Iran: What Happened on Election Night? The Ghalam News Editor's Account

The Latest in Iran (19 November): It’s the Nukes Today

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Abdofazl Fateh was the editor of Ghalam News, a publication close to Mir Hossein Mousavi before it was shut down by the Iranian Government. His account of what happened on the night of the Presidential election, 12 June, has re-surfaced.

Alongside the account of Mousavi advisor Alireza Beheshti, which we published on 25 August, Fateh's recollection puts forth the story of an opposition that feared manipulation of the results. Indeed, that fear prompted one of the key moves of the crisis, Mousavi's decision to hold a press conference before the votes were announced. The subsequent decision to write a letter to the Supreme Leader about the concerns brought this response from the head of Ayatollah Khamenei's security, Mr Vahid: "From his words I sensed that I must consider the election over. He said that he had sent a reminder to the Interior Ministry about the way they plan to announce the results, but he said that Mr. Ahmadinejad would win by a big margin."

Thanks to Pedestrian for the translation:

Thursday morning [11 June] we had consecutive meetings with Mr. Mousavi. The main topic of discussion was the provisions for election day. Numerous reports had reached people in the campaign which made us really worried about the election process. Supervising the ballot boxes was of serious concern to us.

Mir Hossein Mousavi chose a number of friends to follow up on these issues in parallel. One problem was that the text messaging service had been completely shut down by the ministry.

It was planned that Mousavi would vote in one of the mosques in the south of Tehran. This mosque was called the grand Jameh mosque in Rey [an old city in the south of Tehran]. Around 11 p.m. on Thursday, the time and place of Mousavi’s voting was put up on the Ghalam’s website [Mousavi's main webiste].

When I went to that mosque on Friday morning, a large group of reporters were there. Mr. Mousavi voted alongside Mrs. Rahnavard and went up to the podium of the mosque to give a talk for a very short time. He was saying that we will stay up tonight when the microphone was shut off.

We returned to the campaign headquarters right away. Mousavi was following the news. Reports that came from various election centers one after another indicated that the turnout was outstanding. Most of the reports pointed to a greater turnout for Mousavi.

It was only a few hours into voting day that pro-Government outlets and websites reported that Ahmadinejad had won. But reports indicated that we would be winning by a big margin.

Everyone was filled with an indescribable sense of happiness. A report was read by the Voter Protection Office. Many of the election centers were reporting very, very slow lines, the shortage of ballots, and various obstacles faced by voters. But, the combination of announced results we were getting indicated that Mousavi was well ahead.

Mousavi was continuously calling the heads of Parliament and judiciary, the leader’s office, and the Supreme Administrative Court to tell them about the problems and obstacles voters were facing.

Complaints were increasing minute by minute. In many voting centers, the ballots were finished. But nothing was done about it. We all came to the conclusion that this was a planned move on the part of the organizers of the election. It was apparent that they had no desire to get extra ballots to the centers, or to speed up the process or to extend voting hours. Reports told us that some voting centers had closed as early as 4 p.m. Even though hour by hour voting was to be extended to 10 p.m. many voting centers were closed before then, and even some people who had stood for hours in line did not get to vote.

Around 4 in the afternoon, someone called Mir Hossein Mousavi and told him that some have reached the decision to announced a 19 [million] vs. 14 [million] win for Ahmadinejad. Mousavi called the officials to let them know.

Around 6 p.m. in the afternoon, Mousavi wrote a letter to the Leader asking him to intervene and correct the voting irregularities we were continuously hearing.

Around 10 p.m. we heard some news that some are going to announce the end of the election with a win for Ahmadinejad. This is when counting votes had not started yet across the country.

Mousavi had a press conference and gave a warning regarding the counting process and mentioned some of the irregularities that had been reported.

Around 11 p.m. Mousavi wrote a confidential letter to the Leader, I transferred the letter to the Leader’s home/office myself and gave it to Mr. Vahid. We spoke for a few minutes and from his words I sensed that I must consider the election over. He said that he had sent a reminder to the interior ministry about the way they plan to announce the results, but he said that Mr. Ahmadinejad would win by a big margin. I told him that from all reports, eyewitness accounts, data and all logical assessment, it was just the opposite of what he was claiming.

After handing the letter, I came back to Mousavi. All our friends were there. Mousavi told the story to every single person and sought their advice. Everyone was dumbstruck. Nobody believed this result. And no report of such an outcome was sent to us by the officers overlooking the election centers [across the country]. After talking to everyone, Mousavi said: “the elections are people’s rights. I can’t give up people’s rights. I’m going to see this through and until this lie is cleared up, I will share the accounts of it with the people.”

The newspaper had been ordered not to headline anything that would predict the results. The Green Word [Mousavi's paper] had such a headline ready and was not permitted to run it. But, reports indicated that Iran and Kayhan newspapers were going to run a headline announcing Ahmadinejad’s victory [note, at this point, the final results had not yet been announced]. IRNA and Fars had already declared Ahmadinejad the winner.

Mousavi left the meeting at around 2 in the morning. We were all talking to one another and everybody was trying to come up with a solution but the results announced by the interior ministry were so great that it was obvious they were leaving no room for argument or protest.

Around 4 in the morning I heard that there had been disperse confrontations in the campaign headquarters and tear gas had been thrown [the headquarters were later raided].

Near the early hours of the morning, there were some in the street honking their horns, happy with victory.

I speak to Hamid Rasaee. Fourth months ago he’d said that Ahmadinejad would win 23 million votes and that he would surpass the 22 million votes for President Khatami in 1997. He’d said that Mousavi would have around 10 million votes. I wasn’t as smart as he was, I congratulated him on his prediction.

In the morning, we met up again and spoke among ourselves. Then we went to see Mousavi. He was sitting there, calm and collected as always. He read his statement for us.

The phone is constantly ringing. Everybody is startled, some are crying, some are screaming. Some are depressed, others worried. When I look at Mousavi, I too am ashamed and I can’t help but cry. I seek refuge in the presence of the lord and hope that he will watch over you. Alas! The diary had to end this way …

The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama's Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)

The Bomb, The Bomb: Distorting the Latest Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme
Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up

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1. IT'S THE NUKES, STUPID

If anyone in the Iranian Government still believes in the
Washington-directed "velvet revolution", rather than using it as a stick to beat the opposition, he/she can breathe easy. The driving force for the Obama Administration's approach to Iran is the quest for an agreement on uranium enrichment.

That ambition is led by the President, and his determination has brought general consensus in an Administration that was arguing over the value of talks earlier in 2009. Broadly speaking, the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department are all on the same page now.

Any reference to the internal situation in Iran, as in the Obama recent statement calling for recognition of the rights of protesters, is a gloss. The President and his advisors may have a legal and humanitarian interest in what happens to demonstrators, as well to US citizens detained and sentenced to years in prison in Iran, but it is not their top policy priority.

Indeed, Washington's position is now fixed firmly enough to withstand not only the demands of reformists but figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani to go slow on deal with President Ahmadinejad. I suspect we will find that Obama has personally gone farther --- much farther --- than any President since 1979 to get an accommodation with Tehran.

2. GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG

The quest for a nuclear deal has been accompanied by a disturbing if tangential story of how "intelligence" and "analysis" has undermined the Iranian opposition.

Ever since the June election, some US officials, primarily in the intelligence community, have been putting out the line that the Green Movement is insignificant and/or not to be trusted on issues such as nuclear weapons, Israel, and
"anti-Americanism". (The public face of this line is the commentaries of Flynt Leverett, formerly of the National Security Council, and Hillary Mann Leverett, formerly of the State Department.)

This assessment was reinforced by the appearance in October of former Khatami Government official and "Karroubi advisor" Ataollah Mojaherani at the conference of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His strident caution to the audience that a "Green Government" was unlikely to give ground on Iran's nuclear programme or on the position towards Israel apparently sent shock waves through the audience, angering other reformists present in the audience who feared Mohajerani had just damaged their cause.

They were right. It is the Mojaherani incident that is behind the clamour of well-placed Washington columnists like Jackson Diehl and David Ignatius to beware the Greens. More importantly, the speech fuelled the "analysis" within the CIA that the politics of Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami were not to be trusted, a belief that accompanied (and possibly fed by) sources such as those in Borzou Daragahi's pre-13 Aban article assaulting the Green Movement.

What is intriguing is how a Washington distraction became the foundation for some in the CIA to bury or fear the Greens. It is true that Mohajerani was a prominent member of the Karroubi campaign and wore the badge of a glittering if past political career: youngest deputy of the first post-Revolution Parliament, Vice-President in the Rafsanjani Government, Minister of Culture under Mohammad Khatami.

Still, at the time, we gave almost no space to the Mojaherani speech because it was so disconnected from events and political strategy in Iran. Before and after the Washington episode, I have not seen Mojaherani's name rise up in the movements of the Green Wave. In short, he was one of a number of former officials who have or had connections with a complex network of "reformists".

For many in Washington, however, Mojaherani was thought to be no less than the ambassador for the Green Movement, presenting its manifesto. And when the approach of his speech did not match up to the "revolution" --- in presentation and policy, if not Islamic system --- that they wanted, those officials and commentators reacted like a lover spurned.

(There is a wider point here. The Iranian Government has had success in disrupting communications within Iran
but it is also important that it has limited any dialogue between the reformist opposition and the "outside", in this case the
US Government. With no direct line
established as the Green Movement evolved, American officials have
relied upon a variety of people, usually located outside Iran presenting a wide range of often contradictory advice and speculation rather than solid information.

While the situation may have been inevitable, given the detentions of many reformists and de facto house arrest of leaders like Mir Hossein Mousavi, it strikes me that the Obama Administration has not worked around these restrictions to read the lines --- and between the lines --- of statements not only of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami but of other activists like Alireza Beheshti and senior clerics from and beyond Qom.)

3. THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS

As a case study in internal politics,
the beauty of the Obama nuclear-first, engagement-first approach has been how it has brought consensus amongst differing groups within the Administration. If the talks brought nuclear agreement, that would be a significant result for the unclenched fist (the line often attributed to some State Department officials and envoys like Richard Holbrooke). If they were finally collapsed by Iranian stalling and intransigence, the platform for aggressive sanctions would be laid (the line often
attributed to Dennis Ross, now at the National Security Council).

The only problem comes if, having grasped the hand of the Iranian Government in talks, the Obama Administration then has to slap Ahmadinejad's face in the absence of an agreement.

Washington's current calculation, supported by its diplomatic strategy, turns the Russian key. Moscow's envoys are working on the Iranian Government to accept the uranium enrichment plan, while Russian President Dmitri Medvedev issues unsubtle hints that he will not stand back if Tehran balks.

That is not the same as a Russian commitment to sanctions. Let's assume, however, that Moscow accepts a US-led multilateral effort inside or outside the United Nations. And let's assume that President Obama, who no doubt has mentioned this in Beijing this week, gets a Chinese promise to stand aside.

What next? If there is no nuclear agreement, it will quite likely be because the Supreme Leader has objected, despite Obama's sustained direct efforts. So how does a stricter round of sanctions change Ayatollah Khamenei's position?

It doesn't. So the Obama Administration is presumably counting on a diplomatic and economic containment, indeed isolation, of Iran.

That, however, does nothing to address the issue of President Ahmadinejad, who remains in office. It does nothing to deal with the increasing role of the Revolutionary Guards in matters beyond the nuclear and even military realm. (Indeed, as some analysts have contended, further sanctions may assist the Guard's economic ventures, although this effect may be mitigated if the restrictions can specifically target Guard "investments".)

Sanctions certainly do nothing with respect to the reformists and the Green movement. Even if Washington recants and tries to bring them back into political consideration, it is unclear --- given the perceived snub by Obama's officials in recent weeks --- if the opposition will offer even a cautious welcome.

4. BACK TO THE CUL-DE-SAC

In the Bush years, the cul-de-sac for American policy was the threat that could not be carried out. Whether the vision was a "turn left from Baghdad" intervention, briefly considered in 2003, the military strikes advocated by Vice President Cheney in 2007, or a sledgehammer set of economic sanctions, the Administration could not deliver the blow. The "best" it could manage was the muddled if funded programme of "soft power" in the 2nd term, which was never defined as either a live-and-let-live civic engagement or the cover for "velvet revolution".

The hope of the Obama approach has been to get out of that dead end, opening up space for other initiatives such as Middle Eastern agreements, through engagement. And, considered narrowly in the context of discussions on nuclear programmes and regional politics, that was solid, realist common sense.

But "narrowly" became very narrow after the elections of 12 June. If Obama wanted to dance, he had to dance with an Iranian President who now lacked legitimacy (despite the efforts of engagement advocates like the Leveretts to explain how Ahmadinejad had really won the election and a clear mandate).

That legitimacy, within weeks of the election, was not just a question of a "reformist" challenge. Ahmadinejad has also been in a tenuous position vis-a-vis political rivals like Hashemi Rafsanjani, the conservatives/principlists in the Iranian Parliament, Ayatollahs (and thus bodies such as the Assembly of Experts), and at times the Supreme Leader. That is why the Iranian President, far from breaking off talks to pursue The Bomb, is hugging the nuclear discussions so close --- with no prospect of salvation through an economic miracle, this is his prescription for political longevity.

Now Obama's engagement gamble, re-shaped in this post-June cauldron, may still succeed if the Supreme Leader gives his backing to an agreement on uranium enrichment. (Which is why, just to repeat, this President is going farther than any predecessor in 30 years) A wider US agenda, which may adapt engagement for exchanges on Iran's political and legal issues as well as geopolitical interests, could then be drafted.

But, if the nuclear deal does not go through, Obama and Ahmadinejad now dance in a downward spiral. The Iranian President will struggle to serve out his disputed second term. And the US President will be back in the cul-de-sac: pressed by some advisors and a lot of Congressmen to pursue sanctions which offer no remedy for --- and no exit from --- the political dilemma of his failed engagement.

Latest from Iran (1 November): Is This the Opposition's Moment?

NEW Video: Sharif University Protest (1 November)
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The Latest from Iran (31 October): Karroubi to March on 13 Aban

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2100 GMT: A Hold-Up of the Telecommunications Privatisation? Mehr News reports that Iran's General Inspection Organization has said uncertainties remain in the purchase of the Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI), submitting its report to a Parliamentary committee for further investigation.

Three Iranian firms, part of a consortium named Etemad Mobin Development, bought 50 percent plus one share of the company for $7.8 billion on 20 September. There are claims that the Revolutionary Guard is a hidden partner in the consortium.

2050 GMT: Mr Smith adds to the news (1530 GMT) that Mehdi Karroubi restated his claims of election fraud in a meeting today. Karroubi was actually meeting the leadership of Daftar-Tahkim-Vahdat, the student organisation who supported him in the Presidential campaign and whose leaders, Ahmad Zeidabadi and Abdollah Momeni, are currently in jail.

2030 GMT: More on Hengameh Shahidi. After some uncertainty this afternoon over her announced release on $90,000 bail, the Karroubi advisor was able to leave after more than 120 days in detention, including 50 in solitary confinement. There are reports that she has been transferred to hospital following her hunger strike last week.

We have been identifying Shahidi as a lawyer. Mr Smith checks in to correct us: she is a prominent journalist and war correspondent.

1550 GMT: "Other" Larijani Jumps In on Nuclear Issue. Sadegh Larijani, head of Iran's judiciary and brother of Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani, has jumped into the discussion on the nuclear negotiations, declaring that they were not beneficial to Iran.

That's a pretty blatant political move, given that uranium enrichment isn't exactly a judicial responsibility. So is this now a Larijani axis against President Ahmadinejad on the issue of "engagement" with the West?

1540 GMT: Crackdown? The Western media are excited over a statement from Iran's deputy head of police Ahmad Reza Radan, "The police will act against any illegal gathering on the 13th of Aban." Even Britain's Sky News, which rarely notes internal Iran developments, hails this as a "Top Story".

We're playing wait-and-see. It was inevitable that the police would react to this week's 13 Aban declarations with law-and-order warnings. More significant will be any threats from Government leaders or the Revolutionary Guard.

1530 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi, speaking to the Central Council of University Alumni, claimed that votes were "rationed" in the Presidential election. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was allocated 25 million votes while Karroubi was allowed only 330,000.

1505 GMT: Iranian Labor News Agency is reporting that Karroubi advisor and lawyer Hengameh Shahidi, who has been on hunger strike in Evin Prison, has been released on $90,000 bail. Iranian activists are saying, however, that Shahidi has not appeared in front of the prison, where her family is waiting.

1500 GMT: Reformist political activist Behzad Nabavi has appeared in court today. After requesting an open trial, Nabavi, suffering from ill health throughout his four-month detention, was transferred to hospital.
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1450 GMT: And the Protest Videos Keep Coming. We've posted the latest, from Sharif University latest.

1425 GMT: Grand Ayatollah Sane'i has issued a statement inviting people to participate in rallies on 13 Aban (4 November). Sane'i warned that tyrants and autocrats should well know that the Iranian nation, by its strong resistance and by participation in the events of 13 Aban, will unveil and neutralise hidden and secret plans made against the rights and interests of the people.

1415 GMT: According to Iranian Labor News Agency, the head of  Friday Prayers Committee, Seyed Reza Taghavi, has declared that Hashemi Rafsanjani will not be leading Tehran's prayers in the near-future.

1200 GMT: The Coordination Council of the Reform Front has issued a statement inviting all people to demonstrate on 13 Aban (4 November). The Council condemned the post-election trials and heavy sentences imposed on protesters and expressed deep regrets and sorrow of “examples of promoting organised violence”, such as the assaults against Mehdi Karoubi and Alireza Beheshti at the Tehran Media Fair.

1135 GMT: Video Flashback. To honour President Ahmadinejad's defiance of his "mosquito" enemies, we have posted the video of his 6 July post-election speech, during which he battled a Giant Flying Bug.
1115 GMT: Ahmadinejad v. The Mosquito. Unsurprisingly, Western media are buzzing about the President's statement this morning, "While enemies have used all their capacities ... the Iranian nation is standing powerfully and they are like a mosquito."

No one, unfortunately, is interpreting what exactly mosquito-swatting means. Go beyond the metaphor, and Ahmadinejad is maintaining his strategy --- set out in his speech on Thursday --- of continuing talks by framing them as Western concessions to Iran's strength: "Given the negative record of Western powers, the Iranian government ... looks at the talks with no trust. But realities dictate to them to interact with the Iranian nation."

0945 GMT: State Media Endorses Khatami?

Really. Press TV gives a full and positive description of former president Mohammad Khatami's Saturday statement to reformist university groups (see yesterday's updates). The headline is "We Will Remain Critical of Power" from Khatami's assertion, “We will continue to stay critical of the current power trend, of course within the framework of a movement that supports Islam, the Islamic Republic and the [1979] Revolution.”

How can Press TV embrace the opposition leader? First, it emphasises that Khatami is calling for criticism within the system. Then it takes the sting out of Khatami's targeted criticism of "some deviations which must be set right with.. religious and Revolutionary principles", never mentioning that this is directed at the current Government. So Press TV can endorse Khatami's assurance that the Reformist movement denounces violence “by all means”, while ignoring the specific meaning of his declaration that "certain other parties endorse it as the basis of their thoughts and actions".

0900 GMT: Islamic Republic News Agency reports that the Russian Ambassador to Iran is continuing to press Tehran to accept the third-party enrichment deal for its uranium stock.

Does this state media report indicate the Ahmadinejad Government is still keeping the door open for talks? And, if so, how far?

0810 GMT: Profiles of the Day. Homy Lafayette writes about Mehdi Karroubi's advisor, journalist, and women's rights activist Hengameh Shahidi, who is on hunger strike in Evin Prison. Shahidi has been detained since 30 June.

And Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times picks up Wednesday's story of the maths student, Mahmoud Vahidnia, who challenged the Supreme Leader.

0800 GMT: A very good day for the Green opposition yesterday. Mir Hossein Mousavi took over the news cycle with his statement anticipating the protests of 13 Aban (4 November), and then Mehdi Karroubi announced that he would be joining marchers at Amir Kabir University on Wednesday. Meanwhile, amidst the in-house fighting over the nuclear talks with the "West", there was little of note from the regime.

A quiet morning so far, so we've posted other signals of the opposition momentum. There is video of the Saturday gathering in Tehran's Laleh Park of the mothers of those killed and detained, and we have the latest examples of the videos promoting the 13 Aban marches.