Afghanistan: Beyond the Politics and Propaganda, The War of Logistics

Less than two weeks after the Presidential election, the political narrative is unravelling in Afghanistan. The New York Times offers a black-comedy "Really? You Don't Say" moment with its headline, "Increasing Accounts of Fraud Cloud Afghan Vote", while Dexter Filkins, the highly-praised Times reporter, turns from recent rah-rah cheerleading of the US military to pronounce, "Seven Days That Shook Afghanistan: a string of disturbing military and political events revealed not just the extraordinary burdens that lie ahead for the Americans and Afghans toiling to create a stable nation, but the fragility of the very enterprise itself".

Still, the US military will press on. The US commander, General Stanley McChrystal, will confirm today in his report to the President that he wants 20,000 more troops. The "private" publicity machine is already in motion, with top analyst/promoter Anthony Cordesman (who happened to advise McChrystal during the report's development) given space in The Washington Post to declare that the General should get Everything He Wants: "We have a reasonable chance of victory if we properly outfit and empower our new team in Afghanistan; we face certain defeat if we do not."

Amidst these predictable political developments and military escalations, Juan Cole offers a valuable reminder of the complexities of the battle:

Are the Taliban Surrounding NATO Armies and Cutting them Off?

There is an old saying in military affairs, that everyone wants to do strategy and tactics, but real men do logistics. That is, moving persons and materiel around and managing supplies seems tedious, but they are crucial to success. The Obama administration has substituted the Logistics of War for the War on Terror. It is moving troops and equipment and assets around in the millions, on a vast scale, and therefore its enemies--whether the Sunni radicals in Iraq or the neo-Taliban, are also concentrating on logistics. The staccato, desultory news items of bombings here and air strikes there, make sense if the individual incidents are viewed as struggles over supply lines-- whether supply lines for military purposes, or supplies of intangibles such as international legitimacy. And in this context, the gingerness with which Washington is now approaching Russia and Iran makes perfect sense.

The logistics war in AfPak were on full view Sunday, with the long fingers of blazing conflagrations jabbing the sky amidst billowing waves of jet black smoke both in Chaman in Pakistan near the Afghan border, and in Kunar Province. The bombing of supply trucks is to this war what u-boat attacks on supply ships were to the two world wars.

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Afghanistan: The US Marches On (with 20,000 More Troops)....To Where?

Afghanistan: Forget the Election, Let’s Have Some More Troops

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UPDATE 1000 GMT: The Independent of London offers the "exclusive" that the US commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, will ask for 20,000 more troops in his long-awaited report to President Obama.

Regular EA readers won't be surprised, as only last Sunday we featured the public-relations offensive by two Administration officials pointing towards an increase of 25,000 soldiers. The question: will the US press for some of the increase to come from NATO allies or will it provide all of the additional forces?
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The post-election situation drags on in Afghanistan, with the result of the Presidential vote descending into a protracted delay amidst allegations of fraud. The electoral commission has now suspended daily briefings, and stories have emerged of a heated row between President Hamid Karzai and President Obama's envoy Richard Holbrooke, apparently over the attempt of the Karzai camp to alter the vote so the President would be re-elected in the first round.

Our suspicion has been that, for many in Washington, this political quagmire would merely be the backdrop (and indeed the pretext) for an intensified military campaign. Robert Dreyfuss of The Nation shares our fears. Particuarly notable in his account below is the large presence of Bruce Riedel, who helped design the Obama strategy of intervention in Afghanistan at the start of 2009.

Afghanistan Apocalypse

Yesterday afternoon at the Brookings Institution, four analysts portrayed a bleak and terrifying vision of the current state of affairs in Afghanistan in the wake of the presidential election. All four were hawkish, reflecting a growing consensus in the Washington establishment that the Afghanistan war is only just beginning.

Their conclusions: (1) A significant escalation of the war will be necessary to avoid utter defeat. (2) Even if tens of thousands of troops are added to the US occupation, it won't be possible to determine if the US/NATO effort is succeeding until eighteen months later. (3) Even if the United States turns the tide in Afghanistan, no significant drawdown of US forces will take place until five years have passed.

The experts at the panel were Bruce Riedel, a 30-year CIA veteran and adviser to four presidents, who chaired President Obama's Afghan task force; Michael O'Hanlon, a military expert and adviser to General David Petraeus; Tony Cordesman, a conservative military expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Kim Kagan, head of the Institute for the Study of War.

Not a single panelist questioned the goals, purpose or objectives of the Afghan war. Not one said anything about a political solution to the war, about negotiations, or about diplomacy. Not one questioned the viability of an open-ended commitment to the war. And none of them had any doubts about the strategic necessity of defeating the Taliban and its allies. Although the growing political opposition to the war was referenced in passing -- more than half of Americans say the the war isn't worth fighting, and liberal-left members of Congress are beginning to raise objections -- the panel seemed to believe that President Obama can and must ignore politics and push to expand the war when General McChrystal, as expected, recommends an increase in the the level of US forces once again. O'Hanlon, a well-connected, ultra-hawkish Democrat who backed the war in Iraq, said that the chances that Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi will lead congressional opposition to the war in Afghanistan in 2009-2010 are zero. "Congress will not pull the rug out from under Barack Obama, before the mid-term elections," he asserted, calling the very idea "unthinkable" and "political suicide."

O'Hanlon, who had just returned from Afghanistan, acknowledged that McChrystal is "fully aware that, right now, America is not winning this war." But he gently scolded Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the joint chiefs, for saying that the war is "deteriorating." If Mullen goes around saying that in public, even after the addition of 21,000 US troops in 2009, he makes it harder to convince Americans that the war is winnable. O'Hanlon strongly favors adding yet more troops, but he didn't provide numbers on how many forces the US will need ultimately. If the United States can turn things around, "In four to five years we will be able to substantially downsize."

The bleakest account of the war came from Cordesman, Washington's resident Cassandra. He delivered a blistering assessment of the Bush administration's complete failure to pursue the Afghan war, with "almost no coherence in strategy" for seven years. President Bush, he said, didn't properly "resource" (i.e., fund) the war, kept troop levels far too low, and failed to build the Afghan National Army (ANA). In addition, he said, US intelligence was extremely poor. The Bush administration and the Pentagon lied about how the war was going, saying, for instance, that only 13 out of 364 Afghan districts were threatened by the Taliban, when if fact nearly half of the country was under siege. And he said that, even under McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry, a former military commander, coordination between the military command and the embassy is "extremely poor."

Cordesman warned that McChrystal and the NATO/ISAF command is under pressure from the White House and the National Security Council not to increase troops levels, and he warned that if "politically correct" limitations are imposed on the US war effort, "I believe we will lose this war." He blasted General James Jones, the national security adviser, for expressing White House opposition to additional troops during a meeting with McChrystal at which Bob Woodward of the Washington Post was present. Of the four panelists, Cordesman was the only one who suggested that Obama and the NSC might resist McChrystal's request for additional forces.

Riedel presented a series of alternative outcomes of the presidential election, which may or may not result in a second-round runoff election in October. He seemed gloomy about the overall election results, noting that overall turnout was held to 30 to 40 percent, and that in some provinces turnout would be far less, below 20 percent. In some areas, less than 5 percent of women voted at all, he said. And he said that President Karzai, if he wins, will emerge even more dependent than before on warlords. Indeed, amid charges of widespread fraud being leveled by leading opposition candidates, general apathy and disaffection about the vote from the majority Pashtun population, and effective Taliban-led intimidation, the election may not create any sense of legitimacy for the next government. (According to Cordesman, "Regardless of who wins, we will not have people capable of governing the country.")

But Riedel's more apocalyptic point came in response to a questioner who wondered why the war is important. If we lose in Afghanistan, or if we withdraw, it will trigger a victorious war dance throughout the Muslim world by radicals and militants, he said. Riedel portrayed the stakes in the war as nothing less than dealing a fatal blow to jihadism. "The triumph of jihadism, in driving NATO out of Afghanistan, will resonate throughout the Muslim world," he said, comparing it to the belief among many Al Qaeda and Taliban types that the defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan in the 1980s led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nowhere did Riedel suggest that there is a middle ground between crushing the Taliban and an outright Taliban victory over the United States, say, by reaching a political solution brokered by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other outside parties with large sections of the Taliban leadership. Nor did any of the panelists suggest that it's possible to split Al Qaeda and the most extreme elements of the anti-Western forces in Afghanistan-Pakistan away from other Islamists, such as the Taliban's core leadership and guerrilla chieftains such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former US and CIA ally in the 1980s, who is now a key ally of the Taliban.

Martin Indyk, who runs foreign policy for Brookings, asked Riedel if reality, so far, clashed with the plan that he helped draw up for Obama earlier this year. No, said Riedel. He said that Obama had inherited a disaster in Afghanistan from the Bush administration."Trying to turn that around overnight is an illusion," he said. (He failed to note that in trying to turn it around, Obama is turning it in the wrong direction, i.e., toward escalation rather than de-escalation.) "Anyone who thinks that in 12 to 18 months we're going to be anywhere close to victory is living in a fantasy," Riedel said. He did leave open the possibility that the conflict is now unwinnable, and that the US escalation is "too little, too late." But, like the rest of the panelists, Riedel suggested that there is no alternative to victory.

Sadly, like Richard Holbrooke, who two weeks ago told a Washington audience that he can't define victory, none of the panelists bothered to explain what victory might look like either -- only that it will take a decade or more to get there.

Video & Transcript: Mullen, Eikenberry Sell Afghanistan War on "Meet the Press" (23 August)

Transcript and Analysis: Mullen, Eikenberry Sell the Afghanistan War on CNN (23 August)

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We commented earlier on the Obama Administration's double act selling the war in Afghanistan, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen and US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, on CNN. As disturbing as this appearance was, this one might be worse.

Like the CNN interview, this exchange started not with consideration of Afghanistan's political situation but with the question of how many troops the US should put into the country. And to set that up, host David Gregory asked a fatuous, leading question about weak-willed US public opinion to which Mullen invoked both Al Qa'eda and 9-11.

To give Gregory some credit, he did get to the serious issues of Afghanistan's political and economic development and whether the US was "nation-building". When he did, Mullen and Eikenberry floundered helplessly. Granted I am not a fan of the Obama policy, but even a supporter of the US effort should have concerns after this performance.

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DAVID GREGORY: first, in addition to waging political battles at home, the President is faced with two ongoing wars abroad.

This week Afghans went to the polls as Americans expressed fresh skepticism about the U.S. war there now entering its ninth year. And in Iraq, new threats of sectarian violence after bombers strike inside Baghdad's green zone. Two men charged with coordinating the U.S. military and diplomatic mission in that region join us now: Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from Afghanistan this morning, our U.S. ambassador, retired Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry.

Welcome to both of you.

Let me start with you, Admiral Mullen on the question of U.S. resolve. This was a poll taken by The Washington Post and ABC News this week, and these were the results. Is the war in Afghanistan worth the fight? No, 51 percent. Has American--have the American people lost that will to fight this war?

ADM. MIKE MULLEN: Well, I'm, I'm a Vietnam veteran myself. I'm certainly aware of the criticality of support of the American people for, for this war and in, in fact, any war. And so certainly the numbers are of concern.

That said, the president's given me and the American military a mission, and, and that focuses on a new strategy, new leadership, and we're moving very much in that direction. I am very mindful and concerned about the threat that's there. The strategy really focuses on defeating al-Qaeda and their extremist allies. That's where the original 911 attacks came from, that region. They've now moved to Pakistan. Afghanistan is very vulnerable in terms of Taliban and extremists taking over again, and I don't think that threat's going to go away. They still plot against us, see us as somebody they want to, to, to kill in terms of as many American lives as possible. And in that regard, we're very focused on executing that mission.

MR. GREGORY: Well, let's talk about that focus. General McChrystal, our commander on the ground, is expected to release his report, his assessment of what's happening on the ground. Will he request of this president more troops to fight in Afghanistan?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, McChrystal's assessment will come in here in I think the next two weeks. And his guidance was go out as a new commander, put a new team together and come back and tell us exactly how you assess conditions on the ground, take into consideration the president's strategy. He's going to do that. The--his assessment will come in and won't speak specifically to resources. There's an expectation we'll deal with resources after that assessment.

MR. GREGORY: Right. Well, but Senator McCain is saying in an interview this morning it will deal with resources, that he'll come back with high, medium and, and low threat assessments in terms of how many more troops you need, whether you need 15,000, 25,000 or 45,000 additional troops. Will he come in with a specific troop request, and will that increase in troop request meet skepticism from the White House?

ADM. MULLEN: The assessment that he will submit here in the next couple of weeks won't specifically deal with requirements for additional resources. We'll deal with the--with whatever additional resources might be required subsequent to that in the normal process.

MR. GREGORY: But this question that Senator McCain raises, which is he's afraid that there's going to be skepticism in the White House about any request for more troops and that more troops are vital if you're going to carry out this mission, where do you fall down on that?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I think when we look at the strategy the president's laid out, look what General McChrystal says he needs to--in order to carry out that strategy, my recommendation to the president will be based on getting the resource strategy matched absolutely correct. And so we'll see where that goes once the assessment is in here. And I've had this conversation with the president, who understands that whatever the mission is, it needs to be resourced correctly. That said, it'll be the initial assessment that will be important, and then the risks that are associated with that assessment, and then we'll figure out where we go from there.

MR. GREGORY: But can you carry out this mission with the troops you've got?

ADM. MULLEN: That's really something that we will evaluate over the next few weeks after we get the assessment from General McChrystal.

MR. GREGORY: Ambassador Eikenberry, let me bring you in here and talk about the elections this week. Already there are claims of irregularities and fraud, voter turnout much lower than expected in the south, particularly low among women. And we don't have a clear result yet of the election. To what extent does this election, this presidential election in Afghanistan highlight the challenges that the U.S. faces there?

MR. KARL EIKENBERRY: Well, David, let's talk about what we do know about the election. First of all, it's a very historic election. It's the first presidential provincial council election led by the Afghan people that's taken place in this country in over 30 years. And the second point, it's a very important election. This is an election in which, as in all democracies at this point in time now with the, with the presidential election, with the provincial council election, which the people are going to the polls and it's an opportunity them--for them to renew their ties with their government. And that's important to this process to remember. If we look back over the history of Afghanistan over the last 30 years, we have civil war, we have occupation, we've got a complete collapse of governance and rule of law which sets the conditions then for Afghanistan to be a state controlled by international terrorism. Those were the conditions that led to 11 September of 2001. So this election that's just been completed, yes, it's, it was a very difficult election, but it's an opportunity then for renewal of the trust in the bonds...

MR. GREGORY: All right. Well, let me...

MR. EIKENBERRY: ...between the people of Afghanistan and their government.

MR. GREGORY: Let me jump in here. There's the question of the Taliban. The Taliban is really enemy one for U.S. forces there. It's stronger, it's resurgent from the period after 9/11. What does this election show, the level of intimidation by the Taliban about the Taliban's strength and the challenge to U.S. forces?

MR. EIKENBERRY: Well, I think it shows, David, that there's great excitement within this country for the Afghans to regain control of their country, for sovereignty. We had a two-month extraordinary election campaign that we just got through, a very exciting time in which there was unprecedented political activity that occurred, TV debates, rallies throughout the country. It was a very civil kind of debate that occurred. And it was all national candidates, for the first time in Afghanistan's history crossing ethnic lines and campaigning around the country.

MR. GREGORY: I want to bring Admiral Mullen back in here. We're talking about the threat of the Taliban. And, you know, ultimately a lot of Americans are wondering--you see it in that poll--what it is we're fighting to do there. The president this week told Veterans of Foreign Wars Afghanistan is a war of necessity. But other people have said no, it's not, it's actually a war of choice. Richard Haass, who was around in the Bush administration when this war was started in Afghanistan, wrote this in The New York Times this week: "In the wake of 9/11, invading Afghanistan was a war of necessity. The U.S. needed to act in self-defense to oust the Taliban. There was no viable alternative. Now, however, with a friendly government in Kabul, is our military presence still a necessity?" My question: If the central mission was fighting al-Qaeda, are we fulfilling that central mission still?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, David, this is the war we're in. And in fact, the mission the president has given us is to defeat and disrupt al-Qaeda and its extremist allies. And that's very specific and that includes the Taliban, which has grown to be much more sophisticated in the last two to three years and is a much tougher enemy in that regard. And they really are linked. Across that border in Pakistan, they provide the safe haven for al-Qaeda. They also feed fighters into Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda would very much like to see Kabul become the capital that is was before, essentially run by extremists. So in that regard, the--it's very much linked. And again, it's the mission that the military has right now to focus--and General McChrystal is doing this--focus on the security for the people, focus on the Afghan people. And that's a significant change from where we were just a few months ago. And it is in that focus that both understands what they feel about their security, which is pretty bad right now and getting worse, and moving to a direction--moving in a direction that provides security so then we can develop governance, so then we can develop an economy and they can take over their own destiny.

MR. GREGORY: We're rebuilding this nation?

ADM. MULLEN: To a certain degree there is, there is some of that going on.

MR. GREGORY: Is that what the American people signed up for?

ADM. MULLEN: No, I'm--right now the American people signed up, I think, for support of getting at those who threaten us. And, and to the degree that, that the Afghan people's security and the ability to ensure that a safe haven doesn't recur in Afghanistan, there's focus on some degree of making sure security's OK, making sure governance moves in the right direction and developing an, an economy which will underpin their future.

MR. GREGORY: But there seems to be a fundamental problem here. You know, in the Vietnam era it was talk about mission creep; the idea of, you know, gradually surging up forces, having nation-building goals and, and running into challenges all along the way. You're not going to commit to this this morning, it doesn't seem, but the reality is that it appears to fulfill this mission--to beat the Taliban, which is stronger than it ever was, to also fight al-Qaeda--there needs to be more troops in addition to this goal of trying to secure the population.

ADM. MULLEN: The, the focus on the, the people certainly is going to come by, by way of having--create, creating security for them, so their future can be brighter than it is right now. But it isn't just that. I mean, part of the president's strategy is to bring in a, a significant civilian capacity. Ambassador Holbrooke was just there on his fifth or sixth trip, and he was both--in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. So this is a civilian military approach. It's a new strategy. It's the first one. And I recognize that, that we've been there over eight years, but I, I, I also want to say that this is the first time we've really resourced a strategy on both the civilian and military side. So in certain ways we're starting anew.

MR. GREGORY: The question for both of you is about exit strategy. This is what the president said back in March, so the American people know when this is going to come to an end. He said, "There's got to be an exit strategy. There's got to be a sense that it is not perpetual drift." And yet just a couple of weeks ago--you mentioned Richard Holbrook, envoy to the region. He was a forum here in Washington. He was asked how he would define success in Afghanistan. This is what he would say: "I would say this about defining success in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the simplest sense, the Supreme Court test for another issue--we'll know it when we see it." We'll know it when we see it? Is that supposed to provide solace to the American people that we're not getting into drift when it comes to an exit strategy?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I've said from a military perspective I believe we've got to start to turn this thing around from a security standpoint in the next 12 to 18 months. And I think after that we'd have a better view of how long it's going to take and what we need to do. Again, we're just getting the pieces in place from the president's new strategy in March on the ground now both on the military side--we've put forces there and we will have--we will add more this year--and on the civilian side. So it's going to take us a while to understand that. I don't see this as a, a mission of endless drift. I think we know what to do, we've learned a lot of lessons from Iraq, focusing on the Afghan people. It's a counterinsurgency effort right now, it's not just a--what was a counterterrorism effort several years ago. And that's why we've got to focus on the Afghan people, their security and creating forces, Afghan forces to provide for their own security.

MR. GREGORY: Ambassador Eikenberry, you're a former military man as well. What's your gut tell you? How long is it going to take to succeed in Afghanistan?

MR. EIKENBERRY: David, let's talk about progress. What--and what we would see as progress is over the next several years that the Afghan national army and the Afghan national police are much more in front, much more capable and that they're able to provide for the security of their own population. That's a several year process and beyond. What else does progress look like? Progress looks like a government of Afghanistan that's able to attend much more to the needs of their people, to provide reasonable services to them, to provide security for them. And progress look like a region in which there's more cooperation. Can we see outlines of what progress might look like over the next several years consistent with our strategy, ready to partner with the next Afghan administration that emerges after the winner of this election has occurred? Yeah, sure we can.

MR. GREGORY: It's just interesting, Admiral Mullen, that he talks about progress and not victory. Is victory possible in Afghanistan?

ADM. MULLEN: I try to focus this on what it's going to take to succeed there given the mission that we've got, and I go and would just re-emphasize now just on top of the progress, it's the focus on the people and giving them a future that allows them to take care of their own country and doesn't create an environment in which al-Qaeda and its extremist allies can threaten us as they have and execute a threat as they did in the past.

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you quickly about Iraq, the violence playing out this week in the green zone; 95 people killed, an attack on the foreign and finance ministry. This is Baghdad, where the Iraqis are now in control. You have warned about the threat of sectarian violence that could ultimately doom Iraq. What troubles you about what you saw this week?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I, I, I still think that is probably the most significant threat is if sectarian violence breaks out in, in large measure. And so these attacks last week certainly are of great concern not just to me but General Odierno, Ambassador Hill and many others. And we're watching that very carefully. That has been addressed very quickly with Prime Minister Maliki and his leadership. In addition to that, I've been concerned about the politics of it all; in fact, resolving the issues particularly up north around Kirkuk. Those are probably the two biggest threats to the future security and progress. But I've also said we're leaving. I mean, we're, we're--in, in the next several months--they're going to have an election beginning next year. After that we're going to start a fairly rapid draw down of our forces. And so it's really important that the political and military leadership of Iraq take control and generate positive solutions for them as a country.

MR. GREGORY: Finally here, we are just days away from the eighth anniversary of 9/11. What is your assessment of al-Qaeda's capability of striking the U.S. again?

ADM. MULLEN: Still very capable, very focused on it, the leadership is. They also are able to both train and support and finance, and so that capability is still significant and, and one which we're very focused on making sure that doesn't happen again.

MR. GREGORY: All right, we're going to leave it there.

Ambassador Eikenberry in Afghanistan, thank you very much for being with us this morning.

And, Admiral Mullen, always nice to have a couple of San Fernando Valley guys together on a Sunday morning. Thank you very much.

ADM. MULLEN: Thank you, David.

Pakistan: After Mehsud's Death, Are the Taliban Defeated?

The apparent assassination of the Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud (pictured) in an American missile attack has raised questions over the future of the insurgency. This article from Arif Rafiq of The Pakistan Policy Blog is a compehensive look not only at the situation in Pakistan but across the border in Afghanistan:

Almost two weeks after the killing of Baitullah Mehsud, Pakistan continues to have an upper hand over the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). But Rawalpindi-Islamabad’s gains over the TTP are unconsolidated. The Pakistani Taliban network can rejuvenate itself. Pakistan needs to sustain its vigilance against the militants, while at the same time not drag itself into a full-fledged conflict in South Waziristan it is not ready for.

Pakistan has managed to:

* secure its major urban areas outside the Pashtun belt, and, to a large extent, Peshawar, from militant attacks. There has been no equivalent of the Manawan police academy or ISI office attacks in Lahore or the Pearl Continental attack in Peshawar.
* cleanse the Malakand division of militants (though not completely — see below) to the extent that much of the internally displaced population is returning home and willing to facilitate policing efforts to prevent a Taliban return.
* increase approval of the Pakistan Army in the Malakand division, despite the fact that it hasn’t followed a COINdinista Network Approved Strategy (CNAS).
* continue to penetrate terrorist cells and apprehend key facilitators, funders, and trained suicide bombers.
* push the militant leadership into the North-South Waziristan corridor.
* fracture the TTP leadership, or at least create the perception that it is in “disarray.”
* put the Mehsud network — and anti-state takfiri terrorists, in general — on the defensive, both physically and ideologically.
* maintain pressure on TTP remnants in Bajaur, Khyber, Mohmand, and Orakzai. Note that there hasn’t been an attack on a NATO convoy in Pakistan recently.
* transfer the Pashtun “hot potato” on to the United States.

This success is due to:

* the use of air power against militants in the Malakand division and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that, while causing significant civilian casualties, neither turned the local population against the central government nor strained the manpower of the Pakistani security services.
* a commitment to keep a large military presence in Swat for the next few years.
* a sustained counterpropaganda campaign utilizing the private media and religious scholars, particularly Barelvis.
* a clever psy-ops campaign against the TTP.
* a whole-hearted embrace of its fallen soldiers, with public funerals made accessible to the media.
* excellent investigative and police work done by the federal interior ministry down to the provincial police forces.
* the decision by the Obama administration to focus drone attacks against the Baitullah Mehsud network.

The TTP has failed to:

* prove that Baitullah Mehsud is alive. Hakimullah Mehsud, who appears to be living, promised a Baitullah video by last Monday, but it never appeared.
* demonstrate leadership continuity by appointing a successor to Baitullah.
* counter Pakistan Army claims that there was a clash between Hakimullah and Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud by having the two agree on a Baitullah successor or, somehow, publicly prove they are on the same page.
* show that it remains a force to be reckoned with by pulling off a major attack in Islamabad, Peshawar, or urban Punjab.
* legitimize (or re-legitimize) its insurgency and campaign of terror in the eyes of the Pakistani public by linking it to Pakistan’s support for the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.

Despite the Pakistan military’s gains against the TTP, the terrorist outfit’s senior leadership — aside from Baitullah — remains alive. Commanders such as Faqir Muhammad and Hakimullah Mehsud are around. But their continued existence does not preclude a disassembly of the TTP. Afterall, it is an umbrella organization. Disassembly would require the commanders to no longer share the same threat: the Pakistan military-intelligence establishment. And that would require an undesirable return to a messy policy of Rawalpindi sorting out the bad guys from the less bad guys (i.e. “good” vs. “bad” Taliban).

For the Pakistan Army, South Waziristan remains the belly of the beast. Its unforgiving land is the home of the Mehsud network as well as a host of Pakistani and foreign jihadi groups.

But, for many reasons, the Pakistan Army cannot afford a ground incursion into South Waziristan....

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Transcript II: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea and Pakistan (9 August)

Video and Transcript I: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, Iran (9 August)
Transcripts III: National Security Advisor Jones on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea (9 August)

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CHRIS WALLACE: General, welcome to “FOX News Sunday.”

JONES: Thank you, Chris. Good to be here.

WALLACE: Is Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban inside Pakistan, dead?

JONES: Well, we think so. The Pakistani government has believed -- believes that he is, and all evidence that we have suggests that. But there are reports from the Mehsud organization that he’s not. But we think -- we think that it looks like he is.

WALLACE: Let me ask you to clear up another matter. There were reports yesterday of a gun fight between two leading contenders to replace Mehsud and that one where both of them had been killed in a gun fight.

But this morning, one of those two people who was allegedly dead reportedly called Reuters news service to say that he’s alive and well and there was no fight. What do you know about that?

JONES: Well, we’ve heard -- we’ve heard stories about that. We can’t -- I can’t confirm it. But it certainly is -- appears to be that there was some dissension in the ranks. That’s not a bad thing for us.

And it goes to show that I think the strategy that we’re engaged with with Pakistan is actually having some effect. And that’s good.

WALLACE: Well, I was going to ask you, assuming that Mehsud is dead, what does it say about the president’s war on terror?

JONES: Well, I think in terms of Pakistan, it means that the Pakistani government and the army is -- and our relationships with the army are having good effect, and I think that we’re moving in the right direction.

Mehsud is -- was a very bad individual, a real thug, responsible for a lot of violence, a lot of innocent people losing their lives. And I think that if there’s dissension in the ranks and that if, in fact, he is, as we think, dead, this is a positive indication that in Pakistan things are turning for the better.

WALLACE: Well, let me ask you about that. Regardless of who’s in charge, there’s still up to 20,000 Taliban fighters inside Pakistan. Is this a key moment for the Pakistanis to go after them? And are we pressing the Pakistani government and military to do just that?

JONES: Well, for the last several months, Chris, we’ve had a very, very good engagement with the Pakistani government. The Pakistani army has acquitted itself quite well in the Swat region, showing sensitivity for refugees as well.

We have a growing relationship in terms of intelligence sharing, and I think the relationships between the two -- the two countries are on the -- certainly very positive right now -- and also the relationships with Afghanistan.

Don’t forget this is a theater-wide engagement. This is an important moment. I won’t say it’s a tipping point, but it certainly shows that we’re having some success.

When you can take out a leader like Mehsud, you do show -- you do have some dissension in the ranks, and it reduces their capability to organize, regardless of how many they have.

This is a strong message. Pakistan deserves to be -- to be credited for its role. And we hope that we continue the pressure and we don’t -- we don’t let up.

WALLACE: Afghanistan -- you say it’s a theater-wide issue. Afghanistan is scheduled to hold national elections on August 20th. With the Taliban active in about half of that country, will that election go off? And what are the chances of serious disruptions?

JONES: Well, all indications right now are that the elections are going to go off, that they’re going to be fair. They’re going to be secure in most parts, secured by lot of Afghan forces, with international forces forming the outer ring of security. We are paying a lot of attention to that.

It looks like they’re having a good debate going into the elections. And so the signs are positive now. We’re quite sure that there will be -- there will be some efforts out there to disrupt them, but we hope to keep that to a minimum.

WALLACE: The new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, reportedly wants more U.S. troops sent to Afghanistan.

But according to the Washington Post, you told our top brass in late June that the president was done sending additional troops. And I want to get to the quote. “If there were new requests for force now, the president would quite likely have a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment.”

Everyone in the room caught the phonetic reference to W-T-F, which in the military and elsewhere means “what the expletive.”

JONES: Right.

WALLACE: General, did you say that?

JONES: I did say that, but in the context of the overall strategy. We -- this is not, Chris, simply about the number of troops.

This -- I have been involved in Afghanistan for the better part of six years of my life, initially as a NATO commander. And in my two years of retirement, we conducted a major study about Afghanistan. And now I’m back into it.

What is not lacking in Afghanistan is a comprehensive strategy. We have published the strategy that not only is agreed to here by everyone in the nation’s capital, but also by lot of our international allies.

Essentially, there are three prongs to the strategy. There’s a security prong. That is -- that is about troops. But economic recovery and cohesion with the security strategy is important. And better governance and rule of law, from Kabul all the way down to the local townships is extremely important.

So my point in saying what I said was that it is not simply about troops. Now...

WALLACE: But are you ruling out more troops for Afghanistan?

JONES: As you know, as you mentioned, General McChrystal is doing a comprehensive assessment, which is what any military commander does when they take over a significant job.

And the secretary of defense has heard his preliminary report, has asked some questions. It will come up through the chain of command, and then we’ll see what...

WALLACE: But if he asks for more troops, you’re not ruling it out?

JONES: Not ruling it out at all.

WALLACE: OK. There have been a flurry of recent reports, including a comment over the last couple of days from the new British army chief of staff, that to secure Afghanistan will take at least -- at least -- another decade.

First of all, do you agree with that? And secondly, is the president prepared for that kind of long-term commitment?

JONES: Well, I know Sir David Richards quite well. He was the commander of ISAF when I was his senior commander at NATO.

And I think that what we have in place right now is a comprehensive strategy. We have yet to go past the first milestone of evaluating it.

But I think the strategy that the president has agreed to and announced that all allies have agreed to, that emphasizes the three prongs that I just mentioned -- our -- and also, it also emphasizes more role for an increased capacity in the Afghan army and also the Afghan police.

If we do that, I think we will -- we’ll see indications very quickly that we’re turning in the right direction. And I think that the Afghans will be able to control their own destiny much quicker.

WALLACE: Do you want to give us a time line for that?

JONES: I don’t want to give -- I don’t want to predict a time line, just like we couldn’t predict a time line in Iraq. But you get to that tipping point. If you -- if the pieces are all organized correctly, you get to that tipping point a lot quicker, and then it becomes irreversible.

WALLACE: President Obama has made it part of his policy to try to reach out to Iran. Are we still prepared to negotiate with President Ahmadinejad after what seemed to be widespread reports that he stole the election?

JONES: In the context of the international P Five -- what we call the P Five-Plus One negotiations, we have -- we have extended an open invitation to Iran to join the talks, which we would -- we strongly hope they do.

They have not responded to that invitation. That’s been on the table since April. We hope that they do. The...

WALLACE: The fact -- let me just ask -- you say we hope they do. The fact that we -- that...

JONES: We hope that they respond.

WALLACE: But the fact that Ahmadinejad may have stolen the election makes no difference?

JONES: Well, the fact of the election really makes a difference to the people of Iran. They are the ones that have to decide on the legitimacy of it.

We have to deal with this -- the -- whatever the central authority is. If it turns out to be the same individuals, then that’s who we have to deal with.

But the issues on the table are so important, in terms of nuclear weapons -- I might say North Korea as well -- that when they respond, if they respond, we’ll have to deal with them. That’s just the fact of life. WALLACE: A report this morning that the Revolutionary Guard in Iran wants the political candidate, presidential candidate who lost, to go on trial for unrest after the elections. How would we regard that?

JONES: With regard to Iran, there’s obviously some internal difficulties in that country. We have basically taken the stance that since we can’t, obviously, affect it one way or another, nor should we, that we will deal with the Iran as this thing shakes out.

But it is obvious that there’s some internal difficulties. We’ll just watch and see what happens.

WALLACE: General, what have you learned from President Clinton’s trip to North Korea this week to bring back those two journalists? Did Kim Jong-il or any of the other top officials in their meetings indicate they want a new relationship with the U.S.?

JONES: Well, as you know, Chris, this was a private mission and one that the -- I think the -- we’re all grateful to the former president for taking it on. Certainly the families -- the joyful reunion was something we all celebrate.

And by the way, we would like to see the same kind of reunion in South Korea with the detainee that the North Koreans have, and also with the Japanese abductees that are still in North Korean prisons.

But the former president and the leader had about a 3.5-hour discussion. Reportedly, they discussed the importance of denuclearization in terms of weapon systems of the North Korean Peninsula -- of the Korean Peninsula, and -- in addition to, you know, talking about other things that the former president may have wished to discuss.

WALLACE: But did -- in that meeting -- as you say, it was over three hours. Did the North Koreans indicate they want a new relationship with the U.S.? And did they specifically ask for direct talks rather than going back to the six-party talks?

JONES: North Koreans have indicated that they would like a new relation -- a better relation with the United States. They’ve always advocated for bilateral engagement. We have put on the table in the context of the talks we would be happy to do that if, in fact, they would rejoin the talks. So we think the...

WALLACE: We would have -- be willing to have bilateral talks in the context of the six-party...

JONES: Within the context of the -- of the six-party talks.

WALLACE: What did we learn about Kim’s health and his hold on power from the Clinton trip?

JONES: Well, we’re still very much debriefing the party that went with President Clinton. But preliminary reports appeared that the -- that Kim Jong-il is in full control of his organization, his government. The conversations were respectful and cordial in tone.

WALLACE: But he’s still in charge?

JONES: And he certainly is -- he certainly appears to still be the one who’s in charge.

WALLACE: Can you assure the American people that all that the North Koreans got from this trip in exchange for the two American journalists -- that all they got from this trip was the photo-op, that there were no secret concessions from the United States?

JONES: I can do that with absolutely a straight face. There was no official message sent via the former president, and there were no promises, other than to make sure that the two young girls were reunited with their families.

WALLACE: A couple of final questions. Will the president meet his deadline for closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay by next January?

JONES: Well, we have every intention of doing so, and there’s a lot of work going on every single day to make sure that we find the right solution. And I’m confident that we’ll be able to meet that deadline.

WALLACE: Finally, let’s talk a little bit about Jim Jones, because I think it’s fair to say that you have been lower profile than some of your predecessors as national security adviser, particularly Henry Kissinger and some of the others.

But you’re not seen in public all the time hovering right next to the president. You’re not seen as the gatekeeper who controls all the foreign policy types who get in to see the president. Do you have a different view of your job?

JONES: I do. I think this is also a different century. And I think the national security adviser runs an organization that deals from everything starting with climate change and energy all the way to cybersecurity, including the normal threats that we associate with the job.

So it’s very complex. We have economic issues that we’re concerned about. And so I think...

WALLACE: But particularly in terms of your role.

JONES: I think -- I think, first of all, there’s no problem with me seeing the president on any matter that he wants to discuss or I want to discuss. That is -- that is not a problem.

I believe that there’s a -- there’s a new way of doing business, to tee up the issues that are very complex and span a huge, huge array of subjects that each day the president has to deal with.

And I think that getting the right people in to see the president at the right time to brief him on a daily basis on these issues is the right thing to do. It’s just...

WALLACE: And you’re not threatened that...

JONES: I don’t -- I don’t -- at the principal’s level, with Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, we talk every day. We talk with Susan Rice up at the -- up at the U.N. We have a very collaborative team. There’s no dissension. There’s no -- there’s nothing but trust and confidence. And that’s the enjoyable part of the job.

So I don’t -- I want to make sure that the president gets the best advice he can. If I need to put my particular spin on it, I have -- I have no problem doing that.

I just -- I just think that I serve the president better by presiding over an organization that tees up the issues in the right way. We have a good process, I think, to make sure that the president gets the advice that he needs, that -- we vet it. We tear it apart. We fight over it if we need to.

But when we come to see the president, we have a -- we have a -- he gets -- he gets the pros and the cons. And if I -- as the national security adviser, if I need to say something either privately or with my colleagues, I do so. I don’t have any problem with that.

WALLACE: General Jones, we want to thank you so much for coming in today. Please come back, sir.

JONES: I appreciate it. Thank you, Chris.

WALLACE: Pleasure.

JONES: Thank you.