Iran Urgent Analysis: Judiciary Overrules Ahmadinejad --- Release of US Detainee Shourd Delayed

UPDATED 2100 GMT: President Ahmadinejad's office has just issued a brief statement, via the Islamic Republic News Agency, that the release of the "American spy" Sarah Shourd has been delayed.

LATEST Iran Breaking: Latest on Detained US Hiker Sarah Shourd

The release of Sarah Shourd, one of three US citizens picked up by Iranian authorities in July 2009 while hiking near the Iraq-Iran border, has been delayed.

An Iranian Labor News Agency story quotes Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi, in what appears to have been a sudden, late-night intervention (after 11 p.m. Tehran time), "Because the legal procedure on her case is not finished, her release is canceled."

The release was supposed to take place at 9 a.m. Saturday at the Hafeziyeh of Saad Abad, a Presidential palace which has been the site of high-profile appearances of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and visiting leaders.

Our snap analysis?

The Foreign Ministry and, more importantly, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, pushed too hard and too fast on the release of Sarah Shourd. Not necessarily in the release itself --- that could be justified as a humanitarian gesture, given the end of Ramadan and Shourd's gender and poor health --- but in its presentation.

Initially the freeing of Shourd was to take place in a hotel in north Tehran, probably as a low-key handover to Swiss officials, who represent US diplomatic interests in Iran. Then, however, the plans changed: the ceremony was now going to take place in the Presidential palace at Saad Abad, the site of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's public appearances with foreign leaders.-

At the same time, the Foreign Ministry --- which had recently been at odds with the President but which wanted the release of at least one US detainee as a diplomatic move --- put out the message that Ahmadinejad deserved the credit for Shourd's release.

So now a low-key freeing of the detainee had become a high-profile showpiece for the President. A showpiece on 11 September, with all that date means, and thus a clear signal of accommodation with the US. A showpiece which in itself was the warm-up act for Ahmadinejad's trip to New York and the United Nations later this month. (Remember, the wider context is Ahmadinejad's desire to return to uranium enrichment talks with Washington via the 5+1 powers.)

That was too much for both Larijanis, Speaker of Parliament Ali and head of judiciary Sadegh. The two, already manoeuvring vis-a-vis the President over authority in a dispute which had been escalating in recent weeks, did not want Ahmadinejad to take the glory and thus the political legitimacy of spearheading Shourd's release. (A bit of recent history: in 2007, 15 British sailors were held for weeks in Tehran after supposedly straying into Iranian waters. Although Ali Larijani was central to the discussions that brought their release, it was Ahmadinejad who presided over a choreographed ceremony and gift-giving to the sailors as they were freed.)

And there was an added bit of distaste for Ahmadinejad's critics. Word was getting out that the "high officials" who were to appear at this suddenly-arranged very public ceremony might included the President's controversial and widely-disliked Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

So, at the last minute, on the Iranian weekend and after most of the media had gone to sleep, Sadegh Larijani's judiciary moved. The Foreign Ministry and the Presidency had no right intervening in a judicial matter. Shourd's release would have to be considered by the proper authorities, i.e., Iran's courts.

At least for this moment, that sudden move has prevailed.

Meanwhile, where is the Supreme Leader, the supposed authority in Iran's system? The apparent answer tonight is that he had been off to the side of all this drama. With Ahmadinejad's speed in raising the profile of Shourd's release and with the judiciary's sudden counter-attack, there has been no space for Ayatollah Khamenei to intervene. And, if he were to do so right now, he risks putting himself in the centre of a rather nasty fight between the heads of his three branches of Government. So the Supreme Leader's best move may be just to sit back and hope his politicians can find some face-saving accommodation.

Iran Exclusive: The Escalating Battle With Ahmadinejad

Last month two leaders of the Motalefeh (Islamic Coalition) Party, Habibollah Asgarowladi and Mohammad Nabi Habibi, requested a meeting with President Ahmadinejad. The discussion soon went beyond polite regards: Asgrowladi and Nabi Habibi told Ahmadinejad that he was "the biggest cause" of the improved position of the Green Movement in Iranian society.

The leaders of Motalefeh --- which has been a conservative mainstay of the Islamic Republic since its formation --- went further. They asked Ahmadinejad, "Who was the first person to chant, 'Marg bar Velayat-e-Faqih' (Death to Clerical Supremacy)?"

The President said nothing. Asgarowladi and Nabi Habibi continued, "You." In Ahmadinejad's televised debate with Mir Hossein Mousavi in the 2009 campaign, they explained, the President had equated the fate of the Revolution with his own. Ahmadinejad had put himself above everyone, even the Supreme Leader, and the Islamic Republic.

The meeting might seem extraordinary, but it is only one more incident in the battle against the President --- a battle that, at the moment, is not being led by the Greens or the reformists but by conservatives who are disillusioned with the state of Iran and with Ahmadinejad's personal approach to politics.

Since January, we have documented the escalation of that battle, to the point where key conservatives such as Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani and 2009 Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei have been involved in discussions of how to limit or even replace Ahmadinejad, on a daily basis. Defenders of the President, inside and outside Iran, will argue that this is only the normal rough-and-tumble of politics and that the Government as well as the regime is secure.

We're not so sure. From sources inside Iran, we get the picture of rising rather than falling difficulties.

Prices are now increasing, in some cases soaring, across a range of essentials. This week it was reported that electricity bills have risen for some consumers in Tehran by five times. Water has become more expensive. Lamb, which sells for about £10 per kilogramme ($7 per pound) in Britain, is £15 per kilogramme ($10.50 per pound) in Iran, with its lower level of wages.

Sources report that the cultural atmosphere is increasing turning against the "Islamic Revolution". The disappointment and anger is not translating into open political activity. Instead, amidst the repression and sense of crisis, there is a lethargy. Young people are looking to emigrate, and university students are seeking visas to study abroad.

This summer, the rift had opened not only between the President and Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani but also between Ahmadinejad and the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani. In separate meetings with the Supreme Leader, Ali and Sadegh each said that the President was not popular and continued, "Please believe it. Don't support him."

Ayatollah Khamenei insisted, "No, this is not the situation." He told the Larijanis that there must be co-operation and said that he would hold a meeting at the start of Ramadan.

Ali Larijani replied, "My heart is not in it." Khamenei responded, "This is a religious duty."

As we noted in detail at the time, the Supreme Leader did chair that discussion with Ahmadinejad and the two Larijanis, following this with a public speech invoking "unity". A few days later, Ali Larijani and Ahmadinejad gave a public show of reconciliation.

Soon, however, that display broke down. Ahmadinejad's appointment of special envoys for international affairs led to dispute with Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, who had previously kept quiet over the political tensions, and opened up the space for renewed criticism by the President's opponents in Parliament and the conservative media. The fragile economic situation offered the platform for a gradual renewal of criticism by Ahmadinejad's foes.

And so it was that, only a few weeks after his dramatic intervention and loud proclamation of "unity", the Supreme Leader was once more --- at the behest of his officials and politicians --- having to rebuke Ahmadinejad. This was not only over foreign policy but over the President's economic management, including privatisation and handling of imports.

Is that enough to hold the Government together for some more months? Another story....

Last month Mohsen Rezaei --- former commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Secretary of the Expediency Council, 2009 Presidential candidate --- met the Supreme Leader. Rezaei requested, "Please let us carry out the unity plan," by which he meant support of a combination of leading politicians and officials that would curb and possibly put aside Ahmadinejad.

The Supreme Leader asked, "Will this include [opposition figures Mir Hossein] Mousavi and [Mehdi] Karroubi?"

Rezaei paused for a very long moment and then said, "Maybe."

Khamenei was quicker in his response, "No."

So, as our sources summarise, "Iran is in a cul-de-sac." Most of the population is dispirited and apathetic about politics; they see no care for them from the Government, no benefit in the Republic, no use in pursuit of "reform".

Meanwhile, the establishment is increasingly fragmented. Ahmadinejad is in political difficulties, facing heavyweight challenges from the Parliament and possibly from Iran's judiciary, but he can still rely upon the security services and his allies still dominate the Ministry of Intelligence.

Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Leader still has not pulled the trigger on his President. There have been times when it appeared Ayatollah Khamenei might do so. for example, last summer in the dispute over Ahmadinejad's power play for Iran's ministries and his insistence on keeping Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, now Chief of Staff, by his side. It appears, however, that Khamenei is still acceptingalbeit without satisfaction and with a great deal of concern --- "the devil he knows" rather than the devil he doesn't. He cannot accept a political coalition which --- without Ahmadinejad --- might have to reach out to reformists and the opposition to bring a semblance of stability.

I suspect Ahmadinejad and his allies not only know that but are playing upon that. For the Supreme Leader's rebukes of his President have not brought the downfall of the controversial Rahim-Mashai. They have not brought a retraction of the President's foreign policy move with his appointment of special envoys, including the same Rahim-Mashai. They have not even brought a shift in Ahmadinejad's economic approach.

This is turning into quite a contest. For at the end of the day --- assuming that the conservatives who dislike the President do not put the white flag --- both the President and the Supreme Leader cannot emerged unbloodied. Either Ahmadinejad must be publicly limited or the weakness of Khamenei's claim of a "velayat-e-faqih", as the Motalefeh leaders foretold in their meeting with the President), will have been exposed.

On to the next round....

The Latest from Iran (8 September): Sakineh Execution Suspended?

2055 GMT: Karroubi Watch. Mehdi Karroubi has posted an open letter to the Iranian nation, declaring, "Our leaders have no control over their disturbed nerves and minds."

2035 GMT: The Battle Within. Interesting to see that another website has picked up on MP Ali Motahari's declaration, which we reported earlier (see 1544 GMT), that the Parliament must prevent an emergence of “dictatorship” in the Ahmadinejad Government and that, if it failed to do so, it had betrayed the nation.

Even more interesting to note the the website is the English-language version of Mehr, which is not known as a prominent critic of the President and his allies.

NEW Iran Feature: Re-visiting the 2009 Election (Keshavarz)
NEW Iran Snap Analysis: Who is Running Foreign Policy?
Iran Exclusive: Rafsanjani Declares “I Won’t Bear This Situation”
Iran Exclusive: FM Mottaki Attempted to Resign over Ahmadinejad Foreign Policy
The Latest from Iran (7 September): The Real Stories

2025 GMT: US "Iran is a Dictatorship" Alert. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, responding to a question after her speech today at the Council on Foreign Relations, declared, "I don''t think there''s any doubt that Iran is morphing into a military dictatorship with a sort of religious ideological veneer. It is becoming the province of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and in concert with some of the clerical and political leadership."

While those sentences are seizing headlines tonight, they are far from new. Clinton used similar language in Qatar in February, as the US tried to forge an alliance of Arab countries against Tehran. At that time, the dictatorship line appeared to be another arrow in Washington's quiver of measures to bring pressure on Iran over the nuclear issue and regional contests.

Initially, it might not be clear if the declaration on this occasion was anything more than a rhetorical flourish. In her speech --- a grand tour of why US leadership is necessary around the world --- the Secretary of State devoted some time to Iran's nuclear programme but not a single word to the internal political and legal situation. She focused on the theme of Iran as the international enemy to be repelled with the assertion, "Early returns from implementation of the sanctions are that they''re feeling the economic effects. We would hope that that would lead them to reconsider their positions, not only with respect to nuclear weapons but, frankly, the export of terrorism."

Yet these paragraphs, immediatedly following the "military dictatorship", point to a somewhat different US strategy, "I don't think that's what the Iranian Revolution for a republic of Iran, an Islamic republic of Iran, was ever meant to become. So I know there is a great deal of ferment and activities inside that we do try to support.

"At the same time, we don't want to either endanger or undermine those very same people so that it becomes, you know, once again, the U.S. doing something instead of the U.S. being supportive of what indigenous efforts are taking place."

So is there a US strategy not only to acknowledge the justice and rights issues but to bolster the activists pursuing them? It is here the vision becomes muddled because of an apparent uncertainty as to where Iranian events may head. Clinton could only offer a vague notion, "I think that there is a very sad confluence of events occurring inside Iran that I think eventually --- but I can''t put a time frame on it -- the Iranian people themselves will respond to."

1710 GMT: Power (Price) Surge. Deputy Minister of Energy Mohammad Behzad, commenting on the rise in electricity prices (reportedly five times for some Tehran residents), says subsidies have been cut for people who use too much energy.

Behzad offered the consolation that consumers can pay bills by installments.

1705 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Two Haft Tapeh Sugar Cane factory workers, Alireza Saeedi and Behrouz Mollazadeh, have each received one-year jail sentences.

The two labor activists were arrested last December and released on $70,000 bail. Their "crime" was satirical clips of the Supreme Leader on their cell phones.

1555 GMT: The Rahnavard Challenge. More on the letter from Zahra Rahnavard to the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani (see 1210 GMT), "Don't Erase the Freedom and Rights of Citizens".

We are all responsible for the people's future....What misery has come to our country, in which opposition people and families' houses get raided, in which people get arrested and kept as hostages, while their relatives get thretened? Which of these actions is Islamic or human?

Rahnavard continues:

How do you expect society to remain sane, when thugs attack women and youngsters...?
What has happened? Is this a war between Iran and Saddam or against helpless families, detained by thugs, which were certainly armed and equipped by a part of the rulers?

Before God enters and burns all together, I expect from you as the head of judges to restore justice to the people. I expect you to appear at least once in public and boldly condemn all officials and sentence them.

1544 GMT: Parliament v. President. Leading MP Ali Motahari is speaking up again, claiming that silence on government deviance paves the way for dictatorship. Motahari criticised the Majlis for bowing to government threats on subsidy cuts, hijab and chastity issues, the 5th Budget Plan, and foreign policy.

Motahari's take-away line: Ahmadinejad has to decide if he wants velayat-e-faqih (clerical authority) or velayat-e-Mashai (the authority of Presidential Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai).

Former Presidential candidate Nategh Nouri has said that the President's refusal to implement laws is dictatorship. Reformist MP Ali Akbar Oulia adds that Ahmadinejad's withdrawal of the 5th Budget Plan, because of Parliamentary amendments, "ridicules everyone". (The Majlis Research Center concludes that, during 2008-2009, the Government has applied only six of 112 Majlis laws in due time; 58 were implemented late and 48 not at all.)

MP Javad Jahangirzadeh claims that 45 MPs have already signed for the impeachment of energy minister Majid Namjoo and that many others support the move.

1540 GMT: Claim of Day. The Supreme Leader's representative to the Revolutionary Guard has said that the 12th "hidden" Imam will appear when the people support Ayatollah Khamenei.

1530 GMT: The Post-Election Dead. Peyke Iran has posted a list of 150 people whom it says have been killed in the conflict since the June 2009 election.

1525 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Lebanon's Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh has said that Lebanese banks will have to comply with stricter sanctions by the UN, the US, and the European Union on Iran: “It is up to the Lebanese banks to act in accordance with their interests and be sure, if they have to make an operation, that it’s an operation that can’t be contested internationally.”

Salameh said that the latest UN resolution “is very clear and we will respect it and make sure it is respected".

1520 GMT: Execution (Sakineh) Watch. The European Parliament has condemned the death sentence on Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani by 658-1, with 22 abstentions.

1320 GMT: Execution (Sakineh) Watch. An EA correspondent adds more reason for caution:

Mehmanparast had said this [that the sentence for stoning was suspended during the summer] yesterday during his usual press briefing together with the ongoing case for murder, but for some reason world media decided to ignore it yesterday and pick up the identical Press TV quote today.

The alarming thing in all this is that Mehmanparast is the Foreign Ministry spokesman and is making statements on a case which has absolutely nothing to do with his ministry. The Justice ministry and the judicial authority, both of which have people capable of reading out statements, have kept near-absolute silence on the matter.

If Sakineh is indeed hanged, Mehmanparast can wash his hands off it by saying that his ministry does not hang people and the judicial authorities can say that we have not given any assurances all along.

1310 GMT: Neither the Islamic Republic News Agency nor Fars News are carrying the Mehmanparast statement about the sentencing of Sakineh Mohammad Ashtiani.

1250 GMT: Execution (Ashtiani) Watch. The Western media is buzzing over "a suspension of the death sentence" of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, convicted of adultery and later complicity in the murder of her husband.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast has said, "The sentencing of Ms. Ashtiani for adultery has been stopped and [her case] is being reviewed again, and her sentencing for complicity in murder is in process."

That somewhat confusing statement does appears to be a limited change in the Iranian position: earlier this summer, Tehran suspended the sentence of execution by stoning, the original penalty imposed on Ashtiani, but left open execution by a means such as hanging. (Most of the Western media have overlooked or misunderstood this, as they report that it is Mehmanparast's statement today that suspends stoning.)

However, I am being cautious. Mehmanparast may be saying that the execution on the adultery charge is only being held up while the "complicity in murder" moves to the conclusion of sentencing, which of course could be the death penalty.

Yesterday Mehmanparast warned European countries such as France and Italy not to interfere in the country and he repeated that line today: "Defending a person on trial for murder should not be turned into a human rights matter." He repeated that, if this was such a matter, European countries could free all incarcerated murderers in the name of human rights.

Mehmanparast then attempted to justify the death punishment for adultery: "even "Western countries, which are not sensitive about family values, take offence at betrayal".

1240 GMT: Lawyer Watch. A further note on yesterday's court appearance of journalist and activist Heshmatollah Tabarzadi (see 0720 GMT): he was represented by Mohammad Ali Dadkhah, as his lawyer Nasrine Sotoudeh was detained on Saturday.

1210 GMT: Justice. In the wake of the siege of Mehdi Karroubi's house, Zahra Rahnavard has written the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, to demand justice for the Iranian people.

Wondering if intimidations, detentions, and abuses were "Islamic" and "human", Rahnavard asked Larijani how he expects society to remain "healthy" when homes and student dormitories are attacked.

1030 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Mahmoud Bagheri, a member of the Iranian Teachers Trade Union, has been released after two months detention.

0910 GMT: Sanctions Watch. South Korea has announced new sanctions, including review of most financial transactions, against Iran. An expanded blacklist will affect more than 100 Iranian firms and individuals, inspections of suspicious cargo will be expanded, and investments in Iran's energy sector will be limited.

Seoul also said Iran's Bank Mellat faces "a heavy penalty" for moving hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian nuclear, missile and defense agencies.

0905 GMT: Can't Be Clearer Than This. Back to our main story today....

Press TV headlines on the letter signed by 122 MPs over the President's appointment of special envoys for foreign policy, "Iran Lawmakers Criticize Ahmadinejad".

0858 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch (Election Fraud Edition). Detained reformist politician Mostafa Tajzadeh has re-asserted, in a visit with his wife, his conviction that the 2009 Presidential election was a "fraud", involving officials such as Guardian Council head Ayatollah Jannati and the Revolutionary Guard. He asked why the Iranian judiciary has not addressed the complaint that he and six other prominent detainees have filed over alleged manipulation of the vote.

Tajzadeh also said that officials have yet to answer his question, "On what charge am I detained?"

The politician's defiance comes after sustained attempts by the regime --- through intimidation, threats, and propaganda --- for a Tajzadeh "confession" that the reformists knew they had lost the Presidential ballot.

0855 GMT: We have posted an analysis by Fatemeh Keshavarz, "Revisiting the 2009 Election".

0750 GMT: Sanctions Watch. The US Treasury has added Iranian-owned, German-based European-Iranian Trade Bank AG to its sanctions blacklist, claiming the bank has provided a financial lifeline to Iranian companies involved in weapons proliferation.

The Hamburg-based bank, known as EIH Bank, has been banned from the US financial system. Tehran has reportedly increased its reliance on EIH, amidst sanctions, to conduct business on behalf of blacklisted companies.

0720 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Kurdish writer, poet, and translator Aziz Naseri has reportedly been arrested.Another session in the trial of journalist and activist Heshmatollah Tabarzadi was held yesterday. Tabarzadi reportedly used the appearance to talk about the conditions in Rajai Shahr Prison (see 0705 GMT).

0715 GMT: Gasoline Magic. For the sake of balance, given the apparent reference by the Supreme Leader to Iran's "poor economic performance" (see 0655 GMT), we must issue an All-is-Well Alert:

Iran’s oil minister, Massoud Mirkazemi, announced that Iran has now become self-sufficient in its petrol production and is no longer dependent on foreign imports in this regard.

Iranian media report that Massoud Mirkazemi told reporters at a press conference today that Iran is now producing 66 million litres of petrol per day.

He said that Iran was formerly producing 44 million litres a day and in order to supply the domestic demand 20 million litres were imported from abroad....

Mirkazemi said: "Since 20 days ago we started increasing production in the production units and finally managed to bring our daily production up to 66.5 million litres per day in the past week."

0705 GMT: Torture Watch. HRANA is claiming that the death of prisoner Mohsen Beikvand in Rajai Shahr Prison on 31 August was a killing organised by officials: "Prisoners confined in Rajai Shahr prison believe prison authorities directly issued an order [to other prisoners] to murder Beikvand."

In May, HRANA released a video of alleged abuse of Beikvand, with the breaking of both legs and burns on his body. He was reportedly moved to solitary confinement days later.

Earlier this week, EA featured a report by Loes Bijnen on the "gruesome" conditions in Rajai Shahr.

0655 GMT: We begin this morning with a snap analysis, "Who Is Running Iran's Foreign Policy?"

Meanwhile, as we note the latest speech of the Supreme Leader, proclaiming that Iran will repel international sanctions, this summary is striking:

[The Leader] reiterated that the enemies seek to frustrate the Iranian people by exerting economic pressure on the country with the intent of turning the nation against the government by blaming it for poor economic performance.

Ayatollah Khamenei said their goal is to cut ties between the government and nation.

However, they have not known the Iranian nation and are mistaken in their calculations.

"Poor economic performance"? Is that an implicit admission of Iran's difficulties --- identified in a scathing statement by the head of the Supreme Audit Court this week --- with manufacturing, imports, unemployment, privatisation, and even its energy sector?

Iran Feature: Re-visiting the 2009 Election (Keshavarz)

Writing in CounterPunch, Fatemeh Keshavarz re-examines what may have happened in the 2009 Presidential election, bringing in analysis of a recently-leaked audio in which a Revolutionary Guard commander describes interference by the Iranian military before, during, and after the vote.



Keshavarz applies her analysis to the tension in Iran today, 15 months after the election: "The leak of the tape, whether by the IRGC [Islamic Revolution Guards Corps] intelligence [bureau] or unhappy elements among them, makes another point clear. The battle of Ahmadinejad’s government for establishing its legitimacy is not over --- not even among the members of the Guard. The intelligence chiefs therefore deem it necessary to convince their own members that they are in control of the situation --- better still, they themselves have masterminded the current situation in the first place.

More than a year has passed since millions of Iranians marched on the streets calling the 2009 election a military coup carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG), their militia the Basij, and their armed plainclothes hired hands "lebaseshakhsis". The goals of the coup: keeping Ahmadinejad in power and completing the military and economic control of the IRG in the country. After beating up, arresting, and sometimes killing the protesters, the government put a record number of Iranian journalists behind bars (most now serving long sentences) and banned the foreign press from entering the country except to report on officially-orchestrated occasions.

Subsequently, Mir Housein Mousavi, the main opponent of Ahmadinejad and many members of the reformist opposition --- known as the Green Movement --- were put effectively under house arrest curbing their ability to reach the public in Iran. Moving the scenes of its brutality from the streets to jails and interrogation rooms, the regime dropped out of headlines thereby reducing the pressure on the Iranian authorities to answer for their brutal treatment of the opposition.

In the meantime, using its full control over the media, the Iranian government began to promote an alternative account of the 2009 election, an account which has not been without impact on the western left. It goes like this: the Iranian upper and upper middle classes, fooled by the western supporters of the reformists, had assumed that they had the majority while, in fact, in small towns and villages widespread support for Ahmadinejad gave him his 63% victory in the elections. Frustrated with their own miscalculations, the defeated reformists resorted to street violence, and therefore the government had no choice but to use harsher measures to calm things down.

This scenario has many big holes including the fact that, even if Ahmadinejad had the support of the rural areas, the Iranian population is about 65% urban and in fact the large cities are more than able to give any candidate a victory. Furthermore, hundreds of video clips document the peacefulness of the early protest marches in large cities as well as small towns. They also document the unprovoked violence of the security forces against the marchers.

All of this has become relevant again. Less than a month ago, an audio file of a speech by a chief intelligence officer and interrogator from the top ranks of the Revolutionary Guards came to light describing the behind-the-scenes [manoeuvres] of Ahmadinejad’s 2009 victory. The speech was leaked to the opposition websites, and spread fast despite the heavy censorship imposed in Iran. Besides the fascinating details revealed in it, there are other things that make the document important including the fact that no one (not even the government) has disputed its authenticity.

It is, in fact, very likely that the speech was leaked intentionally by the government itself. These facts lead to important questions. Who is the speaker? What does the tape reveal? What is the reformist opposition doing about it? And, why would the Iranian government leak a document that confirms its complicity in a fraudulent election, if indeed the leak has been intentional?

First a quick update on the current conditions in Iran. The country still has the highest number of jailed reporters in the world and only the official news and views are reported on the national media. Expressing political opposition in a blog can lead to five years in jail where the prisoners go on frequent hunger strikes to protest torture, unsanitary living conditions, and insult. Female prisoners will receive reduced sentences if they confess to illicit sexual relations with prominent members of the reform movement. Families of the prisoners who resist making confessions are threatened with more arrests.

And, despite Mr. Ahmadinejad’s claim quoted in The New Yorker’s recent piece “After the Crackdown”, his critics are not free to speak their minds. A standard charge for jailed journalists is “insulting (read criticizing) the president.” To get a sense of the problem, imagine you are an Iranian blogger citing Mr. Ahmadinejad’s claim in his New Yorker interview in your blog and asking, “If it is ok to criticize our president, why are some journalists in jail for 'insulting' him?” You will likely receive a brief phone call from a security agent within days. He will tell you to introduce yourself to one of the intelligence headquarters (or even directly to the main office of Evin Prison). If you are smart, you will do so immediately and quietly.

Side by side with these “security” measures, the National Iranian Radio and Television works to uphold its conspiratorial master narrative: the discovery of a “foreign” plot to end the supremacy of Islam in Iran. Those who would criticize the government are agents of this foreign “enemy.” One does not even need a blog to be considered a foreign agent. It is enough to mention an anti-government protest to a friend in an e-mail, or, worse still, attach a picture of the protest to the e-mail. Last week, in anticipation of the official Quds Day celebration, the day the Iranian government reiterates its support for the Palestinians, the e-mail use was reduced to three hours a day.

The universities (particularly the schools of humanities and social sciences) are perceived as infested with sympathy for the foreign enemy. In the past ten months, Ali Khamenei the Supreme Leader, major cleric Mesbah Yazdi, and Sadeq Larijani, the head of the Iranian judiciary, have all spoken about the unsuitability of the humanities for Iranian universities. Mr. Larijani targeted sociology, psychology, and the branch of philosophy that addresses human existential issues as the most unsuitable ones.

Against this sustained discourse of a foreign threat --- versus the dutiful, legitimate, and honest efforts of the government to offset the treat –-- there is now the newly leaked audio-file of a speech in which, a major Revolutionary Guard intelligence officer and interrogator brags about saving the Supreme Leader’s glory via keeping Mr. Ahmadinejad in the presidential office. This has, according to him, been done single-handedly by members of the Revolutionary Guard through sensible planning and timely action: that is identifying the enemy (the reformists), and using all means (obstruction, violence, spying, threats, and arrests) to stop them from winning the election.

Read full article....