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Entries in Baitullah Mehsud (3)

Sunday
Aug302009

Defending Torture, Bombing Iran (Video): Dick Cheney on Fox News Sunday (30 August)

Torture and Lies: Confronting Cheney — 7 More Points to Note
Torture and Lies: Confronting Cheney

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Apologies for not mincing words, but the US in the midst of a sustained public-relations effort to whitewash the torture stain of the Bush Administration by 1) arguing that it wasn't torture and 2) if it was, it helped win the War on Terror. After the release this week of the damning 2004 CIA internal report on the Administration's authorisation of torture and its ineffectiveness, Dick Cheney has been at the front of the campaign to save his legacy, if not America's standing in the world. Fox News set him with the softball questions this morning.

(An important side note for Iran-watchers. Check out the passage late in the transcript where Cheney comes out as a strong supporter of an airstrike on Iran in 2007-8):

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CfFiBy8jLM[/youtube]

CHRIS WALLACE, HOST: Mr. Vice President, welcome back to "FOX News Sunday."

RICHARD CHENEY, FORMER VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: It's good to be back, Chris.

WALLACE: This is your first interview since Attorney General Holder named a prosecutor to investigate possible CIA abuses of terror detainees.

What do you think of that decision?

CHENEY: I think it's a terrible decision. President Obama made the announcement some weeks ago that this would not happen, that his administration would not go back and look at or try to prosecute CIA personnel. And the effort now is based upon the inspector general's report that was sent to the Justice Department five years ago, was completely reviewed by the Justice Department in years past.

They made decisions about whether or not there was any prosecutable offense there. They found one. It did not involve CIA personnel, it involved contract personnel. That individual was sentenced and is doing time. The matter's been dealt with the way you would expect it to be dealt with by professionals.

Now we've got a political appointee coming back, and supposedly without the approval of the president, going to do a complete review, or another complete investigation, possible prosecution of CIA personnel. We could talk the whole program about the negative consequences of that, about the terrible precedent it sets, to have agents involved, CIA personnel involved, in a difficult program that's approved by the Justice Department, approved by the National Security Council, and the Bush administration, and then when a new administration comes in, it becomes political.

They may find themselves dragged up before a grand jury, have to hire attorneys on their own because the Justice Department won't provide them with counsel.

It's a terrible, terrible precedent.

WALLACE: There are a lot of aspects that you just raised. Let me review some of them.
Why are you so concerned about the idea of one administration reviewing, investigating the actions of another one?

CHENEY: Well, you think, for example, in the intelligence arena. We ask those people to do some very difficult things. Sometimes, that put their own lives at risk. They do so at the direction of the president, and they do so with the -- in this case, we had specific legal authority from the Justice Department. And if they are now going to be subject to being investigated and prosecuted by the next administration, nobody's going to sign up for those kinds of missions.

It's a very, very devastating, I think, effect that it has on morale inside the intelligence community. If they assume that they're going to have to be dealing with the political consequences -- and it's clearly a political move. I mean, there's no other rationale for why they're doing this -- then they'll be very reluctant in the future to do that.

WALLACE: Do you think this was a political move not a law enforcement move?

CHENEY: Absolutely. I think the fact is, the Justice Department has already reviewed the inspector general's report five years ago. And now they're dragging it back up again, and Holder is going to go back and review it again, supposedly, to try to find some evidence of wrongdoing by CIA personnel.

In other words, you know, a review is never going to be final anymore now. We can have somebody, some future administration, come along 10 years from now, 15 years from now, and go back and rehash all of these decisions by an earlier administration.

WALLACE: Let me follow up on that. The attorney general says this is a preliminary review, not a criminal investigation. It is just about CIA officers who went beyond their legal authorization. Why don't you think it's going to stop there?

CHENEY: I don't believe it. We had the president of the United States, President Obama, tell us a few months ago there wouldn't be any investigation like this, that there would not be any look back at CIA personnel who were carrying out the policies of the prior administration. Now they get a little heat from the left wing of the Democratic Party, and they're reversing course on that.

The president is the chief law enforcement officer in the administration. He's now saying, well, this isn't anything that he's got anything to do with. He's up on vacation on Martha's Vineyard and his attorney general is going back and doing something that the president said some months ago he wouldn't do.

WALLACE: But when you say it's not going to stop there, you don't believe it's going to stop there, do you think this will become an investigation into the Bush lawyers who authorized the activity into the top policymakers who were involved in the decision to happen, an enhanced interrogation program?

CHENEY: Well, I have no idea whether it will or not, but it shouldn't.

The fact of the matter is the lawyers in the Justice Department who gave us those opinions had every right to give us the opinions they did. Now you get a new administration and they say, well, we didn't like those opinions, we're going to go investigate those lawyers and perhaps have them disbarred. I just think it's an outrageous precedent to set, to have this kind of, I think, intensely partisan, politicized look back at the prior administration.

I guess the other thing that offends the hell out of me, frankly, Chris, is we had a track record now of eight years of defending the nation against any further mass casualty attacks from Al Qaeda. The approach of the Obama administration should be to come to those people who were involved in that policy and say, how did you do it? What were the keys to keeping this country safe over that period of time?

Instead, they're out there now threatening to disbar the lawyers who gave us the legal opinions, threatening contrary to what the president originally said. They're going to go out and investigate the CIA personnel who carried out those investigations. I just think it's an outrageous political act that will do great damage long term to our capacity to be able to have people take on difficult jobs, make difficult decisions, without having to worry about what the next administration is going to say.

WALLACE: If the prosecutor asks to speak to you, will you speak to him?

CHENEY: It will depend on the circumstances and what I think their activities are really involved in. I've been very outspoken in my views on this matter. I've been very forthright publicly in talking about my involvement in these policies.

I'm very proud of what we did in terms of defending the nation for the last eight years successfully. And, you know, it won't take a prosecutor to find out what I think. I've already expressed those views rather forthrightly.

WALLACE: Let me ask you -- you say you're proud of what we did. The inspector general's report which was just released from 2004 details some specific interrogations -- mock executions, one of the detainees threatened with a handgun and with an electric drill, waterboarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 183 times.

First of all, did you know that was going on?

CHENEY: I knew about the waterboarding. Not specifically in any one particular case, but as a general policy that we had approved.

The fact of the matter is, the Justice Department reviewed all of those allegations several years ago. They looked at this question of whether or not somebody had an electric drill in an interrogation session. It was never used on the individual, or that they had brought in a weapon, never used on the individual. The judgment was made then that there wasn't anything there that was improper or illegal with respect to conduct in question...

(CROSSTALK)

WALLACE: Do you think what they did, now that you've heard about it, do you think what they did was wrong?

CHENEY: Chris, my sort of overwhelming view is that the enhanced interrogation techniques were absolutely essential in saving thousands of American lives and preventing further attacks against the United States, and giving us the intelligence we needed to go find Al Qaeda, to find their camps, to find out how they were being financed. Those interrogations were involved in the arrest of nearly all the Al Qaeda members that we were able to bring to justice. I think they were directly responsible for the fact that for eight years, we had no further mass casualty attacks against the United States.

It was good policy. It was properly carried out. It worked very, very well.

WALLACE: So even these cases where they went beyond the specific legal authorization, you're OK with it?

CHENEY: I am.

WALLACE: One specific question about Holder, the Obama administration -- you put out the statement saying that you were upset that President Obama allowed the attorney general to bring these cases. A top Obama official says, hey, maybe in the Bush White House they told the attorney general what to do, but Eric Holder makes independent decisions.

CHENEY: Well, I think if you look at the Constitution, the president of the United States is the chief law enforcement officer in the land. The attorney general's a statutory officer. He's a member of the cabinet.

The president's the one who bears this responsibility. And for him to say, gee, I didn't have anything to do with it, especially after he sat in the Oval Office and said this wouldn't happen, then Holder decides he's going to do it. So now he's backed off and is claiming he's not responsible.

I just, I think he's trying to duck the responsibility for what's going on here. And I think it's wrong.
WALLACE: President Obama has also decided to move interrogations from the CIA to the FBI that's under the supervision of the National Security Council, and the FBI will have to act within the boundaries of the Army Field Manual.

What do you think that does for the nation's security? And will we now have the tools if we catch another high-value target?

CHENEY: I think the move to set up this -- what is it called, the HIG Group?

WALLACE: Yes.

CHENEY: It's not even clear who's responsible. The Justice Department is, then they claim they aren't. The FBI is responsible and they claim they aren't. It's some kind of interagency process by which they're going to be responsible for interrogating high-value detainees.

If we had tried to do that back in the aftermath of 9/11, when we captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11, we'd have gotten no place. I think it moves very much in the direction of going back to the old way of looking at these terrorist attacks -- that these are law enforcement problems, that this isn't a strategic threat to the United States.

I think it's a direct slap at the CIA. I don't think it will work.

I think that if they were faced with the kind of situation we were faced with in the aftermath of 9/11, suddenly capturing people that may have knowledge about imminent attacks, and they're going to have to have meetings and decide who gets to ask what question and who's going to Mirandize the witness, I think it's silly. It makes no sense. It doesn't appear to be a serious move in terms of being able to deal with the nation's security.

WALLACE: Well, on another issue, the CIA has stopped a program to kill or capture top al Qaeda leaders, top al Qaeda terrorists. And CIA Director Panetta told lawmakers that you told the CIA not to inform Congress.

Is that true?

CHENEY: As I recall -- and frankly, this is many years ago -- but my recollection of it is, in the reporting I've seen, is that the direction was for them not to tell Congress until certain lines were passed, until the program became operational, and that it was handled appropriately.

And other directors of the CIA, including people like Mike Hayden, who was Leon Panetta's immediate predecessor, has talked about it and said that it's all you know a very shaky proposition. That it was well handled, that he was not directed not to deal with the Congress on this issue, that it's just not true.

WALLACE: The CIA released two other documents this week -- "Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: Preeminent Source on Al Qaeda"...

CHENEY: Right.

WALLACE: "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al Qaeda."

While they say that the overall program got absolutely crucial information, they do not conclude whether the enhanced interrogation programs worked. They just are kind of agnostic on the issue. And then there's what President Obama calls the core issue -

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Could we have gotten that same information without resorting to these techniques? And it doesn't answer the broader question, are we safer as a consequence of having used these techniques?

(END VIDEO CLIP)

CHENEY: Well, these two reports are versions of the ones I asked for previously. There's actually one, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al Qaeda," there's another version of this that's more detailed that's not been released.

But the interesting thing about these is it shows that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah provided the overwhelming majority of reports on Al Qaeda. That they were, as it says, pivotal in the war against Al Qaeda. That both of them were uncooperative at first, that the application of enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically waterboarding, especially in the case of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, is what really persuaded him. He needed to cooperate.

I think the evidence is overwhelming that the EITs were crucial in getting them to cooperate, and that the information they provided did in fact save thousands of lives and let us defeat all further attacks against the United States.

The thing I keep coming back to time and time again, Chris, is the fact that we've gone for eight years without another attack. Now, how do you explain that?

The critics don't have any solution for that. They can criticize our policies, our way of doing business, but the results speak for themselves. And, as well as the efforts that we went to with the Justice Department and so forth to make certain what we were doing was legal, was consistent with our international treaty obligations.

WALLACE: At one point the Vice President showed us the view of majestic mountains from his back yard. I asked about the Democrats running battle with the CIA including Nancy Pelosi's charge the agency once lied to her.

Republicans have made the charge before, do you think Democrats are soft on National Security?

CHENEY: I do, I've always had the view that in recent years anyway that they didn't have as strong of advocates on National Defense or National Security as they used to have, and I worry about that, I think that things have gotten so partisan that the sort of the pro defense hawkish wing of the Democratic party has faded and isn't as strong as it once was.

WALLACE: Now that he has been in office for seven months, what do you think of Barack Obama?

CHENEY: Well, I was not a fan of his when he got elected, and my views have not changed any. I have serious doubts about his policies, serious doubts especially about the extent to which he understands and is prepared to do what needs to be done to defend the nation.

WALLACE: Now, he has stepped up the use of the Predator drones against Al Qaeda. He has continued rendition. Aren't there some things you support that he has done?

CHENEY: Sure, some of those things have been -- the use of the Predator drone, something we started very aggressively in the Bush Administration, marrying up the intelligence platform with weapons is something we started in August of 2001. It has been enormously successful. And they were successful the other day in killing Batula Masood [Beitullah Mehsud], which I think all of those are pluses.

But my concern is that the damage that will be done by the President of the United States going back on his word, his promise about investigations of CIA personnel who have carried those policies, is seriously going to undermine the moral, if you will, of our folks out at the agency. Just today, for example, the courts in Pakistan have ruled that A. Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistan nuclear weapon man who provided assistance to the Iranians, the North Koreans, the Libyans, has now been released from custody.

It is very, very important we find out and know long term what he is up to. He is, so far, the worst proliferator of nuclear technology in recent history. Now we have got agents and people out at the agency who ought to be on that case and worried about it, but they are going to have to spend time hiring lawyers at their own expense in order to defend themselves against the possibility of charges.

WALLACE: Actually, the CIA has now said that they are going to pay for the lawyers.

CHENEY: Well, that will be a new proposition. Always before, when we have had these criminal investigations, the fact is that the employees themselves had to pay for it.

WALLACE: What do you think of the debate over healthcare reform and these raucous town halls?

CHENEY: I think it is basically healthy.

WALLACE: And what do you think of the healthcare reform issue?

CHENEY: I don't -- well, it is an important issue, but I think the proposals the Administration has made are -- do not deserve to be passed. I think the fact that there is a lot of unrest out there in the country that gets expressed in these town hall meetings with folks coming and speaking out very loudly about their concerns indicates that there are major, major problems of what the administration is proposing.

WALLACE: There was a story in The Washington Post a couple of weeks ago that in the process of writing your memoir, you have told colleagues about your frustration with President Bush, especially in his, your second term. Is that true?

CHENEY: No.

WALLACE: That story was wrong.

CHENEY: Right.

WALLACE: The report says that you disagreed with the President's decision to halt water boarding, you agreed with his decision to close the secret prisons, you disagreed with his decision to reach out to Iran and North Korea. Is that true?

CHENEY: Well, we had policy differences, no question about that, but to say that I was disappointed with the President is not the way it ought to be phrased. The fact of the matter is, he encouraged me to give him my view on a whole range of issues. I did.

Sometimes he agreed. Sometimes he did not. That was true from the very beginning of the Administration.

WALLACE: Did you feel that he went soft in the second term?

CHENEY: I wouldn't say that. I think you are going to have wait and read my book, Chris, for the definitive view.

WALLACE: It sounds like you are going to say something close to that?

CHENEY: I am not going to speculate on it. I am going to write a book that lays out my view of what we did. It will also cover a lot of years before I ever went to work for George Bush.

WALLACE: Will you open up in the book about areas where you disagreed --

CHENEY: Sure.

WALLACE: -- with the president?

CHENEY: Sure.

WALLACE: There is a question I have wanted to ask you for some period of time. Why didn't your Administration take out the Iranian nuclear program, given what a threat I know you believe it was, given the fact that you knew that Barack Obama favored, not only diplomatic engagement, but actually sitting down with the Iranians, why would you leave it to him to make this decision?

CHENEY: It was not my decision to make.

WALLACE: Would you have favored military action?

CHENEY: I was probably a bigger advocate of military action than any of my colleagues.

WALLACE: Do you think that it was a mistake, while you were in power, while your administration was in power, not to go after the nuclear infrastructure of Iran?

CHENEY: I can't say that yet. We do not know how it is ultimately going to come out.

WALLACE: But you don't get the choice to make it 20/20 hindsight.

CHENEY: Well, I --

WALLACE: In 2007, 2008, was it a mistake not to take out their program?

CHENEY: I think it was very important that the military option be on the table. I thought that negotiations could not possibly succeed unless the Iranians really believed we were prepared to use military force. And to date, of course, they are still proceeding with their nuclear program and the matter has not yet been resolved.

We can speculate about what might have happened if we had followed a different course of action. As I say I was an advocate of a more robust policy than any of my colleagues, but I didn't make the decision.

WALLACE: Including the president?

CHENEY: The president made the decision and, obviously, we pursued the diplomatic avenues.

WALLACE: Do you think it was a mistake to let the opportunity when you guys were in power, go, knowing that here was Barack Obama and he was going to take a much different --

CHENEY: I am going to -- if I address that, I will address it in my book, Chris.

WALLACE: It is going to be a hell of a book.

CHENEY: It is going to be a great book.

WALLACE: Was it a mistake for Bill Clinton, with the blessing of the Administration, to go to North Korea to bring back those two reporters?

CHENEY: Well, obviously, you are concerned for the reporters and their circumstances, but I think if we look at it from a policy standpoint, it is a big reward for bad behavior on the part of the North Korean leadership. They are testing nuclear weapons.

They have been major proliferators of nuclear weapons technology. They built a reactor in the Syrian Desert very much like their own reactor for producing plutonium for nuclear weapons.They probably are the worst proliferators of nuclear technology any place in the world today.

And there ought to be a price for that. Instead, I think when the former President of the United States goes, meets with the leader and so forth, that we are rewarding their bad behavior. And I think it is a mistake.

WALLACE: You would not have done it.

CHENEY: No.

WALLACE: How concerned are you about the increase in violence in Iraq since we pulled out of the major population areas and also what do you make of the fact that the top Shiite parties have formed an alliance tilting towards Iran and leaving out Prime Minister Maliki?

CHENEY: Well, I am concerned about Iraq, obviously. I have been a strong supporter of our policies there from the very beginning. I think we made major, major efforts to take down Saddam Hussein's regime, establish a viable democracy in the heart of the Middle East. I think especially going through the surge strategy in '07 and '08, we achieved very significant results.

It is important that we not let that slip away. And we need to be concerned, I think, in these days now in the beginning of the new Administration, I would like to see them focus just as much on victory as they are focused on getting out. And I hope that they don't rush to the exit so fast, that we end up in a situation where all of those gains that were so hard won are lost.

WALLACE: Given the increase in violence, given some of these new issues, in terms of the political lay of the land, given President Obama's plan to pull all combat troops out by a year from now, the summer of 2010, how confidant are you that -- that Iraq, as a stable, moderate country, is going to make it?

CHENEY: I don't know. I don't know that anybody knows. I think it is very important that they have success from a political stand point. I think the Maliki government is doing better than it was at some points in the past. I hope that we see continued improvement in the Iraqi armed forces, security services.

But I think to have an absolute deadline by which you're going to withdraw, that's totally unconditioned to developments on the ground -- I think there's a danger there that you're going to let the drive to get out overwhelm the good sense of staying long enough to make certain the outcome is what we want.

WALLACE: Obviously, this weekend, the country is focused on the death of Ted Kennedy. What did you think of him?

CHENEY: Well, I -- personally, I liked him. In terms of policy, there's very little we agreed on. He was a liberal Democrat from Massachusetts. I was a conservative Republican from Wyoming. So there wasn't much that we had to work together on.

On the other hand, I admired the fact that he got into the arena as much as he did for most of his professional life, and was obviously a very active participant.

WALLACE: How are you adjusting to life out of power?

CHENEY: Well, this is the fourth time I've done it, Chris. So it's not my first rodeo, as we say. I'm enjoying private life. I just -- excuse me -- took my family on an Alaskan cruise for a week, all the kids and the grandkids. We've gotten to spend a great deal of time in Wyoming, which, as you can tell her in Jackson Hole, is one of the world's finer garden spots.

So I have, I think, adjusted with a minimal amount of conflict and difficulty. It's been pretty smooth.

WALLACE: What do you miss?

CHENEY: Oh, I'm a junky, I guess, all those years. I spent more than 40 years in Washington, and enjoyed, obviously, the people I worked with, wrestling with some of the problems we had to wrestle with. I enjoyed having the CIA show up on my doorstep every morning, six days a week, with the latest intelligence.

WALLACE: You miss that?

CHENEY: Sure.

WALLACE: Why?

CHENEY: Because it was fascinating. It was important stuff. It kept me plugged in with what was going on around the world. And as I say, I'm a junky from a public policy stand point. I went to Washington to stay 12 months and stayed 41 years.

I liked it. I thought it was important. And I will always be pleased that I had the opportunity to serve.

WALLACE: Do you miss having your hands on the levers of power?

CHENEY: No, I don't think of it in those terms.

WALLACE: But I mean being able to affect things. You obviously feel strongly about these issues.

CHENEY: Right.

WALLACE: Do you miss the fact that now you're just another man watching cable news?

CHENEY: No, and as I say, I've been there before. I left government after the first Nixon term and went to the private sector. I left after the Ford administration and ran for Congress. Then left after the secretary of defense and went to the private sector. So these are normal kinds of transitions that you've got to make in this business.

What I've always found is that there are compensating factors to living a private life, to having more freedom and time to do what I want, and to spend more time with the family, which is very important. Over the years, you know, I've sacrificed a lot in order to be able to do those things I've done in the public sector.

WALLACE: Well, we want to thank you for talking with us and including in your private life putting up with an interview from the likes of me.

CHENEY: It's all right. I enjoy your show, Chris.

WALLACE: Thank you very much, and all the best sir.

CHENEY: Good luck.
Tuesday
Aug182009

Pakistan: After Mehsud's Death, Are the Taliban Defeated?

MEHSUDThe apparent assassination of the Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud (pictured) in an American missile attack has raised questions over the future of the insurgency. This article from Arif Rafiq of The Pakistan Policy Blog is a compehensive look not only at the situation in Pakistan but across the border in Afghanistan:

Almost two weeks after the killing of Baitullah Mehsud, Pakistan continues to have an upper hand over the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). But Rawalpindi-Islamabad’s gains over the TTP are unconsolidated. The Pakistani Taliban network can rejuvenate itself. Pakistan needs to sustain its vigilance against the militants, while at the same time not drag itself into a full-fledged conflict in South Waziristan it is not ready for.

Pakistan has managed to:

* secure its major urban areas outside the Pashtun belt, and, to a large extent, Peshawar, from militant attacks. There has been no equivalent of the Manawan police academy or ISI office attacks in Lahore or the Pearl Continental attack in Peshawar.
* cleanse the Malakand division of militants (though not completely — see below) to the extent that much of the internally displaced population is returning home and willing to facilitate policing efforts to prevent a Taliban return.
* increase approval of the Pakistan Army in the Malakand division, despite the fact that it hasn’t followed a COINdinista Network Approved Strategy (CNAS).
* continue to penetrate terrorist cells and apprehend key facilitators, funders, and trained suicide bombers.
* push the militant leadership into the North-South Waziristan corridor.
* fracture the TTP leadership, or at least create the perception that it is in “disarray.”
* put the Mehsud network — and anti-state takfiri terrorists, in general — on the defensive, both physically and ideologically.
* maintain pressure on TTP remnants in Bajaur, Khyber, Mohmand, and Orakzai. Note that there hasn’t been an attack on a NATO convoy in Pakistan recently.
* transfer the Pashtun “hot potato” on to the United States.

This success is due to:

* the use of air power against militants in the Malakand division and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that, while causing significant civilian casualties, neither turned the local population against the central government nor strained the manpower of the Pakistani security services.
* a commitment to keep a large military presence in Swat for the next few years.
* a sustained counterpropaganda campaign utilizing the private media and religious scholars, particularly Barelvis.
* a clever psy-ops campaign against the TTP.
* a whole-hearted embrace of its fallen soldiers, with public funerals made accessible to the media.
* excellent investigative and police work done by the federal interior ministry down to the provincial police forces.
* the decision by the Obama administration to focus drone attacks against the Baitullah Mehsud network.

The TTP has failed to:

* prove that Baitullah Mehsud is alive. Hakimullah Mehsud, who appears to be living, promised a Baitullah video by last Monday, but it never appeared.
* demonstrate leadership continuity by appointing a successor to Baitullah.
* counter Pakistan Army claims that there was a clash between Hakimullah and Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud by having the two agree on a Baitullah successor or, somehow, publicly prove they are on the same page.
* show that it remains a force to be reckoned with by pulling off a major attack in Islamabad, Peshawar, or urban Punjab.
* legitimize (or re-legitimize) its insurgency and campaign of terror in the eyes of the Pakistani public by linking it to Pakistan’s support for the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.

Despite the Pakistan military’s gains against the TTP, the terrorist outfit’s senior leadership — aside from Baitullah — remains alive. Commanders such as Faqir Muhammad and Hakimullah Mehsud are around. But their continued existence does not preclude a disassembly of the TTP. Afterall, it is an umbrella organization. Disassembly would require the commanders to no longer share the same threat: the Pakistan military-intelligence establishment. And that would require an undesirable return to a messy policy of Rawalpindi sorting out the bad guys from the less bad guys (i.e. “good” vs. “bad” Taliban).

For the Pakistan Army, South Waziristan remains the belly of the beast. Its unforgiving land is the home of the Mehsud network as well as a host of Pakistani and foreign jihadi groups.

But, for many reasons, the Pakistan Army cannot afford a ground incursion into South Waziristan....

Read rest of article....
Sunday
Aug092009

Transcripts III: National Security Advisor Jones on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea (9 August)

Video and Transcript I: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, Iran (9 August)
Transcript II: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran

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JAMES JONES 2

The transcript of the interview with General James Jones, President Obama's National Security Advisor, on CBS News' Face the Nation with Bob Schieffer:

BOB SCHIEFFER: And good morning again, General Jones is in the studio with us this morning.

Thank you very much for coming, General. You went to Afghanistan back in June, you took reporter Bob Woodward along on the trip and afterwards he reported that you told the commanders there they would have to make due with what they had. Yet every day brings a new report that General McChrystal, the top American commander on the ground there, is preparing a new assessment and it appears that he is going to ask for more troops.

We hear that from various people, Anthony Cordesman from CSIS is just back from there. He says we have set impossible goals. We set impossible time frames. He says you are going to have to have more resources.

Are you getting ready to consider putting more troops into Afghanistan?

JONES: We -- first of all, it is a pleasure to be with you, thank you very much for having me. The fact is -- and I’ll get to my remarks on what the intention was, but the fact is that in March, we announced a very comprehensive strategy that everybody participated in.

That strategy has essentially three legs, more security, followed by economic development, followed by better governance from the -- at the local levels in Afghanistan. And buttressed by more rapid development of the Afghan army and the Afghan police. So we want to put an Afghan capacity together as quickly as possible. We have over 40 nations on the ground, we have all of the international organizations you could want, from the U.N. to NATO, to E.U., the World Bank, the IMF, and nongovernmental organizations.

And Afghanistan will be solved by a better coordination of these elements. The troop strength is an important piece of it, and my message to General McChrystal and to the commanders when I went there was to say, think about the total strategy that we have all agreed to, General McChrystal is conducting an assessment at the request of secretary of defense.

They -- the Defense Department will evaluate what General McChrystal has to say, and in due time it will come up for a decision by the president.

But I did not say -- I want to be clear on this, I did not say that troop strength is off the table for discussion. What I did say is that we have yet to be able to measure the implementation of the new strategy, so if you have recommendations, make it in the context of the new strategy.

This -- we have learned one thing in six years, we -- this is not just about troop strength.

SCHIEFFER: Well, but that sounds like you are getting us ready for sending more troops to Afghanistan.

JONES: Well, let me put another thing on the table here. When the president made his decision, there were additional troops that were on the charts that the secretary of defense said at the time, Mr. President, you do not have to make this decision now, this is something we can consider later after we measure the implementation of our strategy.

So we will have discussions as the weeks and months go by. The big thing for us now is to make sure that the strategy is being implemented, we have got new commanders, we have got new diplomats, we have got Richard Holbrooke, who is providing the theater engagement.

It is not just about Afghanistan, it’s about Pakistan and what is going on there.

SCHIEFFER: But, General, we have been there how long? Six years, and it is like -- it sounds like you are talking about we just got there.

JONES: No, no, no. We -- I have been involved in this for six years also.

SCHIEFFER: Well, how bad is it there? Every report we have is that it is worse than it has ever been. That it has become sort of a sinkhole and now you are trying to develop yardsticks to find out how well we are doing.

When are we going to know how we are doing, even? JONES: We will -- that is a very good question, and it is a fair question. I -- this is my opinion. My opinion was that we did not have a well-articulated strategy until March of this year.

We had a strategy for security. We had a little bit of a strategy for economic development, which was other people’s problems. And we had a strategy that may be addressed a little bit of governance and the rule of law. This strategy merges all of those three things.

We also are -- we are definitely going to, in conjunction with our allies, develop the Afghan army at a faster rate and the Afghan police so we can have Afghans in charge of their own destiny in a shorter period of time.

So, yes, we have been there six years. But if you go back to the overall history of it, and you look at the three pillars that need to be developed, security has always been done reasonably well, although we have had some backsliding since 2007, but the other two have been allowed to not develop as quickly.

So in conjunction with our allies, and I want to make sure that I make this point as well, that this is not just a U.S. problem. This is an international problem, and we cannot -- I think we have the strategy and we will shortly see, and I mean within a year, whether this strategy is working and then we will adjust from there.

SCHIEFFER: We’ll know in a year if the new strategy...

JONES: Within the year...

SCHIEFFER: ... is working?

JONES: And we have the metrics to evaluate this strategy. The Congress has mandated them. We were going to do them anyway. The president has said, “I want regular reports as to how we’re doing.”

SCHIEFFER: But so far it isn’t working? Would that be fair to say?

JONES: Well, it’s -- it’s only been three months old.

SCHIEFFER: Well, I mean, the previous strategy?

JONES: We don’t even have -- the troop strength that has been agreed has not even arrived there, so -- so my benchmark is this administration, in March, committed to a new strategy. We involved Afghanistan. We involved Pakistan. We involved NATO, the allies. We had the NATO summit, where the allies had a -- a new...

SCHIEFFER: So let me see if I can just sum this up.

JONES: ... a new attitude.

SCHIEFFER: You’re going to develop a new strategy...

JONES: We’ve had it.

SCHIEFFER: ... and you have a new strategy going, and you may have to send more troops to Afghanistan?

You’re not, at least, going to rule that out at this point?

JONES: I won’t rule -- we won’t rule anything out that stands to reason, but it is fair to say that, once we agree on a new strategy, we want to make sure that it is -- has a chance to be evaluated.

SCHIEFFER: OK.

JONES: And if things come up where we need to adjust one way or the other, and it involves troops or it involves more incentives...

(CROSSTALK) JONES: ... for economic development or better assistance to help the Afghan government function, we’ll do that.

SCHIEFFER: Now, what was it, last weekend, that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, flew out to meet with General McChrystal?

JONES: Correct.

SCHIEFFER: That suggests there may be some sort of -- we may be in some sort of crisis mode. This was a secret trip that wasn’t announced until after they completed it.

Would you think -- would you say that things in Afghanistan at this point are at a crisis level?

JONES: Well, we’re -- coming up to a very important election. We have, I think, a -- no, I don’t think -- I don’t think we’re at a crisis level, in terms of -- or that there’s going to be any movement on the ground by the Taliban that’s going to overthrow the government. We’re going to have, I think, a good election. The signs are that it’s going to be -- the instruments of security are being well- thought-out.

I think, with the success that we’ve had on the Pakistan side of the border, which we can talk about if you like, and the growing troop strength by the U.S. and some of our allies on the Afghan side, I think -- I think the security aspect of things is -- going to get better.

There’s going to be a little bit more fighting. Unfortunately, we’re taking more casualties, but if we’re able to marry up the other two legs of this three-legged stool that I mentioned, put things that will change the economic forecast for the Afghan people on the ground, put Afghan troops, Afghan police in the villages languages and towns, I think that’s the -- that’s the future.

SCHIEFFER: Let me ask you about this situation in Pakistan. Mehsud, the top Taliban man -- I heard you say earlier today that we’re 90 percent sure that we got him. Now, how important is that?

JONES: Well, I think it is very important. First of all, it’s important because this is Pakistan’s public enemy number one, if I could. He has -- he controls a very violent aspect of the insurgent problems in -- on the Pakistani side of the border. And this would be -- this is a big deal, and...

SCHIEFFER: Let’s talk, a little bit, about the developments in North Korea. Former President Clinton went there. He got these people. We now know that it was the North Koreans that said, if you’ll send him, we’ll -- we’ll let these two young Americans go.

We also know that, because I’ve heard you already report this, that the president, former president, did have conversations with them on a variety of subjects.

What happens now? Do we -- do we expect some development here now?

JONES: Well, we hope so. President Clinton did have the opportunity to talk to the North Korean leader and suggest that the happy scene that was carried out in California with the unification of families could have happened with the detainee from South Korea in Seoul or in Tokyo with the Japanese abductees and he represented our desire to have them released as well.

I think that obviously with his, as the former president, with his father, the Korean leader’s father, was -- had eight years of experience with dealing with North Korea, and he was able to, in his own way -- the I hope persuasive that there is a better way, there is a better path, that it is clear that a couple of things are clear.

One is that we sent no official or unofficial message from our government, so there was no -- there is nothing secretive here, that North Korea knows that the path to talking is through the six party process, and that within that six party process --

SCHIEFFER: They seem to want to have some sort of one-on-one dialogue with the United States. Would we be willing to do that?

JONES: Sure within the context of the six party talks.

SCHIEFFER: What does that mean?

JONES: Meaning if they come back to the talks, we will talk to them bilaterally within those talks. We have coordinated all of this by the way with the other allies, the Chinese, the Russians, the South Koreans, the Japanese. So the path is clear, and President Clinton is a very convincing gentleman and I hope he was able to convince them.

SCHIEFFER: Let me ask you this, General. Why do you think the North Korean leader wanted to do this? Was he trying to impress his own people? Was he trying to impress his military that look, I can get a former president of the United States to come over here. That shows you I am still a strong and vibrant leader? Or was he trying to impress the rest of the world? What was that all about?

JONES: You know, I would be guessing. You know, internally, he can manipulate this anyway he wants but as far as the rest of the world, I think that we are clear on what it was and what it wasn’t.

SCHIEFFER: And what it was?

JONES: What it was is a private humanitarian mission to rescue and obtain the release of two girls so they could be with their families and that is President Obama’s -- that was his goal in this.

SCHIEFFER: Finally, Gitmo. Every indication is you will not be able to make the president’s deadline of closing that down by the end of the year.

JONES: This is a complex issue and we are working on this every single day. I still believe that we can achieve our goals, but it is a complex issue.

SCHIEFFER: But you are not sure if you are going to make it?

JONES: No, I think we will. I think there are some things on the table that we can’t necessarily talk about right now, but hopefully there are some signs here that we will find the right way to do this.

SCHIEFFER: All right General Jones, thanks for being with us and I hope you come back.

JONES: It is a pleasure, thank you very much.