Iran Snap Analysis: Playtime's Over

No doubt about it. Politics, conflict, and manoeuvring are back in Iran. After the New Year’s holiday, almost all the players were on court yesterday — the Supreme Leader, the President, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mir Hossein Mousavi, reformist MPs.

This re-surge of politics, marked by the fight over Ahmadinejad's subsidy cut and spending proposals and the meeting of reformists with Mousavi, Rafsanjani, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami, has even caught the eye of journalists who have written little since the supposed bust of the Green Movement on 22 Bahman (11 February).

The non-Iranian media has only a limited view, however, and are scrambling for explanations: The New York Times, for example, decides that the Supreme Leader has come down strongly on the side of Ahmadinejad in the subsidy battle --- a fair hypothesis, but the "proof" comes from the declarations of the Islamic Republic News Agency and Press TV. (The Times article also takes no note of the Mousavi-Rafsanjani-Karroubi-Khatami meetings with reformists.)



What does all this mean? A proper analysis will take some time and will also need to be flexible to take account of the rush of developments, but here are some starting points:

1. This conflict has always been more than just the Green Movement v. the regime. Some coverage of 22 Bahman (11 February) fed that misleading view; the events yesterday demonstrate that we can now put away the narrative of "it all ended on that day".

2. Rafsanjani, Mousavi, and the reformists all signalled that they want to work within the framework of the Islamic Republic, and Rafsanjani in particular made it clear that there should be no challenge to the Supreme Leader. At the same time, all also stated firmly that the Government has distanced itself from the people, the marker of continuing and possibility escalating challenge to Ahmadinejad.

3. The meetings with the reformist coalition of MPs emphasised the importance of Parliament in the Iranian system. That is not just deference to those were in attendance; it is a sign that the Majlis is seen as the site of a move against the President. That in turn points to an attempt to work with the conservative "opposition within", including Larijani, in the battle on the budget and economic legislation.

4. But it's not just economics. There are a series of unresolved issues that the Parliament could take further, notably the investigation of the Government's post-election abuses.

Playtime is over.

Comments

[Tom H]

I welcome the enthusiasm of this analysis. I would certainly like to see reformers and moderate conservatives connect up and take the fight to Ahmadinejad. But the analysis seems contradictory. If Rafsanjani and Mousavi agree not to challenge the Supreme Leader, and Larijani works for the SL, and the SL has endorsed Ahmadinejad's subsidy-cut proposal, where is the space for a challenge? Once the key players grant the SL veto power, they're finished.

I realize that Mousavi/Karroubi/Khatami do not roll over for the SL. But this analysis is about the tantalizing promise of a coalition, which would have to be conditioned at some level on willingness to defy the SL, since the claims of rivalry between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad appear to be overstated. Is there evidence of any independence from the SL among the moderate conservative players?

[ange paris]

Tom H
I have understood that :
-Larijani works for the SL : right
-The SL has endorsed Ahmadinejad’s subsidy-cut proposal : wrong, only the half is approuved and SL has said to AN that he has to obey the law and what the majlis, (the parlement) has decided.So he dosen't support him at all;
-All the others, Moussavi, Karroubi, Khatami and Rafsanjani are against AN;
-Larijani and all the moderate conservatives are against him;
=>conclusion : AN is almost alone.
We will see if the half of SL and his veto power will be working in the favor of AN ? I don't think so, there is only one way , the removal of AN.

[Scott Lucas]

Tom H,

I should have been clearer --- I don't think, contrary to the media spin taken as news by NY Times and to the analysis of other Iran-watchers like Meir Javedanfar, that Khamenei is fully behind the President in his battle with the Parliament.

S.

[Arshama]

@ # 4. Government’s post-election abuses

Deutsche Welle reports that Mohammad Davari, former chief editor of Saham News website, is under heavy pressure in Evin to accuse Karroubi of false allegations in the Kahrizak case, i.e. to deny his own accusations of rape in this horrible detention camp, which led to his imprisonment in September 2009: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5437554,00.html

[Zephyr]

When the Supreme Leader says that all branches of government must "ease the way for the implementation" of the subsidy reform law and singles out the administration as the organ which is in the middle of the *meidan-e karhaye ejra-i* [don't have an adequate translation, sorry] that sounds to me like he has backed Ahmadinejad in the latest spat with the Majles. Ahmadinejad's absurd call for a referendum and his latest letter to Larijani might then even be considered deliberate provocations to force Khamenei's hand...

[Scott Lucas]

Zephyr,

Much appreciated.

S.