Iran Exclusive: The Escalating Battle With Ahmadinejad

Last month two leaders of the Motalefeh (Islamic Coalition) Party, Habibollah Asgarowladi and Mohammad Nabi Habibi, requested a meeting with President Ahmadinejad. The discussion soon went beyond polite regards: Asgrowladi and Nabi Habibi told Ahmadinejad that he was "the biggest cause" of the improved position of the Green Movement in Iranian society.

The leaders of Motalefeh --- which has been a conservative mainstay of the Islamic Republic since its formation --- went further. They asked Ahmadinejad, "Who was the first person to chant, 'Marg bar Velayat-e-Faqih' (Death to Clerical Supremacy)?"

The President said nothing. Asgarowladi and Nabi Habibi continued, "You." In Ahmadinejad's televised debate with Mir Hossein Mousavi in the 2009 campaign, they explained, the President had equated the fate of the Revolution with his own. Ahmadinejad had put himself above everyone, even the Supreme Leader, and the Islamic Republic.

The meeting might seem extraordinary, but it is only one more incident in the battle against the President --- a battle that, at the moment, is not being led by the Greens or the reformists but by conservatives who are disillusioned with the state of Iran and with Ahmadinejad's personal approach to politics.

Since January, we have documented the escalation of that battle, to the point where key conservatives such as Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani and 2009 Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei have been involved in discussions of how to limit or even replace Ahmadinejad, on a daily basis. Defenders of the President, inside and outside Iran, will argue that this is only the normal rough-and-tumble of politics and that the Government as well as the regime is secure.

We're not so sure. From sources inside Iran, we get the picture of rising rather than falling difficulties.

Prices are now increasing, in some cases soaring, across a range of essentials. This week it was reported that electricity bills have risen for some consumers in Tehran by five times. Water has become more expensive. Lamb, which sells for about £10 per kilogramme ($7 per pound) in Britain, is £15 per kilogramme ($10.50 per pound) in Iran, with its lower level of wages.

Sources report that the cultural atmosphere is increasing turning against the "Islamic Revolution". The disappointment and anger is not translating into open political activity. Instead, amidst the repression and sense of crisis, there is a lethargy. Young people are looking to emigrate, and university students are seeking visas to study abroad.

This summer, the rift had opened not only between the President and Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani but also between Ahmadinejad and the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani. In separate meetings with the Supreme Leader, Ali and Sadegh each said that the President was not popular and continued, "Please believe it. Don't support him."

Ayatollah Khamenei insisted, "No, this is not the situation." He told the Larijanis that there must be co-operation and said that he would hold a meeting at the start of Ramadan.

Ali Larijani replied, "My heart is not in it." Khamenei responded, "This is a religious duty."

As we noted in detail at the time, the Supreme Leader did chair that discussion with Ahmadinejad and the two Larijanis, following this with a public speech invoking "unity". A few days later, Ali Larijani and Ahmadinejad gave a public show of reconciliation.

Soon, however, that display broke down. Ahmadinejad's appointment of special envoys for international affairs led to dispute with Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, who had previously kept quiet over the political tensions, and opened up the space for renewed criticism by the President's opponents in Parliament and the conservative media. The fragile economic situation offered the platform for a gradual renewal of criticism by Ahmadinejad's foes.

And so it was that, only a few weeks after his dramatic intervention and loud proclamation of "unity", the Supreme Leader was once more --- at the behest of his officials and politicians --- having to rebuke Ahmadinejad. This was not only over foreign policy but over the President's economic management, including privatisation and handling of imports.

Is that enough to hold the Government together for some more months? Another story....

Last month Mohsen Rezaei --- former commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Secretary of the Expediency Council, 2009 Presidential candidate --- met the Supreme Leader. Rezaei requested, "Please let us carry out the unity plan," by which he meant support of a combination of leading politicians and officials that would curb and possibly put aside Ahmadinejad.

The Supreme Leader asked, "Will this include [opposition figures Mir Hossein] Mousavi and [Mehdi] Karroubi?"

Rezaei paused for a very long moment and then said, "Maybe."

Khamenei was quicker in his response, "No."

So, as our sources summarise, "Iran is in a cul-de-sac." Most of the population is dispirited and apathetic about politics; they see no care for them from the Government, no benefit in the Republic, no use in pursuit of "reform".

Meanwhile, the establishment is increasingly fragmented. Ahmadinejad is in political difficulties, facing heavyweight challenges from the Parliament and possibly from Iran's judiciary, but he can still rely upon the security services and his allies still dominate the Ministry of Intelligence.

Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Leader still has not pulled the trigger on his President. There have been times when it appeared Ayatollah Khamenei might do so. for example, last summer in the dispute over Ahmadinejad's power play for Iran's ministries and his insistence on keeping Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, now Chief of Staff, by his side. It appears, however, that Khamenei is still acceptingalbeit without satisfaction and with a great deal of concern --- "the devil he knows" rather than the devil he doesn't. He cannot accept a political coalition which --- without Ahmadinejad --- might have to reach out to reformists and the opposition to bring a semblance of stability.

I suspect Ahmadinejad and his allies not only know that but are playing upon that. For the Supreme Leader's rebukes of his President have not brought the downfall of the controversial Rahim-Mashai. They have not brought a retraction of the President's foreign policy move with his appointment of special envoys, including the same Rahim-Mashai. They have not even brought a shift in Ahmadinejad's economic approach.

This is turning into quite a contest. For at the end of the day --- assuming that the conservatives who dislike the President do not put the white flag --- both the President and the Supreme Leader cannot emerged unbloodied. Either Ahmadinejad must be publicly limited or the weakness of Khamenei's claim of a "velayat-e-faqih", as the Motalefeh leaders foretold in their meeting with the President), will have been exposed.

On to the next round....

Iran Feature: Re-visiting the 2009 Election (Keshavarz)

Writing in CounterPunch, Fatemeh Keshavarz re-examines what may have happened in the 2009 Presidential election, bringing in analysis of a recently-leaked audio in which a Revolutionary Guard commander describes interference by the Iranian military before, during, and after the vote.



Keshavarz applies her analysis to the tension in Iran today, 15 months after the election: "The leak of the tape, whether by the IRGC [Islamic Revolution Guards Corps] intelligence [bureau] or unhappy elements among them, makes another point clear. The battle of Ahmadinejad’s government for establishing its legitimacy is not over --- not even among the members of the Guard. The intelligence chiefs therefore deem it necessary to convince their own members that they are in control of the situation --- better still, they themselves have masterminded the current situation in the first place.

More than a year has passed since millions of Iranians marched on the streets calling the 2009 election a military coup carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG), their militia the Basij, and their armed plainclothes hired hands "lebaseshakhsis". The goals of the coup: keeping Ahmadinejad in power and completing the military and economic control of the IRG in the country. After beating up, arresting, and sometimes killing the protesters, the government put a record number of Iranian journalists behind bars (most now serving long sentences) and banned the foreign press from entering the country except to report on officially-orchestrated occasions.

Subsequently, Mir Housein Mousavi, the main opponent of Ahmadinejad and many members of the reformist opposition --- known as the Green Movement --- were put effectively under house arrest curbing their ability to reach the public in Iran. Moving the scenes of its brutality from the streets to jails and interrogation rooms, the regime dropped out of headlines thereby reducing the pressure on the Iranian authorities to answer for their brutal treatment of the opposition.

In the meantime, using its full control over the media, the Iranian government began to promote an alternative account of the 2009 election, an account which has not been without impact on the western left. It goes like this: the Iranian upper and upper middle classes, fooled by the western supporters of the reformists, had assumed that they had the majority while, in fact, in small towns and villages widespread support for Ahmadinejad gave him his 63% victory in the elections. Frustrated with their own miscalculations, the defeated reformists resorted to street violence, and therefore the government had no choice but to use harsher measures to calm things down.

This scenario has many big holes including the fact that, even if Ahmadinejad had the support of the rural areas, the Iranian population is about 65% urban and in fact the large cities are more than able to give any candidate a victory. Furthermore, hundreds of video clips document the peacefulness of the early protest marches in large cities as well as small towns. They also document the unprovoked violence of the security forces against the marchers.

All of this has become relevant again. Less than a month ago, an audio file of a speech by a chief intelligence officer and interrogator from the top ranks of the Revolutionary Guards came to light describing the behind-the-scenes [manoeuvres] of Ahmadinejad’s 2009 victory. The speech was leaked to the opposition websites, and spread fast despite the heavy censorship imposed in Iran. Besides the fascinating details revealed in it, there are other things that make the document important including the fact that no one (not even the government) has disputed its authenticity.

It is, in fact, very likely that the speech was leaked intentionally by the government itself. These facts lead to important questions. Who is the speaker? What does the tape reveal? What is the reformist opposition doing about it? And, why would the Iranian government leak a document that confirms its complicity in a fraudulent election, if indeed the leak has been intentional?

First a quick update on the current conditions in Iran. The country still has the highest number of jailed reporters in the world and only the official news and views are reported on the national media. Expressing political opposition in a blog can lead to five years in jail where the prisoners go on frequent hunger strikes to protest torture, unsanitary living conditions, and insult. Female prisoners will receive reduced sentences if they confess to illicit sexual relations with prominent members of the reform movement. Families of the prisoners who resist making confessions are threatened with more arrests.

And, despite Mr. Ahmadinejad’s claim quoted in The New Yorker’s recent piece “After the Crackdown”, his critics are not free to speak their minds. A standard charge for jailed journalists is “insulting (read criticizing) the president.” To get a sense of the problem, imagine you are an Iranian blogger citing Mr. Ahmadinejad’s claim in his New Yorker interview in your blog and asking, “If it is ok to criticize our president, why are some journalists in jail for 'insulting' him?” You will likely receive a brief phone call from a security agent within days. He will tell you to introduce yourself to one of the intelligence headquarters (or even directly to the main office of Evin Prison). If you are smart, you will do so immediately and quietly.

Side by side with these “security” measures, the National Iranian Radio and Television works to uphold its conspiratorial master narrative: the discovery of a “foreign” plot to end the supremacy of Islam in Iran. Those who would criticize the government are agents of this foreign “enemy.” One does not even need a blog to be considered a foreign agent. It is enough to mention an anti-government protest to a friend in an e-mail, or, worse still, attach a picture of the protest to the e-mail. Last week, in anticipation of the official Quds Day celebration, the day the Iranian government reiterates its support for the Palestinians, the e-mail use was reduced to three hours a day.

The universities (particularly the schools of humanities and social sciences) are perceived as infested with sympathy for the foreign enemy. In the past ten months, Ali Khamenei the Supreme Leader, major cleric Mesbah Yazdi, and Sadeq Larijani, the head of the Iranian judiciary, have all spoken about the unsuitability of the humanities for Iranian universities. Mr. Larijani targeted sociology, psychology, and the branch of philosophy that addresses human existential issues as the most unsuitable ones.

Against this sustained discourse of a foreign threat --- versus the dutiful, legitimate, and honest efforts of the government to offset the treat –-- there is now the newly leaked audio-file of a speech in which, a major Revolutionary Guard intelligence officer and interrogator brags about saving the Supreme Leader’s glory via keeping Mr. Ahmadinejad in the presidential office. This has, according to him, been done single-handedly by members of the Revolutionary Guard through sensible planning and timely action: that is identifying the enemy (the reformists), and using all means (obstruction, violence, spying, threats, and arrests) to stop them from winning the election.

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