Afghanistan: The US Marches On (with 20,000 More Troops)....To Where?

Afghanistan: Forget the Election, Let’s Have Some More Troops

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UPDATE 1000 GMT: The Independent of London offers the "exclusive" that the US commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, will ask for 20,000 more troops in his long-awaited report to President Obama.

Regular EA readers won't be surprised, as only last Sunday we featured the public-relations offensive by two Administration officials pointing towards an increase of 25,000 soldiers. The question: will the US press for some of the increase to come from NATO allies or will it provide all of the additional forces?
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The post-election situation drags on in Afghanistan, with the result of the Presidential vote descending into a protracted delay amidst allegations of fraud. The electoral commission has now suspended daily briefings, and stories have emerged of a heated row between President Hamid Karzai and President Obama's envoy Richard Holbrooke, apparently over the attempt of the Karzai camp to alter the vote so the President would be re-elected in the first round.

Our suspicion has been that, for many in Washington, this political quagmire would merely be the backdrop (and indeed the pretext) for an intensified military campaign. Robert Dreyfuss of The Nation shares our fears. Particuarly notable in his account below is the large presence of Bruce Riedel, who helped design the Obama strategy of intervention in Afghanistan at the start of 2009.

Afghanistan Apocalypse

Yesterday afternoon at the Brookings Institution, four analysts portrayed a bleak and terrifying vision of the current state of affairs in Afghanistan in the wake of the presidential election. All four were hawkish, reflecting a growing consensus in the Washington establishment that the Afghanistan war is only just beginning.

Their conclusions: (1) A significant escalation of the war will be necessary to avoid utter defeat. (2) Even if tens of thousands of troops are added to the US occupation, it won't be possible to determine if the US/NATO effort is succeeding until eighteen months later. (3) Even if the United States turns the tide in Afghanistan, no significant drawdown of US forces will take place until five years have passed.

The experts at the panel were Bruce Riedel, a 30-year CIA veteran and adviser to four presidents, who chaired President Obama's Afghan task force; Michael O'Hanlon, a military expert and adviser to General David Petraeus; Tony Cordesman, a conservative military expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Kim Kagan, head of the Institute for the Study of War.

Not a single panelist questioned the goals, purpose or objectives of the Afghan war. Not one said anything about a political solution to the war, about negotiations, or about diplomacy. Not one questioned the viability of an open-ended commitment to the war. And none of them had any doubts about the strategic necessity of defeating the Taliban and its allies. Although the growing political opposition to the war was referenced in passing -- more than half of Americans say the the war isn't worth fighting, and liberal-left members of Congress are beginning to raise objections -- the panel seemed to believe that President Obama can and must ignore politics and push to expand the war when General McChrystal, as expected, recommends an increase in the the level of US forces once again. O'Hanlon, a well-connected, ultra-hawkish Democrat who backed the war in Iraq, said that the chances that Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi will lead congressional opposition to the war in Afghanistan in 2009-2010 are zero. "Congress will not pull the rug out from under Barack Obama, before the mid-term elections," he asserted, calling the very idea "unthinkable" and "political suicide."

O'Hanlon, who had just returned from Afghanistan, acknowledged that McChrystal is "fully aware that, right now, America is not winning this war." But he gently scolded Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the joint chiefs, for saying that the war is "deteriorating." If Mullen goes around saying that in public, even after the addition of 21,000 US troops in 2009, he makes it harder to convince Americans that the war is winnable. O'Hanlon strongly favors adding yet more troops, but he didn't provide numbers on how many forces the US will need ultimately. If the United States can turn things around, "In four to five years we will be able to substantially downsize."

The bleakest account of the war came from Cordesman, Washington's resident Cassandra. He delivered a blistering assessment of the Bush administration's complete failure to pursue the Afghan war, with "almost no coherence in strategy" for seven years. President Bush, he said, didn't properly "resource" (i.e., fund) the war, kept troop levels far too low, and failed to build the Afghan National Army (ANA). In addition, he said, US intelligence was extremely poor. The Bush administration and the Pentagon lied about how the war was going, saying, for instance, that only 13 out of 364 Afghan districts were threatened by the Taliban, when if fact nearly half of the country was under siege. And he said that, even under McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry, a former military commander, coordination between the military command and the embassy is "extremely poor."

Cordesman warned that McChrystal and the NATO/ISAF command is under pressure from the White House and the National Security Council not to increase troops levels, and he warned that if "politically correct" limitations are imposed on the US war effort, "I believe we will lose this war." He blasted General James Jones, the national security adviser, for expressing White House opposition to additional troops during a meeting with McChrystal at which Bob Woodward of the Washington Post was present. Of the four panelists, Cordesman was the only one who suggested that Obama and the NSC might resist McChrystal's request for additional forces.

Riedel presented a series of alternative outcomes of the presidential election, which may or may not result in a second-round runoff election in October. He seemed gloomy about the overall election results, noting that overall turnout was held to 30 to 40 percent, and that in some provinces turnout would be far less, below 20 percent. In some areas, less than 5 percent of women voted at all, he said. And he said that President Karzai, if he wins, will emerge even more dependent than before on warlords. Indeed, amid charges of widespread fraud being leveled by leading opposition candidates, general apathy and disaffection about the vote from the majority Pashtun population, and effective Taliban-led intimidation, the election may not create any sense of legitimacy for the next government. (According to Cordesman, "Regardless of who wins, we will not have people capable of governing the country.")

But Riedel's more apocalyptic point came in response to a questioner who wondered why the war is important. If we lose in Afghanistan, or if we withdraw, it will trigger a victorious war dance throughout the Muslim world by radicals and militants, he said. Riedel portrayed the stakes in the war as nothing less than dealing a fatal blow to jihadism. "The triumph of jihadism, in driving NATO out of Afghanistan, will resonate throughout the Muslim world," he said, comparing it to the belief among many Al Qaeda and Taliban types that the defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan in the 1980s led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nowhere did Riedel suggest that there is a middle ground between crushing the Taliban and an outright Taliban victory over the United States, say, by reaching a political solution brokered by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other outside parties with large sections of the Taliban leadership. Nor did any of the panelists suggest that it's possible to split Al Qaeda and the most extreme elements of the anti-Western forces in Afghanistan-Pakistan away from other Islamists, such as the Taliban's core leadership and guerrilla chieftains such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former US and CIA ally in the 1980s, who is now a key ally of the Taliban.

Martin Indyk, who runs foreign policy for Brookings, asked Riedel if reality, so far, clashed with the plan that he helped draw up for Obama earlier this year. No, said Riedel. He said that Obama had inherited a disaster in Afghanistan from the Bush administration."Trying to turn that around overnight is an illusion," he said. (He failed to note that in trying to turn it around, Obama is turning it in the wrong direction, i.e., toward escalation rather than de-escalation.) "Anyone who thinks that in 12 to 18 months we're going to be anywhere close to victory is living in a fantasy," Riedel said. He did leave open the possibility that the conflict is now unwinnable, and that the US escalation is "too little, too late." But, like the rest of the panelists, Riedel suggested that there is no alternative to victory.

Sadly, like Richard Holbrooke, who two weeks ago told a Washington audience that he can't define victory, none of the panelists bothered to explain what victory might look like either -- only that it will take a decade or more to get there.

Video and Transcript I: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, Iran (9 August)

Transcript II: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea and Pakistan (9 August)
Transcripts III: National Security Advisor Jones on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea (9 August)

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National Security Advisor James Jones is doing overtime today as the Obama Administration's foreign policy salesman. He's been interviewed on three of the top Sunday morning politics chat shows: Meet the Press, Fox News Sunday (transcript in a separate entry), and Face the Nation (transcript in a separate entry). The topics covered are the same: this week's release of two American journalists from North Korea, the possible assassination of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, and engagement with Iran.

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And it's a triple dose of nothingness, with little of significance being said. To be fair to Jones, that's because of the appalling simplistic media narrative. On North Korea, it's sentimental "Yay, We Got Americans Out of an Evil Place" vs. "Oh, No, We Cut a Deal to Get Americans Out of an Evil Place". The Mehsud case becomes a Boy's Own story of daring American operations (even though no American would have been physically present, even in the air above, when the unmanned drone fired its missile), obscuring the problems in Pakistan that will last beyond --- and possibly be magnified --- by the killing. And Iran? Both the media and Obama Administration are in the side alley of the nuclear programme issue.

DAVID GREGORY: General James Jones, welcome back to MEET THE PRESS.

GEN. JAMES JONES (RET.): Thank you, sir. Appreciate it.

MR. GREGORY: Big news; North Korea, the two American journalists back home. This was the scene as it played out in Los Angeles on Wednesday, former President Bill Clinton accompanying the two journalists back home. He has since come back east and you have been able to fully debrief him. What can you say you have now learned about North Korea and specifically Kim Jong Il?

GEN. JONES: Well, I think that first of all I want to emphasize this was a private mission. And we can get into that if you'd like. But this was a private mission where--in, in which there were no official or unofficial messages sent by this government or by President Obama. So we celebrate the fact that we've had these--this great reunion and--but we can say that--we can also report that the president did--former president did spend time with the Korean leader, that he appeared to be in control of his government and, and his--he sounded very, very reasoned in terms of his conversation.

MR. GREGORY: His health is a big issue, right?

GEN. JONES: His health is a big issue, but obviously we didn't have any time to make an assessment there. But he seemed in control of his faculties. And the president, the former president was able to engage him on a number of subjects. As you know, he had very--relationship with his father and--when he was in the--when he was--when the president was in office, and so he was able to convey his own, his personal views with regard to the importance of the issues of the moment, which is making sure that nuclear weapons do not appear on the Korean Peninsula.

MR. GREGORY: Well, let's talk about that, the nuclear issue. It must have come up during their conversations. What was said?

GEN. JONES: Well, I think--I don't want to speak for President Clinton. We're in, in the process of getting, getting his thoughts as well, we haven't completely finished with that. But, but it's clear thus far that he did press home the fact that if North Korea really desired to rejoin the family of nations in a, in a credible way, that the, the, the way forward is not to, to build nuclear weapons and to rejoin the, the six party talks, and within the context of those talks that they could have a dialogue with the United States.

MR. GREGORY: So North Korea has said they don't want to be part of these six party talks anymore. Just a couple of weeks ago they were exchanging insults with the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton.

GEN. JONES: Right.

MR. GREGORY: Do--did they give an indication to the former president that that's changed, that they might be willing to come back now?

GEN. JONES: I, I think time will tell on that, David, to be honest. But I, I'm quite sure the former president was very articulate and persuasive, that the North Koreans know exactly what the world, the global community, particularly the members of the six party talks expect, and there is a path for them to, to, to move forward.

MR. GREGORY: Any positive signs, though, from the talks?

GEN. JONES: We'll have to wait and see.

MR. GREGORY: Is there a deadline, in your mind, for when they need to come back?

GEN. JONES: I, I think this is such, this is such a big issue that--and we're making such good progress with our relations with China and Russia and other countries to, to, to show them the, the, the, the wisdom of making the right decisions here. But it, it is up to them, and we--they know exactly what, what the end stage should look like.

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you a little bit about the backstory. How did this first come up, the idea of sending President Clinton over there? You did a lot of vetting of this idea. What were your concerns and how did it come up?

GEN. JONES: Well, it, it actually came up through a private channel, through the communication from the two girls to their families. And evidently, the North Koreans implied that if former President Clinton were to take on this mission, that they would guarantee the release of, of the two girls.

MR. GREGORY: But it had to be Bill Clinton; couldn't be Al Gore, couldn't be somebody else?

GEN. JONES: They specified Bill Clinton. And, and so the president said, well, let's see if former President Clinton'd be willing to do this thing.

MR. GREGORY: So there were no reservations in your mind or the president's mind?

GEN. JONES: I, I think the, the president, from day one, gave us the task of trying to get those girls back. And, and that was, that really was job number one. And we thought that--and, and, and President Clinton, former President Clinton said he would be, he would take this on in a private way, and that's exactly what happened.

MR. GREGORY: But, but you're experienced with this. I mean, the North Koreans say things all the time and they don't live up to their agreements. How did you test that in fact he wouldn't come back empty, empty-handed?

GEN. JONES: Well, you know, ultimately, regardless of all of the, the, the, the backwards and forwards on this--and we did, we did have, we do have channels to talk to the North Koreans. We, we received a personal assurance of the leader that they would grant, in their terms, special amnesty, and that if former President Clinton came to North Korea that he would leave with those two girls. And ultimately, you say OK.

MR. GREGORY: Right.

GEN. JONES: Let's see, let's see which--let's see if they'll live up to their word. And they did.

MR. GREGORY: There's been some criticism of this mission, and it centers around this photograph. This was the picture that experts say Kim Jong Il wanted, and he got it. There is the former president sitting right next to him. Henry Kissinger writes this this morning in op-ed piece in The Washington Post: "A visit by a former president, who is married to the secretary of state, will enable Kim Jong Il to convey to North Koreans, and perhaps to other countries, that his country is being accepted into the international community--precisely the opposite of what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has defined as the goal of U.S. policy until Pyongyang abandons its nuclear weapons program." Did this president just hand Kim Jong Il a propaganda victory?

GEN. JONES: I, I don't think so. I mean, maybe in Kim Jong Il's mind, and he'll play it out inside of North Korea anyway he wants. But we vetted this, this mission with the South Koreans, with the Japanese, the Chinese, with the Russians, and we have 100 percent support by all these countries. We--the president also--the former president also asked for the release of a South Korean detainee and the, the, the Japanese abductees, which we think would be also a great picture to see the reunification of those families, which we're very concerned about. So no, I don't--I, I, I just think that, you know, we wanted to get those girls out. The North Koreans gave us a, a path to that and the president of the United States said, "Look, we want these families reunified. They shouldn't be held in captivity." And, and by the way, if we hadn't done that, we'd be having a different conversation tonight because--today, because they would have--they would have said, "Well, you had an opportunity just, just to send the, the former president."

MR. GREGORY: All right. Well, to that point, former President Clinton, he goes to Pyongyang, he goes to North Korea, gets this result. If you want a breakthrough with North Korea, a breakthrough that's been so elusive to previous administrations, should President Obama go to North Korea and talk to the North Koreans now?

GEN. JONES: That's a--that, that is the--the future relationship of our two countries wholly dependent upon the ability of the North Koreans to understand where they are in terms of not only just the United States, but, but this big issue of nuclear weapons and...

MR. GREGORY: All right, but would you, would you rule that out as a potential for breakthrough?

GEN. JONES: I, I wouldn't speculate on, on hypotheticals. I--we are doing, we're doing the right thing with a whole family of nations. Proliferation is a big issue. It's a big issue in North Korea, it's a huge issue in Iran, and we are at the, at the center point of this, this, this debate. And it's a global debate, it is not just about bilateral relations. This is a very serious problem.

MR. GREGORY: Let, let me go through a few other hot-button issues in our remaining moments. In Pakistan an important al-Qaeda figure, a Mehsud, who was the head of Pakistan's al-Qaeda leadership, reportedly killed. Are you able to confirm that today?

GEN. JONES: I wish I could, to be honest with you totally. We think so. We, we put it in the 90 percent category, if you want. But Pakistan has confirmed it. We know there are some reports now from the Mehsud tribe that, that he wasn't. But the evidence is pretty conclusive.

MR. GREGORY: What, what does it mean to the United States' security?

GEN. JONES: Well, I think it's a--this is a big deal. And, and it's not only--by the way, it's not only happening in this part of the world, it's happening in other parts of the world as well with some--with a gradual coming together by the family of nations to reject terrorism as something that's acceptable. In terms of the region, it means that the Pakistani armed forces and the Pakistani government are doing quite well in terms of their fight against extremism. This was--Baitullah Mehsud was the public enemy number one in, in, in Pakistan, so it's their, their biggest target. And we've already seen evidence of dissension in the ranks about who's, who's going to follow him. This is--if this is--if this happened, and we think it did, this was a good thing.

MR. GREGORY: Is it still your belief that Osama bin Laden is in Pakistan?

GEN. JONES: That one's a little bit more elusive. We are still very much on the hunt. We think that he's still in that general region. But that's a, that's a tougher nut to crack.

MR. GREGORY: Let me...

GEN. JONES: But this, this was a big deal.

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you about Afghanistan. General McChrystal, commander on the ground, is doing an assessment of the mission and what he needs to achieve that mission successfully. The question about the endgame, The Washington Post reports today about the long-term cost to America. "As the Obama administration expands U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, military experts are warning that the U.S. is taking on security and political commitments that will last at least a decade and a cost that will probably eclipse that of the Iraq war." What is the endgame in Afghanistan? What kind of time frame should Americans expect?

GEN. JONES: The endgame in Afghanistan is obviously to turn the responsibility for their security and economic prosperity and the governance over to Afghans as quickly as possible. We're doing that three ways. One is in March we announced a comprehensive strategy that wasn't only focused on troop strength and security, although there's a certain minimum there that's required, but also the, the cohesion of security, economic development and good governance and rule of law from local mayors all the way up to Kabul. We've generally done pretty well over time on the security pillar. NATO, the United States and 47 sovereign countries, are on the ground in Afghanistan. The U.N., NATO, the European Union, the World Bank, all, all sorts of nongovernmental organizations, all the instruments are there to turn this thing in the right direction. The question is, how do you work--get them to work more cohesively?

MR. GREGORY: Right.

GEN. JONES: And that's the new strategy. And, and, and if we can get that done--and we will know that fairly quickly. We're--we've published a new set of metrics--or not published, but they're being developed in, in concert with the congressional guidance. We have a, an envoy in--hard at work to frame this whole thing, new commanders, new ambassadors. And we think that it's going to change--it's going move in the right direction. I don't--I, I can't tell you...

MR. GREGORY: At least a decade, though? I mean...

GEN. JONES: No, no, no. No.

MR. GREGORY: ...should Americans really settle--it's less than a decade, you think, in terms of...

GEN. JONES: Yeah, I think, I think, I...

MR. GREGORY: ...our commitment.

GEN. JONES: You can't predict here where the tipping point is, just like we couldn't really predict it in Iraq. But it will--if it's done right and if it's done cohesively, the tipping point will be much, much quicker, much sooner than that. We will know whether this strategy is working in--within, within the--by the, by the end of the next year, and we'll be able to make some prediction--maybe some predictions at that time. But not before.

MR. GREGORY: General McChrystal wants more troops for Afghanistan. Will he get a skeptical response from President Obama?

GEN. JONES: General McChrystal is doing what all good commanders do when you take over a big job, you do an assessment. You--General McChrystal has the overall strategy that's been agreed to and he is making his commander's estimate on how to function within that strategy. And we'll just have to wait and see what he, what he has to say. But it, but it has to be--whatever, whatever we do is with the context of a new--a, a strategy that was agreed upon in March, and very--a very comprehensive one.

MR. GREGORY: Before you go, on Iran, are there new developments this morning about those three American hikers who strayed into Iran?

GEN. JONES: Yes, there are in the sense that the government has officially acknowledged that they have them in their custody.

MR. GREGORY: And that's news. That had not been disclosed before.

GEN. JONES: That, that, that is as of this morning, we do have that, we do have that confirmation.

MR. GREGORY: How does this administration deal with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad? Is he in a position, you think, with the political fighting, to engage with the West?

GEN. JONES: We certainly hope so. It--he is the figure of authority that we have to deal with. But it's clear that there's major, major problems going on--I won't say major problems, but major events going on inside of Iran that have to do with the election. But we have to deal with the figures of authority that are in position. We have sent strong messages that we would like these three young people released as soon as possible, and also others that they have in, in their custody as well. This is--these, these are innocent people. We want their families reunited, and we want it--we would like to have it done as quickly as possible.

MR. GREGORY: We'll leave it there. General Jones, thank you very much for being here.

GEN. JONES: Thank you very much.

MR. GREGORY: Thanks for being here.

GEN. JONES: My pleasure.

Transcript II: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea and Pakistan (9 August)

Video and Transcript I: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, Iran (9 August)
Transcripts III: National Security Advisor Jones on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea (9 August)

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CHRIS WALLACE: General, welcome to “FOX News Sunday.”

JONES: Thank you, Chris. Good to be here.

WALLACE: Is Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban inside Pakistan, dead?

JONES: Well, we think so. The Pakistani government has believed -- believes that he is, and all evidence that we have suggests that. But there are reports from the Mehsud organization that he’s not. But we think -- we think that it looks like he is.

WALLACE: Let me ask you to clear up another matter. There were reports yesterday of a gun fight between two leading contenders to replace Mehsud and that one where both of them had been killed in a gun fight.

But this morning, one of those two people who was allegedly dead reportedly called Reuters news service to say that he’s alive and well and there was no fight. What do you know about that?

JONES: Well, we’ve heard -- we’ve heard stories about that. We can’t -- I can’t confirm it. But it certainly is -- appears to be that there was some dissension in the ranks. That’s not a bad thing for us.

And it goes to show that I think the strategy that we’re engaged with with Pakistan is actually having some effect. And that’s good.

WALLACE: Well, I was going to ask you, assuming that Mehsud is dead, what does it say about the president’s war on terror?

JONES: Well, I think in terms of Pakistan, it means that the Pakistani government and the army is -- and our relationships with the army are having good effect, and I think that we’re moving in the right direction.

Mehsud is -- was a very bad individual, a real thug, responsible for a lot of violence, a lot of innocent people losing their lives. And I think that if there’s dissension in the ranks and that if, in fact, he is, as we think, dead, this is a positive indication that in Pakistan things are turning for the better.

WALLACE: Well, let me ask you about that. Regardless of who’s in charge, there’s still up to 20,000 Taliban fighters inside Pakistan. Is this a key moment for the Pakistanis to go after them? And are we pressing the Pakistani government and military to do just that?

JONES: Well, for the last several months, Chris, we’ve had a very, very good engagement with the Pakistani government. The Pakistani army has acquitted itself quite well in the Swat region, showing sensitivity for refugees as well.

We have a growing relationship in terms of intelligence sharing, and I think the relationships between the two -- the two countries are on the -- certainly very positive right now -- and also the relationships with Afghanistan.

Don’t forget this is a theater-wide engagement. This is an important moment. I won’t say it’s a tipping point, but it certainly shows that we’re having some success.

When you can take out a leader like Mehsud, you do show -- you do have some dissension in the ranks, and it reduces their capability to organize, regardless of how many they have.

This is a strong message. Pakistan deserves to be -- to be credited for its role. And we hope that we continue the pressure and we don’t -- we don’t let up.

WALLACE: Afghanistan -- you say it’s a theater-wide issue. Afghanistan is scheduled to hold national elections on August 20th. With the Taliban active in about half of that country, will that election go off? And what are the chances of serious disruptions?

JONES: Well, all indications right now are that the elections are going to go off, that they’re going to be fair. They’re going to be secure in most parts, secured by lot of Afghan forces, with international forces forming the outer ring of security. We are paying a lot of attention to that.

It looks like they’re having a good debate going into the elections. And so the signs are positive now. We’re quite sure that there will be -- there will be some efforts out there to disrupt them, but we hope to keep that to a minimum.

WALLACE: The new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, reportedly wants more U.S. troops sent to Afghanistan.

But according to the Washington Post, you told our top brass in late June that the president was done sending additional troops. And I want to get to the quote. “If there were new requests for force now, the president would quite likely have a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment.”

Everyone in the room caught the phonetic reference to W-T-F, which in the military and elsewhere means “what the expletive.”

JONES: Right.

WALLACE: General, did you say that?

JONES: I did say that, but in the context of the overall strategy. We -- this is not, Chris, simply about the number of troops.

This -- I have been involved in Afghanistan for the better part of six years of my life, initially as a NATO commander. And in my two years of retirement, we conducted a major study about Afghanistan. And now I’m back into it.

What is not lacking in Afghanistan is a comprehensive strategy. We have published the strategy that not only is agreed to here by everyone in the nation’s capital, but also by lot of our international allies.

Essentially, there are three prongs to the strategy. There’s a security prong. That is -- that is about troops. But economic recovery and cohesion with the security strategy is important. And better governance and rule of law, from Kabul all the way down to the local townships is extremely important.

So my point in saying what I said was that it is not simply about troops. Now...

WALLACE: But are you ruling out more troops for Afghanistan?

JONES: As you know, as you mentioned, General McChrystal is doing a comprehensive assessment, which is what any military commander does when they take over a significant job.

And the secretary of defense has heard his preliminary report, has asked some questions. It will come up through the chain of command, and then we’ll see what...

WALLACE: But if he asks for more troops, you’re not ruling it out?

JONES: Not ruling it out at all.

WALLACE: OK. There have been a flurry of recent reports, including a comment over the last couple of days from the new British army chief of staff, that to secure Afghanistan will take at least -- at least -- another decade.

First of all, do you agree with that? And secondly, is the president prepared for that kind of long-term commitment?

JONES: Well, I know Sir David Richards quite well. He was the commander of ISAF when I was his senior commander at NATO.

And I think that what we have in place right now is a comprehensive strategy. We have yet to go past the first milestone of evaluating it.

But I think the strategy that the president has agreed to and announced that all allies have agreed to, that emphasizes the three prongs that I just mentioned -- our -- and also, it also emphasizes more role for an increased capacity in the Afghan army and also the Afghan police.

If we do that, I think we will -- we’ll see indications very quickly that we’re turning in the right direction. And I think that the Afghans will be able to control their own destiny much quicker.

WALLACE: Do you want to give us a time line for that?

JONES: I don’t want to give -- I don’t want to predict a time line, just like we couldn’t predict a time line in Iraq. But you get to that tipping point. If you -- if the pieces are all organized correctly, you get to that tipping point a lot quicker, and then it becomes irreversible.

WALLACE: President Obama has made it part of his policy to try to reach out to Iran. Are we still prepared to negotiate with President Ahmadinejad after what seemed to be widespread reports that he stole the election?

JONES: In the context of the international P Five -- what we call the P Five-Plus One negotiations, we have -- we have extended an open invitation to Iran to join the talks, which we would -- we strongly hope they do.

They have not responded to that invitation. That’s been on the table since April. We hope that they do. The...

WALLACE: The fact -- let me just ask -- you say we hope they do. The fact that we -- that...

JONES: We hope that they respond.

WALLACE: But the fact that Ahmadinejad may have stolen the election makes no difference?

JONES: Well, the fact of the election really makes a difference to the people of Iran. They are the ones that have to decide on the legitimacy of it.

We have to deal with this -- the -- whatever the central authority is. If it turns out to be the same individuals, then that’s who we have to deal with.

But the issues on the table are so important, in terms of nuclear weapons -- I might say North Korea as well -- that when they respond, if they respond, we’ll have to deal with them. That’s just the fact of life. WALLACE: A report this morning that the Revolutionary Guard in Iran wants the political candidate, presidential candidate who lost, to go on trial for unrest after the elections. How would we regard that?

JONES: With regard to Iran, there’s obviously some internal difficulties in that country. We have basically taken the stance that since we can’t, obviously, affect it one way or another, nor should we, that we will deal with the Iran as this thing shakes out.

But it is obvious that there’s some internal difficulties. We’ll just watch and see what happens.

WALLACE: General, what have you learned from President Clinton’s trip to North Korea this week to bring back those two journalists? Did Kim Jong-il or any of the other top officials in their meetings indicate they want a new relationship with the U.S.?

JONES: Well, as you know, Chris, this was a private mission and one that the -- I think the -- we’re all grateful to the former president for taking it on. Certainly the families -- the joyful reunion was something we all celebrate.

And by the way, we would like to see the same kind of reunion in South Korea with the detainee that the North Koreans have, and also with the Japanese abductees that are still in North Korean prisons.

But the former president and the leader had about a 3.5-hour discussion. Reportedly, they discussed the importance of denuclearization in terms of weapon systems of the North Korean Peninsula -- of the Korean Peninsula, and -- in addition to, you know, talking about other things that the former president may have wished to discuss.

WALLACE: But did -- in that meeting -- as you say, it was over three hours. Did the North Koreans indicate they want a new relationship with the U.S.? And did they specifically ask for direct talks rather than going back to the six-party talks?

JONES: North Koreans have indicated that they would like a new relation -- a better relation with the United States. They’ve always advocated for bilateral engagement. We have put on the table in the context of the talks we would be happy to do that if, in fact, they would rejoin the talks. So we think the...

WALLACE: We would have -- be willing to have bilateral talks in the context of the six-party...

JONES: Within the context of the -- of the six-party talks.

WALLACE: What did we learn about Kim’s health and his hold on power from the Clinton trip?

JONES: Well, we’re still very much debriefing the party that went with President Clinton. But preliminary reports appeared that the -- that Kim Jong-il is in full control of his organization, his government. The conversations were respectful and cordial in tone.

WALLACE: But he’s still in charge?

JONES: And he certainly is -- he certainly appears to still be the one who’s in charge.

WALLACE: Can you assure the American people that all that the North Koreans got from this trip in exchange for the two American journalists -- that all they got from this trip was the photo-op, that there were no secret concessions from the United States?

JONES: I can do that with absolutely a straight face. There was no official message sent via the former president, and there were no promises, other than to make sure that the two young girls were reunited with their families.

WALLACE: A couple of final questions. Will the president meet his deadline for closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay by next January?

JONES: Well, we have every intention of doing so, and there’s a lot of work going on every single day to make sure that we find the right solution. And I’m confident that we’ll be able to meet that deadline.

WALLACE: Finally, let’s talk a little bit about Jim Jones, because I think it’s fair to say that you have been lower profile than some of your predecessors as national security adviser, particularly Henry Kissinger and some of the others.

But you’re not seen in public all the time hovering right next to the president. You’re not seen as the gatekeeper who controls all the foreign policy types who get in to see the president. Do you have a different view of your job?

JONES: I do. I think this is also a different century. And I think the national security adviser runs an organization that deals from everything starting with climate change and energy all the way to cybersecurity, including the normal threats that we associate with the job.

So it’s very complex. We have economic issues that we’re concerned about. And so I think...

WALLACE: But particularly in terms of your role.

JONES: I think -- I think, first of all, there’s no problem with me seeing the president on any matter that he wants to discuss or I want to discuss. That is -- that is not a problem.

I believe that there’s a -- there’s a new way of doing business, to tee up the issues that are very complex and span a huge, huge array of subjects that each day the president has to deal with.

And I think that getting the right people in to see the president at the right time to brief him on a daily basis on these issues is the right thing to do. It’s just...

WALLACE: And you’re not threatened that...

JONES: I don’t -- I don’t -- at the principal’s level, with Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, we talk every day. We talk with Susan Rice up at the -- up at the U.N. We have a very collaborative team. There’s no dissension. There’s no -- there’s nothing but trust and confidence. And that’s the enjoyable part of the job.

So I don’t -- I want to make sure that the president gets the best advice he can. If I need to put my particular spin on it, I have -- I have no problem doing that.

I just -- I just think that I serve the president better by presiding over an organization that tees up the issues in the right way. We have a good process, I think, to make sure that the president gets the advice that he needs, that -- we vet it. We tear it apart. We fight over it if we need to.

But when we come to see the president, we have a -- we have a -- he gets -- he gets the pros and the cons. And if I -- as the national security adviser, if I need to say something either privately or with my colleagues, I do so. I don’t have any problem with that.

WALLACE: General Jones, we want to thank you so much for coming in today. Please come back, sir.

JONES: I appreciate it. Thank you, Chris.

WALLACE: Pleasure.

JONES: Thank you.

Transcripts III: National Security Advisor Jones on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea (9 August)

Video and Transcript I: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, Iran (9 August)
Transcript II: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran

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The transcript of the interview with General James Jones, President Obama's National Security Advisor, on CBS News' Face the Nation with Bob Schieffer:

BOB SCHIEFFER: And good morning again, General Jones is in the studio with us this morning.

Thank you very much for coming, General. You went to Afghanistan back in June, you took reporter Bob Woodward along on the trip and afterwards he reported that you told the commanders there they would have to make due with what they had. Yet every day brings a new report that General McChrystal, the top American commander on the ground there, is preparing a new assessment and it appears that he is going to ask for more troops.

We hear that from various people, Anthony Cordesman from CSIS is just back from there. He says we have set impossible goals. We set impossible time frames. He says you are going to have to have more resources.

Are you getting ready to consider putting more troops into Afghanistan?

JONES: We -- first of all, it is a pleasure to be with you, thank you very much for having me. The fact is -- and I’ll get to my remarks on what the intention was, but the fact is that in March, we announced a very comprehensive strategy that everybody participated in.

That strategy has essentially three legs, more security, followed by economic development, followed by better governance from the -- at the local levels in Afghanistan. And buttressed by more rapid development of the Afghan army and the Afghan police. So we want to put an Afghan capacity together as quickly as possible. We have over 40 nations on the ground, we have all of the international organizations you could want, from the U.N. to NATO, to E.U., the World Bank, the IMF, and nongovernmental organizations.

And Afghanistan will be solved by a better coordination of these elements. The troop strength is an important piece of it, and my message to General McChrystal and to the commanders when I went there was to say, think about the total strategy that we have all agreed to, General McChrystal is conducting an assessment at the request of secretary of defense.

They -- the Defense Department will evaluate what General McChrystal has to say, and in due time it will come up for a decision by the president.

But I did not say -- I want to be clear on this, I did not say that troop strength is off the table for discussion. What I did say is that we have yet to be able to measure the implementation of the new strategy, so if you have recommendations, make it in the context of the new strategy.

This -- we have learned one thing in six years, we -- this is not just about troop strength.

SCHIEFFER: Well, but that sounds like you are getting us ready for sending more troops to Afghanistan.

JONES: Well, let me put another thing on the table here. When the president made his decision, there were additional troops that were on the charts that the secretary of defense said at the time, Mr. President, you do not have to make this decision now, this is something we can consider later after we measure the implementation of our strategy.

So we will have discussions as the weeks and months go by. The big thing for us now is to make sure that the strategy is being implemented, we have got new commanders, we have got new diplomats, we have got Richard Holbrooke, who is providing the theater engagement.

It is not just about Afghanistan, it’s about Pakistan and what is going on there.

SCHIEFFER: But, General, we have been there how long? Six years, and it is like -- it sounds like you are talking about we just got there.

JONES: No, no, no. We -- I have been involved in this for six years also.

SCHIEFFER: Well, how bad is it there? Every report we have is that it is worse than it has ever been. That it has become sort of a sinkhole and now you are trying to develop yardsticks to find out how well we are doing.

When are we going to know how we are doing, even? JONES: We will -- that is a very good question, and it is a fair question. I -- this is my opinion. My opinion was that we did not have a well-articulated strategy until March of this year.

We had a strategy for security. We had a little bit of a strategy for economic development, which was other people’s problems. And we had a strategy that may be addressed a little bit of governance and the rule of law. This strategy merges all of those three things.

We also are -- we are definitely going to, in conjunction with our allies, develop the Afghan army at a faster rate and the Afghan police so we can have Afghans in charge of their own destiny in a shorter period of time.

So, yes, we have been there six years. But if you go back to the overall history of it, and you look at the three pillars that need to be developed, security has always been done reasonably well, although we have had some backsliding since 2007, but the other two have been allowed to not develop as quickly.

So in conjunction with our allies, and I want to make sure that I make this point as well, that this is not just a U.S. problem. This is an international problem, and we cannot -- I think we have the strategy and we will shortly see, and I mean within a year, whether this strategy is working and then we will adjust from there.

SCHIEFFER: We’ll know in a year if the new strategy...

JONES: Within the year...

SCHIEFFER: ... is working?

JONES: And we have the metrics to evaluate this strategy. The Congress has mandated them. We were going to do them anyway. The president has said, “I want regular reports as to how we’re doing.”

SCHIEFFER: But so far it isn’t working? Would that be fair to say?

JONES: Well, it’s -- it’s only been three months old.

SCHIEFFER: Well, I mean, the previous strategy?

JONES: We don’t even have -- the troop strength that has been agreed has not even arrived there, so -- so my benchmark is this administration, in March, committed to a new strategy. We involved Afghanistan. We involved Pakistan. We involved NATO, the allies. We had the NATO summit, where the allies had a -- a new...

SCHIEFFER: So let me see if I can just sum this up.

JONES: ... a new attitude.

SCHIEFFER: You’re going to develop a new strategy...

JONES: We’ve had it.

SCHIEFFER: ... and you have a new strategy going, and you may have to send more troops to Afghanistan?

You’re not, at least, going to rule that out at this point?

JONES: I won’t rule -- we won’t rule anything out that stands to reason, but it is fair to say that, once we agree on a new strategy, we want to make sure that it is -- has a chance to be evaluated.

SCHIEFFER: OK.

JONES: And if things come up where we need to adjust one way or the other, and it involves troops or it involves more incentives...

(CROSSTALK) JONES: ... for economic development or better assistance to help the Afghan government function, we’ll do that.

SCHIEFFER: Now, what was it, last weekend, that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, flew out to meet with General McChrystal?

JONES: Correct.

SCHIEFFER: That suggests there may be some sort of -- we may be in some sort of crisis mode. This was a secret trip that wasn’t announced until after they completed it.

Would you think -- would you say that things in Afghanistan at this point are at a crisis level?

JONES: Well, we’re -- coming up to a very important election. We have, I think, a -- no, I don’t think -- I don’t think we’re at a crisis level, in terms of -- or that there’s going to be any movement on the ground by the Taliban that’s going to overthrow the government. We’re going to have, I think, a good election. The signs are that it’s going to be -- the instruments of security are being well- thought-out.

I think, with the success that we’ve had on the Pakistan side of the border, which we can talk about if you like, and the growing troop strength by the U.S. and some of our allies on the Afghan side, I think -- I think the security aspect of things is -- going to get better.

There’s going to be a little bit more fighting. Unfortunately, we’re taking more casualties, but if we’re able to marry up the other two legs of this three-legged stool that I mentioned, put things that will change the economic forecast for the Afghan people on the ground, put Afghan troops, Afghan police in the villages languages and towns, I think that’s the -- that’s the future.

SCHIEFFER: Let me ask you about this situation in Pakistan. Mehsud, the top Taliban man -- I heard you say earlier today that we’re 90 percent sure that we got him. Now, how important is that?

JONES: Well, I think it is very important. First of all, it’s important because this is Pakistan’s public enemy number one, if I could. He has -- he controls a very violent aspect of the insurgent problems in -- on the Pakistani side of the border. And this would be -- this is a big deal, and...

SCHIEFFER: Let’s talk, a little bit, about the developments in North Korea. Former President Clinton went there. He got these people. We now know that it was the North Koreans that said, if you’ll send him, we’ll -- we’ll let these two young Americans go.

We also know that, because I’ve heard you already report this, that the president, former president, did have conversations with them on a variety of subjects.

What happens now? Do we -- do we expect some development here now?

JONES: Well, we hope so. President Clinton did have the opportunity to talk to the North Korean leader and suggest that the happy scene that was carried out in California with the unification of families could have happened with the detainee from South Korea in Seoul or in Tokyo with the Japanese abductees and he represented our desire to have them released as well.

I think that obviously with his, as the former president, with his father, the Korean leader’s father, was -- had eight years of experience with dealing with North Korea, and he was able to, in his own way -- the I hope persuasive that there is a better way, there is a better path, that it is clear that a couple of things are clear.

One is that we sent no official or unofficial message from our government, so there was no -- there is nothing secretive here, that North Korea knows that the path to talking is through the six party process, and that within that six party process --

SCHIEFFER: They seem to want to have some sort of one-on-one dialogue with the United States. Would we be willing to do that?

JONES: Sure within the context of the six party talks.

SCHIEFFER: What does that mean?

JONES: Meaning if they come back to the talks, we will talk to them bilaterally within those talks. We have coordinated all of this by the way with the other allies, the Chinese, the Russians, the South Koreans, the Japanese. So the path is clear, and President Clinton is a very convincing gentleman and I hope he was able to convince them.

SCHIEFFER: Let me ask you this, General. Why do you think the North Korean leader wanted to do this? Was he trying to impress his own people? Was he trying to impress his military that look, I can get a former president of the United States to come over here. That shows you I am still a strong and vibrant leader? Or was he trying to impress the rest of the world? What was that all about?

JONES: You know, I would be guessing. You know, internally, he can manipulate this anyway he wants but as far as the rest of the world, I think that we are clear on what it was and what it wasn’t.

SCHIEFFER: And what it was?

JONES: What it was is a private humanitarian mission to rescue and obtain the release of two girls so they could be with their families and that is President Obama’s -- that was his goal in this.

SCHIEFFER: Finally, Gitmo. Every indication is you will not be able to make the president’s deadline of closing that down by the end of the year.

JONES: This is a complex issue and we are working on this every single day. I still believe that we can achieve our goals, but it is a complex issue.

SCHIEFFER: But you are not sure if you are going to make it?

JONES: No, I think we will. I think there are some things on the table that we can’t necessarily talk about right now, but hopefully there are some signs here that we will find the right way to do this.

SCHIEFFER: All right General Jones, thanks for being with us and I hope you come back.

JONES: It is a pleasure, thank you very much.

The Latest from Iran (3 August): Trials and Inaugurations

Iran Video: The Khamenei-Ahmadinejad “Non-Kiss” (3 August)
NEW Iran Analysis: Naming a President
Trials in Iran: The Latest from Mousavi
NEW Iran Video: The Abtahi “Confession”, Roohul Amini, and Tehran Trial (2 August)
The Latest from Iran (2 August): Raising the Stakes

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2115 GMT: A Personal Note "#CNNFail". I am watching, open-mouthed, as CNN milks the Khomeini-Ahmadinejad "non-kiss" for 10 minutes of blather, with Reza Sayah, his producer,and the happy, chatty, vacuous Michael Holmes chuntering on about how they disagreed about the meaning of the physical interaction: Did Khameini block Mahmoud's embrace? Did Mahmoud check the Supreme Loyalty because he wanted to show sufficient loyalty? It's all ho-ho, ha-ha at the end of their proclaimed 15-hour day.

Here's a friendly suggestion to all the CNN folks. If you spent as much time carefully evaluating political sources over the last two weeks, including the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad tensions, or if you gave a little thought to the politics beyond the single image of the Supreme Leader and the President, including today's demonstrations and the reactions to Saturday's trial, you wouldn't have to spend 600 seconds saying nothing of consequence beyond flagrant self-promotion.

2040 GMT: Another Effort for Conciliation. According to the Iranian Labor News Agency, Maryam Behrouzi, the head of the society of Zeynab, a conservative women's group has stated, "Both principalist and reformist factions have had faults and irregularities and must attempt to cleanse themselves so that the establishment regains its reputation and regains the trust of the people." At the same time, Behrouzi said, "In these [televised] confessions [of reformists] wno mention has been made of  'velvet revolution'....The Supreme Leader has called the two factions of principalist and reformist to be to wings of the same system and accusing one fraction of 'soft deposition' will cause a huge damage to the establishment....If some individuals of a fraction make a mistake that mistake should not be used to indict a whole faction."

2030 GMT: A Very Important Correction. Mehdi Karroubi has denied the report of Fars News alleging that he participated in a demonstration between Vali-e Asr Square and Vanak Square as "an absolute falsehood". Karroubi says, "At the alleged time [I] was participating in the memorial service of the filmmaker Seifollah Daad at the Nour Mosque. This mosque is located between Vali-e Asr and Vanak; however, [I] did not get out of [my] car and did not address the people."

Our correspondent Mani analyses:

Karroubi is not back tracking. The account is from Etemade Melli, Karroubi's official site, and therefore should be considered true. I think that the reason why Karroubi is making this statement is because Fars News had a mendacious reason for reporting Karroubi's presence. The number of demonstrators today was relatively small so  Fars News is implying that Karroubi has participated in a demonstration in which support for him and the reform movement is waning.

Karroubi's statement is reinforcing the fact that he did not call for this demonstration, as opposed to last Thursday in which he had effectively called for protest and got sizable popular participation in one of the least accessible locations in Tehran.

1710 GMT: Confusion of reports over how big protests are and the extent of clashes with security forces. We will be back later with a late-night update to try to set out definitive information.

1610 GMT: Non-Non-Non-Story of the Day. The New York Times wastes a lot of newsprint on "U.S. Weighs Iran Sanctions if Talks Are Rejected". The story claims that National Security Advisor James Jones floated the idea, while in Israel, of "cutting off [Iran's] imports of gasoline and other refined oil products...if it fails to respond to President Obama’s offer to negotiate on its nuclear program".

This is the equivalent of fantasy politics, since the prospect of any US-Iran talks on any issue of substance is suspended. In case The New York Times hasn't paid attention, the Government in Tehran lacks legitimacy, amongst many of its own people and many in the international community. So until Mahmoud Ahmadinejad becomes more than a President in name, there can be no discussions of significance.

The real story, if reporter David Sanger had cared to notice, is that the Obama Administration has used this suspension to get Free Credit, posing as tough guy before both Israel and the US Congress. That is an approach without cost until someone actually suggests, with the passage of time and the (probable) continuing internal tension in Iran, that talk of sanctions be replaced by action.

1600 GMT: Steady stream of reports of protests across Tehran, including Vanak Square and Fatemeh Square as well as Vali-e Asr Square.

CNN now reporting "thousands" in Vali-e Asr and numbers growing. (CNN has also just reported as "Just In" that Mehdi Karroubi was amongst protestors, 35 minutes after we posted the information.)

1535 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz, interpreting a report from the Islamic Republic News Agency, says Tehran is under "quasi-military government" in with police based on all major city streets and in squares.

1525 GMT: Fars News that opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi (see 0700 GMT) was among demonstrators in Vali-e Asr Square this afternoon. reports

1500 GMT: More Mr President. Earlier we reported Ahmadinejad's threat to "hang [protesters] from the roof]". Another translation of the speech in Mashaad has the President saying, "[I will] stick their heads to the ceiling."

Mahmoud may want to be a bit careful, however, as his supporters are denying any such sticking or banging of heads is going on. From an interview with pro-Ahmadinejad member of Parliament Bizhan Novabeh:

Reporter: Mr. Nobaveh, what are you doing for the detained? Did you know the son of Ruholamini? Are you looking into why he was killed during his detention?

Nobaveh: Who is saying this? Now it’s possible he hit his head against the floor.

Reporter: His corpse says something different.

Nobaveh: Why are you speaking nonsense? We have to ask the government to look into this.

Reporter: It’s possible that your investigations will take time and every moment that passes lowers [the importance of] this incident.

Nobaveh: This talk is a crime. This talk, in any case, is subject to investigation.

Reporter: I asked one simple question. Regarding the son of Ruholamini, are you of the belief that there should be an investigation?

Nobaveh: Don’t 27 people a day die in road accidents?

Reporter: Road deaths are different than … deaths … .

Nobaveh: What’s the difference? In any case we haven’t heard of any deaths.

1430 GMT: CNN reports, from sources, an estimated 1000 protesters marching on Val-e Asr. Horns are honking, "V for Victory" signs are being flashed, and there are chants of "God is Great".

1100 GMT: Some reports suggest that during the inauguration ceremony, Ahmadinejad tried to kiss the Supreme Leader's hand but was rebuffed. Another break in protocol:  for the first time the decree was read by the head of the leadership office (traditionally this was done by the son of Ayatollah Khomeini, or later former presidents).

1050 GMT: Facinating photo comparison between the 2005 and 2009 inauguration.



0735 GMT: The Supreme Leader has now endorsed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President. There is no indication of any statement beyond the formal announcement.

0715 GMT: You Have to Hand It to Mahmoud. Ahmadinejad may be in trouble (in our opinion, emasculated as a leader), but he's as brazen as ever. In his recent trip to Mashaad, avoiding the "4oth Day" ceremonies in Tehran,  he told "professors who are members of the basij": "Let the inauguration ceremonies end; afterward we will grab [our opponents] over the collar and hang them from the roof."

0700 GMT: Saham News, the official website of Mehdi Karroubi, has published his response to the Tehran trials. Karroubi concludes that the "weak and ridiculous indictment [was] prepared with such alacrity and haste against respected political figures...partly due to the time crunch of the presidential inauguration and partly because [the Government] feels that it must respond to to the events that accompanied the recent memorial ceremonies."

Karroubi is proposing a political response, with representatives from the Karroubi, Mousavi, Rezaei and Ahmadinejad stating their positions regarding the existence or non-existence of election fraud in front of the cameras of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.

Karroubi, while reassuring, "I have always been loyal to Imam [Khomeini] and the establishment", asks, "How credibile are these elections, especially under the current conditions in which the country is in an abnormal condition and mass arrests and killings have taken place?" He adds:

When people witness those being treated extremely roughly [by the Revolutionary Guard and Basij] and are being told that the Revolutionary Guard and Basij are innocent and the [demonstrators] are riff-raff; in a society in which student dormitories are attacked and people have witnessed the attack and an official statement says we are not sure who ordered the suppression; in a society that the body of a beloved family member is returned to their family and the family is told that we have no idea who killed your child ---- how can you assume that the people will place any stock in a process that trots out individuals in prison clothes in order that these prisoners assert that the presidential election was free of fraud?....

These actions not only have no positice effect [on society] but in fact cause the establishment to lose its reputation and is a blot on the fame of the Islamic Republic.

0655 GMT: Disrupting the Disruption? Mowj-e-Sabz reports Irancell Company last night sent a text message to its subscribers that the network will experience problems in the next 72 hours, the first time that it has put out advance notification. Coincidentally, Ahmadinejad's inauguration occurs 48 hours from now.