Iran Analysis: Re-alignment v. Crackdown --- Which "Wins"?

Forget all the talk and newspaper articles, which EA correspondents like Josh Shahryar took apart on Saturday, about this conflict being settled in favour of a heavy-fisted Government. While the opposition is still considering its next moves, there was more than enough to show that 1) this is far more than a simple narrative of Government putting down the Green Movement and 2) that Government is far from secure in its supposed victory.

NEW Iran: A Tale of Cricket, Andre the Giant, and Protests
Iran: “It’s All Over” for the Green Movement?

First, the less dramatic --- frankly, quite mundane --- but significant political move. The "ambiguous" Hashemi Rafsanjani is no longer ambiguous. His statement at the Council reaffirmed his basic position of siding with the Supreme Leader, but equally important were his call for unity and the need to make changes to ensure the security of the Iranian system.



Still a bit vague? Well, you have to join the statement to that of Mohsen Rezaei: Secretary of the Council, Presidential candidate, and Rafsanjani ally. Yep, ally. Rezaei's own declaration to the Council was for alterations to the electoral law that governed last year's unresolved campaign.

That might seems a bit too bureaucratic for much attention, but the significance of "alterations" is that they would take away power from bodies such as the Guardian Council, the group that tightly oversees and restricts Iran's political process. And that in turn means an opening up of space in the system for factions, parties, and individuals --- even critical parties and individuals if they stay within the legal framework of the system.

A Rafsanjani-Rezaei alignment is not new --- think "National Unity Plan" and the possible January initiative to clip the authority of President Ahmadinejad. In this case, however, it is narrower but more focused. Take away some of the political  power wielded by the executive and hand it to an ostensibly "neutral" body.

So how will the Government respond? Well, not directly. Saturday was another day where it was defending against attacks on the economy and trying to show its authority with more threats against the supposedly vanquished opposition and, perhaps, even "conservative" elements who are not on-board.

Iran police chief Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam declared that media are the collaborators of intelligence services, assuring anyone listening that Iran's security services will take care of the foreign media in time to prevent any regime change.

Justice Minister Morteza Bakhtiari pronounced that you can forget the "official" figure of 300 detained on Ashura (27 December); it was actually 700. So let there be no doubt that the regime would also "get" Karroubi and Mousavi to prevent any significant challenge.

Ahmadinejad's media advisor Mehdi Kalhor chipped in with the news that the first "velvet revolution" in Iran was on 2 Khordaad 1376 (23 May 1997), the day that Mohammad Khatami was elected President. Neat twist, this. It is not the Ahmadinejad 2009 victory that is fraudulent but that of Khatami, who just happens to be one of the leading opposition figures, and the "reformists".

In Qom, Ahmadinejad's clerical backer, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, analysed that "the devil" played a role in the recent "riots" in Iran. Satan's companions includes "jinnis" and devious people, and democracy is another example of his ferocity and tyranny.

Not exactly the statements of a regime secure in its skin. Hmm....

Well, one easy read is that Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi haven't exactly gone away. They met for the second time this week on Saturday, this in Karroubi's home. No details given by Karroubi's website Saham News, but the point is that they met. The Government watches and frets that 22 Bahman did not settle matters.

But it should not only be watch the devil's foreign and domestic minions. The situation is such that any shift, even with "the system", of power and oversight is a slap-down to a President and his advisors who have escalated this crisis to the point of no compromise.

So expect more threats against Hashemi Rafsanjani in the near-future. Look for more counter-attacks from members of Parliament who no longer have any respect for Ahmadinejad. And bring back the recurrent question.

What say you now, Supreme Leader?

Comments

[Arshama]

Scott,

Thank you so much for the alignement of recent domestic developments, excellent as usual.

I think it gives new momentum and additional clarification to your recent posting "Watching on many fronts". i.e. 1) Rafsanjani, 2) Economy, and 3) Karroubi Watch:
http://enduringamerica.com/2010/02/18/latest-on-iran-18-february-watching-on-many-fronts/

After the brutal crackdowns of recent months obviously the opposition (in it's broadest sense) has decided to undertake coordinated moves, challenging AN (and consequently the SL) on several fronts:

1) Legitimacy Front, led by Rafsanjani and Rezaie, who aim at disempowering the Guardian Council, one of the SL's most influential panels to direct political affairs according to his own autoritarian ideas,
2) Economy Front, led by moderate hardliners and the few remaining reformers in the parliament, who oppose AN's destructive budget and other economic plans, and
3) Political Participation / Human Rights Front, led by Moussavi, Karroubi and to a certain extent by Khatami as well, insisting on the rule of law and the responsability of officials for post-electional events.

Of course all the three are defending the people's rights against a progressively irresponsible and incapable government, which has nothing to offer to it's sovereign, the people, than security forces, arrests, menaces and cuts of subsidies, while it is dumping national incomes and properties on all possible levels.

IMHO these moves attest to a vibrant political scene in Iran, which has lost nothing of it's vitality, not even 8 months after the rigged elections.

Arshama

[Publicola]

The movement for democracy is to be found in cities among the younger as well as more educated sections of the population. Thus the tenor of reporting in general.

Therefore here some pertinent figures and data:

The age median in Iran is 27 years (i.e. half of the population is younger than this figure); the age median of Germany is approx. 44 years.

Iran and. Italy have an identical degree of urbanisation: 68% live in cities respectively.

Literacy in Iran with more than 80 % approaches that of Turkey with approx. 87%.

The official election result of over 35% for the opposition bestows a higher degree of political legitimation to the opposition than each single large German popular party with a large and broad electorate is able to dispose of

[(i.e. definitely under 35%; more exactly:
SPD [Socialdemocrats] - 23%;
CDU/CSU [Christian-Democrats] - 33.8%;
FDP [Liberaldemocrats] – 14,6%)]

after the last election to the Bundestag/parliament, the election of the present coalition government CDU/CSU plus FDP = 48,4 %).

In other words, the violent suppression of the oppositional trends is likely condemned to (mid- and longterm) failure at least from a demographic and statistical point of view.

[guest]

Khatami was elected in 1376 not 1397. We are in persian year of 1388 right now. I know that it is confusing but for an Iranian reader year 1397 is a year well into the future.

[Samuel]

"The official election result of over 35% for the opposition bestows a higher degree of political legitimation to the opposition than each single large German popular party with a large and broad electorate is able to dispose of".

But Khatami won the presidency with over 65% of the vote so based on this the reformist % has gone down about 30%. Couple this with the fact that the reformist youth is the most likely to emigrate to the West (where they already live ideologically and emotionally) while the pro-IRI young will stay put and you have a very secure IRI future.

[Publicola]

"The OFFICIAL[ly admitted] election result of over 35%"
"But Khatami won the presidency with over 65% of the vote"

it is certainly not only me, who assumes that in reality and in fact the election results will have been similar to the Khatami-results quoted by Samuel.

As far as I guess this Iranian election 2009 was not at all like a(ny) [relaxed] national election in Germany [or any other European country] with usually lots of, with often considerable, decisive amounts of floating, undecided voters, who only 1-5 minutes before they enter the polling booth decide offhand and somehow by chance who to vote for, a fact which did make precise election predictions risky in Germany in 2009, producing a surprise effect as to the election winners.

An election result of more than 35% - this only the officially conceded, highly controversial figure - is a dead sure basis for decisively changing, for reforming any (!) society from head to foot, to the quick, down to atomic scale so to speak:

The German ecological party „The Greens “ was elected into parliament in 2009 with 10,7%. This long-term percentage of about 10%, rarely more than that on a national level – a relatively rather modest and relatively rather small figure when compared to the current Iranian election result has led to the (globalising) fact that all parties in Germany (and in Europe, where the ecological parties have been achieving similar results over the long term) are not able to exist as an eligible political party, are not able to put up any (!) candidate of any (!) party for election without a pronounced ecological and environmental party program ! Of course it takes it time ! Profound changes are not brought about within half a year !

So what consequently to expect of an Iranian - longterm (see Khatami election) - election result [at least and officially admmitted:] triple those election results of European ecological parties ?

[Scott Lucas]

Guest,

Apologies for my error --- I mis-typed the Persian year.

S.

[Adam]

Samuel,

The Mousavi total was actually probably higher than the 65% Khatami got, since AN has made the case for reform even more urgent because of the economic collapse. Further, even if 65% of the population did immigrate over time the remainder would not be secure because there is no way that oil prices in this decade will increase 10-fold the way they did the last ten years and AN needs rapidly rising oil revenues just to manage what is already a dangerous recession in Iran. This is not to mention that Iran's oil production is starting to decline steadily and the IR has absolutely no forseeable alternative to oil revenues, particularly since it is driving its most able young people to immigrate.

[Samuel]

Adam,

"The Mousavi total was actually probably higher than the 65% Khatami got..."

I disagree because I think that AN's support in the Rural Areas, small towns and smaller cities is underappreciated. AN spent much of his first administration travelling to small towns and remote provinces. He held Cabinet meetings in such areas and gave numerous speeches there. He also consciously diverted government spending and investment from the Capital to the remote areas, ironic for a former Mayor of Tehran. This focus on daily life in the IRI outside the large urban centers was unprecedented for any President of Iran. Did Khatami do such things? Did Rafsanjani? Of course not.

One may call this populism, demagoguery or something even more insulting but the fact is that it paid off. This is partly the reason why the criticism of the govt. for bringing in supporters from the small towns is so bizarre. THAT'S WHERE THEIR MOST ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTERS ARE. It is not as if they are bringing in Pakistani Shiites.

[Adam]

Those are the regime's traditional claims regarding AN's miraculous electoral support, but they have no credibility. As an earlier poster pointed out, Iran's population is now well over 60% urban so the urban/rural divide would not split in AN's favor. Further, AN's mysterious rural support is a novel invention, as in 2005 AN did worse in rural districts than he did in Urban ones against Rafsanjani.
You seem to authentically dislike Ahmadinejad, particularly his affection towards nazi-esque ideology and revisionism, so why do you continue to support the mass murder of Iran's youth in the name of propping up this lie of an election?

[Samuel]

"Iran’s population is now well over 60% urban so the urban/rural divide would not split in AN’s favor"
The divide is not necessarily urban/rural. It is also small town and small city as opposed to Tehran. The former can also be "urban".

"Further, AN’s mysterious rural support is a novel invention, as in 2005 AN did worse in rural districts than he did in Urban ones against Rafsanjani."

He was the Mayor of Tehran after all. Read what I wrote above "AN spent much of his first administration travelling to small towns and remote provinces." The 2005 election was BEFORE his first administration.

"You seem to authentically dislike Ahmadinejad"

I do but it comes down to choices at hand. Since no one is going to vote for me for President I view AN as a better alternative to the snake Mousavi whose basic theme was a complete lie. In essence he argued that the Greens represented Ayatollah Khomeini's legacy. It is that fundamental fabrication, the portrayal of a fictitious Khomeini who never existed on earth, that accounts for the genuine hatred that many of us have for Mousavi.

[Publicola]

My first posting here on this thread (please see above) referred of course explicitly to the officially conceded results [which I consider faked] as a starting point.

Reports and informed guesses refer to a high constituency of the opposition among a) the young and educated and b) in cities:
ad a) Iran and Italy have an identical degree of urbanisation: 68% live in cities respectively
ad b) Literacy in Iran with more than 80 % approaches that of Turkey with approx. 87%.

There has been an - officially admitted - figure of more than 35 % supporting a program of basically the following demands:
The demands expressed and insisted upon by the democratic movement always refer to the realization and observance of the Iranian constitution, are always constitutional, for instance:

• that the state (i.e. the three powers: the judiciary, the legislative, the executive) follows and obeys painstakingly and meticulously the regulations stipulated by the constitution,

• that the republican constitutional freedoms of opinion, of the press, of assembly,

• that the constitutional separation of the three branches of power (the judiciary, the legislative, the executive),

• that constitutional “habeas corpus”,

• that the constitutional freedom of religion (Bahá'í),

• are meticulously and painstakingly observed by Iran’s citizens and in particular by the state and all state-organs.

Obviously the only guardian of the Iranian constitution at the time being seems to be the democratic grass roots movement.

Now back to election figures and their meaning for the political process:

Compared to any European election results (of the ecological parties in Europe, which hardly ever acquired a percentage beyond 14 % nationally, and never acquired a figure beyond 20 % ! ),
a (long-term) election result of about 10% proved as a dead sure basis to force (over the long-term) any (!) other parties to adopt an ecological agenda, if they did not want to disappear from the political stage.

This figure of ca. 10 % long-term votes has in the meantime translated into an influential power which was able to enforce politicians worldwide to adopt an ecological program, e.g
to implement the Kyoto protocol,
to enforce Europe-wide ecological measures like ban on smoking [whatever I might personally think of that]
etc. etc. etc.