan. Not trusting Zardari to oversee either the military campaign or the programme of economic development, the US began talks with former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif; while Sharif, deposed by the Musharraf coup of 1999, had been seen as too “Islamist” in his politics by Washington, now he was the alternative to the ineffective President. The promises of economic advance were eclipsed by political worries: “[The situation] had gotten significantly worse than I expected as the Swat deal [with local tribes] unraveled,” said Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Within six weeks, those assurances of the non-military dimension have been eclipsed or fallen by the wayside. Washington pressed Zardari to abrogate the Swat Valley agreements with local tribes, and when the Taliban responded by expanding operations beyond the northwest, the Pakistani military launched an offensive which continues as I write. So far from “growing” the economy and social services, the US-backed drive on the safe havens has generated up to one million refugees, out of a local populaton of 1.3 million, in and beyond the Swat Valley.

Meanwhile, General Petraeus --- having been initially rebuffed by Obama --- is reasserting his conception of a military-first counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. Less than a week after Obama said, “What I will not do is to simply assume that more troops always result in an improved situation,” Petraeus was putting forth the request for another 10,000 troops.37 In early May, Petraeus pushed for --- and got from the President --- the firing of General McKiernan and his replacement by General McChrystal, a Petraeus ally whose background is in Special Operations. The change came less than a week after US bombs killed more than 100 people in Farah province, the largest civilian death toll in a single incident since 2001. In two major interviews with US broadcasters days later, Petraeus made no reference to non-military activities in Afghanistan.

The irony is not that Obama's promise of a strategy led by politics rather than boots on the ground rings hollow but that the military approach may be eclipsed by Afghan politics. Manoeuvring to strengthen his own position, Karzai has advocated talks with former foes. By May, his persistence was being met by cautious but clear welcome from former Taliban officials, and it may have even led to a cautious American embrace, as US officials were allegedly in discussions with a California-based representative of the former Afghan leader Gulbuddin Hekmatayar.

There were still public warnings to Karzai, as in Secretary of State Clinton's testimony to a Senate hearing at the end of April, “With respect to the Government, its capacity, its problems providing services, its perception of being less than transparent, straightforward, honest: it’s a problem, I’m not going to tell you it’s not”, followed by her omission of Karzai's name when she added, “Several members of the Cabinet are doing an excellent job.” On the day of the Afghan President's visit to Washington, Washington Post reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran resurrected the line, “Senior members of Obama's national security team say Karzai has not done enough to address the grave challenges facing his nation. They deem him to be a mercurial and vacillating chieftain who has tolerated corruption and failed to project his authority beyond the gates of Kabul.”

However, as Karzai visited President Obama in May, he did so with the assurances that he had struck political deals to lock down voting blocs, notably through the naming of his two Vice Presidential running mates, while potential threats had withdrawn from the electoral campaign. So it was he who could take the high ground, lecturing the US about the civilian casualties of bombing: “It’s the standard of morality that we are seeking which is also one that is being desired and spoken about in America.”
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In an interview with Newsweek magazine, published in mid-May, President Obama was asked, “What's the hardest thing you have had to do?” He replied:

Order 17,000 additional troops into Afghanistan. There is a sobriety that comes with a decision like that because you have to expect that some of those young men and women are going to be harmed in the theater of war. And making sure that you have thought through every angle and have put together the best possible strategy, but still understanding that in a situation like Afghanistan the task is extraordinarily difficult and there are no guarantees, that makes it a very complicated and difficult decision.

Significantly, however, as Obama went through the narrative of the decision to increase military forces in Afghanistan, his lengthy reply did not address strategy. Instead, he offered empathy (“meeting with young men and women who've served, and their families, and the families of soldiers who never came back”) and context (“a recognition that the existing trajectory was not working, that the Taliban had made advances, that our presence in Afghanistan was declining in popularity, that the instability along the border region was destabilizing Pakistan as well”) before ending in a vague description of process and bureaucracy:

Once that strategic review had been completed, then I sat in a room with the principals and argued about it, and listened to various perspectives, saw a range of options in terms of how we could move forward; asked them to go back and rework their numbers and reconsider certain positions based on the fact that some of the questions I asked could not be answered. And when I finally felt that every approach—every possible approach—had been aired, that all the questions had either been answered or were unanswerable, at that point I had to make a decision and I did.

Even at the level of tactics, Obama's “decision” seems muddled. The Administration adopted the position of ostensibly supporting the Pakistani Government, while undermining its President. US officials told favoured journalists, “On some major security and intelligence issues, [Zardari] claimed no knowledge or sought to shift blame to others, and the overall impression was of an accidental president who still has an uncertain grasp on power.” Obama himself blasted the civilian leadership, to the point where he threatened overruling them:

I am gravely concerned about the situation in Pakistan….The civilian government there right now is very fragile and don’t seem to have the capacity to deliver basic services: schools, health care, rule of law, a judicial system that works for the majority of the people. We will provide them all of the cooperation that we can. We want to respect their sovereignty, but we also recognize that we have huge strategic interests, huge national security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don’t end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.

In May, President Zardari was on an extended tour outside Pakistan when the long-awaited (from Washington's viewpoint) military offensive against the Taliban was launched. The public face on the campaign was instead Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani.

In Afghanistan, the political machinations of the US Government, far from getting the “right” leadership, had merely strengthened the President it hoped to depose. Outside Kabul, the collateral damage of US air attacks alienated civilians, working to the advantage of insurgents. The replacement of the American commander in Afghanistan, far from promising a re-consideration with “fresh eyes”, offered the assurance that the military tactics --- without any apparent consideration of their political counterpart --- simply needed to be refined and “targeted”. In their rhetoric, Obama officials, for all their invocations of “existential threat”, risking making Pakistan an (expendable) frontline in US homeland security; as one critic cogently assessed, “In short, it’s not the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to keep Pakistan stable, it is his responsibility to attack extremist safe havens in Pakistan in order to prevent a catastrophic terrorist attack against the US, Canada, or the European Union.”

On 19 May Secretary of State Clinton, in the midst of announcing $110 million in emergency aid (part of which, she hoped, would be donated by benevolent viewers), declared, “Our policy toward Pakistan over the last 30 years has been incoherent.” She did not pause to consider the possible irony of coherence in her own statement: having initially promised aid for the “progress” and development of Pakistani communities, Clinton was now offering the money for their sacrifice, with because 2 million of them had been internally displaced by US-backed military operations.

And perhaps she did not need to pause for consideration. The geographic focus of the Obama Administration may differ from that of its predecessor, but its rhetoric of the battle against Al Qa'eda and extremists, transcending the reality of the local situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, holds forth Marilyn Young's notion of the “limited unlimited war”. In such a war, the strategic ends of not only a military “victory” for US forces but political, economic, and social resolution for the populaces in those countries are peripheral; the ongoing battle is an end in itself. “War” and “national security” take over, rationalised by a permanent fear.

Which is why, when asked in the Newsweek interview, “Can anything get you ready to be a war president?”, Obama could reduce “strategic issues” to an 18-word question:

I think that it certainly helps to know the broader strategic issues involved. I think that's more important than understanding the tactics involved....The president has to make a decision: will the application of military force in this circumstance meet the broader national-security goals of the United States?

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Inside Line Special: Iraq, Syria, and Turkey's Move into the Middle East

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Iraq and Syria are in the midst of the most serious tension between the two countries since the 2003 Iraq War. The Iraqi Government has blamed two devastating truck bombs that killed 95 people and wounded 600 in Baghdad on August 19 on insurgents who crossed the Syrian border. Yesterday Iraq deployed thousands of reinforcements along the border, and the Government asserted that it had provided Damascus with evidence linking Iraqis in Syria to the bombings.

Two countries' conflict are another's opportunity, however. For Turkey, mediation between Baghdad and Damascus is a chance to implement its "strategy in depth" in the Middle East. On Monday, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met Iraqi counterpart Hoshyar Zebari, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and President Jalal Talabani in Baghdad.

After offering his condolences to Iraqi people and a denunciation of the bombings as a threat to the stability of Iraq, Davutoglu asked the Iraqi Government to take a become milder line towards Syria, following al-Maliki’s initial harsh statement that Iraq "asked Syria to return to us those targeting the Iraqi people but Syria sent us only common criminals.” Davutoglu told al-Maliki that there was no short-term solution for the crisis and offered to take information and documents to Damascus, establishing co-operation between Syria, Iraq and Turkey.

The documents referred to briefly today in The Washington Post are the outcome of Davutoglu's intervention. But this, for Ankara, is only the beginning. Just as it used another crisis, the Gaza War of December-January, to further its ties with Syria and its Middle Eastern presence, so it will now extend that influence by being the "good broker" to two of its most important neighbours.

The Latest from Iran (4 September): A Friday Pause?

NEW Neda Update: The Appeal for Her Detained Fiance, Caspian Makan
NEW Iran: Satire Becomes “News” – Ahmadinejad’s Ayatollah and Prisoner Rape
Latest Iran Video: The Ruholamini Memorial (3 September)
The Latest from Iran (3 September): Ahmadinejad Gets His Cabinet

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2015 GMT: Being a Detainee is Jolly Nice. Fars News has run an "interview" with Saeed Hajjarian in which the reformist politician expresses “his satisfaction about his condition in prison.” Hajjarian denies “being hospitalized, being subjected to harsh forms of torture or given mind-altering drugs.”

Hajjarian's daughter Zeinab offers a different picture, writing Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili, that her mother is under severe pressure from Government interrogators and that her father has told the authorities, “I have followed your dictates and announced that my situation in prison is satisfactory. Why don’t you leave my family alone?”

1405 GMT: There Goes My Visiting Professor Post at Tehran University. At Friday prayers in Tehran, Ayatollah Mohammad Emami Kashani has declared that the study of the humanities is very important but the subjects should be not be taught in "the Western style".

Reuters' take on the address is that Kashani tried to turn attention away from Iran's legitimacy crisis towards its influence overseas: "It is now the time to export the revolution...it is not the time to treat each other like this. Such remarks cause damage to the Islamic society and prevent the export of the revolution."

1355 GMT: Making Supreme Lemonade out of Cabinet Lemons. Full credit to Press TV and Fars News for their conversion of potential criticism of yesterday's vote of confidence into high praise for the Supreme Leader.

Here was their challenge. The Vice Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, has revealed that up to 9 of the 21 Ministers nominated by President Ahmadinejad were not winning over the Parliament, "If we had not received the Leader's recommendations, eight or nine ministers would have failed to win the vote of confidence. It would not have been a good start for the government."

Hmm....that's not high praise for Ahmadinejad's people, and it seems to indicate the Supreme Leader interfered in a Parliamentary process. But wait. Press TV sticks that admission in the 7th paragraph, far below the "right" interpretation:

Iran's vice speaker, Mohammad-Reza Bahonar, has hailed the Leader of the Islamic Revolution for providing Parliament with "friendly" guidance on clearing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's nominees for his cabinet.

Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei "recommended that the government should start working at the earliest and with fullest capacity at the time when the country is faced with domestic and international crises and issues," Fars News Agency quoted Bahonar as saying on Thursday.

Well played, sir. Very well played.

1335 GMT: A full list of the 72 people whose deaths have been confirmed in post-election violence has now been posted on the Internet.

1325 GMT: After a quiet morning, some items of interest are emerging. Khabar carries an interview with a Revolutionary Guard member describing the capture of leading reformists such as Saeed Hajjarian and the methods used to make them "confess".

1040 GMT: The Holy Shrine of Imam Khomeini has announced the cancellation of all forthcoming events during Ramadan. Former President Khatami was due to speak at the shrine next week, with Green movement activists discussing a rally in support.

1035 GMT: Mohammad Reza Bahonar, a Deputy Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, has claimed that the Supreme Leader's intervention was necessary for the approval of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and five other ministers (oil, industry, trade, cooperatives, and transport).

1030 GMT: We've just posted a warning about running too quickly with "news" on Iran, documenting how a satirical piece on Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi authorising rape of prisoners turned into "reality".

0930 GMT: Still very quiet on news front, so we'll happily note that Josh Shahryar's excellent dissection of the "pro-Ahmadinejad" argument on the Iranian election --- which we posted on Tuesday --- has now made it to The Huffington Post.

0730 GMT: With news slowing after yesterday's events in Parliament, we've taken the time to write an extended analysis of the current and future political and economic situation, "Has Ahmadinejad Won?" Thanks to all our readers, whose comments yesterday were invaluable.

Away from Parliament, the "40th day" memorial ceremony for Mohsen Ruholamini (pictured), who died in detention in Evin Prison, took place yesterday at Vali-e Asr Mosque in Tehran. Since Ruholamini's father, Abdolhossein Ruholamini, is a prominent "conservative" political activist and advisor to Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, the authorities posed no obstacle, as they have been with other memorials for slain protestors. We've posted the video in a separate entry.