UPDATED Iran Debate: How Weak (or Strong) is Ahmadinejad?

The Latest from Iran (30 August): Parliament Discusses the Cabinet

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

UPDATED 31 August, 0725 GMT: Enduring America's Chris Emery, formerly known as "Mr Jones", has now made his contribution to what is becoming, I think, one of the most important discussions in the post-election crisis --- see below. Mr Smith has offered a reply.

UPDATED 1145 GMT: Mr Smith has made another intervention in the debate.
--
Over the weekend, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tough talking at Friday prayers in Tehran and as he was submitting his Cabinet choices to Parliament, we have been debating the President's position and future prospects. EA's Mr Smith and Mr Johnson are joined by Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau, whose column sparked the discussion, and Fintan Dunne.

SAHIMI: ....Such fabrications [like those in his Friday speech] are of course meant to present Ahmadinejad as a confident leader. But, in reality, he is weaker and more isolated than ever. True, the right wing is in control, but that control has been achieved first and foremost by the support of the high command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Otherwise, the base of support for Ahmadinejad among the population is extremely narrow, limited to at most 15% of the population.

At the same time,...glaring fissures which have emerged within the conservative and reactionary camp, which poses a growing threat to Iran’s political stability. Even Ayatollah Khamenei and the hardliners around him are well aware of the danger, which explains why they have been gradually retreating over the past few weeks.

First, they acknowledged some of the crimes that have taken place in the detention centers.

Second, they have retreated from linking the reformist leaders with foreign powers, notwithstanding Ahmadinejad’s tired accusations during Friday Prayers.

Third, Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the former judiciary chief, as a member to the powerful Guardian Council, in preparation for the departure of Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the ultra-conservative secretary-general of the Council, and an ardent supporter of Ahmadinejad. At least compared to Jannati, Shahroudi is a relative moderate.

Fourth, Ahmadinejad’s appointment of Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as the First Vice President was blocked. Mashai was even barred for two months from holding any governmental position, another tactic to put Ahmadinejad under control.

Fifth, many of the reformists and their supporters, if not their main leaders, have been released from detention.

Sixth, behind-the-scene efforts continue to reach some sort of reconciliation between the reformists and the conservative camp. So far these have failed because the main demand of the reformists, holding a new election, has been rejected.

Seventh, Saeed Mortazavi, the notorious Tehran Prosecutor General and the man implicated in many crimes was sacked.

At the same time, Iran’s uranium enrichment program has stagnated, either by design, or due to technical difficulties, or because of a lack of raw materials (yellow cake) needed for uranium enrichment. Iran has also become more flexible with the International Atomic Energy Agency, allowing more visits to its nuclear sites.....

All are signs of a very weak Ahmadinejad presidency ahead, not to mention his complete lack of legitimacy in the eyes of a large majority of Iranian people, even among those who may have supported him before the election.

Even more damaging for Ahmadnejad is that his chief clerical patron, Ayatollah Khamenei, has himself been greatly weakened. The Ayatollah has been openly challenged and strongly criticized by many important clerics. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the most important Shiite cleric in Iran, openly called him unqualified and his reign illegitimate. Ayatollah Khamenei has allowed himself to be reduced to the leader of one faction in the conservative camp by openly and unabashedly supporting Ahmadinejad. He can no longer pretend that he is above the political fray.

SMITH: [The Tehran Bureau article] lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line: Ahmadinejad is weak, is in trouble, is a lame duck already, etc.

While of course all of us wish that this was the case, the reality appears quite different, as we have seen no real thrust to wrestle him out of office. The Supreme Leader has only rebuked him frontally during the [former First Vice President] Mashai affair and he still has the rather remarkable opportunity of talking from official platforms such as Friday Prayers, saying things quite different from what the Supreme Leader says, and still walking out relatively unscathed.

Granted, he has the same amount, or more, difficulties than any executive leader in the world would have for forming a government, but I would be very cautious in calling Ahmadinejad a has-been and that days may be counted down to his demise. Sadly, I doubt this scenario will happen anytime soon.

We shouldn’t forget that the Supreme Leader, conservative critics of AN like the Larijanis, Ahmad Tavakoli (who happens to be the Larijanis’ cousin), and more have essentially agreed to accept the outcome of the Presidential election as announced by the Interior ministry. Hence, they are simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government, more than mounting a challenge that is really geared towards removing Ahmadinejad from power.

DUNNE: Muhammad Sahimi was too dismissive in describing of Ahmadinejad as "isolated and delusional", and he erred in reducing the regime to the person of the president.

But he was correct to describe Ahmadinejad as "weak". Professor Sahimi accurately catalogs the ongoing obstruction of the hardliners and the very public political fractures. Furthermore he shows the regime is now tellingly reliant on a narrow base of IRGC appointees to fill government posts.

Ahmadinejad/IRGC's core 'hard' support is as low as 12%, with a 'softer' support extending to up to 20% of the population. Because of this, the disputed president's public pronouncements are reductionist and defensive --aimed at his own supporters and the ill-informed. By contrast, most other voices in Iranian politics are addressing the remaining 80%+ of the population.

Despite their hard-line rhetoric, Ahmadinejad/IRGC are unable to crush the reformers. It is going to be far harder to violently suppress any mass public protests in the weeks ahead. And there is a dire political problem looming for this one-legged regime: it's the economy, stupid!

Even a government of national unity would be hard-pressed to dig the Iranian economy out of the mire against the backdrop of deteriorating global finances. A lame duck Ahmadinejad government comprising an ineffectual clique will certainly fail to turn things around. One shudders to contemplate the unspoken financial state of Iran. Currency problems and capital flight are doubtless significant.

As the weeks pass, the economy will join the stolen election as the twin key political issues for the populace. Imagine an opposition rally protesting the economic straits of the people as well as the stolen election. Imagine the regime trying to suppress such a rally.

That the reformers are not already in prison is a victory in itself. Now, a death by a thousand cuts threatens the Iranian regime. That reality explains the government's determined effort to halt such a slow slide by means of show trials --which have backfired.

The reformists could compromise by accepting the current status quo, on condition of substantive electoral reform overseen by a parliamentary process. But from their perspective it might be best to simply allow this regime to stew in their own economic juice until well roasted.

JOHNSON: I find Mr. Smith's assertion that Professor Sahimi's article "lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line" to be both inaccurate (many of Sahimi's statements have been have also been reported here in Enduring America as well as other news-sites), and rather unfair.

Mr. Smith states that there is no thrust to wrestle Ahmadinejad out of office. This statement only makes sense if Mr. Smith considers the reformist movement to be irrelevant. I think that there has been a major effort to wrestle Ahmadinejad out of office; and that effort is still going on. The fact that Ahmadinejad has not been able to imprison and/or neutralize the ringleaders of this effort (Khatami, Mousavi and Karroubi), even though he has explicitly demanded it in public, demonstrates the limitations that exist to his power.

Ahmadinejad's pre-Friday prayers speach seems to have a lot of significance for Mr. Smith. I think that it is rather strange that a strong and powerful and confident president of the Islamic Republic of Iran must choose the mid- to low-profile pre-Friday prayers speech, since many of the faithful participating in Friday prayers either eschew or arrive near the end of the speech, to address the country instead of using IRIB [state television]. Did IRIB not give Ahmadinejad broadcasting time? If so, what kind of a strong President is denied this?

Mr. Smith considers the fact that Ahmadnejad is "saying things quite different from what the Supreme Leader says, and still walking out relatively unscathed" as evidence for Ahmadinejad's power. I think this is more a statement of Khamenei's weakness than Ahmadinejad's strength. I think the replacement of [Tehran chief prosecutor] Mortazavi is the real litmus test. If Mortazavi's successor puts an end to the trials and somehow addresses the issues of torture and the secret burials, a tangible limitation of the President's power has been put in place. This would be the first step taken to abort Ahmadinejad's "velvet coup".

Mr. Smith also takes Ahmadinejad's parliamentary troubles lightly. I agree that conservative parliamentarians are "simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government". However I think that the rumblings and confrontations demonstrated by a sizable fraction of conservative MPs with regards to the President demonstrate that these MPs are convinced that: firstly, Ahmadinejad has no intention of giving them any kudoes and power; secondly, Ahmadinejad's plan may have also intended to weaken their power as well as that of the reformists; and thirdly, they may think that all the recent scandals (torture, unmarked graves, etc.) has turned Ahmadinejad into a political hot potato that must be dropped as soon as possibly.

The outcome of the presidential election was accepted by the conservatives in June. Not all of them are necessarily bound to continue to accept that now, especially if rejecting Ahmadinejad is equivalent to their political survival. The upcoming vow of confidence will be a demonstration of how the conservatives feel towards Ahmadinejad's policies.

SMITH: My assertions regarding Ahmadinejad were not so much related to his political "power", rather to his chances of political survival.

I don't deny that he is weak, has severe issues in forming his government, and is prey to all sorts of critics, both conservative and reformist. My considerations are focused, however, on whether Ahmadinejad will survive the storm in the short term and be able to stay in his place. I still believe he will, because the conservatives have too much to lose in terms of legitimacy after substantially endorsing the election results in June. No one, including the Larijanis, has contested the latter yet, and this is quite important in my view.

This is not to deny that friction between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei exists, but again not at boiling point level. Lastly, Ahmadinejad's appearing at Friday prayers was completely to be expected, as it is Government Week in Iran right now, and nearly all Presidents have appeared on the podium on this occasion.

EMERY: I wouldn't necessarily connect all the concessions detailed by Sahimi and Mr Johnson to Ahmadinejad's apparent isolation or weakness. Certainly the "stagnating" nuclear issue is not really evidence of a "very weak Ahmadinejad presidency ahea". I'm also not convinced that Ahmadinejad's inability to have Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and Rafsanjani locked up is, as Mr. Johnson suggests, a useful demonstration of the limitations that exist to his power. The absence of such dictatorial powers are inherent in the office of the presidency.

My position is somewhere in between those expressed by Mr Smith and Mr Johnson. I agree with Mr Smith that Ahmadinejad will probably survive attempts to remove him. However, my prediction is for a totally chaotic second term in which Ahmadinejad is unable to achieve anything substantial as the Parliament and judiciary acts increasingly independently from the government (perhaps already seen in the "moving" of Mortazavi and appointment of Ejeie to posts in the judiciary). Increasingly, the question of the Supreme Leader's succession will come to dominate back stage political manoeuvrings.

As such, the real question is not so much whether Ahmadinejad has lost his public legitimacy or whether the Larijanis have or have not questioned the election result. The immediate apparent legacy of the crisis is that the coordination required for an effective legislative program will be almost impossible to achieve. The still-unknown legacy is the extent of the compromises, principally in terms of Iran's justice system, that Khamenei offers to avoid further mass protests. I don't see Ahmadinejad as particularly significant in how that pans out, although the result of the current trials does seem a reasonable litmus test.

The wider point is that Ahmadinejad doesn't actually appear to have much in the way of policies at the moment. Nor does he appear to grasp the enormity of the task in front of him. Ahmadinejad's second term may hang on this failure as much as anything else. Of course, he will now find it much harder to pass the legislation and reforms he thinks will do something about it and his failures will undoubtedly be capitalised on by his opponents. But a lot does depend on the merit of his policies.

Frustration will be hard for Ahmadinejad to take because the economy is where he has exercised more control than any other President. He also believes he has a strong mandate for his economic "vision", for which the SL has publicly stated his broad agreement (again, more than for any previous President). The real test will thus be when Ahmadinejad tries to pass something fiscal.

If Ahmadinejad does appear increasingly irrelevant or lame, then another important question is how he will react. When he appeared almost invisible in the first few weeks of the crisis, he tried to claw back his bureaucratic authority by some high profile sackings and appointments. I think everyone (including the Supreme Leader) was surprised at how brazen he was in trying to re-assert his visibility. It seems he is now emboldened enough to publicly differ with the Supreme Leader on the trials as well.

I don't see the Supreme Leader as likely to publicly remove his patronage from Ahmadinejad, but it could be possible that he will move closer towards an informal triumvirate with the Larijanis. But Ahmadinejad still has some leverage. Any US-Iranian engagement will require his cooperation, in that he will have the ability to de-rail it or at least cause severe problems. The SL will also recognise that there may be a political price to pay, in terms of the overall authority of the regime, for damaging the office of the Presidency. Ahmadinejad's ouster could even bring the IRGC [Revolutionary Guard] onto the streets.

SMITH: I largely concur with Chris Emery on the unstable nature of AN's second term, although I would, once again, exercise caution as to the real extent of Parliamentary opposition to Ahmadinejad. This will become much clearer in the next few days, as the various ministers receive their votes of confidence.

I too can see many avenues of deadlock for Ahmadinejad in his second term, particularly if the reformists attempt to embark on a long-term route that will target the 2012 Parliamentary elections, as they will have to attack the current composition of the Guardian Council and hence try to chip away at the current conservative quasi-monopoly over state power.

I would also be wary to think that Ahmadinejad does not " grasp the enormity of the task in front of him". I haven't seen statements to this effect by him. His second speech in Parliament yesterday, which I followed via live TV, was actually quite well-constructed. He defended, inter alia, his cabinet changes by saying that reshuffles are necessary, or else cabinets could last 50 years and elections would be made worthless. And his points on women and the experience of other members of his cabinet are also quite interesting. My own experience in dealing with him over the years (I have also had the dubious privilege of shaking his hand and asking him a couple of questions during press conferences) leads me to believe that he is more wily and clever than his external appearance makes him out to be.

As to the judiciary, I think we really have to wait till the end of Sadegh Larijani's appointments to see what the state of play is. Mortazavi was shooed out and in the door again in the last few days and the rest of the appointees such as Ejeie are hardliners in their own right, opposed to Ahmadinejad but not really wishing to make concessions to the reformists.

I still remain convinced that the Supreme Leader will pull a stunt by the end of Ramadan and pardon the reformist bigwigs, after the latter have received long prison sentences. Should he be clever, he would arrange for all of them to be carted off to his palace and be offered the pardon there in front of TV cameras. It would discredit them and allow Khamenei to show off his magnanimity, for free.

The Latest from Iran (29 August): The Stakes Are Raised

UPDATED Iran: How the Regime Constructed the “Velvet Revolution”
Iran Video Exclusive: Ministry of Intelligence Proves “Velvet Revolution”
The Latest from Iran (28 August): The President Prays

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1820 GMT: EA correspondent Mr Johnson gives us some guidance on the change of Tehran chief prosecutor:

Regardless of Dowlatabadi's political affiliations, the replacement of Mortazavi is a sign that the establishment considers him to be a liability and perhaps dispensable as a potential scapegoat.

The main issue is whether this change is merely cosmetic or whether the establishment take a proactive approach, namely, scuttle the trials (which can be easily done because all the indictments are so flimsy that none of them can bear any legal scrutiny), and somehow solve the very public and very embarrasing and inflammatory issue of prison tortures and unmarked graves, thereby regaining some semblence of legality and law. The next few days will be extremely inportant.

1755 GMT: A reader strikes back immediately at the security force denials of involvement in post-election raids: "You can't fake live video feed. We've got evidence on several videos that basij attacked dorms in Tehran University," and offers this:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzUhJXTspcw[/youtube]

1740 GMT: This is now looking like a concerted campaign between the President and security force commanders to deny any post-election misdeeds. After Tehran's police chief denied any detainee was killed in Kahrizak prison (0845 GMT), the Revolutionary Guard commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari has said the post-election death toll is 20 Basiji militia and only 9 "opponents and outlaws". Jafari denied that the Basiji were involved in the raids on university dormitories days after the election.

1715 GMT: EA's Iran analyst Mr Smith drops by to take issue with the portrayal by Tehran Bureau of an "isolated, weak, and delusional" Ahmadinejad (1310 GMT):

This lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line: Ahmadinejad is weak, is in trouble, is a lame duck already, etc.

While of course all of us wish that this was the case, the reality appears quite different, as we have seen no real thrust to wrestle him out of office. The Supreme Leader has only rebuked him frontally during the [former First Vice President] Mashai affair and he still has the rather remarkable opportunity of talking from official platforms such as Friday Prayers, saying things quite different from what the SL says, and still walking out relatively unscathed.

Granted, he has the same amount, or more, difficulties than any executive leader in the world would have for forming a government, but I would be very cautious in calling Ahmadinejad a has-been and that days may be counted down to his demise. Sadly, I doubt this scenario will happen anytime soon.

We shouldn't forget that the Supreme Leader, conservative critics of AN like the Larijanis, Ahmad Tavakoli (who happens to be the Larijanis' cousin), and more have essentially agreed to accept the outcome of the Presidential election as announced by the Interior ministry. Hence, they are simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government, more than mounting a challenge that is really geared towards removing Ahmadinejad from power.

1700 GMT: Back from an afternoon break for a wedding.

After a couple of weeks of indecision, Tehran's Chief Prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi has been replaced by Abbas Jafari Dowlatabadi, head of judiciary in the southern province of Khuzestan.

The Los Angeles Times is framing Dowlatabadi as "a relatively moderate newcomer" and portraying Mortazavi's "firing" as a signal against the trials of political detainees that he oversaw. We're not sure of that interpretation --- any comments would be welcome.

1340 GMT: Our question (0445 GMT): "Does Mehdi Karroubi make another intervention on detentions and abuses?" Karroubi's answer: an open letter to the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, offering to provide documentation and detainees who have suffered abuse.

1323 GMT: The principlist member of Parliament Ali Motahari, who has been highly critical of the Government in recent weeks, has said Ahmadinejad's remarks contest and challenge the Supreme Leader and the President must be held responsible for his deeds and words, particularly on the issue of detentions.

1315 GMT: The reformist party Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution, some of whose members are among the political detainees, have strongly condemned the 4th “show trial” and called it a reminder of the medieval inquisition courts and Stalin-era tribunals. The party emphasised that the staged “trials” and false “confessions” are conspiracies to suspend the reformist parties.

1310 GMT: And, on the same theme, Muhammad Sahimi at Tehran Bureau pays great attention to the "glaring fissures [which] have emerged within the conservative and reactionary camp", albeit with the dramatic presentation of an "isolated, weak, and delusional" Ahmadinejad.

1300 GMT: It's not just Enduring America that is raising questions about the divide between the Supreme Leader and the President in light of their differing speeches on Wednesday and yesterday. The reformist website Rah-e-Sabz has noted the divergences over foreign-inspired revolution and, in particular, Ahmadinejad's denial of any security force responsibility for abuses less than 48 hours after Ayatollah Khamenei promised that anyone guilty of such abuses would be published.

1110 GMT: The Battle over the Cabinet. A prominent "conservative" member of Parliament, Ahmad Tavakoli, has said that 7 of President Ahmadinejad's 21 Ministerial nominees will fail to receive a vote of confidence. Echoing reports from yesterday, Tavakoli said all three women put forth will be rejected because of a lack of executive experience.

1040 GMT: In an interview with Etemad newspaper, Mohammad Hashemi, the brother of Hashemi Rafsanjani, said that Rafsanjani is not planning to quit leading Friday Prayers He also described how security forces beat Rafsanjani's daughter-in-law while arresting her during one of the post-election protests.

0905 GMT: Pretty slow day after yesterday's excitement. No answers to any of our questions at 0445 GMT. Internet chatter is on the call by Human Rights Watch on the new head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, to "tackle rights abuses".

0845 GMT: Nothing Happened Here. More signs of an Ahmadinejad Fightback. After the President's claims yesterday that incidents at detention centres were the fault of the protest movement, rather than the security forces, the Tehran police chief, Azizollah Rajabzadeh, has explained that "no defendants were transferred to the Kahrizak detention centre without a judicial warrant and no defendant was killed" in the prison.

Oh. Well, following on the week's theme --- the Supreme Leader and the President on different pages of the script --- someone might want to tell Ayatollah Khamenei, who has admitted mistakes at Kahrizak and ordered its closure.

0515 GMT: A Follow-Up on "Velvet Revolution". After our analysis yesterday, "How the Regime Constructed the Velvet Revolution", an EA correspondent points to an interview by Ayande News with Hamid Reza Moghadam-Far, the Managing Director of Fars News Agency, and a Mr. Gharebaghi, whom Ayande claim are two of the authors of the Tehran trial indictments. Their views of the "velvet revolution" are posted in an update of the analysis.

0445 GMT: At the risk of being overdramatic, Friday was a day of two statements, that of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to and beyond the audience at Tehran's prayers and that of Mohammad Khatami to and beyond reformist leaders.

The founding assertion of each statement was that the current President/former President was ready to take the post-election crisis to a political and legal showdown with the ultimate public punishment. In Ahmadinejad's case, he was ready to press until the opposition leaders were imprisoned for a long, long time; in Khatami's, he was ready to see the "traitors" ejected from power and positions of responsibility.

What we now await, in an always-shifting conflict but one which continues to be about legitimacy, is the response of others. With respect, the protest movement is mainly an observer, with the next mass demonstration proposed for 18 September, so attention turns to political and religious leaders. Does Hashemi Rafsanjani and his allies break cover, after their recent skirmish over the Tehran trial, and give any support to Khatami? Does Mehdi Karroubi make another intervention on detentions and abuses, and thus those responsibile for them, or wait for a Parliamentary response to his claims? Where is Mir Hossein Mousavi?

And, just to repeat our thought from yesterday, what does the Supreme Leader do now?

The Latest from Iran: Responding to the Trial (26 August)

The Latest from Iran (25 August): The Trials Resume
The 4th Tehran Trial: The Tehran Bureau Summary
Video: The 4th Tehran Trial (25 August)
The Tehran Trial: The Regime Goes After the Reformists AND Rafsanjani

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis



2145 GMT: The Tehran Times has published an English summary of the letter from the Rafsanjani office striking back at former 1st Vice President and current Ahmadinejad Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai (see 1225 and 1545 GMT):

“Mr. Mashaii’s record in making incorrect and illogical statements is so clear that there is no need for a reply,” but in light of the fact that the person who has made such fabrications was supposed to become the president’s first vice president and is currently the chief of staff of the Presidential Office, it seems that there is “a very complex conspiracy” to create conflict among the pillars of the establishment, part of the statement read.

The statement also called Rahim-Mashaii’s remarks hallucinations and added that the Supreme Leader had earlier warned the country’s officials about such hallucinations.

2110 GMT: Associated Press has published an English summary of Ayatollah Montazeri's open letter (see 1605 GMT): "The biggest oppression ... is despotic treatment of the people in the name of Islam. I hope the responsible authorities give up the deviant path they are pursuing and restore the trampled rights of the people....I hope authorities...have the courage to announce that this ruling system is neither a republic nor Islamic and that nobody has the right to express opinion or criticism."

2055 GMT: The Rafsanjani Fightback. Remember the former President's delay in passing Mehdi Karroubi's 29 July letter asking for an investigation of abuse claims? Well, after yesterday's trial events, compare and contrast this news: Rafsanjani has passed the cases of two rape victims to the Supreme Leader, to Ayatollah Montazeri, and to Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq.

2000 GMT: Some members of Parliament are objecting to the composition of the special National Security Committee investigating post-election events such as abuse of detainees. Their concern is that three pro-Ahmadinejad members of the committee have already asserted in interviews that the prisoners are in good condition and that there has been no torture, rape, or secret burials.

1945 GMT: Fars News has now published (as has Parleman News) a full summary of the Supreme Leader's statement, initially given to a meeting of the Student Leaders of the Islamic Revolution. It contains the extracts we've noted below, within this context: Ayatollah Khamenei noted incidents such as raids on University dormitories and clashes in the Central Bazaar area soon after the election but put these within the context of the legitimacy in which 85 percent of the population participated.

1915 GMT: Reuters adds an important proviso on the Khamenei statement. Just because he is stepping away from the "velvet revolution" charge does not mean he is giving complete absolution to the demonstrators: "There is no doubt that this movement, whether its leaders know or not, was planned in advance."

The Reuters framing also indicates that the Supreme Leader may not have been rejecting the current trials but drawing a line against any more arrests of key opposition figures.

1900 GMT: Want Some More? How about a possible slap-down of the trials and detentions from the Supreme Leader? "We should not proceed in dealing with those behind the protests based on rumours and guesswork. The judiciary should only give rulings based on solid evidence, not on circumstantial evidence."

And let's add a warning that some of those involved in detentions and violence against protestors may face their own reckoning: "I appreciate the work of the police and Basij [militia] in dealing with the riots, but this does not mean that some of the crimes which occurred will not be dealt with and anyone who is a member of those two who committed a fault should be dealt with."

1845 GMT: An Important Signal? The Supreme Leader has finally emerged after yesterday's trial, and it looks like he may be putting some distance between himself and President Ahmadinejad. In a statement read on state TV, Ayatollah Khamenei declared:

I do not accuse the leaders of the recent incidents to be subordinate to the foreigners, like the United States and Britain, since this issue has not been proven for me. This plot was defeated, since fortunately our enemies still do not understand the issue in Iran. Our enemies were given a slap in face by the Iranian nation, but they are still hopeful and they are pursuing the issue.

It is one thing for the Supreme Leader to rebuff the President's attack on Hashemi Rafsanjani, but this appears to be a message to back off the campaign against the reformists.

1605 GMT: Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri has re-entered the political arena with an open letter: "For worldly gains, gentlemen have closed their eyes and ears and hearts on all facts. They should have courage and announce that this regime is neither Islamic nor Republic."

1555 GMT: A Crack in the Coverage. Press TV English's website, in contrast to the anti-reformist drumbeat of much of Iran's state media, has an extended feature on the refusal of defendant Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, the deputy head of the Islamic Iran Participant Front (see yesterday's updates, 1720 GMT) to confess after yesterday's trial: "As a reformist I have always held clear positions. I have always opposed all forms of illegal activities and my stance has not changed."

1545 GMT: More on the Rafsanjani Fightback. The response of Rafsanjani's office to the statements of former 1st Vice President Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai (see 1225 GMT) has not only called them pure fabrications but has stated, "Mashai and Ahmadinejad must defend their accusations in an honest and qualified court."

1535 GMT: Who Will Have Dinner with Mahmoud? Understandably, there has been much glee amongst opponents of the President at the news that only 20 of 290 MPs showed up at his "breaking of the fast" meal on Sunday. An EA correspondent sends in a more accurate and more important assessment:

Instead of lobbying the conservative faction as a whole over his Cabinet choices, Ahmadinejad has decided to enter into individual negotiations with MPs from economically challenged areas and remote provinces.

He has been trying to woo these MPs by inviting them for Eftar, the evening meal of Ramadan, at the Presidential residence. However, although the number of these parties have increased, most MPs have given Ahmadinejad the cold shoulder. Only 1/3 of the MPs from economically-challenged areas and remote provinces have broken bread with the president. One of the pro-Ahmadinejad MPs has declared that eight of the suggested ministers lack basic qualifications for attaining confidence votes.

1520 GMT: 24 hours after the latest post-election trial, Mehdi Karroubi has written to the new head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, to congratulate him and to express his hope, "considering the sensitive political and social conditions", that Larijani will ensure "the implementation of the Constitution, the legal defense of freedom and citizenship rights, and the maintenance legal justice to defend the dignity of the system".

1240 GMT: EA Public Service Announcement. Initially we were going to bring out a detailed analysis today of the Tehran trial and its impact, but we're watching carefully how certain groups and individuals, especially Hashemi Rafsanjani, manoeuvre. So the special analysis, "Iran Showdown: The Regime's Battle on Three Fronts", will be posted Thursday morning.

1225 GMT: And That's Not All. Rafsanjani, or those allied with him, have also struck back in a statement condemning recent remarks by the former First Vice President and Ahmadinejad ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

1210 GMT: Picking up on the Rafsanjani fightback against the charges in the Tehran trial, we should note that Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi Hashemi, did not merely proclaim his innocence. He also turned the allegations of corruption and mismanagement back against the President, claiming that Tehran had "lost" 340 billion tomans (almost $3.5 million) when Ahmadinejad was Mayor of the city.

1130 GMT: The offer of former President Mohammad Khatami has issued a statement criticising "confessions" in the Tehran trials, obtained under "extraordinary circumstances", as invalid and rejecting the specific charges that were made against him. (Reuters has an English-language summary.)

0815 GMT: The Disappearing American. The US media's coverage of the Tehran trial yesterday was poor, and reporters still have no clue about the significance of the testimony about the Rafsanjani family. Even so, there appears to be an extraordinary gap in their coverage.

When French national Clotilde Reiss appeared in an earlier trial, she was the focus of attention from "Western" press. However, when academic Kian Tajbakhsh, a dual Iran-US national, not only appeared as a defendant but testified yesterday, the American media seem to have been asleep. CNN refers to Tajbakhsh only in the context of Saeed Hajjarian's testimony (MSNBC does briefly mention Tajbaksh's statement). The New York Times leaves the academic out of their summary.

We hope to have a full analysis later of how the Iranian regime is using Tajbakhsh, as well as the Iranian defendants, to construct the "velvet revolution" that is supposedly threatening Tehran.

0805 GMT: Irony Alert. Less than 24 hours after Tuesday's trial, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, the former Minster of Intelligence and Iran's new Prosecutor General, has declared: "The performance of justice must start with the judiciary."

0800 GMT: Tuesday's Other Court Appearance. Hossein Karroubi, the son of Presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi, was summoned to court to answer charges about his involvement in post-election conflict. He later spoke with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: "They brought up several charges against me, including propaganda against the establishment, spreading prostitution, agitating public opinion, attempting to [assist] rioters, and so on. I responded that the country's youth had shed its blood in the streets, and young detainees in prison had been killed in the worst possible ways. We talked about what these things [mean] for the health of the [state]. They let me go after I paid bail."

Hossein Karorubi added that Monday's discussion between his father and members of Parliament over Mehdi Karroubi's allegations of abuse of detainees was "a very good meeting. Both the parliament members and Mr. Karroubi were satisfied....They first have to investigate the four cases, then Mr. Karroubi will present other cases."

0650 GMT: No to a Presidential Bright Idea. Ahmadinejad, in a move which I am sure is unconnected with current politics, proposed that working hours in governmental offices and banks be reduced during Ramadan by more than three hours each day. Speaker of Parliament Larijani squashed the ploy, however, declaring that the proposal was "against the constitution".

0640 GMT: More on the Secret Burials of Protestors. In this video interview with BBC Persian, Hanif Mazroui, the editor-in-chief of Norooz Online, has offered additional evidence of how government officials forced the staff of Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery to inter 40 bodies of slain demonstrators in mid-July.

Yesterday the managing director of the cemetery was fired by the Government, but Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has ordered that a group of MPs investigate the allegations.

0630 GMT: The next public stage in the battle? It could be this Friday's prayers in Tehran.

The big event will not be the prayer address, led by Hojatoleslam Sadighi. Instead, it will be the introduction to prayers by President Ahmadinejad. No doubt there will be politics behind (and perhaps in front of) religion, with the President following up on the attacks of the trial and making the case for his Cabinet 48 hours before Parliament begins voting on his Ministerial nominations.

But, further down the religious and political roads, the Friday prayer service to watch will be on the last Friday of Ramadan, which I think will be 18 Spetember. On Qods Day, the prayer leader will be Hashemi Rafsanjani.

0625 GMT: It seems so long ago, but it was only last Saturday that Hashemi Rafsanjani's statement to the Expediency Council prompted feverish speculation on whether he was giving in to the regime, with his call for unity behind the Supreme Leader, or setting up his next manoeuvre. To help clarify matters --- and read into that whatever you wish --- Rafsanjani's website has put up the audio of the former President's statement.

600 GMT: We should get a sense today of the effectiveness of the regime's dramatic move yesterday, using the Tehran trial not only as an all-out assault on the reformist movement but against the challenge of Hashemi Rafsanjani. We're working on a full analysis for later today. (Here are a couple of teasers: did the Supreme Leader support the assault? And how will the conservatives and principlists, with a majority inside Parliament and powerful figures outside it, react given their recent disquiet with President Ahmadinejad's approach on detentions?)

Meanwhile, another clue from the trial pointing to Rafsanjani as a primary target for Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard. The journalist Mohammad Atrianfar, a key figure in the Kargozaran party linked to Rafsanjani, was brought out again --- he had "confessed" on national television after the first trial --- to attack the former President's June letter to the Supreme Leader that raised concerns about manipulation of the election. The "criticism was inappropriate" and "not suitable for national publication".

The Latest from Iran (24 August): The 4-D Chess Match

NEW Israel Shock Announcement: Saudis Go Nuclear…All Tehran’s Fault
NEW Welcome to the Irony: Iran's Parliament Passes Bill to Defend Human Rights
The Latest from Iran (23 August): An Anti-Ahmadinejad Bloc?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis



2110 GMT: In addition to providing the first set of his evidence of detainee abuse to Parliament, Mehdi Karroubi has responded to criticism from a conservative MP, Ahmad Tavakoli, that the revelations were against Karroubi's revolutionary background and would have bad consequences. Karroubi said that it was not right to sacrifice "our religion, dignity and bravery for the benefit of ourselves" and that the regime's is to no one's benefits.

2100 GMT: Returning to the comments of former 1st Vice President Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai (see 1315 GMT), more to raise a smile than to offer any analysis. Rahim-Mashai said that the election had demonstrated President Ahmadinejad's historic and extraordinary popularity in the world, a popularity unique before and after the Islamic Revolution. He added that, had it not been for the “challenges” that the Ahmadinejad Administration created in the world, Iran would not be as successful as it is today. (Press TV has a summary in English.)

1945 GMT: The Los Angeles Times blog "Babylon & Beyond" has summarised the first testimony of detainee abuse produced by Mehdi Karroui (see 1535 and 1930 GMT):

Iranian officials interviewed an alleged victim of jailhouse rape at the hands of security personnel. But instead of consoling him, they asked him embarrassing questions and blamed him for the violence.

They said it was the young man's own fault for protesting the results of Iran's June 12 presidential elections, according to a fresh account of the alleged rape published on the website of a prominent reformist politician.

"I asked them why I and others were raped in prison," the young man says he asked two interrogators and a judge who had agreed to hear his story....

One of the three replied, "'When the supreme leader confirmed the election result, everyone should have recognized it."

1940 GMT: For What It's Worth. Press TV, citing Ayandeh newspaper, reports that the managing director of the Behehst-e-Zahra cemetery has denied the secret burial of post-election casualties. Norooz claimed earlier this week, from information provided by a cemetery employee, that security forces had forced staff to inter 40 bodies.

1930 GMT: Tabnak reports that Kazam Jalali of the Parliament National Security Committee has met with Mehdi Karroubi to discuss Karroubi's initial presentation of evidence on the sexual abuse of detainees (see 1535 GMT). The Los Angeles Times offers an English summary quoting Jalali, “Karoubi agreed to introduce four persons, who have met him personally and claimed that they were tortured and raped in prison, to Parliament. Karoubi told us these four persons are ready to provide their testimonies that they were sexually abused, but they do not feel secure.”

1600 GMT: Cyber-Wars. We will probably run a feature tomorrow, but it appears that the Iranian authorities are doing serious damage to the communications and presence of the Green opposition and reformists.

One key site of Mir Housein Mousavi's campaign, Ghalam News, was hacked out of existence last month ("Service Unavailable"). It is reported that another, Kalameh Sabz, has been down for more than 10 days. The closure of Etemade Melli newspaper has been followed by the disappearance of its website ("Under Construction"); Seda-ye Edalat fell at the end of July. (The website of the Etemade Melli political party is still up and a key source for information.)

1535 GMT: The Evidence Emerges. Mehdi Karroubi has released the first testimony from an abused detainee from Saham News via his party's website, Etemade Melli, and promised that this is only "a corner of the documentation".

1525 GMT: Press TV features the story that head of judiciary Sadegh Larijani has appointed the former Minister of Intelligence, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, as Iran's Prosecutor General, as well as naming Ayatollah Ahmad Mohseni-Gorgani as the head of the Supreme Court.

Nothing surprising there --- we reported Mohseni-Ejeie's appointment many days ago. What is significant is that Press TV is obviously repeating the news to give the President a poke in the eye. On no less than four occasions in a short article (three times in the text; once in the caption), the website stresses, "The appointment comes as earlier last month President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sacked his intelligence minister Mohseni-Ejei after he objected to the president's first deputy pick."

1450 GMT: Rumours have been flying for the last 36 hours that one of the defendants in tomorrow's fourth Tehran trial of post-election detainees will be prominent politician Saeed Hajjarian. That has now expanded to the claim that Hajarian and reformist political heavyweights , Mohsen Aminzadeh, Mostafa Tajzadeh, and Mohsen Mirdamadi will be making "confessions" on television on Tuesday night.

1400 GMT: Journalist Mahsa Amirabadi has been released after more than two months in detention. Her husband Masoud Bastani is still in Evin Prison.

1315 GMT: Slow politics day so far, but one story has been developing. The former First Vice President and current (but suspended for legal reasons) Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, has given an extended interview to Islamic Republic News Agency, declaring that the Presidential election was a "referendum" on the Government.

Rahim-Mashai's lengthy version of how the election developed, however, is important for another reason. He asserts that Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to use events to curb the authority of the Supreme Leader. In the context of current events, this may be seen as a clear signal that the Ahmadinejad camp is trying to prevent any rapprochement between Ayatollah Khamenei and the former President, or as we frame it, an anti-Ahmadinejad compromise.

0915 GMT: A Green Media and Organisation. Seyed Mohammad Maraashi, writing on the website of the Mir Hossein Mousavi campaign, declares:

The continuation of this movement is tied to the creation of a cohesive organization with its own definite means of communication. The establishment of a closely knit organization depends primarily on setting up a newspaper or a television and radio network. That will allow the movement’s supporters to receive the news from trustworthy sources. This initiative will also prevent the irresponsible distribution of rumors....

But the creation of an official newspaper, radio or television network is only one of the considerable tasks of the movement. Another momentous task is the establishment of an organization. Every organization must focus on a particular objective, and this objective can be realized if we devise and preserve this organization’s structure through constant education and activity....

We should not forget that the current condition is the condition of a coup d’état, and we should be prepared to go to jail, or even to die, for our political activities.

0700 GMT: Watching Hashemi. Maryam at Keeping the Change offers a challenging evaluation of Rafsanjani's role and strategy, set in the context of his 30 years at the forefront of Iranian politics and his 17 July address at Friday prayers in Tehran:

In the first half of his speech, Rafsanjani emphasized the importance of unity to resolving the post-election crisis, a theme he discussed primarily through citations to the Quran....Rafsanjani's [Saturday] comments to the Expediency Council reinforce this view.... [It was] another...example of Rafsanjani's desire to strike a middle ground, though one which superficially favored the Establishment in the short term.

It's a persuasive argument as far as it goes, but it leaves an important question. Is it possible to find unity in the current crisis?

0545 GMT: Late last night, after a day trying to interpret where exactly Hashemi Rafsanjani stood in the post-election conflict between and amidst the President, the Supreme Leader, conservative and principlist groups, and the Green opposition, one reader wrote, "This really is the most incredible four-dimensional chess game."

In a new day in that game, the players are on a break. However, there is one move, from a high-ranking reformist member of Parliament: "The First Vice-Speaker of Iran's Parliament, Mohammad-Hassan Aboutorabi-Fard, told reporters on Sunday that it was 'likely' that the Parliament (Majlis) would reject about five of the introduced nominees."

Aboutourabi-Fard made the same statement last week, as did Mohammad-Reza Bahonar, the second Vice-Speaker. The question, of course, is whether other MPs share their scepticism.

The Latest from Iran (20 August): Grinding to a Halt

The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1810 GMT: Recognise Us Because We're Really Nice. There have been signs this week that the Ahmadinejad Government would be more flexible in its position on the nuclear programme, and today this came from the Associated Press, via unnamed diplomats:

Iran has lifted a ban and allowed UN inspectors to visit a nearly-completed nuclear reactor. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency visited the reactor in Arak after a year-long ban...Iran agreed last week to expand uranium enrichment monitoring of the site.

1735 GMT: Ahmadinejad and the IRGC Factor. As we wait for the fallout from the President's televised speech on his Cabinet selections, here's how American anlaysts get it right. And wrong.

The appointment of Ahmad Vahidi as Minister of Defense has been noticed because he was commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps in the late 1980s/early 1990s. So, it is said, Vahidi's appointment indicates a consolidation of the relationship between the President and the IRGC in the face of opposition not only from "reformists" but from "conservative" and "principlist" elements.

Right.

And, the analysts continue, this indicates that Ahmadinejad plans to continue and maybe accelerate Iran's material support for pro-Iranian parties and militias in the Middle East.

Wrong.

This, of course, may be a consequence over time of Vahidi's appointment but to assert --- without any evidence --- that the external dimension is more important than the President's manoeuvres in an internal crisis smacks of a view that revolves around Washington, rather than Tehran.

1725 GMT: Worst. Claim. Ever: It's All Hillary's Fault. Iran's police chief of police Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam has said that the "confessions" of political detainees must be authentic because their mastermind, Hillary Clinton, has openly revealed their plans: "Some say that the police has extracted confessions by force, but I tell them: No-one has extracted confession out of Mrs. Clinton, yet she reveals all issues freely."

While Ahmadi-Moqaddam's statement should be called out as a crass cover-up of the state's treatment of prisoners, it does point to the lack of wisdom in Clinton's posturing --- motivated primarily to counter domestic charges that the Administration had stood back from post-election events --- when she told CNN earlier this month that the US Government did much "behind the scenes" for Iranian protesters.

1450 GMT: Reuters has now picked up on the problems for Ahmadinejad's Ministerial appointments in Parliament, adding this quote from Speaker Ali Larijani on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting: "Those nominated by the president for government posts must have sufficient expertise and experience, otherwise a great deal of the country's energy would be wasted."

1410 GMT: Creating Some Political Space? Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, speaking to the Islamic Society of Engineers, has declared that the primary duty of Government is "justice so human beings may perfect themselves" and that it was essential for people to have "economic, cultural, and political mobility".

1340 GMT: Tonight's the Night. After the stop-start process of naming his Cabinet, President Ahmadinejad takes to the national airwaves in a broadcast just after the 9 p.m. news. He may do so with a bit of nervousness: protestors are planning to drown out the President with "Allahu Akhbars", and Ahmadinejad's previous broadcast didn't go so well. Remember his defeat at the hands of the Giant Moth? (If you missed it, here's the video.)

1150 GMT: Another Shot at Ahmadinejad. Jomhoori Eslami reports that an Iranian court has temporarily suspended former First Vice President and current Presdential Chief of Staff Esfandiari Rahim-Mashai for two months because of charges of financial misconduct.

1140 GMT: The Fight Begins? The Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, has warned that at leave five of President Ahmadinejad's choices for Ministers may not receive votes of confidence. Reuters has English-language summary of report.

1100 GMT: No Newspaper is Safe. Even the hard-line "conservative" Kayhan could be banned from newsstands. According to the Iranian Labor News Agency, the same court that banned Etemade Melli has ordered Saeed Mortazavi, the Tehran Prosecutor General, to halt the publication of Kayhan, because of the failure of its editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, to answer two court summons. Shariatmadari was taken to court by Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief advisor Alireza Beheshti and others over the "publication of repeated lies" against the candidate.

0720 GMT: The English-language version of the Iran Parliament website has just released the names of the 18 ministers whom it says were submitted by President Ahmadinejad to the Parliament "on Wednesday". There are no surprises amongst the names, which we revealed in yesterday's updates.

0620 GMT: Reading Another Change. We reported yesterday that the new head of Iran's judiciary, Saeed Larijani, had given a clear thumb-in-the-eye to the President with the appointment of Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, the Minister of Intelligence fired by Ahmadinejad, as Iran's Prosecutor General.

Larijani is also replacing Tehran's chief prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi, with Morteza Bakhtiari, the former head of Iran's prison service and former Governor of Isfahan. The timing is a bit curious, since Mortazavi was seen as the legal force behind the prosecution of post-election political detainees, and we are in the middle of the Tehran trials.

So is Larijani asserting his authority against the President? Or is the simple explanatio n that Mortazavi is moving to a post in Ahmadinejad's executive? And will there be an impact, short-term or long-term, on detentions and prosecutions?

0540 GMT: Meanwhile, a foreign-policy breakthrough for the President and his Government received surprisingly little attention. Syrian President Bashir al-Assad was in Tehran for a chat.

The cover story was that Assad came to Iran to broker the release of French national Clotilde Reiss, arrested and still awaiting trial on bail. Iranian state media preferred the image of election legitimacy, quoting Assad's greeting to Ahmadinejad, “I’ve come here today to personally convey my warm congratulations to you and the Iranian nation. I believe what happened in Iran was an important development and a great lesson to foreigners."

The overriding significance, however, is in the Associated Press headline, "Iran’s supreme leader reinforces Syria alliance." Ahmadinejad, who has been ostracised internationally since his trip to Moscow just after the election, will get a symbolic boost; however, it is unclear whether Assad was reinforcing the alliance or holding it in suspension. Before 12 June, it appeared that the Tehran-Damascus relationship was an important influence on questions from the Israel-Palestine dynamic (and the in-fighting within the Palestinian leadership), the situation in Lebanon, and the wider state of play (political and economic) between Iran and Arab States. How much of it that continues while Ahmadinejad's real rather than symbolic legitimacy is still doubted?

0500 GMT: We took a break last night to recharge our batteries and return this morning not to news but to two non-events.

The first non-event was President Ahmadinejad's to formally submit his Ministerial nominations to Parliament by yesterday's deadline. In the morning, all appeared to be almost complete: Mehr News was reporting three names remained to be confirmed, and then Tabnak said only one, the Minister of Justice. At 1:22 p.m. local time, a few hours before the deadline, the English-language site of the Parliament recapped the news.

And then nothing. There was a clue that all was not well when the President's Wednesday night national broadcast was postponed for 24 hours but, otherwise, updates stopped as the deadline came and went. (Press TV's website is still stuck on its Wednesday morning headline, "More Ahmadinejad cabinet nominees revealed".) Then, just after 10 p.m., the Farsi-language version of the Parliament website reported simply, "The letter of the President still has not come."

No one is offering the reason for the delay, but the obvious speculation is that some of the names in the list leaked by the media were unacceptable to members of Parliament. And so we enter today, ready to analyse but with no way forward yet on the questions: will Ahmadinejad make concessions and change some of his selections? Will there be any punishment for his failure to meet the deadline? Will any high-ranking "conservative" or "principlist" MPs come out publicly against the President?

However, it is the other non-event, largely missed by media, which is occupying us this morning. Yesterday the Executive Committee of the Assembly of Experts postponed the next meeting of the Assembly, which was due in about 10-12 days. Our question from yesterday's update, "Who pushed for the delay?", is still unanswered. To get an idea of the stakes involved in this answer, consider the make-up of the Executive Committee: Hashemi Rafsanjani aligned against Ahmadinejead supporters Hashemi Shahroudi (former Head of Judiciary), Mohammad Yazdi (Rafsanjani's foe within the Assembly), Ghorban Ali Dorri Najafabadi (Prosecutor General), and Ahmad Khatami (the hard-line temporary leader of Friday prayers in Tehran).

An EA correspondent offers this assessment, leading to an important but so far overlooked point:

The excuse that the Assembly meeting was delayed because of Ramadan [which starts on Saturday] appears as exactly that, an excuse and nothing more. Parliament will debate and possibly block Ahmadinejad's ministerial nominees well into Ramadan, Government will carry on business, and I am sure the trials will not go into recess for a month.

So what seems to be the case here is someone simply unwilling to have the session happen so soon. The latest letters sent by the former MPs and the Qom ulama [clerics] might have precipitated the case. They either blew the lid off Rafsanjani's machinations or persuaded the Supreme Leader to force a postponement in order to work on the Assembly members and make sure they don't spell trouble for him. At any rate, it just adds to all the shocks that have hit the orderly functioning of state institutions after June 12.

Amidst all the demonstrations, the detentions and trials, and the political machinations, the Iranian Government is effectively suspended. And the longer that situation persists, the more the question emerges: when is there a breaking point, not of showdown in the streets or in the Parliament, but in day-to-day life?