Tuesday
Nov172009
The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama's Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)
Tuesday, November 17, 2009 at 19:25
The Bomb, The Bomb: Distorting the Latest Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme
Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up
1. IT'S THE NUKES, STUPID
If anyone in the Iranian Government still believes in the
Washington-directed "velvet revolution", rather than using it as a stick to beat the opposition, he/she can breathe easy. The driving force for the Obama Administration's approach to Iran is the quest for an agreement on uranium enrichment.
That ambition is led by the President, and his determination has brought general consensus in an Administration that was arguing over the value of talks earlier in 2009. Broadly speaking, the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department are all on the same page now.
Any reference to the internal situation in Iran, as in the Obama recent statement calling for recognition of the rights of protesters, is a gloss. The President and his advisors may have a legal and humanitarian interest in what happens to demonstrators, as well to US citizens detained and sentenced to years in prison in Iran, but it is not their top policy priority.
Indeed, Washington's position is now fixed firmly enough to withstand not only the demands of reformists but figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani to go slow on deal with President Ahmadinejad. I suspect we will find that Obama has personally gone farther --- much farther --- than any President since 1979 to get an accommodation with Tehran.
2. GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG
The quest for a nuclear deal has been accompanied by a disturbing if tangential story of how "intelligence" and "analysis" has undermined the Iranian opposition.
Ever since the June election, some US officials, primarily in the intelligence community, have been putting out the line that the Green Movement is insignificant and/or not to be trusted on issues such as nuclear weapons, Israel, and
"anti-Americanism". (The public face of this line is the commentaries of Flynt Leverett, formerly of the National Security Council, and Hillary Mann Leverett, formerly of the State Department.)
This assessment was reinforced by the appearance in October of former Khatami Government official and "Karroubi advisor" Ataollah Mojaherani at the conference of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His strident caution to the audience that a "Green Government" was unlikely to give ground on Iran's nuclear programme or on the position towards Israel apparently sent shock waves through the audience, angering other reformists present in the audience who feared Mohajerani had just damaged their cause.
They were right. It is the Mojaherani incident that is behind the clamour of well-placed Washington columnists like Jackson Diehl and David Ignatius to beware the Greens. More importantly, the speech fuelled the "analysis" within the CIA that the politics of Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami were not to be trusted, a belief that accompanied (and possibly fed by) sources such as those in Borzou Daragahi's pre-13 Aban article assaulting the Green Movement.
What is intriguing is how a Washington distraction became the foundation for some in the CIA to bury or fear the Greens. It is true that Mohajerani was a prominent member of the Karroubi campaign and wore the badge of a glittering if past political career: youngest deputy of the first post-Revolution Parliament, Vice-President in the Rafsanjani Government, Minister of Culture under Mohammad Khatami.
Still, at the time, we gave almost no space to the Mojaherani speech because it was so disconnected from events and political strategy in Iran. Before and after the Washington episode, I have not seen Mojaherani's name rise up in the movements of the Green Wave. In short, he was one of a number of former officials who have or had connections with a complex network of "reformists".
For many in Washington, however, Mojaherani was thought to be no less than the ambassador for the Green Movement, presenting its manifesto. And when the approach of his speech did not match up to the "revolution" --- in presentation and policy, if not Islamic system --- that they wanted, those officials and commentators reacted like a lover spurned.
(There is a wider point here. The Iranian Government has had success in disrupting communications within Iran
but it is also important that it has limited any dialogue between the reformist opposition and the "outside", in this case the
US Government. With no direct line
established as the Green Movement evolved, American officials have
relied upon a variety of people, usually located outside Iran presenting a wide range of often contradictory advice and speculation rather than solid information.
While the situation may have been inevitable, given the detentions of many reformists and de facto house arrest of leaders like Mir Hossein Mousavi, it strikes me that the Obama Administration has not worked around these restrictions to read the lines --- and between the lines --- of statements not only of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami but of other activists like Alireza Beheshti and senior clerics from and beyond Qom.)
3. THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS
As a case study in internal politics,
the beauty of the Obama nuclear-first, engagement-first approach has been how it has brought consensus amongst differing groups within the Administration. If the talks brought nuclear agreement, that would be a significant result for the unclenched fist (the line often attributed to some State Department officials and envoys like Richard Holbrooke). If they were finally collapsed by Iranian stalling and intransigence, the platform for aggressive sanctions would be laid (the line often
attributed to Dennis Ross, now at the National Security Council).
The only problem comes if, having grasped the hand of the Iranian Government in talks, the Obama Administration then has to slap Ahmadinejad's face in the absence of an agreement.
Washington's current calculation, supported by its diplomatic strategy, turns the Russian key. Moscow's envoys are working on the Iranian Government to accept the uranium enrichment plan, while Russian President Dmitri Medvedev issues unsubtle hints that he will not stand back if Tehran balks.
That is not the same as a Russian commitment to sanctions. Let's assume, however, that Moscow accepts a US-led multilateral effort inside or outside the United Nations. And let's assume that President Obama, who no doubt has mentioned this in Beijing this week, gets a Chinese promise to stand aside.
What next? If there is no nuclear agreement, it will quite likely be because the Supreme Leader has objected, despite Obama's sustained direct efforts. So how does a stricter round of sanctions change Ayatollah Khamenei's position?
It doesn't. So the Obama Administration is presumably counting on a diplomatic and economic containment, indeed isolation, of Iran.
That, however, does nothing to address the issue of President Ahmadinejad, who remains in office. It does nothing to deal with the increasing role of the Revolutionary Guards in matters beyond the nuclear and even military realm. (Indeed, as some analysts have contended, further sanctions may assist the Guard's economic ventures, although this effect may be mitigated if the restrictions can specifically target Guard "investments".)
Sanctions certainly do nothing with respect to the reformists and the Green movement. Even if Washington recants and tries to bring them back into political consideration, it is unclear --- given the perceived snub by Obama's officials in recent weeks --- if the opposition will offer even a cautious welcome.
4. BACK TO THE CUL-DE-SAC
In the Bush years, the cul-de-sac for American policy was the threat that could not be carried out. Whether the vision was a "turn left from Baghdad" intervention, briefly considered in 2003, the military strikes advocated by Vice President Cheney in 2007, or a sledgehammer set of economic sanctions, the Administration could not deliver the blow. The "best" it could manage was the muddled if funded programme of "soft power" in the 2nd term, which was never defined as either a live-and-let-live civic engagement or the cover for "velvet revolution".
The hope of the Obama approach has been to get out of that dead end, opening up space for other initiatives such as Middle Eastern agreements, through engagement. And, considered narrowly in the context of discussions on nuclear programmes and regional politics, that was solid, realist common sense.
But "narrowly" became very narrow after the elections of 12 June. If Obama wanted to dance, he had to dance with an Iranian President who now lacked legitimacy (despite the efforts of engagement advocates like the Leveretts to explain how Ahmadinejad had really won the election and a clear mandate).
That legitimacy, within weeks of the election, was not just a question of a "reformist" challenge. Ahmadinejad has also been in a tenuous position vis-a-vis political rivals like Hashemi Rafsanjani, the conservatives/principlists in the Iranian Parliament, Ayatollahs (and thus bodies such as the Assembly of Experts), and at times the Supreme Leader. That is why the Iranian President, far from breaking off talks to pursue The Bomb, is hugging the nuclear discussions so close --- with no prospect of salvation through an economic miracle, this is his prescription for political longevity.
Now Obama's engagement gamble, re-shaped in this post-June cauldron, may still succeed if the Supreme Leader gives his backing to an agreement on uranium enrichment. (Which is why, just to repeat, this President is going farther than any predecessor in 30 years) A wider US agenda, which may adapt engagement for exchanges on Iran's political and legal issues as well as geopolitical interests, could then be drafted.
But, if the nuclear deal does not go through, Obama and Ahmadinejad now dance in a downward spiral. The Iranian President will struggle to serve out his disputed second term. And the US President will be back in the cul-de-sac: pressed by some advisors and a lot of Congressmen to pursue sanctions which offer no remedy for --- and no exit from --- the political dilemma of his failed engagement.
Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up
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1. IT'S THE NUKES, STUPIDIf anyone in the Iranian Government still believes in the
Washington-directed "velvet revolution", rather than using it as a stick to beat the opposition, he/she can breathe easy. The driving force for the Obama Administration's approach to Iran is the quest for an agreement on uranium enrichment.
That ambition is led by the President, and his determination has brought general consensus in an Administration that was arguing over the value of talks earlier in 2009. Broadly speaking, the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department are all on the same page now.
Any reference to the internal situation in Iran, as in the Obama recent statement calling for recognition of the rights of protesters, is a gloss. The President and his advisors may have a legal and humanitarian interest in what happens to demonstrators, as well to US citizens detained and sentenced to years in prison in Iran, but it is not their top policy priority.
Indeed, Washington's position is now fixed firmly enough to withstand not only the demands of reformists but figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani to go slow on deal with President Ahmadinejad. I suspect we will find that Obama has personally gone farther --- much farther --- than any President since 1979 to get an accommodation with Tehran.
2. GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG
The quest for a nuclear deal has been accompanied by a disturbing if tangential story of how "intelligence" and "analysis" has undermined the Iranian opposition.
Ever since the June election, some US officials, primarily in the intelligence community, have been putting out the line that the Green Movement is insignificant and/or not to be trusted on issues such as nuclear weapons, Israel, and
"anti-Americanism". (The public face of this line is the commentaries of Flynt Leverett, formerly of the National Security Council, and Hillary Mann Leverett, formerly of the State Department.)
This assessment was reinforced by the appearance in October of former Khatami Government official and "Karroubi advisor" Ataollah Mojaherani at the conference of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His strident caution to the audience that a "Green Government" was unlikely to give ground on Iran's nuclear programme or on the position towards Israel apparently sent shock waves through the audience, angering other reformists present in the audience who feared Mohajerani had just damaged their cause.
They were right. It is the Mojaherani incident that is behind the clamour of well-placed Washington columnists like Jackson Diehl and David Ignatius to beware the Greens. More importantly, the speech fuelled the "analysis" within the CIA that the politics of Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami were not to be trusted, a belief that accompanied (and possibly fed by) sources such as those in Borzou Daragahi's pre-13 Aban article assaulting the Green Movement.
What is intriguing is how a Washington distraction became the foundation for some in the CIA to bury or fear the Greens. It is true that Mohajerani was a prominent member of the Karroubi campaign and wore the badge of a glittering if past political career: youngest deputy of the first post-Revolution Parliament, Vice-President in the Rafsanjani Government, Minister of Culture under Mohammad Khatami.
Still, at the time, we gave almost no space to the Mojaherani speech because it was so disconnected from events and political strategy in Iran. Before and after the Washington episode, I have not seen Mojaherani's name rise up in the movements of the Green Wave. In short, he was one of a number of former officials who have or had connections with a complex network of "reformists".
For many in Washington, however, Mojaherani was thought to be no less than the ambassador for the Green Movement, presenting its manifesto. And when the approach of his speech did not match up to the "revolution" --- in presentation and policy, if not Islamic system --- that they wanted, those officials and commentators reacted like a lover spurned.
(There is a wider point here. The Iranian Government has had success in disrupting communications within Iran
but it is also important that it has limited any dialogue between the reformist opposition and the "outside", in this case the
US Government. With no direct line
established as the Green Movement evolved, American officials have
relied upon a variety of people, usually located outside Iran presenting a wide range of often contradictory advice and speculation rather than solid information.
While the situation may have been inevitable, given the detentions of many reformists and de facto house arrest of leaders like Mir Hossein Mousavi, it strikes me that the Obama Administration has not worked around these restrictions to read the lines --- and between the lines --- of statements not only of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami but of other activists like Alireza Beheshti and senior clerics from and beyond Qom.)
3. THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS
As a case study in internal politics,
the beauty of the Obama nuclear-first, engagement-first approach has been how it has brought consensus amongst differing groups within the Administration. If the talks brought nuclear agreement, that would be a significant result for the unclenched fist (the line often attributed to some State Department officials and envoys like Richard Holbrooke). If they were finally collapsed by Iranian stalling and intransigence, the platform for aggressive sanctions would be laid (the line often
attributed to Dennis Ross, now at the National Security Council).
The only problem comes if, having grasped the hand of the Iranian Government in talks, the Obama Administration then has to slap Ahmadinejad's face in the absence of an agreement.
Washington's current calculation, supported by its diplomatic strategy, turns the Russian key. Moscow's envoys are working on the Iranian Government to accept the uranium enrichment plan, while Russian President Dmitri Medvedev issues unsubtle hints that he will not stand back if Tehran balks.
That is not the same as a Russian commitment to sanctions. Let's assume, however, that Moscow accepts a US-led multilateral effort inside or outside the United Nations. And let's assume that President Obama, who no doubt has mentioned this in Beijing this week, gets a Chinese promise to stand aside.
What next? If there is no nuclear agreement, it will quite likely be because the Supreme Leader has objected, despite Obama's sustained direct efforts. So how does a stricter round of sanctions change Ayatollah Khamenei's position?
It doesn't. So the Obama Administration is presumably counting on a diplomatic and economic containment, indeed isolation, of Iran.
That, however, does nothing to address the issue of President Ahmadinejad, who remains in office. It does nothing to deal with the increasing role of the Revolutionary Guards in matters beyond the nuclear and even military realm. (Indeed, as some analysts have contended, further sanctions may assist the Guard's economic ventures, although this effect may be mitigated if the restrictions can specifically target Guard "investments".)
Sanctions certainly do nothing with respect to the reformists and the Green movement. Even if Washington recants and tries to bring them back into political consideration, it is unclear --- given the perceived snub by Obama's officials in recent weeks --- if the opposition will offer even a cautious welcome.
4. BACK TO THE CUL-DE-SAC
In the Bush years, the cul-de-sac for American policy was the threat that could not be carried out. Whether the vision was a "turn left from Baghdad" intervention, briefly considered in 2003, the military strikes advocated by Vice President Cheney in 2007, or a sledgehammer set of economic sanctions, the Administration could not deliver the blow. The "best" it could manage was the muddled if funded programme of "soft power" in the 2nd term, which was never defined as either a live-and-let-live civic engagement or the cover for "velvet revolution".
The hope of the Obama approach has been to get out of that dead end, opening up space for other initiatives such as Middle Eastern agreements, through engagement. And, considered narrowly in the context of discussions on nuclear programmes and regional politics, that was solid, realist common sense.
But "narrowly" became very narrow after the elections of 12 June. If Obama wanted to dance, he had to dance with an Iranian President who now lacked legitimacy (despite the efforts of engagement advocates like the Leveretts to explain how Ahmadinejad had really won the election and a clear mandate).
That legitimacy, within weeks of the election, was not just a question of a "reformist" challenge. Ahmadinejad has also been in a tenuous position vis-a-vis political rivals like Hashemi Rafsanjani, the conservatives/principlists in the Iranian Parliament, Ayatollahs (and thus bodies such as the Assembly of Experts), and at times the Supreme Leader. That is why the Iranian President, far from breaking off talks to pursue The Bomb, is hugging the nuclear discussions so close --- with no prospect of salvation through an economic miracle, this is his prescription for political longevity.
Now Obama's engagement gamble, re-shaped in this post-June cauldron, may still succeed if the Supreme Leader gives his backing to an agreement on uranium enrichment. (Which is why, just to repeat, this President is going farther than any predecessor in 30 years) A wider US agenda, which may adapt engagement for exchanges on Iran's political and legal issues as well as geopolitical interests, could then be drafted.
But, if the nuclear deal does not go through, Obama and Ahmadinejad now dance in a downward spiral. The Iranian President will struggle to serve out his disputed second term. And the US President will be back in the cul-de-sac: pressed by some advisors and a lot of Congressmen to pursue sanctions which offer no remedy for --- and no exit from --- the political dilemma of his failed engagement.
tagged Alireza Beheshti, Ataollah Mohajerani, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Barack Obama, Borzou Daraghai, David Ignatius, Dennis Ross, Dmitri Medvedev, Flynt Leverett, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, Jackson Diehl, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, Obama Administration, Richard Holbrooke in Middle East & Iran
Alireza Beheshti, Ataollah Mohajerani, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Barack Obama, Borzou Daraghai, David Ignatius, Dennis Ross, Dmitri Medvedev, Flynt Leverett, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, Jackson Diehl, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, Obama Administration, Richard Holbrooke in Middle East & Iran
Reader Comments (20)
Interesting take. Good read. Am curious as to how widespread the intelligence community's view on the Greens goes.
Scott,
Thank you for your analysis. My predication is that engagement plan will lead to a road called NOWHERE. Iranian regime is taking the same path to nuke as Pakistan did. Obama owes the gesture of engagement by Ahmadinejad Government to Green Movement. Without post election turmoil there would not have been any Geneva or Vienna talk. I wrote before that Obama by choosing to dismiss Iranian people and their strong desire to break ties with their current system of government put U.S. on the wrong side of history one more time. The Green Path of Hope was the right turn to Nuke and Obama missed it.
As with Mojaherani, I would not be surprised if he had not been forced or enticed by Iranian regime to lend a helping hand in dismantling Green Movement. This regime forced Abtahi to confess to a reformists plot of calling election fraudulent . This regime murders a 26-year old prison doctor to cover up its crimes in prison. This regime sends people on its payroll to the streets protesting and demanding return of a doctor who attempted to revive Neda. I am sure it can manage sending Mojaherani to scare off a few policy makers or members of intelligence community by portraying Green Movement and reformists as the real nuke mongers.
* Could it not be that the Obama administration is serious about its talk on nuclear proliferation. Then nuclear engagement with Iran is only one front in a larger campaign to stop proliferation, and possibly denuclearize the middle east (including Israel). So nuclear engagement is not part of Iran policy, but Iran policy is part of a larger nuclear policy.
* If a serious attempt at engagement with Iran fails.. would that not be a great argument to convince Russia and China of being more cooperative on containment and isolation, even if it is not openly trumpeted under the name of 'sanctions'. So failure of engagement does not need to be a cul-de-sac.
Scott, I am puzzled that you've taken such a negative turn on Obama. Have you bought into the claim that Obama has somehow thrown the greens under the bus? If so, I suggest you're misreading the Administration's take on "the greens." It seems you also accept Ray Takeyh's debatable contention that A/N is only pursuing the deal as a means to bolster his shaking domestic legitimacy. A few specific questions if I may for consideration:
1. How is it that the Leverett's speak for current US intelligence? That's quite a leap. Speculation? I disagreed with Flynt's original take on the elections too, but I don't then jump to the conclusion that US intel somehow thought likewise.
2. Did you ever locate the full text of Mohajerani's WINEP speech? If it's a "manifesto," then surely we should have it? Ok, I recall you didn't like it. But was he really wrong to suggest that the greens were unlikely to give ground on enrichment as a right under NPT? After all, the greens have been the sharpest in criticizing the deal, not just because it's with A/N, per se, but their substantive objections have been on nationalist grounds. (thus confirming Mohajerani's points, at least what I've read in the Israeli press) I agree with you that figuring out just who speaks for "the greens" on specific policy matters faces numerous contradictions. Yet do you prefer someone else instead?
3. Could you clarify where Rafsanjani urged the Obama team to go slow on "a deal with Ahmadinejad?"
4. And where exactly have reformists done the same? Yes, many have raised criticisms of the deal -- and again from Iranian nationalist grounds? Yet again, could you be more precise and indicate verifiable sources of your claim that they have requested Obama "to go slow" on any "deal with A/N?" If we've missed something among the cacophony of voices purporting to speak for the "reformists," please fill us in.
5. Surely you've got something more than we're not "reading between the lines" of their public statements, or accepting something someone said privately to some beltway think-tank.
6. How is it that the "IAEA deal" is somehow just a deal with Ahmadinejad? As has been asked before, it's inconceivable that Jalili was there "free-lancing" it.
7. What's your alternative strategy? What would "going slow" accomplish?
Nichol,
I think the approach on Iran's nuclear programme is linked to Israel, albeit more as a removing an obstacle to Israel-Palestine talks than as a move to nuclear-free Middle East.
I see your point re Russia and China, but would ask --- even if Russia and China agreed --- what the end-point of the "containment and isolation" would be. I certainly don't see how it would undermine the regime, if by regime you mean Khamenei-IRGC-other institutions.
S.
Megan
I had the same thoughts than you when I read Scott's analysis, that Mohajerani was sent by iranian gorvernment to blow the green movement out ! I think the latter has a very useless systeme of communication and there is a lack of willingness to reach the aim
"aggressively" ; they have to send emisseries, all over the world for the lectures , meeting right people and advertising to counter the misleading propagandas ! I had made this reply few times ago ! it's not too late, if somebody could hear me !!! it's time to react !
Scott Harop
You are not iranian then you couldn't understand the meaning of each word and "to touch" them; "our" Scott is used to being with iranians for long time; for exemple , Rafsanjani did never urge the obama's team to go slow on a deal, but what "our" Scott wants to say : as Rafsanjani ( who is manoeuvring carefully and go slow on the path ), Obama should go slow on a deal with AN., not to destroy what he has begun !!..
[...] Scott Lucas has a good piece on this over on Enduring America, a very good read. The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama’s Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement) 1) IT’S THE NUKES 2) GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG 3) THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS 4) NO OTHER REAL ALTERNATIVES FOR OBAMA: And the US President will be back in the cul-de-sac: pressed by some advisors and a lot o...f Congressmen to pursue sanctions which offer no remedy for — and no exit from — the political dilemma of his failed engagement. The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama’s Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Moveme... [...]
Scott H,
Thank you for a challenging and thoughtful reply. I think your Point 7 calls for Prescription rather than Analysis --- as it deserves an equally thoughtful reply, I'd like to pick up on it later (however, last month Chris Emery and I, joined by others, debated in Comments whether the Obama Administration should pursue the nuclear talks --- Chris, having been sceptical of them on previous occasions, now supports them while I, having supported them up to June, now am averse).
On the other points:
1. The claim that the Leveretts' opinion is shared by some current CIA officers is based on information I consider reliable, but I can't go farther at this point. Same goes for my claim that Rafsanjani is pushing for a go-slow on the deal.
2. I haven't seen the full Mojaherani text but now have an account of the incident from several sources.
3. I was a bit sloppy on the "reformists oppose the deal" claim. I should have been precise and identified the specific criticisms in recent statements such as those of Mir Hossein Mousavi and meetings such as Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.
S.
dear Scott,
* re. Nuclear proliferation, I do have the impression that Obama decided that the existing IAEA & NPT methods are not working, and there a great risk of a spread of nuclear bombs all over the place. He has restarted negotiations with Russia to significantly reduce their numbers of nuclear bombs: the only way to convince others to eventually abstain. It is a larger problem: if Iran gets the bomb, other countries will want to follow.
* re. isolation: At the moment, the US and many of its allies have sanctions to isolate Iran. However: Iran can easily survive, thanks mainly to support from Russia and China to provide alternatives. Because of that, hawkish & tough sanctions by the US alone are pretty useless, while some reduction in the support from Russia and China might have a much larger effect. (I'm not sure which other countries are relevant.. India, Turkey?) The best would of course be to reduce all support for IRG and its business operations.
Scott,
I'm only going to challenge you on #3. In this case, I think your analysis focuses too much on the internal dynamics. In the short-term, yes, sanctions might have little effect. BUTTTTT...
But the question that Iran has really been dealing with for quite some time is this: Will Iran become, if nothing else, a semi-normal functioning state (as Hashemi would like) or a perpetually convulsing, isolated, revolutionary state (as personified by Samuel here at EA)? I'm still unclear where Khamenei is on this, but I'm pretty sure even many, if not most, "Principlists" want a functioning state. The realities of 2009 demand it.
Would REAL, robust sanctions sway Khamenei? I don't know. Would they even give hardliners (IRGC included, though they seem to support a deal) a short-term boost? Yes. But if you want a functioning, normal state, then the medium and long-term impact of said sanctions is VERY BAD indeed.
Joe Klein's post-elec. TIME piece (though flawed in many ways) included an interesting quote from an Iranian conservative who basically said, "Look, everyone, reformist or conservative, wants to cement a deal with America. The issue is who gets credit for it." The other issue, he noted, was Khamenei's reluctance, since doing so means eliminating a "Bogeyman."
In the end, though, I don't think the SL could, even if he wanted to, could scuttle a comprehensive deal. Too many in Tehran know it needs to happen.
Finally, on the Israeli angle, I, for one, DON'T TRUST Benjamin Netanyahu to NOT do something really stupid vis-a-vis Iran. Given today's news of 900 new West Bank settlements, and the reaction to it, I'm pretty sure the WH agrees with me, thus making serious negotiations necessary
Some times a cigar is just a cigar. People went to the streets and shouted "Obama, Obama, either with us or with him". Mr. Obama has answered their call loud and clear - he is with "him", for now. Many had, and continue to have, very high hopes for Mr. Obama's administration on the foreign policy front. Fact is, he has missed a tremendous opportunity (though I am not sure if Mr. Moussavi's Green Path of Hope was a big miss). What Mr. Obama has missed is the opportunity to put the US back on the pedestal of democratic ideals, a venerable position it has not enjoyed in foreign policy matters for many decades. Change (hopefully for the better) in Iran is inevitable. When that day comes, I hope the people of Iran can draw on their generous spirit to rise above the superpower snub. They are clearly on their own in this historic struggle, but will surely remember the German, French and Dutch governments for their supportive words. The Russians will not fare well. As for Mr. Obama, I hope he does something very soon to "engage" with the Iranian people, and not with their despised government.
Kevin,
Thank you for the reply --- I see the logic in your points. I also thank you for the excellent and I think insightful quote via Klein. I don't think Mousavi is opposing the talks with US on principle but over the legitimacy and domestic boost that the "victor" who gets a deal can claim.
S.
@Scott:
Agreed. Were they in real power, I think the Greens would make this deal (or something like it) AND go for a comprehensive agreement w/ the US.
I enjoyed reading this piece and all your comments a great deal, but as I had promised in an earlier thread to refrain from commenting on this subject, due to my emotional bias, I will remain a reader today.
Very interesting thread and discussion however. Next to Rafsanjani and his next move, from the August timeframe, Obama is generating the next best in depth discussion in my opinion.
"I don’t think Mousavi is opposing the talks with US on principle but over the legitimacy and domestic boost that the “victor” who gets a deal can claim."
In other words Mousavi is a hypocrite who does not mean what he says. No real surprise here.
On the issue of American-Iranian engagement it is truly puzzling why anyone would think that the US would have any real concern for a movement such as the Greens other than to use them as an asset to attack the Iranian Govt. While the previous American administration would have undoubtedly raised a bigger cry over the Greens than the current one, the notion that either administration cared or should care about the so-called reformists is childish.
Take the Obama administration in relation to a country like Russia or Cuba. Putin's Russia today is no more "democratic" in a western sense than it was four years ago yet Obama has "reset" the relationship and eliminated much of the tension that existed with the Bush presidency. Russia is no longer attacked for its internal situation or for its actions in places like Georgia and South Ossetia. Some American politicians where full of rage last year over South Ossetia; today when South Ossetia has been made semi-independent you don't hear a thing from Obama.
Obama has moved significantly to improve ties to Revolutionary Cuba and yet what has changed other than one Castro brother stepping aside so that another brother could take over? Cuba is as far away from having western style elections as it was in 1979, the year of the most significant revolution of the 20th century.
Surely the most pathetic spectacle in many years has been the Greens pleading with Master Obama to come and save them. It almost made one pity them. I said almost.
Hi Samuel
I will have to agree with you here.
It looks like we have a "plonker" in Mr Obama
Ever since WW2, every "war" that the US has involved themselves in, they have tied one of their own hands behind their own back. This has not worked very well - and Obama recognized that . So he now ties both hands behind their backs. We have yet to see how well that works.
Barry
@Scott Lucas, @Ange and other folks: the biggest weakness of the Iranian people for the last 200 years was to have come to believe that all major issues were decided in foreign capitals (London, Moscow, or, later, Washington). This lead people to think that to cause any change one had to first get the foreign powers on board, thus the insistence that Obama must support the Green movement for it to succeed. This is very destructive as it dis-empowers the millions of Iranians who are actively opposing this barbaric & kleptocratic regime.
That's why the AN and SL clique wants us to believe that only the foreigners can cause and create massive unrest and opposition. Contrary to them, we know that:
1. We don't need any "green light" from any foreign government to change our country's destiny.
2. The brave people in Iran are putting their lives on the line because they believe they are empowered to bring change.
3. We only need the support of the world's public opinion and the attention of the mass media (thank you Scott Lucas for your excellent work).
4. Let's stop observing & discussing the tea leaves to read the mood or intent of Obama, Cheney or Brown. Let's focus on the universal human rights and our right to free election that are being trampled by AN, SL & Co.
I really should apologize for calling Obama a "plonker". That probably wasn't fair of me.
He appears to me to be someone who is very methodical in his reasoning and actions (maybe too much so for some of us) - but I have read that his electoral campaign was the best run and best orchestrated American Presidential campaign ever.
He (and the Americans in general) have some things in common with the Iranian Regime. In my free country, voting is compulsory -- everybody MUST vote on penalty of a large fine (being free does not come free) . But, as I understand, the US is similar to Iran in that voting is not compulsory - you can do it if you feel like it, or perhaps it might be nicer to go to the beach (or desert) on that day. So, the parties involved do all they can to get their supporters to turn out. (In my country they know that everybody HAS to turn out)
Obama's organization was apparently very good at getting their supporters out to vote - and so did Obama's opposition (but maybe not as well). In Iran, I understand there was also a high turnout on voting day.
The difference between the 2 countries, of course, is that in the US, they actually counted the votes. Obama won convincingly. I have to give him credit for that.
Barry
I think one problem with understanding how sanctions are supposed to work is that we use too many euphemisms these days. Whenever you pressure someone on how exactly sanctions are supposed to bring about a change in policy, they always say it will "increase pressure on the Regime" by its people. What exactly that pressure is meant to look like, or how it will work, is left unsaid.
Given that the Greens are already fighting as hard as anybody can for Democracy right now, and that they're bound to succeed sooner or later since they represent the majority, and history tells us you can only hold together a cult so long after the original guru dies anyway, I really don't see any point in trying to encourage the people to improve their government through sanctions.
Freezing the assets of the IRGC and the Coup masters is a first step to the fair and just solution. That money belongs to the People of Iran.