Defending Torture, Bombing Iran (Video): Dick Cheney on Fox News Sunday (30 August)

Torture and Lies: Confronting Cheney — 7 More Points to Note
Torture and Lies: Confronting Cheney

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Apologies for not mincing words, but the US in the midst of a sustained public-relations effort to whitewash the torture stain of the Bush Administration by 1) arguing that it wasn't torture and 2) if it was, it helped win the War on Terror. After the release this week of the damning 2004 CIA internal report on the Administration's authorisation of torture and its ineffectiveness, Dick Cheney has been at the front of the campaign to save his legacy, if not America's standing in the world. Fox News set him with the softball questions this morning.

(An important side note for Iran-watchers. Check out the passage late in the transcript where Cheney comes out as a strong supporter of an airstrike on Iran in 2007-8):

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CfFiBy8jLM[/youtube]

CHRIS WALLACE, HOST: Mr. Vice President, welcome back to "FOX News Sunday."

RICHARD CHENEY, FORMER VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: It's good to be back, Chris.

WALLACE: This is your first interview since Attorney General Holder named a prosecutor to investigate possible CIA abuses of terror detainees.

What do you think of that decision?

CHENEY: I think it's a terrible decision. President Obama made the announcement some weeks ago that this would not happen, that his administration would not go back and look at or try to prosecute CIA personnel. And the effort now is based upon the inspector general's report that was sent to the Justice Department five years ago, was completely reviewed by the Justice Department in years past.

They made decisions about whether or not there was any prosecutable offense there. They found one. It did not involve CIA personnel, it involved contract personnel. That individual was sentenced and is doing time. The matter's been dealt with the way you would expect it to be dealt with by professionals.

Now we've got a political appointee coming back, and supposedly without the approval of the president, going to do a complete review, or another complete investigation, possible prosecution of CIA personnel. We could talk the whole program about the negative consequences of that, about the terrible precedent it sets, to have agents involved, CIA personnel involved, in a difficult program that's approved by the Justice Department, approved by the National Security Council, and the Bush administration, and then when a new administration comes in, it becomes political.

They may find themselves dragged up before a grand jury, have to hire attorneys on their own because the Justice Department won't provide them with counsel.

It's a terrible, terrible precedent.

WALLACE: There are a lot of aspects that you just raised. Let me review some of them.
Why are you so concerned about the idea of one administration reviewing, investigating the actions of another one?

CHENEY: Well, you think, for example, in the intelligence arena. We ask those people to do some very difficult things. Sometimes, that put their own lives at risk. They do so at the direction of the president, and they do so with the -- in this case, we had specific legal authority from the Justice Department. And if they are now going to be subject to being investigated and prosecuted by the next administration, nobody's going to sign up for those kinds of missions.

It's a very, very devastating, I think, effect that it has on morale inside the intelligence community. If they assume that they're going to have to be dealing with the political consequences -- and it's clearly a political move. I mean, there's no other rationale for why they're doing this -- then they'll be very reluctant in the future to do that.

WALLACE: Do you think this was a political move not a law enforcement move?

CHENEY: Absolutely. I think the fact is, the Justice Department has already reviewed the inspector general's report five years ago. And now they're dragging it back up again, and Holder is going to go back and review it again, supposedly, to try to find some evidence of wrongdoing by CIA personnel.

In other words, you know, a review is never going to be final anymore now. We can have somebody, some future administration, come along 10 years from now, 15 years from now, and go back and rehash all of these decisions by an earlier administration.

WALLACE: Let me follow up on that. The attorney general says this is a preliminary review, not a criminal investigation. It is just about CIA officers who went beyond their legal authorization. Why don't you think it's going to stop there?

CHENEY: I don't believe it. We had the president of the United States, President Obama, tell us a few months ago there wouldn't be any investigation like this, that there would not be any look back at CIA personnel who were carrying out the policies of the prior administration. Now they get a little heat from the left wing of the Democratic Party, and they're reversing course on that.

The president is the chief law enforcement officer in the administration. He's now saying, well, this isn't anything that he's got anything to do with. He's up on vacation on Martha's Vineyard and his attorney general is going back and doing something that the president said some months ago he wouldn't do.

WALLACE: But when you say it's not going to stop there, you don't believe it's going to stop there, do you think this will become an investigation into the Bush lawyers who authorized the activity into the top policymakers who were involved in the decision to happen, an enhanced interrogation program?

CHENEY: Well, I have no idea whether it will or not, but it shouldn't.

The fact of the matter is the lawyers in the Justice Department who gave us those opinions had every right to give us the opinions they did. Now you get a new administration and they say, well, we didn't like those opinions, we're going to go investigate those lawyers and perhaps have them disbarred. I just think it's an outrageous precedent to set, to have this kind of, I think, intensely partisan, politicized look back at the prior administration.

I guess the other thing that offends the hell out of me, frankly, Chris, is we had a track record now of eight years of defending the nation against any further mass casualty attacks from Al Qaeda. The approach of the Obama administration should be to come to those people who were involved in that policy and say, how did you do it? What were the keys to keeping this country safe over that period of time?

Instead, they're out there now threatening to disbar the lawyers who gave us the legal opinions, threatening contrary to what the president originally said. They're going to go out and investigate the CIA personnel who carried out those investigations. I just think it's an outrageous political act that will do great damage long term to our capacity to be able to have people take on difficult jobs, make difficult decisions, without having to worry about what the next administration is going to say.

WALLACE: If the prosecutor asks to speak to you, will you speak to him?

CHENEY: It will depend on the circumstances and what I think their activities are really involved in. I've been very outspoken in my views on this matter. I've been very forthright publicly in talking about my involvement in these policies.

I'm very proud of what we did in terms of defending the nation for the last eight years successfully. And, you know, it won't take a prosecutor to find out what I think. I've already expressed those views rather forthrightly.

WALLACE: Let me ask you -- you say you're proud of what we did. The inspector general's report which was just released from 2004 details some specific interrogations -- mock executions, one of the detainees threatened with a handgun and with an electric drill, waterboarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 183 times.

First of all, did you know that was going on?

CHENEY: I knew about the waterboarding. Not specifically in any one particular case, but as a general policy that we had approved.

The fact of the matter is, the Justice Department reviewed all of those allegations several years ago. They looked at this question of whether or not somebody had an electric drill in an interrogation session. It was never used on the individual, or that they had brought in a weapon, never used on the individual. The judgment was made then that there wasn't anything there that was improper or illegal with respect to conduct in question...

(CROSSTALK)

WALLACE: Do you think what they did, now that you've heard about it, do you think what they did was wrong?

CHENEY: Chris, my sort of overwhelming view is that the enhanced interrogation techniques were absolutely essential in saving thousands of American lives and preventing further attacks against the United States, and giving us the intelligence we needed to go find Al Qaeda, to find their camps, to find out how they were being financed. Those interrogations were involved in the arrest of nearly all the Al Qaeda members that we were able to bring to justice. I think they were directly responsible for the fact that for eight years, we had no further mass casualty attacks against the United States.

It was good policy. It was properly carried out. It worked very, very well.

WALLACE: So even these cases where they went beyond the specific legal authorization, you're OK with it?

CHENEY: I am.

WALLACE: One specific question about Holder, the Obama administration -- you put out the statement saying that you were upset that President Obama allowed the attorney general to bring these cases. A top Obama official says, hey, maybe in the Bush White House they told the attorney general what to do, but Eric Holder makes independent decisions.

CHENEY: Well, I think if you look at the Constitution, the president of the United States is the chief law enforcement officer in the land. The attorney general's a statutory officer. He's a member of the cabinet.

The president's the one who bears this responsibility. And for him to say, gee, I didn't have anything to do with it, especially after he sat in the Oval Office and said this wouldn't happen, then Holder decides he's going to do it. So now he's backed off and is claiming he's not responsible.

I just, I think he's trying to duck the responsibility for what's going on here. And I think it's wrong.
WALLACE: President Obama has also decided to move interrogations from the CIA to the FBI that's under the supervision of the National Security Council, and the FBI will have to act within the boundaries of the Army Field Manual.

What do you think that does for the nation's security? And will we now have the tools if we catch another high-value target?

CHENEY: I think the move to set up this -- what is it called, the HIG Group?

WALLACE: Yes.

CHENEY: It's not even clear who's responsible. The Justice Department is, then they claim they aren't. The FBI is responsible and they claim they aren't. It's some kind of interagency process by which they're going to be responsible for interrogating high-value detainees.

If we had tried to do that back in the aftermath of 9/11, when we captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11, we'd have gotten no place. I think it moves very much in the direction of going back to the old way of looking at these terrorist attacks -- that these are law enforcement problems, that this isn't a strategic threat to the United States.

I think it's a direct slap at the CIA. I don't think it will work.

I think that if they were faced with the kind of situation we were faced with in the aftermath of 9/11, suddenly capturing people that may have knowledge about imminent attacks, and they're going to have to have meetings and decide who gets to ask what question and who's going to Mirandize the witness, I think it's silly. It makes no sense. It doesn't appear to be a serious move in terms of being able to deal with the nation's security.

WALLACE: Well, on another issue, the CIA has stopped a program to kill or capture top al Qaeda leaders, top al Qaeda terrorists. And CIA Director Panetta told lawmakers that you told the CIA not to inform Congress.

Is that true?

CHENEY: As I recall -- and frankly, this is many years ago -- but my recollection of it is, in the reporting I've seen, is that the direction was for them not to tell Congress until certain lines were passed, until the program became operational, and that it was handled appropriately.

And other directors of the CIA, including people like Mike Hayden, who was Leon Panetta's immediate predecessor, has talked about it and said that it's all you know a very shaky proposition. That it was well handled, that he was not directed not to deal with the Congress on this issue, that it's just not true.

WALLACE: The CIA released two other documents this week -- "Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: Preeminent Source on Al Qaeda"...

CHENEY: Right.

WALLACE: "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al Qaeda."

While they say that the overall program got absolutely crucial information, they do not conclude whether the enhanced interrogation programs worked. They just are kind of agnostic on the issue. And then there's what President Obama calls the core issue -

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Could we have gotten that same information without resorting to these techniques? And it doesn't answer the broader question, are we safer as a consequence of having used these techniques?

(END VIDEO CLIP)

CHENEY: Well, these two reports are versions of the ones I asked for previously. There's actually one, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al Qaeda," there's another version of this that's more detailed that's not been released.

But the interesting thing about these is it shows that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah provided the overwhelming majority of reports on Al Qaeda. That they were, as it says, pivotal in the war against Al Qaeda. That both of them were uncooperative at first, that the application of enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically waterboarding, especially in the case of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, is what really persuaded him. He needed to cooperate.

I think the evidence is overwhelming that the EITs were crucial in getting them to cooperate, and that the information they provided did in fact save thousands of lives and let us defeat all further attacks against the United States.

The thing I keep coming back to time and time again, Chris, is the fact that we've gone for eight years without another attack. Now, how do you explain that?

The critics don't have any solution for that. They can criticize our policies, our way of doing business, but the results speak for themselves. And, as well as the efforts that we went to with the Justice Department and so forth to make certain what we were doing was legal, was consistent with our international treaty obligations.

WALLACE: At one point the Vice President showed us the view of majestic mountains from his back yard. I asked about the Democrats running battle with the CIA including Nancy Pelosi's charge the agency once lied to her.

Republicans have made the charge before, do you think Democrats are soft on National Security?

CHENEY: I do, I've always had the view that in recent years anyway that they didn't have as strong of advocates on National Defense or National Security as they used to have, and I worry about that, I think that things have gotten so partisan that the sort of the pro defense hawkish wing of the Democratic party has faded and isn't as strong as it once was.

WALLACE: Now that he has been in office for seven months, what do you think of Barack Obama?

CHENEY: Well, I was not a fan of his when he got elected, and my views have not changed any. I have serious doubts about his policies, serious doubts especially about the extent to which he understands and is prepared to do what needs to be done to defend the nation.

WALLACE: Now, he has stepped up the use of the Predator drones against Al Qaeda. He has continued rendition. Aren't there some things you support that he has done?

CHENEY: Sure, some of those things have been -- the use of the Predator drone, something we started very aggressively in the Bush Administration, marrying up the intelligence platform with weapons is something we started in August of 2001. It has been enormously successful. And they were successful the other day in killing Batula Masood [Beitullah Mehsud], which I think all of those are pluses.

But my concern is that the damage that will be done by the President of the United States going back on his word, his promise about investigations of CIA personnel who have carried those policies, is seriously going to undermine the moral, if you will, of our folks out at the agency. Just today, for example, the courts in Pakistan have ruled that A. Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistan nuclear weapon man who provided assistance to the Iranians, the North Koreans, the Libyans, has now been released from custody.

It is very, very important we find out and know long term what he is up to. He is, so far, the worst proliferator of nuclear technology in recent history. Now we have got agents and people out at the agency who ought to be on that case and worried about it, but they are going to have to spend time hiring lawyers at their own expense in order to defend themselves against the possibility of charges.

WALLACE: Actually, the CIA has now said that they are going to pay for the lawyers.

CHENEY: Well, that will be a new proposition. Always before, when we have had these criminal investigations, the fact is that the employees themselves had to pay for it.

WALLACE: What do you think of the debate over healthcare reform and these raucous town halls?

CHENEY: I think it is basically healthy.

WALLACE: And what do you think of the healthcare reform issue?

CHENEY: I don't -- well, it is an important issue, but I think the proposals the Administration has made are -- do not deserve to be passed. I think the fact that there is a lot of unrest out there in the country that gets expressed in these town hall meetings with folks coming and speaking out very loudly about their concerns indicates that there are major, major problems of what the administration is proposing.

WALLACE: There was a story in The Washington Post a couple of weeks ago that in the process of writing your memoir, you have told colleagues about your frustration with President Bush, especially in his, your second term. Is that true?

CHENEY: No.

WALLACE: That story was wrong.

CHENEY: Right.

WALLACE: The report says that you disagreed with the President's decision to halt water boarding, you agreed with his decision to close the secret prisons, you disagreed with his decision to reach out to Iran and North Korea. Is that true?

CHENEY: Well, we had policy differences, no question about that, but to say that I was disappointed with the President is not the way it ought to be phrased. The fact of the matter is, he encouraged me to give him my view on a whole range of issues. I did.

Sometimes he agreed. Sometimes he did not. That was true from the very beginning of the Administration.

WALLACE: Did you feel that he went soft in the second term?

CHENEY: I wouldn't say that. I think you are going to have wait and read my book, Chris, for the definitive view.

WALLACE: It sounds like you are going to say something close to that?

CHENEY: I am not going to speculate on it. I am going to write a book that lays out my view of what we did. It will also cover a lot of years before I ever went to work for George Bush.

WALLACE: Will you open up in the book about areas where you disagreed --

CHENEY: Sure.

WALLACE: -- with the president?

CHENEY: Sure.

WALLACE: There is a question I have wanted to ask you for some period of time. Why didn't your Administration take out the Iranian nuclear program, given what a threat I know you believe it was, given the fact that you knew that Barack Obama favored, not only diplomatic engagement, but actually sitting down with the Iranians, why would you leave it to him to make this decision?

CHENEY: It was not my decision to make.

WALLACE: Would you have favored military action?

CHENEY: I was probably a bigger advocate of military action than any of my colleagues.

WALLACE: Do you think that it was a mistake, while you were in power, while your administration was in power, not to go after the nuclear infrastructure of Iran?

CHENEY: I can't say that yet. We do not know how it is ultimately going to come out.

WALLACE: But you don't get the choice to make it 20/20 hindsight.

CHENEY: Well, I --

WALLACE: In 2007, 2008, was it a mistake not to take out their program?

CHENEY: I think it was very important that the military option be on the table. I thought that negotiations could not possibly succeed unless the Iranians really believed we were prepared to use military force. And to date, of course, they are still proceeding with their nuclear program and the matter has not yet been resolved.

We can speculate about what might have happened if we had followed a different course of action. As I say I was an advocate of a more robust policy than any of my colleagues, but I didn't make the decision.

WALLACE: Including the president?

CHENEY: The president made the decision and, obviously, we pursued the diplomatic avenues.

WALLACE: Do you think it was a mistake to let the opportunity when you guys were in power, go, knowing that here was Barack Obama and he was going to take a much different --

CHENEY: I am going to -- if I address that, I will address it in my book, Chris.

WALLACE: It is going to be a hell of a book.

CHENEY: It is going to be a great book.

WALLACE: Was it a mistake for Bill Clinton, with the blessing of the Administration, to go to North Korea to bring back those two reporters?

CHENEY: Well, obviously, you are concerned for the reporters and their circumstances, but I think if we look at it from a policy standpoint, it is a big reward for bad behavior on the part of the North Korean leadership. They are testing nuclear weapons.

They have been major proliferators of nuclear weapons technology. They built a reactor in the Syrian Desert very much like their own reactor for producing plutonium for nuclear weapons.They probably are the worst proliferators of nuclear technology any place in the world today.

And there ought to be a price for that. Instead, I think when the former President of the United States goes, meets with the leader and so forth, that we are rewarding their bad behavior. And I think it is a mistake.

WALLACE: You would not have done it.

CHENEY: No.

WALLACE: How concerned are you about the increase in violence in Iraq since we pulled out of the major population areas and also what do you make of the fact that the top Shiite parties have formed an alliance tilting towards Iran and leaving out Prime Minister Maliki?

CHENEY: Well, I am concerned about Iraq, obviously. I have been a strong supporter of our policies there from the very beginning. I think we made major, major efforts to take down Saddam Hussein's regime, establish a viable democracy in the heart of the Middle East. I think especially going through the surge strategy in '07 and '08, we achieved very significant results.

It is important that we not let that slip away. And we need to be concerned, I think, in these days now in the beginning of the new Administration, I would like to see them focus just as much on victory as they are focused on getting out. And I hope that they don't rush to the exit so fast, that we end up in a situation where all of those gains that were so hard won are lost.

WALLACE: Given the increase in violence, given some of these new issues, in terms of the political lay of the land, given President Obama's plan to pull all combat troops out by a year from now, the summer of 2010, how confidant are you that -- that Iraq, as a stable, moderate country, is going to make it?

CHENEY: I don't know. I don't know that anybody knows. I think it is very important that they have success from a political stand point. I think the Maliki government is doing better than it was at some points in the past. I hope that we see continued improvement in the Iraqi armed forces, security services.

But I think to have an absolute deadline by which you're going to withdraw, that's totally unconditioned to developments on the ground -- I think there's a danger there that you're going to let the drive to get out overwhelm the good sense of staying long enough to make certain the outcome is what we want.

WALLACE: Obviously, this weekend, the country is focused on the death of Ted Kennedy. What did you think of him?

CHENEY: Well, I -- personally, I liked him. In terms of policy, there's very little we agreed on. He was a liberal Democrat from Massachusetts. I was a conservative Republican from Wyoming. So there wasn't much that we had to work together on.

On the other hand, I admired the fact that he got into the arena as much as he did for most of his professional life, and was obviously a very active participant.

WALLACE: How are you adjusting to life out of power?

CHENEY: Well, this is the fourth time I've done it, Chris. So it's not my first rodeo, as we say. I'm enjoying private life. I just -- excuse me -- took my family on an Alaskan cruise for a week, all the kids and the grandkids. We've gotten to spend a great deal of time in Wyoming, which, as you can tell her in Jackson Hole, is one of the world's finer garden spots.

So I have, I think, adjusted with a minimal amount of conflict and difficulty. It's been pretty smooth.

WALLACE: What do you miss?

CHENEY: Oh, I'm a junky, I guess, all those years. I spent more than 40 years in Washington, and enjoyed, obviously, the people I worked with, wrestling with some of the problems we had to wrestle with. I enjoyed having the CIA show up on my doorstep every morning, six days a week, with the latest intelligence.

WALLACE: You miss that?

CHENEY: Sure.

WALLACE: Why?

CHENEY: Because it was fascinating. It was important stuff. It kept me plugged in with what was going on around the world. And as I say, I'm a junky from a public policy stand point. I went to Washington to stay 12 months and stayed 41 years.

I liked it. I thought it was important. And I will always be pleased that I had the opportunity to serve.

WALLACE: Do you miss having your hands on the levers of power?

CHENEY: No, I don't think of it in those terms.

WALLACE: But I mean being able to affect things. You obviously feel strongly about these issues.

CHENEY: Right.

WALLACE: Do you miss the fact that now you're just another man watching cable news?

CHENEY: No, and as I say, I've been there before. I left government after the first Nixon term and went to the private sector. I left after the Ford administration and ran for Congress. Then left after the secretary of defense and went to the private sector. So these are normal kinds of transitions that you've got to make in this business.

What I've always found is that there are compensating factors to living a private life, to having more freedom and time to do what I want, and to spend more time with the family, which is very important. Over the years, you know, I've sacrificed a lot in order to be able to do those things I've done in the public sector.

WALLACE: Well, we want to thank you for talking with us and including in your private life putting up with an interview from the likes of me.

CHENEY: It's all right. I enjoy your show, Chris.

WALLACE: Thank you very much, and all the best sir.

CHENEY: Good luck.

Video & Transcript: Mullen, Eikenberry Sell Afghanistan War on "Meet the Press" (23 August)

Transcript and Analysis: Mullen, Eikenberry Sell the Afghanistan War on CNN (23 August)

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We commented earlier on the Obama Administration's double act selling the war in Afghanistan, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen and US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, on CNN. As disturbing as this appearance was, this one might be worse.

Like the CNN interview, this exchange started not with consideration of Afghanistan's political situation but with the question of how many troops the US should put into the country. And to set that up, host David Gregory asked a fatuous, leading question about weak-willed US public opinion to which Mullen invoked both Al Qa'eda and 9-11.

To give Gregory some credit, he did get to the serious issues of Afghanistan's political and economic development and whether the US was "nation-building". When he did, Mullen and Eikenberry floundered helplessly. Granted I am not a fan of the Obama policy, but even a supporter of the US effort should have concerns after this performance.

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DAVID GREGORY: first, in addition to waging political battles at home, the President is faced with two ongoing wars abroad.

This week Afghans went to the polls as Americans expressed fresh skepticism about the U.S. war there now entering its ninth year. And in Iraq, new threats of sectarian violence after bombers strike inside Baghdad's green zone. Two men charged with coordinating the U.S. military and diplomatic mission in that region join us now: Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from Afghanistan this morning, our U.S. ambassador, retired Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry.

Welcome to both of you.

Let me start with you, Admiral Mullen on the question of U.S. resolve. This was a poll taken by The Washington Post and ABC News this week, and these were the results. Is the war in Afghanistan worth the fight? No, 51 percent. Has American--have the American people lost that will to fight this war?

ADM. MIKE MULLEN: Well, I'm, I'm a Vietnam veteran myself. I'm certainly aware of the criticality of support of the American people for, for this war and in, in fact, any war. And so certainly the numbers are of concern.

That said, the president's given me and the American military a mission, and, and that focuses on a new strategy, new leadership, and we're moving very much in that direction. I am very mindful and concerned about the threat that's there. The strategy really focuses on defeating al-Qaeda and their extremist allies. That's where the original 911 attacks came from, that region. They've now moved to Pakistan. Afghanistan is very vulnerable in terms of Taliban and extremists taking over again, and I don't think that threat's going to go away. They still plot against us, see us as somebody they want to, to, to kill in terms of as many American lives as possible. And in that regard, we're very focused on executing that mission.

MR. GREGORY: Well, let's talk about that focus. General McChrystal, our commander on the ground, is expected to release his report, his assessment of what's happening on the ground. Will he request of this president more troops to fight in Afghanistan?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, McChrystal's assessment will come in here in I think the next two weeks. And his guidance was go out as a new commander, put a new team together and come back and tell us exactly how you assess conditions on the ground, take into consideration the president's strategy. He's going to do that. The--his assessment will come in and won't speak specifically to resources. There's an expectation we'll deal with resources after that assessment.

MR. GREGORY: Right. Well, but Senator McCain is saying in an interview this morning it will deal with resources, that he'll come back with high, medium and, and low threat assessments in terms of how many more troops you need, whether you need 15,000, 25,000 or 45,000 additional troops. Will he come in with a specific troop request, and will that increase in troop request meet skepticism from the White House?

ADM. MULLEN: The assessment that he will submit here in the next couple of weeks won't specifically deal with requirements for additional resources. We'll deal with the--with whatever additional resources might be required subsequent to that in the normal process.

MR. GREGORY: But this question that Senator McCain raises, which is he's afraid that there's going to be skepticism in the White House about any request for more troops and that more troops are vital if you're going to carry out this mission, where do you fall down on that?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I think when we look at the strategy the president's laid out, look what General McChrystal says he needs to--in order to carry out that strategy, my recommendation to the president will be based on getting the resource strategy matched absolutely correct. And so we'll see where that goes once the assessment is in here. And I've had this conversation with the president, who understands that whatever the mission is, it needs to be resourced correctly. That said, it'll be the initial assessment that will be important, and then the risks that are associated with that assessment, and then we'll figure out where we go from there.

MR. GREGORY: But can you carry out this mission with the troops you've got?

ADM. MULLEN: That's really something that we will evaluate over the next few weeks after we get the assessment from General McChrystal.

MR. GREGORY: Ambassador Eikenberry, let me bring you in here and talk about the elections this week. Already there are claims of irregularities and fraud, voter turnout much lower than expected in the south, particularly low among women. And we don't have a clear result yet of the election. To what extent does this election, this presidential election in Afghanistan highlight the challenges that the U.S. faces there?

MR. KARL EIKENBERRY: Well, David, let's talk about what we do know about the election. First of all, it's a very historic election. It's the first presidential provincial council election led by the Afghan people that's taken place in this country in over 30 years. And the second point, it's a very important election. This is an election in which, as in all democracies at this point in time now with the, with the presidential election, with the provincial council election, which the people are going to the polls and it's an opportunity them--for them to renew their ties with their government. And that's important to this process to remember. If we look back over the history of Afghanistan over the last 30 years, we have civil war, we have occupation, we've got a complete collapse of governance and rule of law which sets the conditions then for Afghanistan to be a state controlled by international terrorism. Those were the conditions that led to 11 September of 2001. So this election that's just been completed, yes, it's, it was a very difficult election, but it's an opportunity then for renewal of the trust in the bonds...

MR. GREGORY: All right. Well, let me...

MR. EIKENBERRY: ...between the people of Afghanistan and their government.

MR. GREGORY: Let me jump in here. There's the question of the Taliban. The Taliban is really enemy one for U.S. forces there. It's stronger, it's resurgent from the period after 9/11. What does this election show, the level of intimidation by the Taliban about the Taliban's strength and the challenge to U.S. forces?

MR. EIKENBERRY: Well, I think it shows, David, that there's great excitement within this country for the Afghans to regain control of their country, for sovereignty. We had a two-month extraordinary election campaign that we just got through, a very exciting time in which there was unprecedented political activity that occurred, TV debates, rallies throughout the country. It was a very civil kind of debate that occurred. And it was all national candidates, for the first time in Afghanistan's history crossing ethnic lines and campaigning around the country.

MR. GREGORY: I want to bring Admiral Mullen back in here. We're talking about the threat of the Taliban. And, you know, ultimately a lot of Americans are wondering--you see it in that poll--what it is we're fighting to do there. The president this week told Veterans of Foreign Wars Afghanistan is a war of necessity. But other people have said no, it's not, it's actually a war of choice. Richard Haass, who was around in the Bush administration when this war was started in Afghanistan, wrote this in The New York Times this week: "In the wake of 9/11, invading Afghanistan was a war of necessity. The U.S. needed to act in self-defense to oust the Taliban. There was no viable alternative. Now, however, with a friendly government in Kabul, is our military presence still a necessity?" My question: If the central mission was fighting al-Qaeda, are we fulfilling that central mission still?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, David, this is the war we're in. And in fact, the mission the president has given us is to defeat and disrupt al-Qaeda and its extremist allies. And that's very specific and that includes the Taliban, which has grown to be much more sophisticated in the last two to three years and is a much tougher enemy in that regard. And they really are linked. Across that border in Pakistan, they provide the safe haven for al-Qaeda. They also feed fighters into Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda would very much like to see Kabul become the capital that is was before, essentially run by extremists. So in that regard, the--it's very much linked. And again, it's the mission that the military has right now to focus--and General McChrystal is doing this--focus on the security for the people, focus on the Afghan people. And that's a significant change from where we were just a few months ago. And it is in that focus that both understands what they feel about their security, which is pretty bad right now and getting worse, and moving to a direction--moving in a direction that provides security so then we can develop governance, so then we can develop an economy and they can take over their own destiny.

MR. GREGORY: We're rebuilding this nation?

ADM. MULLEN: To a certain degree there is, there is some of that going on.

MR. GREGORY: Is that what the American people signed up for?

ADM. MULLEN: No, I'm--right now the American people signed up, I think, for support of getting at those who threaten us. And, and to the degree that, that the Afghan people's security and the ability to ensure that a safe haven doesn't recur in Afghanistan, there's focus on some degree of making sure security's OK, making sure governance moves in the right direction and developing an, an economy which will underpin their future.

MR. GREGORY: But there seems to be a fundamental problem here. You know, in the Vietnam era it was talk about mission creep; the idea of, you know, gradually surging up forces, having nation-building goals and, and running into challenges all along the way. You're not going to commit to this this morning, it doesn't seem, but the reality is that it appears to fulfill this mission--to beat the Taliban, which is stronger than it ever was, to also fight al-Qaeda--there needs to be more troops in addition to this goal of trying to secure the population.

ADM. MULLEN: The, the focus on the, the people certainly is going to come by, by way of having--create, creating security for them, so their future can be brighter than it is right now. But it isn't just that. I mean, part of the president's strategy is to bring in a, a significant civilian capacity. Ambassador Holbrooke was just there on his fifth or sixth trip, and he was both--in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. So this is a civilian military approach. It's a new strategy. It's the first one. And I recognize that, that we've been there over eight years, but I, I, I also want to say that this is the first time we've really resourced a strategy on both the civilian and military side. So in certain ways we're starting anew.

MR. GREGORY: The question for both of you is about exit strategy. This is what the president said back in March, so the American people know when this is going to come to an end. He said, "There's got to be an exit strategy. There's got to be a sense that it is not perpetual drift." And yet just a couple of weeks ago--you mentioned Richard Holbrook, envoy to the region. He was a forum here in Washington. He was asked how he would define success in Afghanistan. This is what he would say: "I would say this about defining success in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the simplest sense, the Supreme Court test for another issue--we'll know it when we see it." We'll know it when we see it? Is that supposed to provide solace to the American people that we're not getting into drift when it comes to an exit strategy?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I've said from a military perspective I believe we've got to start to turn this thing around from a security standpoint in the next 12 to 18 months. And I think after that we'd have a better view of how long it's going to take and what we need to do. Again, we're just getting the pieces in place from the president's new strategy in March on the ground now both on the military side--we've put forces there and we will have--we will add more this year--and on the civilian side. So it's going to take us a while to understand that. I don't see this as a, a mission of endless drift. I think we know what to do, we've learned a lot of lessons from Iraq, focusing on the Afghan people. It's a counterinsurgency effort right now, it's not just a--what was a counterterrorism effort several years ago. And that's why we've got to focus on the Afghan people, their security and creating forces, Afghan forces to provide for their own security.

MR. GREGORY: Ambassador Eikenberry, you're a former military man as well. What's your gut tell you? How long is it going to take to succeed in Afghanistan?

MR. EIKENBERRY: David, let's talk about progress. What--and what we would see as progress is over the next several years that the Afghan national army and the Afghan national police are much more in front, much more capable and that they're able to provide for the security of their own population. That's a several year process and beyond. What else does progress look like? Progress looks like a government of Afghanistan that's able to attend much more to the needs of their people, to provide reasonable services to them, to provide security for them. And progress look like a region in which there's more cooperation. Can we see outlines of what progress might look like over the next several years consistent with our strategy, ready to partner with the next Afghan administration that emerges after the winner of this election has occurred? Yeah, sure we can.

MR. GREGORY: It's just interesting, Admiral Mullen, that he talks about progress and not victory. Is victory possible in Afghanistan?

ADM. MULLEN: I try to focus this on what it's going to take to succeed there given the mission that we've got, and I go and would just re-emphasize now just on top of the progress, it's the focus on the people and giving them a future that allows them to take care of their own country and doesn't create an environment in which al-Qaeda and its extremist allies can threaten us as they have and execute a threat as they did in the past.

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you quickly about Iraq, the violence playing out this week in the green zone; 95 people killed, an attack on the foreign and finance ministry. This is Baghdad, where the Iraqis are now in control. You have warned about the threat of sectarian violence that could ultimately doom Iraq. What troubles you about what you saw this week?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I, I, I still think that is probably the most significant threat is if sectarian violence breaks out in, in large measure. And so these attacks last week certainly are of great concern not just to me but General Odierno, Ambassador Hill and many others. And we're watching that very carefully. That has been addressed very quickly with Prime Minister Maliki and his leadership. In addition to that, I've been concerned about the politics of it all; in fact, resolving the issues particularly up north around Kirkuk. Those are probably the two biggest threats to the future security and progress. But I've also said we're leaving. I mean, we're, we're--in, in the next several months--they're going to have an election beginning next year. After that we're going to start a fairly rapid draw down of our forces. And so it's really important that the political and military leadership of Iraq take control and generate positive solutions for them as a country.

MR. GREGORY: Finally here, we are just days away from the eighth anniversary of 9/11. What is your assessment of al-Qaeda's capability of striking the U.S. again?

ADM. MULLEN: Still very capable, very focused on it, the leadership is. They also are able to both train and support and finance, and so that capability is still significant and, and one which we're very focused on making sure that doesn't happen again.

MR. GREGORY: All right, we're going to leave it there.

Ambassador Eikenberry in Afghanistan, thank you very much for being with us this morning.

And, Admiral Mullen, always nice to have a couple of San Fernando Valley guys together on a Sunday morning. Thank you very much.

ADM. MULLEN: Thank you, David.

Pakistan: After Mehsud's Death, Are the Taliban Defeated?

The apparent assassination of the Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud (pictured) in an American missile attack has raised questions over the future of the insurgency. This article from Arif Rafiq of The Pakistan Policy Blog is a compehensive look not only at the situation in Pakistan but across the border in Afghanistan:

Almost two weeks after the killing of Baitullah Mehsud, Pakistan continues to have an upper hand over the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). But Rawalpindi-Islamabad’s gains over the TTP are unconsolidated. The Pakistani Taliban network can rejuvenate itself. Pakistan needs to sustain its vigilance against the militants, while at the same time not drag itself into a full-fledged conflict in South Waziristan it is not ready for.

Pakistan has managed to:

* secure its major urban areas outside the Pashtun belt, and, to a large extent, Peshawar, from militant attacks. There has been no equivalent of the Manawan police academy or ISI office attacks in Lahore or the Pearl Continental attack in Peshawar.
* cleanse the Malakand division of militants (though not completely — see below) to the extent that much of the internally displaced population is returning home and willing to facilitate policing efforts to prevent a Taliban return.
* increase approval of the Pakistan Army in the Malakand division, despite the fact that it hasn’t followed a COINdinista Network Approved Strategy (CNAS).
* continue to penetrate terrorist cells and apprehend key facilitators, funders, and trained suicide bombers.
* push the militant leadership into the North-South Waziristan corridor.
* fracture the TTP leadership, or at least create the perception that it is in “disarray.”
* put the Mehsud network — and anti-state takfiri terrorists, in general — on the defensive, both physically and ideologically.
* maintain pressure on TTP remnants in Bajaur, Khyber, Mohmand, and Orakzai. Note that there hasn’t been an attack on a NATO convoy in Pakistan recently.
* transfer the Pashtun “hot potato” on to the United States.

This success is due to:

* the use of air power against militants in the Malakand division and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that, while causing significant civilian casualties, neither turned the local population against the central government nor strained the manpower of the Pakistani security services.
* a commitment to keep a large military presence in Swat for the next few years.
* a sustained counterpropaganda campaign utilizing the private media and religious scholars, particularly Barelvis.
* a clever psy-ops campaign against the TTP.
* a whole-hearted embrace of its fallen soldiers, with public funerals made accessible to the media.
* excellent investigative and police work done by the federal interior ministry down to the provincial police forces.
* the decision by the Obama administration to focus drone attacks against the Baitullah Mehsud network.

The TTP has failed to:

* prove that Baitullah Mehsud is alive. Hakimullah Mehsud, who appears to be living, promised a Baitullah video by last Monday, but it never appeared.
* demonstrate leadership continuity by appointing a successor to Baitullah.
* counter Pakistan Army claims that there was a clash between Hakimullah and Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud by having the two agree on a Baitullah successor or, somehow, publicly prove they are on the same page.
* show that it remains a force to be reckoned with by pulling off a major attack in Islamabad, Peshawar, or urban Punjab.
* legitimize (or re-legitimize) its insurgency and campaign of terror in the eyes of the Pakistani public by linking it to Pakistan’s support for the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.

Despite the Pakistan military’s gains against the TTP, the terrorist outfit’s senior leadership — aside from Baitullah — remains alive. Commanders such as Faqir Muhammad and Hakimullah Mehsud are around. But their continued existence does not preclude a disassembly of the TTP. Afterall, it is an umbrella organization. Disassembly would require the commanders to no longer share the same threat: the Pakistan military-intelligence establishment. And that would require an undesirable return to a messy policy of Rawalpindi sorting out the bad guys from the less bad guys (i.e. “good” vs. “bad” Taliban).

For the Pakistan Army, South Waziristan remains the belly of the beast. Its unforgiving land is the home of the Mehsud network as well as a host of Pakistani and foreign jihadi groups.

But, for many reasons, the Pakistan Army cannot afford a ground incursion into South Waziristan....

Read rest of article....

Transcript II: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea and Pakistan (9 August)

Video and Transcript I: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, Iran (9 August)
Transcripts III: National Security Advisor Jones on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea (9 August)

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CHRIS WALLACE: General, welcome to “FOX News Sunday.”

JONES: Thank you, Chris. Good to be here.

WALLACE: Is Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban inside Pakistan, dead?

JONES: Well, we think so. The Pakistani government has believed -- believes that he is, and all evidence that we have suggests that. But there are reports from the Mehsud organization that he’s not. But we think -- we think that it looks like he is.

WALLACE: Let me ask you to clear up another matter. There were reports yesterday of a gun fight between two leading contenders to replace Mehsud and that one where both of them had been killed in a gun fight.

But this morning, one of those two people who was allegedly dead reportedly called Reuters news service to say that he’s alive and well and there was no fight. What do you know about that?

JONES: Well, we’ve heard -- we’ve heard stories about that. We can’t -- I can’t confirm it. But it certainly is -- appears to be that there was some dissension in the ranks. That’s not a bad thing for us.

And it goes to show that I think the strategy that we’re engaged with with Pakistan is actually having some effect. And that’s good.

WALLACE: Well, I was going to ask you, assuming that Mehsud is dead, what does it say about the president’s war on terror?

JONES: Well, I think in terms of Pakistan, it means that the Pakistani government and the army is -- and our relationships with the army are having good effect, and I think that we’re moving in the right direction.

Mehsud is -- was a very bad individual, a real thug, responsible for a lot of violence, a lot of innocent people losing their lives. And I think that if there’s dissension in the ranks and that if, in fact, he is, as we think, dead, this is a positive indication that in Pakistan things are turning for the better.

WALLACE: Well, let me ask you about that. Regardless of who’s in charge, there’s still up to 20,000 Taliban fighters inside Pakistan. Is this a key moment for the Pakistanis to go after them? And are we pressing the Pakistani government and military to do just that?

JONES: Well, for the last several months, Chris, we’ve had a very, very good engagement with the Pakistani government. The Pakistani army has acquitted itself quite well in the Swat region, showing sensitivity for refugees as well.

We have a growing relationship in terms of intelligence sharing, and I think the relationships between the two -- the two countries are on the -- certainly very positive right now -- and also the relationships with Afghanistan.

Don’t forget this is a theater-wide engagement. This is an important moment. I won’t say it’s a tipping point, but it certainly shows that we’re having some success.

When you can take out a leader like Mehsud, you do show -- you do have some dissension in the ranks, and it reduces their capability to organize, regardless of how many they have.

This is a strong message. Pakistan deserves to be -- to be credited for its role. And we hope that we continue the pressure and we don’t -- we don’t let up.

WALLACE: Afghanistan -- you say it’s a theater-wide issue. Afghanistan is scheduled to hold national elections on August 20th. With the Taliban active in about half of that country, will that election go off? And what are the chances of serious disruptions?

JONES: Well, all indications right now are that the elections are going to go off, that they’re going to be fair. They’re going to be secure in most parts, secured by lot of Afghan forces, with international forces forming the outer ring of security. We are paying a lot of attention to that.

It looks like they’re having a good debate going into the elections. And so the signs are positive now. We’re quite sure that there will be -- there will be some efforts out there to disrupt them, but we hope to keep that to a minimum.

WALLACE: The new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, reportedly wants more U.S. troops sent to Afghanistan.

But according to the Washington Post, you told our top brass in late June that the president was done sending additional troops. And I want to get to the quote. “If there were new requests for force now, the president would quite likely have a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment.”

Everyone in the room caught the phonetic reference to W-T-F, which in the military and elsewhere means “what the expletive.”

JONES: Right.

WALLACE: General, did you say that?

JONES: I did say that, but in the context of the overall strategy. We -- this is not, Chris, simply about the number of troops.

This -- I have been involved in Afghanistan for the better part of six years of my life, initially as a NATO commander. And in my two years of retirement, we conducted a major study about Afghanistan. And now I’m back into it.

What is not lacking in Afghanistan is a comprehensive strategy. We have published the strategy that not only is agreed to here by everyone in the nation’s capital, but also by lot of our international allies.

Essentially, there are three prongs to the strategy. There’s a security prong. That is -- that is about troops. But economic recovery and cohesion with the security strategy is important. And better governance and rule of law, from Kabul all the way down to the local townships is extremely important.

So my point in saying what I said was that it is not simply about troops. Now...

WALLACE: But are you ruling out more troops for Afghanistan?

JONES: As you know, as you mentioned, General McChrystal is doing a comprehensive assessment, which is what any military commander does when they take over a significant job.

And the secretary of defense has heard his preliminary report, has asked some questions. It will come up through the chain of command, and then we’ll see what...

WALLACE: But if he asks for more troops, you’re not ruling it out?

JONES: Not ruling it out at all.

WALLACE: OK. There have been a flurry of recent reports, including a comment over the last couple of days from the new British army chief of staff, that to secure Afghanistan will take at least -- at least -- another decade.

First of all, do you agree with that? And secondly, is the president prepared for that kind of long-term commitment?

JONES: Well, I know Sir David Richards quite well. He was the commander of ISAF when I was his senior commander at NATO.

And I think that what we have in place right now is a comprehensive strategy. We have yet to go past the first milestone of evaluating it.

But I think the strategy that the president has agreed to and announced that all allies have agreed to, that emphasizes the three prongs that I just mentioned -- our -- and also, it also emphasizes more role for an increased capacity in the Afghan army and also the Afghan police.

If we do that, I think we will -- we’ll see indications very quickly that we’re turning in the right direction. And I think that the Afghans will be able to control their own destiny much quicker.

WALLACE: Do you want to give us a time line for that?

JONES: I don’t want to give -- I don’t want to predict a time line, just like we couldn’t predict a time line in Iraq. But you get to that tipping point. If you -- if the pieces are all organized correctly, you get to that tipping point a lot quicker, and then it becomes irreversible.

WALLACE: President Obama has made it part of his policy to try to reach out to Iran. Are we still prepared to negotiate with President Ahmadinejad after what seemed to be widespread reports that he stole the election?

JONES: In the context of the international P Five -- what we call the P Five-Plus One negotiations, we have -- we have extended an open invitation to Iran to join the talks, which we would -- we strongly hope they do.

They have not responded to that invitation. That’s been on the table since April. We hope that they do. The...

WALLACE: The fact -- let me just ask -- you say we hope they do. The fact that we -- that...

JONES: We hope that they respond.

WALLACE: But the fact that Ahmadinejad may have stolen the election makes no difference?

JONES: Well, the fact of the election really makes a difference to the people of Iran. They are the ones that have to decide on the legitimacy of it.

We have to deal with this -- the -- whatever the central authority is. If it turns out to be the same individuals, then that’s who we have to deal with.

But the issues on the table are so important, in terms of nuclear weapons -- I might say North Korea as well -- that when they respond, if they respond, we’ll have to deal with them. That’s just the fact of life. WALLACE: A report this morning that the Revolutionary Guard in Iran wants the political candidate, presidential candidate who lost, to go on trial for unrest after the elections. How would we regard that?

JONES: With regard to Iran, there’s obviously some internal difficulties in that country. We have basically taken the stance that since we can’t, obviously, affect it one way or another, nor should we, that we will deal with the Iran as this thing shakes out.

But it is obvious that there’s some internal difficulties. We’ll just watch and see what happens.

WALLACE: General, what have you learned from President Clinton’s trip to North Korea this week to bring back those two journalists? Did Kim Jong-il or any of the other top officials in their meetings indicate they want a new relationship with the U.S.?

JONES: Well, as you know, Chris, this was a private mission and one that the -- I think the -- we’re all grateful to the former president for taking it on. Certainly the families -- the joyful reunion was something we all celebrate.

And by the way, we would like to see the same kind of reunion in South Korea with the detainee that the North Koreans have, and also with the Japanese abductees that are still in North Korean prisons.

But the former president and the leader had about a 3.5-hour discussion. Reportedly, they discussed the importance of denuclearization in terms of weapon systems of the North Korean Peninsula -- of the Korean Peninsula, and -- in addition to, you know, talking about other things that the former president may have wished to discuss.

WALLACE: But did -- in that meeting -- as you say, it was over three hours. Did the North Koreans indicate they want a new relationship with the U.S.? And did they specifically ask for direct talks rather than going back to the six-party talks?

JONES: North Koreans have indicated that they would like a new relation -- a better relation with the United States. They’ve always advocated for bilateral engagement. We have put on the table in the context of the talks we would be happy to do that if, in fact, they would rejoin the talks. So we think the...

WALLACE: We would have -- be willing to have bilateral talks in the context of the six-party...

JONES: Within the context of the -- of the six-party talks.

WALLACE: What did we learn about Kim’s health and his hold on power from the Clinton trip?

JONES: Well, we’re still very much debriefing the party that went with President Clinton. But preliminary reports appeared that the -- that Kim Jong-il is in full control of his organization, his government. The conversations were respectful and cordial in tone.

WALLACE: But he’s still in charge?

JONES: And he certainly is -- he certainly appears to still be the one who’s in charge.

WALLACE: Can you assure the American people that all that the North Koreans got from this trip in exchange for the two American journalists -- that all they got from this trip was the photo-op, that there were no secret concessions from the United States?

JONES: I can do that with absolutely a straight face. There was no official message sent via the former president, and there were no promises, other than to make sure that the two young girls were reunited with their families.

WALLACE: A couple of final questions. Will the president meet his deadline for closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay by next January?

JONES: Well, we have every intention of doing so, and there’s a lot of work going on every single day to make sure that we find the right solution. And I’m confident that we’ll be able to meet that deadline.

WALLACE: Finally, let’s talk a little bit about Jim Jones, because I think it’s fair to say that you have been lower profile than some of your predecessors as national security adviser, particularly Henry Kissinger and some of the others.

But you’re not seen in public all the time hovering right next to the president. You’re not seen as the gatekeeper who controls all the foreign policy types who get in to see the president. Do you have a different view of your job?

JONES: I do. I think this is also a different century. And I think the national security adviser runs an organization that deals from everything starting with climate change and energy all the way to cybersecurity, including the normal threats that we associate with the job.

So it’s very complex. We have economic issues that we’re concerned about. And so I think...

WALLACE: But particularly in terms of your role.

JONES: I think -- I think, first of all, there’s no problem with me seeing the president on any matter that he wants to discuss or I want to discuss. That is -- that is not a problem.

I believe that there’s a -- there’s a new way of doing business, to tee up the issues that are very complex and span a huge, huge array of subjects that each day the president has to deal with.

And I think that getting the right people in to see the president at the right time to brief him on a daily basis on these issues is the right thing to do. It’s just...

WALLACE: And you’re not threatened that...

JONES: I don’t -- I don’t -- at the principal’s level, with Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, we talk every day. We talk with Susan Rice up at the -- up at the U.N. We have a very collaborative team. There’s no dissension. There’s no -- there’s nothing but trust and confidence. And that’s the enjoyable part of the job.

So I don’t -- I want to make sure that the president gets the best advice he can. If I need to put my particular spin on it, I have -- I have no problem doing that.

I just -- I just think that I serve the president better by presiding over an organization that tees up the issues in the right way. We have a good process, I think, to make sure that the president gets the advice that he needs, that -- we vet it. We tear it apart. We fight over it if we need to.

But when we come to see the president, we have a -- we have a -- he gets -- he gets the pros and the cons. And if I -- as the national security adviser, if I need to say something either privately or with my colleagues, I do so. I don’t have any problem with that.

WALLACE: General Jones, we want to thank you so much for coming in today. Please come back, sir.

JONES: I appreciate it. Thank you, Chris.

WALLACE: Pleasure.

JONES: Thank you.

Transcripts III: National Security Advisor Jones on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea (9 August)

Video and Transcript I: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, Iran (9 August)
Transcript II: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran

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The transcript of the interview with General James Jones, President Obama's National Security Advisor, on CBS News' Face the Nation with Bob Schieffer:

BOB SCHIEFFER: And good morning again, General Jones is in the studio with us this morning.

Thank you very much for coming, General. You went to Afghanistan back in June, you took reporter Bob Woodward along on the trip and afterwards he reported that you told the commanders there they would have to make due with what they had. Yet every day brings a new report that General McChrystal, the top American commander on the ground there, is preparing a new assessment and it appears that he is going to ask for more troops.

We hear that from various people, Anthony Cordesman from CSIS is just back from there. He says we have set impossible goals. We set impossible time frames. He says you are going to have to have more resources.

Are you getting ready to consider putting more troops into Afghanistan?

JONES: We -- first of all, it is a pleasure to be with you, thank you very much for having me. The fact is -- and I’ll get to my remarks on what the intention was, but the fact is that in March, we announced a very comprehensive strategy that everybody participated in.

That strategy has essentially three legs, more security, followed by economic development, followed by better governance from the -- at the local levels in Afghanistan. And buttressed by more rapid development of the Afghan army and the Afghan police. So we want to put an Afghan capacity together as quickly as possible. We have over 40 nations on the ground, we have all of the international organizations you could want, from the U.N. to NATO, to E.U., the World Bank, the IMF, and nongovernmental organizations.

And Afghanistan will be solved by a better coordination of these elements. The troop strength is an important piece of it, and my message to General McChrystal and to the commanders when I went there was to say, think about the total strategy that we have all agreed to, General McChrystal is conducting an assessment at the request of secretary of defense.

They -- the Defense Department will evaluate what General McChrystal has to say, and in due time it will come up for a decision by the president.

But I did not say -- I want to be clear on this, I did not say that troop strength is off the table for discussion. What I did say is that we have yet to be able to measure the implementation of the new strategy, so if you have recommendations, make it in the context of the new strategy.

This -- we have learned one thing in six years, we -- this is not just about troop strength.

SCHIEFFER: Well, but that sounds like you are getting us ready for sending more troops to Afghanistan.

JONES: Well, let me put another thing on the table here. When the president made his decision, there were additional troops that were on the charts that the secretary of defense said at the time, Mr. President, you do not have to make this decision now, this is something we can consider later after we measure the implementation of our strategy.

So we will have discussions as the weeks and months go by. The big thing for us now is to make sure that the strategy is being implemented, we have got new commanders, we have got new diplomats, we have got Richard Holbrooke, who is providing the theater engagement.

It is not just about Afghanistan, it’s about Pakistan and what is going on there.

SCHIEFFER: But, General, we have been there how long? Six years, and it is like -- it sounds like you are talking about we just got there.

JONES: No, no, no. We -- I have been involved in this for six years also.

SCHIEFFER: Well, how bad is it there? Every report we have is that it is worse than it has ever been. That it has become sort of a sinkhole and now you are trying to develop yardsticks to find out how well we are doing.

When are we going to know how we are doing, even? JONES: We will -- that is a very good question, and it is a fair question. I -- this is my opinion. My opinion was that we did not have a well-articulated strategy until March of this year.

We had a strategy for security. We had a little bit of a strategy for economic development, which was other people’s problems. And we had a strategy that may be addressed a little bit of governance and the rule of law. This strategy merges all of those three things.

We also are -- we are definitely going to, in conjunction with our allies, develop the Afghan army at a faster rate and the Afghan police so we can have Afghans in charge of their own destiny in a shorter period of time.

So, yes, we have been there six years. But if you go back to the overall history of it, and you look at the three pillars that need to be developed, security has always been done reasonably well, although we have had some backsliding since 2007, but the other two have been allowed to not develop as quickly.

So in conjunction with our allies, and I want to make sure that I make this point as well, that this is not just a U.S. problem. This is an international problem, and we cannot -- I think we have the strategy and we will shortly see, and I mean within a year, whether this strategy is working and then we will adjust from there.

SCHIEFFER: We’ll know in a year if the new strategy...

JONES: Within the year...

SCHIEFFER: ... is working?

JONES: And we have the metrics to evaluate this strategy. The Congress has mandated them. We were going to do them anyway. The president has said, “I want regular reports as to how we’re doing.”

SCHIEFFER: But so far it isn’t working? Would that be fair to say?

JONES: Well, it’s -- it’s only been three months old.

SCHIEFFER: Well, I mean, the previous strategy?

JONES: We don’t even have -- the troop strength that has been agreed has not even arrived there, so -- so my benchmark is this administration, in March, committed to a new strategy. We involved Afghanistan. We involved Pakistan. We involved NATO, the allies. We had the NATO summit, where the allies had a -- a new...

SCHIEFFER: So let me see if I can just sum this up.

JONES: ... a new attitude.

SCHIEFFER: You’re going to develop a new strategy...

JONES: We’ve had it.

SCHIEFFER: ... and you have a new strategy going, and you may have to send more troops to Afghanistan?

You’re not, at least, going to rule that out at this point?

JONES: I won’t rule -- we won’t rule anything out that stands to reason, but it is fair to say that, once we agree on a new strategy, we want to make sure that it is -- has a chance to be evaluated.

SCHIEFFER: OK.

JONES: And if things come up where we need to adjust one way or the other, and it involves troops or it involves more incentives...

(CROSSTALK) JONES: ... for economic development or better assistance to help the Afghan government function, we’ll do that.

SCHIEFFER: Now, what was it, last weekend, that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, flew out to meet with General McChrystal?

JONES: Correct.

SCHIEFFER: That suggests there may be some sort of -- we may be in some sort of crisis mode. This was a secret trip that wasn’t announced until after they completed it.

Would you think -- would you say that things in Afghanistan at this point are at a crisis level?

JONES: Well, we’re -- coming up to a very important election. We have, I think, a -- no, I don’t think -- I don’t think we’re at a crisis level, in terms of -- or that there’s going to be any movement on the ground by the Taliban that’s going to overthrow the government. We’re going to have, I think, a good election. The signs are that it’s going to be -- the instruments of security are being well- thought-out.

I think, with the success that we’ve had on the Pakistan side of the border, which we can talk about if you like, and the growing troop strength by the U.S. and some of our allies on the Afghan side, I think -- I think the security aspect of things is -- going to get better.

There’s going to be a little bit more fighting. Unfortunately, we’re taking more casualties, but if we’re able to marry up the other two legs of this three-legged stool that I mentioned, put things that will change the economic forecast for the Afghan people on the ground, put Afghan troops, Afghan police in the villages languages and towns, I think that’s the -- that’s the future.

SCHIEFFER: Let me ask you about this situation in Pakistan. Mehsud, the top Taliban man -- I heard you say earlier today that we’re 90 percent sure that we got him. Now, how important is that?

JONES: Well, I think it is very important. First of all, it’s important because this is Pakistan’s public enemy number one, if I could. He has -- he controls a very violent aspect of the insurgent problems in -- on the Pakistani side of the border. And this would be -- this is a big deal, and...

SCHIEFFER: Let’s talk, a little bit, about the developments in North Korea. Former President Clinton went there. He got these people. We now know that it was the North Koreans that said, if you’ll send him, we’ll -- we’ll let these two young Americans go.

We also know that, because I’ve heard you already report this, that the president, former president, did have conversations with them on a variety of subjects.

What happens now? Do we -- do we expect some development here now?

JONES: Well, we hope so. President Clinton did have the opportunity to talk to the North Korean leader and suggest that the happy scene that was carried out in California with the unification of families could have happened with the detainee from South Korea in Seoul or in Tokyo with the Japanese abductees and he represented our desire to have them released as well.

I think that obviously with his, as the former president, with his father, the Korean leader’s father, was -- had eight years of experience with dealing with North Korea, and he was able to, in his own way -- the I hope persuasive that there is a better way, there is a better path, that it is clear that a couple of things are clear.

One is that we sent no official or unofficial message from our government, so there was no -- there is nothing secretive here, that North Korea knows that the path to talking is through the six party process, and that within that six party process --

SCHIEFFER: They seem to want to have some sort of one-on-one dialogue with the United States. Would we be willing to do that?

JONES: Sure within the context of the six party talks.

SCHIEFFER: What does that mean?

JONES: Meaning if they come back to the talks, we will talk to them bilaterally within those talks. We have coordinated all of this by the way with the other allies, the Chinese, the Russians, the South Koreans, the Japanese. So the path is clear, and President Clinton is a very convincing gentleman and I hope he was able to convince them.

SCHIEFFER: Let me ask you this, General. Why do you think the North Korean leader wanted to do this? Was he trying to impress his own people? Was he trying to impress his military that look, I can get a former president of the United States to come over here. That shows you I am still a strong and vibrant leader? Or was he trying to impress the rest of the world? What was that all about?

JONES: You know, I would be guessing. You know, internally, he can manipulate this anyway he wants but as far as the rest of the world, I think that we are clear on what it was and what it wasn’t.

SCHIEFFER: And what it was?

JONES: What it was is a private humanitarian mission to rescue and obtain the release of two girls so they could be with their families and that is President Obama’s -- that was his goal in this.

SCHIEFFER: Finally, Gitmo. Every indication is you will not be able to make the president’s deadline of closing that down by the end of the year.

JONES: This is a complex issue and we are working on this every single day. I still believe that we can achieve our goals, but it is a complex issue.

SCHIEFFER: But you are not sure if you are going to make it?

JONES: No, I think we will. I think there are some things on the table that we can’t necessarily talk about right now, but hopefully there are some signs here that we will find the right way to do this.

SCHIEFFER: All right General Jones, thanks for being with us and I hope you come back.

JONES: It is a pleasure, thank you very much.